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IDENTITY — WOUND AND PRIDE
This paper is an initial contribution to an area of research I am currently embarking on: the role of discourse in processes of ‘transition’ (ie from socialism to capitalism and western forms of democratic government) in central and eastern Europe (henceforth ‘CEE’). My particular focus here will be on attempts in CEE, and specifically Romania, to construct a ‘knowledge-based economy’ (KBE) and ‘information society’ (IS). I shall begin with a brief sketch of the version of Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA) which I am currently working with. I shall then discuss discourse as an element in processes of ‘transition’, and the construction of ‘objects of research’ from research topics such as ‘transition’, KBE and IS. The final part of the paper will look in particular at the recontextualization of discourses of the KBE and IS, especially the later, in Romania. I shall analyse a specific Romanian government policy text, the ‘National Strategy for the promotion of the New Economy and the implementation of the Information Society’ (2002).

Critical Discourse Analysis

I shall pick out some of the main features of the version of CDA I now work with (Fairclough 2003, 2000a, 2000b, Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999, Fairclough, Jessop & Sayer 2004), listing them for the sake of brevity:

1. Discourse is an element of all social processes, events and practices, though they are not simply discourse (Fairclough 1992).
2. The relationship between abstract social structures and concrete social events is mediated by social practices, relatively stabilized forms of social activity (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999).
3. Each of these levels has a linguistic/semiotic element: languages (social structures), orders of discourse (social practices), texts broadly understood (social events) (Fairclough, Jessop & Sayer 2004).
4. Social practices and events are constituted as articulations of dialectically related elements including discourse. These are different (and
they cannot for instance all be reduced to discourse as some versions of discourse theory claim), but not discrete: discourse internalizes and is internalized in other elements (Harvey 1996, Fairclough 2003). For instance, in researching any social organization one is faced with its partly discursive character, including its constitution as an operationalization (putting into practice, ‘translating’ into its non-discursive as well as discursive facets) of particular discourses. But this does not mean that the organization is nothing but discourse, or that it can be researched exclusively through discourse analysis — which would be highly reductive.

5. Discourse figures in three main ways in social practices: discourses (ways of representing, e.g. political discourses), genres (ways of (inter)acting, e.g. lecturing, interviewing), styles (ways of being — identities, e.g. styles of management) (Fairclough 2000a, 2000b).

6. Social practices are articulated into networks which constitute social fields, institutions, and organisations. Orders of discourse are more exactly the linguistic/semiotic facet of such networks (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999).

7. An order of discourse is a social structuring of linguistic/semiotic difference, which is constituted as a relatively stable articulation of discourses, genres and styles (Fairclough 2003). For instance, the political order of discourse, associated with the political field as an articulation of social practices, is constituted in a particular time and place as an articulation of (conservative, liberal, social-democratic etc) discourses, of genres such as political debate, speech, and interview, and of styles including different styles of political leadership.

8. Social change includes change in social structures, social practices and social events.

9. Change in social practices affects how elements are articulated together in practices, how practices are articulated together in networks, and how discourses, genres and styles are articulated together in orders of discourse (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999). Thus the relatively recent development of ‘mediatized politics’ is a re-articulation of the relationship between the fields of politics and media, their re-constitution as a network, which includes a transformation of the political order of discourse, its genres (e.g. the forms of political interview), discourses (e.g. the translation of political discourses into popularized, more ‘conversational’, forms), and styles (political leaders adopt to a degree the ‘show business’ styles of entertainers).
10. Social change in countries, organisations etc is often initiated with new discourses. This operates through a dissemination across structural and scalar boundaries which ‘recontextualizes’ new discourses. These may be enacted as new ways of (inter)acting including genres, inculcated as new ways of being including styles, as well as materialized in e.g. new ways of structuring space. Thus liberal and neo-liberal discourses have been recontextualized in ‘transitional’ countries in CEE, and to varying degrees enacted in new ways of (inter)acting (e.g. in government, including government addressing and interacting with citizens as consumers), inculcated in new ways of being (e.g. people adopting the lifestyles and identities of consumers), and materialized in such new constructions of space as the ‘shopping mall’.

11. ‘May’ is important: there are discursive as well as non-discursive conditions of possibility for discourses having constitutive effects on other elements of the social — the fact that discourses ‘construe’ the world in particular ways does not necessarily mean that they (re-)construct it in those ways (Fairclough, Jessop & Sayer 2004). Social fields, institutions and organizations are ‘intransitive’ realities which have properties which make them more or less amenable or resistant to particular directions of change.

12. CDA claims that analysis of social processes and change is productively carried down into detailed textual analysis. More detailed (including linguistic) analysis of texts is connected to broader social analysis by way of interdiscursive analysis of shifting articulations of genres, discourses, styles in texts (Fairclough 2003).

13. As a form of critical social science CDA analyses social life in its discursive aspects from a normative perspective, ie on the basis of a commitment to a set of values of social justice, social equality, democracy — though there are difference in how such values are understood and interpreted.

**Discourse as an element of processes of ‘transition’**

The importance of language and discourse in processes of ‘transition’ in CEE and elsewhere is quite widely recognized in social research (for instance in Miroiu 1999, and in the conception of influential neo-liberal models of transition as ‘discourses’ in e.g. Bourdieu & Wacquant 2001). But social research has so far produced only a limited understanding of how discourse figures in processes of ‘transition’. This is partly a theoretical problem: the theories of discourse which tend to be drawn upon are relatively underdeveloped, and do
not constitute an adequate basis for providing full and nuanced accounts of how discourse interacts with other non-discursive facets of processes of ‘transition’. It is also a problem of data and analytical method: acknowledgement of the importance of discourse in general and abstract statements about discourse in ‘transition’ or more generally in social change have not generally been translated into detailed analysis texts or talk, so there is little concrete knowledge of how they figure in the unfolding of events or change and continuity of practices in specific types of situation, organization, locality etc. Having said that, forms of textual analysis have already been used in Romanian research on ‘transition’, e.g. on media (e.g. Miroiu 1999, Beciu 2000, Coman 2003), but CDA’s particular mix of interdiscursive and linguistic analysis is I think a more powerful analytical resource for addressing these issues than those I have seen used (Preoteasa 2002 is one case where CDA has been used). I see critical discourse analysis as a resource for producing richer understanding and analysis of the relationship between discourse and other non-discursive facets of social processes and social change, and of the effects of discourse on wider processes of social change, through a ‘transdisciplinary’ dialogue with other theories and disciplines. Transdisciplinary research is a form of interdisciplinary research which sees ‘internal’ development of a theory or discipline (of their theoretical categories and concepts and methods of research) as emerging out of dialogue with others (Fairclough 2003).

**Theorising ‘transition’**

I see methodology as the process through which, beginning with a topic of research such as in this case ‘transition’, and more particularly ‘knowledge-based economy’ and ‘information society’ as objectives within ‘transition’, one constructs ‘objects of research’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992). The choice of appropriate methods (data selection, collection and analysis) depends upon the object of research.

One should not assume that the research topic is transparent in yielding up coherent objects of research, or that the way people in the domain identify issues and problems transparently yields objects of research. In this case, it is widely perceived that neither ‘transition’ nor ‘information society’ nor ‘knowledge-based economy’ are concepts, representations of actual or projected realities, that can be taken at face value (see, for instance, Pickles & Smith 1998, Stark & Bruszt 1998, Jessop 2004, Garnham 2001, Godin 2003). They are themselves elements of discourses which are associated with particular strategies for change, and therefore with particular interested representations
and imaginaries of change, whose epistemological and practical value may be difficult to unravel from their rhetorical value (and perhaps their ideological value). For instance, ‘transition’ construes change in CEE and elsewhere as a passage from a well-defined point of departure to a unitary and well-defined destination, which seems difficult to reconcile with the complexity and diversity of the processes which are actually taking place. Stark & Bruszt (1998) reject ‘transition’ for such reasons in favour of ‘transformation’.

The process of constructing ‘objects of research’ from research topics involves selecting theoretical frameworks, perspectives and categories to bring to bear on the research topic. It is only on the basis of such theorization of the research topic and the delineation of ‘objects of research’ that one can settle upon appropriate methods of data selection, collection and analysis. Clearly, a critical discourse analyst will approach research topics with a theoretical predilection to highlight semiosis, but since this is inevitably a matter of initially establishing relations between semiosis and other elements, the theorisation of the research topic should be conceived of as an interdisciplinary (more specifically, transdisciplinary in the sense I have given to that term) process, involving a combination of disciplines and theories including CDA. In certain cases, this would be the work of a research team, in others (such as the present paper) it may be a matter of a critical discourse analyst drawing upon literature from other disciplines and theories (though in this case I have also collaborated with the main theorist in ‘cultural political economy’ (see below) I draw upon, i.e. Jessop). Needless to say, one has to be selective, i.e. to make judgments about which ‘mix’ of available resources yields the most fruitful theorisation of the research topic including the most fruitful perspective on relations between semiosis and non-semiotic elements.

I shall approach the ‘information society’ and ‘knowledge based economy’ as topics of research by way of recent developments in political economy (Pickles & Smith 1998, Jessop 2002, 2004, Stark & Bruszt 1998, Ray & Sayer 1999, Sayer 1995). In particular, I shall follow Jessop (2004) in viewing them as strategies for achieving and stabilising a new ‘fix’ between a regime of capital accumulation and a regime of political regulation in the aftermath of the demise of the ‘fix’ commonly referred to as ‘Fordism’. This formulation derives from ‘regulation theory’, which has a political-economic rather than a narrowly and purely economic perspective on economic change, arguing that an economic order (‘regime of capital accumulation’) is dependent upon a political order (a ‘mode of regulation’) which can produce and sustain the preconditions for its durable operation. The more general claim is that there are non-economic (including, as we shall see, social and cultural as well as political) preconditions for the establishment and reproduction of economies. The
dominant international political-economic order since the demise of Fordism has been widely identified as ‘post-Fordist’, which is indicative of the uncertainty of what follows, or should follow, Fordism. The significance of the ‘knowledge-based economy’ (this is Jessop’s focus, though the same could be said for the ‘information society’, and for the frequent conjunction of the two, which is characteristic of the material I shall look at) is that it seems to be emerging as a strategy for change which can effectively be operationalized in real change.

They are strategies but, like any strategy, also discourses, particular ways of representing, or rather imagining (because they are certainly as much predictive as descriptive) a new political-economic order. And they are discourses of a particular kind, what we might call ‘nodal’ discourses, in the sense that they are discourses which subsume and articulate in a particular way a great many other discourses — technical discourses (e.g. discourses of ICT), the discourse of ‘intellectual property’, discourses of governance and government (e.g. ‘e-government’), discourses of ‘social exclusion’ and ‘social inclusion’, and so forth. As discourses, they constitute selective representations, ‘simplifications’ (Jessop 2002), ‘condensations’ (Harvey 1996) of highly complex economic, political, social and cultural realities, which include certain aspects of these realities and exclude others, highlight certain aspects and background others. Not any discourse would work as a strategic nodal discourse for imagining and potentially operationalizing, actualizing, a new political-economic fix. A discourse can only work in so far as it achieves a high level of adequacy with respect to the realities it selectively represents, simplifies, condenses — in so far as it is capable (as these seem capable) of being used to represent/imagine realities at different levels of abstraction, in different areas of social life (economy, government, education, health, regional and social disparities etc), on different scales (international, macro-regional (e.g. EU), national, local). It is only if it is a plausible imaginary that it will attract investments of time and money to prepare for the imaginary future it projects, material factors which are crucial to making imaginaries into realities (Cameron & Palan 2004). In this sense, ‘the knowledge-based economy’ and the ‘information society’ have a partially discursive and partially material character. They are discourses, but not just discourses, they are discourses which are materially grounded and materially promoted. The theoretical framework we need to conceptualize this needs to be not just a political economy (rather than a narrow economics), but what Jessop calls a ‘cultural political economy’, a political economy which, amongst other things, incorporates a theory of discourse and of the dialectics of discourse, of how discursive construals of the world can come to construct and reconstruct the world, without losing sight
of the material reality of the world, or the conditions which the material reality of the world sets (as I have briefly indicated) on the discursive (re)construction of the world.

This strategic perspective provides a basis for formulating objects of research for this aspect of ‘transition’ as a topic of research, and the ‘cultural’ orientation of the approach to political economy means that objects of research can be formulated to include or highlight questions of semiosis. Objects of research might include the emergence and constitution, hegemony, dissemination and recontextualization, and operationalization of the strategies of the ‘knowledge-based economy’, and the ‘information society’. These objects of research might be formulated specifically as objects for CDA research projects in the following ways:

- The emergence of the discourses of the ‘knowledge-based economy’ and the ‘information society’ as nodal discourses in association with the emergence of strategies, their constitution through the articulation of relationships between other discourses, including discourses ‘available’ within existing or prior nodal discourses.\(^1\)
- Relations of contestation between discourses within the framework of relations of contestation between strategies, and the emerging hegemony of these nodal discourses.\(^2\)
- The dissemination of the discourses of ‘the knowledge-based economy’ and the ‘information society’ across structures (e.g. between economic markets, governments, public and social services such as education and health) and scales (between ‘global’ or international, macro-regional (e.g. EU or NAFTA), national, and local scales of social life), their recontextualization in new social fields, institutions, organizations, countries, localities.
- The shift of these nodal discourses from ‘construals’ to ‘constructions’ (Sayer 1995), from being just representations and imaginaries to having transformative effects on social reality, being operationalized — enacted as new ways of (inter)acting, inculcated in new ways of being (identities), materialized in new instruments and techniques of production or ways of organizing space.

These different research objects call for different methods in terms of data selection, collection and analysis. Researching the emergence and constitution of these discourses requires a genealogical approach which locates these discourses within the field of prior of discourses and entails collection of historical series of texts and selection of key texts within these series, analysis of the constitution of these discourses through articulation of elements within the field of prior discourses, and specification of the relations of artic-
ulation between the diverse discourses which are drawn together within these nodal discourses. Researching the emergent hegemony of these discourses entails locating these discourses in their relations of contestation with other potentially nodal discourses, which involves for instance focusing on dialogical relations between and within texts in key institutions such as the OECD (Godin 2003). Researching dissemination and recontextualization entails comparing texts in different social fields and at different social scales (e.g. in different societies or localities), and analyzing for instance how, when these discourses are recontextualized, they are articulated with discourses which already exist within these new contexts. Research operationalization calls for ethnographical methods in the collection of data, in that it is only by accessing insider perspectives in particular localities, companies etc that one can assess how discourses are materialized, enacted and inculcated. I shall be discussing only aspects of (the dissemination and) recontextualization of these nodal discourses.

The predominant form of critique associated with CDA and critical social research more generally has been ideology critique. But we can distinguish three forms of critique which are relevant to CDA: ideological, rhetorical, and strategic critique (Fairclough forthcoming). Whereas ideological critique focuses on the effects of semiosis on social relations of power, and rhetorical critique on persuasion (including ‘manipulation’) in individual texts or talk, what we might call ‘strategic critique’ focuses on how semiosis figures within the strategies pursued by groups of social agents to change societies in particular directions. The research objects I have distinguished (emergence, hegemony, recontextualization, and operationalization) can be seen as objects associated with strategic critique. One might see strategic critique as assuming a certain primacy in periods of major social change and restructuring such as the one we are going through now. This is not to suggest at all that ideological and rhetoric critique cease to be relevant, it is more a matter of their relative salience within the critical analysis.

The Pickles & Smith (1998) collection on the political economy of ‘transition’, adopts a regulation approach in combination with theories of governance and elements of cultural theory, raising five central issues. A summary of them will fill out the sketch I have given with respect to ‘transition’ in more general terms.

1. The regulation of political economies in transition. Drawing upon regulation theory, there is a focus on attempts to achieve, and difficulties and failures in achieving, viable coupling between forms of capital accumulation and mechanisms of regulating them.
2. The path-dependent and evolutionary character of political economic transformation, the effect of ‘legacies’, how future developments ‘arise out of the particular trajectories or paths that have been taken in the past’.

3. The dependence of political economic development on transformations in social networks, on new forms of connectivity between social and economic agents.

4. Geographies of transition and the re-scaling of power. Rather than assuming that transitional processes simply follow diverse ‘national roads’, exploring both sub-national regional differences and transnational processes.

5. The significance of local struggles grounded in concrete issues for processes of democratization and change in political subjects.

‘Re-scaling’ alludes to the category of ‘scales’, different levels of social process, organisation, structure and strategy — ‘global’, international and macro-regional (e.g. the EU and candidate countries), national, micro-regional, and local. One aspect of transition is ‘re-scaling’, the emergence of new scales, and the re-organisation of relations between scales (Jessop 2002). The issue of ‘globalisation’ is significant here, as is what has been referred to as ‘glocalisation’ (Robertson 1992), a re-scaling which sets up new relations between the local and the global in ways which can to some degree bypass the national. Ethnographic and other studies of crisis and change in specific localities (Burawoy 2000, Burawoy & Verdery 1999, Anástasoaie 2003) have shown how ‘global’ resources are marshalled by local strategists in struggles over for instance environmental issues, or attempts to re-position economically depressed cities within global urban networks (Pickles 1998). These ‘global’ resources include discourses — for instance, the discourses of internationally organised environmental groups.

On the basis of this literature, one can say the following about ‘transition’:

1. There is not one form of capitalism, but many forms. The market is only one regulatory mechanism within contemporary forms of capitalism, which combines in various ways with others, hierarchies (states) and networks (Pickles & Smith 1998, Jessop 2002, Stark & Bruszt 1998, Sayer 1995).

2. The particular trajectories of ‘transition’ vary in different countries but also within different countries, depending on legacies, including how the process of extrication from communism took place. The forms of capitalism which develop are consequently also variable. (Przeworski 1992, Pickles & Smith 1998, Dăianu 2000)

4. Research on transition in a particular country should be sensitive to (a) variation both between and within social fields — economy, government, politics, media etc (b) hybridity (including mixtures of old and new) in particular fields, institutions, practices etc

5. Transition has semiotic as well as non-semiotic elements. Consequently variation and hybridity will be in part semiotic variation and hybridity (see for instance Miroiu 1999 on variation and hybridity in post-1989 Romanian political discourses) — in the way social life is represented, narrated, imagined (therefore in discourses), in semiotic aspects of forms of action and interaction (therefore in genres), in semiotic aspects of the identities of social actors (therefore in styles).

Recontextualization of the ‘knowledge-based economy’ and ‘information society’ in Romanian policy texts

The dissemination and recontextualization of the strategies and discourses of the ‘knowledge-based economy’ and ‘information society’ in CEE is closely connected to the process of EU enlargement. The Lisbon Council of the EU in 2000 adopted these strategies as part of the ‘e-Europe’ initiative. The EU’s ‘strategic goal’ is to ‘become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’. The ‘e-Europe 2002 Action Plan’ was agreed at Feira in 2000, and the candidate countries for EU membership in CEE were associated with the EU’s strategic goal in adopting the ‘e-Europe+ Action Plan’ in 2001, one reason for which was said to be avoiding a ‘digital divide’ within the EU. According to the Romanian government’s ‘National Strategy for the promotion of the New Economy and the implementation of the Information Society’ (2002) (see Appendix), it was made clear at a conference of ministers of the candidate countries and representatives of the EU in Warsaw (May 2000) that ‘the e-Europe initiative will become a basic element of the process of integration’.

The ‘e-Europe+ Action Plan’ agreed by the candidate countries was explicitly modelled upon the EU’s ‘e-Europe 2002 Action Plan’, and much of the Romanian government’s ‘National Strategy’ document is modelled upon them. The document is partly an ‘action plan’, but it is also partly a strategy document comparable to an extent with the Lisbon Summit Declaration. The nodal discourse in the Lisbon Declaration is ‘the knowledge-based economy’, whereas the nodal discourse in the Romanian document is ‘the information
society’ (the discourse of ‘the new economy’ could be seen as a secondary nodal discourse). There seems to be no clear and stable relation between the two nodal discourses within the ‘eEurope’ and ‘eEurope+’ projects overall, they are articulated together in different ways in different policy documents. In the Romanian position paper on the knowledge-based economy for the World Bank’s ‘Knowledge Economy Forum for EU Accession Countries’ held in Paris at precisely the same time as the publication of the Romanian ‘National Strategy’ document (February 2002), the nodal discourse is ‘the knowledge-based economy’, even though it refers to virtually the same set of strategies and policies. In the Lisbon Declaration, the ‘information society’ is one element of one of three ‘strategies’ for achieving the ‘strategic goal’ of becoming ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world’ (see section 5 of the Lisbon Declaration, Text 1 in the Appendix). Although ‘the knowledge-based economy’ is not an entity or imaginary or strategic goal in the Romanian ‘National Strategy’, the ‘new economy’ is defined partly in recognizably ‘knowledge-based economy’ terms as the ‘intensification of incorporation of knowledge in new products and services’ (‘intensificarea inglobrii cunoașterii în noile produse i servicii’).

As these comments imply, what is significant with respect to recontextualization is both the presence or absence of particular discourses in particular texts, and the relations in which diverse discourses are articulated, ‘textured’, together. One can identify differences between texts is this regard by analysing the relationship between discourses and features of genre, in the sense that genres can be seen as ‘framing’ devices for organising relationships between discourses (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999). Relevant features of genre include the rhetorical structure and argumentative structure of the text (Fairclough 2003). I shall focus my analytical comments upon these issues. One can see how this selection of focuses for analysis depends upon the particular object of research (recontextualization), though there are many other analytical issues (such as the presentation of processes and of agency) which are germane to recontextualization.

In the opening section of the Lisbon Declaration (‘A strategic goal for the next decade’, paragraphs 1-7, text 1, Appendix), predominant features of the rhetorical structure are arguments from problems to solutions and from ends to means. The two paragraphs of the first sub-section (‘The new challenge’) are both arguments from problem to solution, from what ‘is’ happening to what ‘must’ be done in response (from the ‘challenge’, the changes that are happening, to the necessary responses, what the Union ‘must’ do, ‘needs’ to do, what is ‘urgent’ for it to do, what these changes ‘require’). The second section (‘The Union’s strengths and weaknesses’) is also a version of a prob-
lem-to-solution argument, arguing for the proposed solution as a response to ‘weaknesses’ which is timely in the light of ‘strengths’. Paragraphs 5 and 6 in the third section (‘The way forward’) are both arguments from ends (‘strategic goals’) to means (‘strategy’), and paragraph 7 is an argument from ends (‘strategy’) to means of governance for achieving them.

This rhetorical structure constitutes a frame within which diverse discourses are articulated together in a particular way, within which relations are textured (textually constituted) between these discourses. I am particularly concerned here with the placing of expressions which are associated with different discourses in relations of ‘equivalence’, through listing and other forms of paratactic connection (Fairclough 2003). One can see this as a process of (re-)classifying, texturing relations between expressions as co-members of a class (even if, as is generally the case, the class itself is not named — what van Leeuwen 1996 calls ‘association’). In paragraph 5, for instance, the formulation of the ‘strategic goal’ sets up a relation of equivalence between ‘sustainable economic growth’ ‘more and better jobs’ and ‘greater social cohesion’ (more precisely: there is a comitative structure which sets up a relation of equivalence between the first and the other two phrases, and a coordinate structure which sets up a relation of equivalence between these two), all as attributes of ‘the knowledge-based economy’. Each of these equivalent phrases represents a substantive EU policy area associated with an elaborated discourse (the discourses of growth, (un)employment, social and regional cohesion), and the relations of equivalence between them are linguistic realizations of interdiscursive hybridity (the ‘mixing’ of discourses).

The formulation of the ‘overall strategy’ which is the means to achieving the ‘strategic goal’ again sets up relations of equivalence, between the three listed elements of the strategy (‘preparing …’, ‘modernising …’, ‘sustaining …’), and within them between ‘better policies for the information society and R&D’ (and within this, between ‘information society’ and ‘R&D’), ‘stepping up the process of structural reform for competitiveness and innovation’ (and within this, between ‘competitiveness’ and ‘innovation’) and ‘completing the internal market’; between ‘modernising the European social model’, ‘investing in people’ and ‘combating social exclusion’; and so forth. Again, diverse policy areas and associated discourses (e.g. ‘the information society’, ‘competitiveness’, ‘social exclusion’) are articulated together in particular relations within the nodal discourse of the ‘knowledge-based economy’.

A significant overall feature of the articulation of discourses in the document is that in the formulation of problems, the strategic goal, and the strategies for achieving it, discourses which represent the economy (‘sustainable economic growth’ in the strategic goal) are articulated with discourses which
represent social problems and policies (‘more and better jobs’ and ‘social cohesion’ in the strategic goal).

One notable difference between the Lisbon Declaration and the Romanian ‘National Strategy’ document is that there is no section in the latter with a comparable rhetorical structure, articulating arguments from problems to solutions with arguments from ends to means. In more general terms, the Romanian document is not based upon arguments from the specific problems facing Romania to strategic goals for dealing with them (and strategies for achieving these). This is on the face of it a surprising absence in a national strategy document, though as I argue later not actually at all surprising given Romania’s international position. This does not mean that problems are not identified in the document, or that goals and strategies and policies are not specified. They are, but what is significant is the relations that are textured between them. For instance, the relationship between strategic goals and problems is largely reversed: rather than goals and strategies being legitimized in terms of their adequacy and timeliness in responding to a diagnosis of the problems facing the country, the problems are construed as weaknesses and difficulties with respect to achieving the strategic goal, taken as given, of ‘the information society’. This is indicated by the wider rhetorical structure of the document: the strategic goal is formulated (as I shall show below) in chapters 1 and 2 on the basis of claims about the general benefits (not specific benefits to Romania) of the ‘information society’ and Romania’s international commitments (especially to ‘eEurope+’), and specific Romanian problems (of poverty, emigration of skilled labour etc) are identified only in chapter 3 within an assessment of the country’s current position in respect of the ‘information society’.

Arguments for the ‘information society’ as the strategic goal are largely implicit. The Lisbon Declaration is ‘based upon’ arguments from problems to solutions in the material sense that the document begins from these arguments. The Romanian document by contrast begins with a general chapter about the ‘information society’ and the ‘new economy’ which does not directly refer to Romania at all, and only indirectly alludes to Romania in the final few paragraphs. In terms of rhetorical structure, the chapter is an extended description of the ‘information society’, followed by prescriptions about what must be done to construct such a society. The first, descriptive, section construes the ‘information society’ as actually existing, rather than as a strategic goal, representing it in an idealised (and to some degree utopian) way, which construes in universal terms what are commonly claimed to be its potential effects and benefits as if they were actual effects and benefits. Here for instance is a translation of the second paragraph:
The information society represents a new stage of human civilization, a new and qualitatively superior way of life, which implies the intensive use of information in all spheres of human activity and existence, with major economic and social consequences. The information society allows widespread access to information for its members, a new way of working and learning, greater possibilities for economic globalization, and increasing social cohesion.

It is only in the ninth of its thirteen paragraphs that a strategic perspective on ‘constructing the new model of society’ (‘Construirea noului model de societate...’) appears. The following paragraphs specify the role of government, business, the academic community, and civil society in this process. By this stage one can assume that Romania in particular is being alluded to without being explicitly named — this is implicit in the claim that ‘national development priorities for the medium-long term’ and ‘objectives of adhesion to Euro-Atlantic structures’ (often formulated in this way in Romanian policy contexts) need to be taken into account. The ‘information society’ as a strategic goal is covertly established on the basis of idealised claims about the ‘information society’ as a universal reality.

The second chapter is a review of tendencies and policies internationally and within the EU including a summary of the ‘e-Europe’ and ‘eEurope+’ initiatives. Romania is a participant in ‘eEurope+'. The ‘information society’ as a ‘development objective’ is claimed to be ‘an essential condition for participation in the single European market’. It is implied, without being explicitly stated, that this applies to Romania, and that the ‘information society’ is therefore its ‘development objective’ (strategic goal). The third chapter is a STEEP (social, technological, economic and political factors) analysis of the current situation with respect to the ‘information society’ internationally and in Romania, which includes a review of problems and possibilities and policies in Romania — it is here, as I said earlier, that specifically Romanian problems are introduced.

Thus the ‘information society’ is implicitly established as Romania’s strategic goal on essentially extraneous grounds: the universal benefits it brings as an existing reality, and the commitment to this strategic goal as a part of commitment to the ‘e-Europe+’ initiative.

It is only in chapter 4 (‘Strategic Directions and Options’) that ‘strategic choices’ for Romania are explicitly addressed. I shall comment on the rhetorical and argumentative structure of the first section (entitled ‘Global objectives’, see Texts 2 and 3 in the Appendix), and how it frames the articulation of discourses. The rhetorical structure of the section is characterized by arguments from general factual claims about economic changes and their societal consequences in ‘the information society’, to possibilities, policies and strategies.
(for, by implication, particular countries). Although these arguments are formulated in general terms without specific reference to Romania (Romania is referred to explicitly only in the last sentence), they can be taken as referring implicitly to Romania — the list of four policies includes what appear to be specifically Romanian policies (especially the fourth, which is very similar to policies advocated explicitly for economic applications of ICT in Romania in the next section of the chapter). The first sentence makes a general factual claim about the consequences of large-scale use of ICTs (‘profound implications for socio-economic life, fundamental transformations in the way of producing goods and services and in human behaviour’). The second sentence is a conditional formulation of the possibilities opened up: greater use of information technologies ‘can ensure the socio-economic progress characteristic of information societies’, as long as ‘objectives and orientations of a strategic nature are adopted through policies appropriate to the actual societies in which we live’. Four policies are then listed (‘consolidation of democracy and the rule of law’, ‘development of a market economy and progressive movement towards the new economy’, ‘improving the quality of life’ (and, through policies to achieve this, ‘integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and the Global Information Society’), ‘consolidation and development of a national economic framework which ensures the production of goods and services which are competitive on internal and external markets’). The first three elements of this list are structured as arguments from end to means. In the following two paragraphs, there are two sentences making general factual claims about the ‘information society’, which frame a more specific claim (sentence 3) about the development of knowledge as ‘a critical, determining factor in economic growth and standards of living’, which by implication makes it possible (sentence 4) for the ‘digital divide’ to become, with ‘appropriate strategies’, the ‘digital opportunity’. The pattern of argument from factual economic claim to strategic possibilities is repeated in the following two paragraphs. The final sentence is a recommendation, ‘given the example of the countries referred to above and presented in the appendix’ (Ireland, Israel, Finland), that Romania ‘should make a fundamental choice to develop a branch of the economy which produces the goods and services demanded by the information society, based on ICT’.

The rhetorical structure of the first section of the Lisbon Declaration set up a relationship between diagnosed problems, a strategic goal for solving them, and strategies for achieving it (with means for achieving these strategic ends). Here by contrast the strategic goal is taken for granted rather than established on the basis of diagnosis of problems (there is no such diagnosis), and the focus is on possibilities arising from general claims about economic
and social change and the strategies for realizing them. Thus at the one point in the document where ‘strategic options’ specifically for Romania are addressed, there is no attempt to establish strategic goals adapted to Romania’s particular problems, and the only strategic choice recommended, in the last sentence (the only one where Romania is explicitly referred to), relates specifically and narrowly to economic applications of ICT. The rest of the chapter is taken up with an elaboration of this.

I noted above that in the Lisbon Declaration, discourses which represent the economy are articulated with discourses which represent social problems and policies. In the Romanian document, there is something resembling this articulation in the list of four policies, but it is significantly different. First, this articulation is only within strategies to achieve the assumed strategic goal of ‘the information society’, whereas in the Lisbon Declaration the articulation of economic and social discourses is present in the formulation of problems, strategically goal, and strategies for achieving it. Second, and connectedly, it is only social policies that are represented, not social problems. Third, the social policies represented relate to political issues and ‘the quality of life’, but not for instance to standards of living (or the key problem of poverty), employment (or the problem of unemployment), or the major divisions between urban and rural areas and populations. That is, major social problems which one might see as demanding social policies (including those focused upon in the Lisbon Declaration, (un)employment, social and regional cohesion) are not represented.

I shall make a few comments on the articulation of discourses within the listed policies. In the first, a relation of equivalence is textured between ‘democracy’ and ‘(the institutions of) the state of right’, which one can see as significant in terms of the recontextualization of the discourse of ‘e-government’ (as a constituent discourse of both the nodal discourses): the aim of establishing the ‘state of right’ was one of the key ways in which Romanian society after 1989 differentiated and distanced itself from the Ceauşescu era. On the other hand, the equivalence relations within the formulation of the means for achieving the policy (between ‘the participation of citizens in public life’, ‘the facilitation of non-discriminatory access to public information’, ‘improvement of the quality of public services’, modernization of public administration’) constitute an articulation of discourses which one might find in the ‘e-government’ policies of EU members. In the third, the policy of ‘improving the quality of life’ is represented as a means to ‘integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and the Global Information Society’. This is again significant with respect to recontextualization. ‘Integration into Euro-Atlantic structures’, subsuming integration into the EU, is often formulated as a
Romanian policy objective which has been interpreted as merging together in a confused way EU membership and NATO membership (Repere 2004). Policies for improving the quality of life are a means to this end in that they are amongst the conditions Romania must meet (in terms of the ‘acquis communautaires’ and the ‘e-Europe’ initiative) for joining the EU.

If we look at the arguments and explanations given in the document as a whole for Romania’s adoption of the ‘information society’ as a strategic goal it may clarify what problems it is covertly construed as a solution to. ICT is ‘considered an important engine for boosting the national economy and promoting national interests’. Romania has adhered to the objectives of the ‘eEurope’ programme, ‘considering them a beneficial framework for the urgent process of integration in the EU’. If Romania is not rapidly integrated into ‘Euro-Atlantic structures’ (the strategy of the ‘information society’ is represented as a precondition for this), ‘the economic gap between our country and developed countries will grow’. What is noteworthy is that factors to do with the economy, ‘national interests’ and EU integration are included, but — in contrast with the Lisbon Declaration — social factors (unemployment, poverty, social exclusion, social and regional cohesion) are not. These are the cases where Romania is specifically and explicitly referred to. There is a much larger number of others where arguments for the ‘information society’ are given in general terms, without reference to particular countries, which can be seen as implicitly applying to Romania. Apart from the first chapter, these are mainly economic arguments (e.g. ‘developing countries can obtain certain economic advantages from rapidly capitalizing on the opportunities offered by ICT and especially electronic commerce’). In the first chapter, there are a number of general claims about the ‘information society’ which might be taken as implicit arguments in favour of adopting it as a strategic goal, and these do include solutions to social problems (see the paragraph quoted earlier). But these arguments do not, of course, address Romania’s particular and in some ways quite specific social problems (e.g. approximately 40% of the workforce is still employed in agriculture).

In Chouliaraki & Fairclough (1999), we argued that recontextualization is a colonization-appropriation dialectic. There is both a process of an ‘external’ discourse colonizing the recontextualizing practices (country, field, organization etc), and a process of the ‘external’ discourse being appropriated within the recontextualizing practices. In principle one can claim that there is no colonisation without appropriation — recontextualization is always an active process on the part of ‘internal’ social agents of inserting an ‘external’ element into a new context, working it into a new set of relations with its existing elements, and in so doing transforming it. This is often manifested in the
interdiscursive hybridity of texts, the mixing of ‘external’ with ‘internal’ discursive elements. Moreover, in strategic terms one could argue that strategic relations between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ social agents will always be inflected by strategic relations between ‘internal’ social agents.

However, it is necessary to add two provisos to this theoretical account. First, the degree to which recontextualization becomes an active process of appropriation entailing potentially substantive transformation of recontextualized elements (which includes the possibilities of them being strategically used by some ‘internal’ agents in their struggles with others, being contained or marginalized or contested, etc) depends upon the state of the relations between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ agents and of relations between ‘internal’ agents. Recontextualizing contexts may manifest degrees of passivity. Second, however active the process of appropriation, one cannot assume that it will be equally active in all practices within the recontextualizing context (e.g. a nation-state such as Romania).

In general terms, the room for autonomous agency and initiative in contemporary Romania with respect to the main lines of economic and social policy and activity is rather limited. Romania is strongly committed to integration into the European Union and ‘Euro-Atlantic structures’ and to maintaining good relations with and the support and assistance of the EU, the USA, EU states, international agencies (UNO, World Bank, IMF and so forth), and these come with conditions attached which leave Romania with little room for manoeuvre. I have shown in the analysis of the ‘National Strategy’ document that, rather than being explicitly legitimized as solutions to Romania’s particular problems, strategic goals are implicitly legitimized through idealized claims about the ‘information society’ construed as a universal reality, and by reference to Romania’s international commitments. Any state is faced with the problem of legitimizing its goals, strategies and policies, and these can perhaps be seen as the legitimizing strategies adopted by the Romanian government (though such a conclusion would require more extensive analysis of policy documents and other government material). Given its international position, one might argue that Romania does not have the option of formulating goals, strategies and policies on the basis of an analysis of its specific problems and needs. Though Boia (1999), in distinguishing ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ Romanian responses to integration with ‘the west’ over the course of modern Romanian history, suggests that it is a characteristic of the ‘offensive’ (integrationist) responses to proceed with scant regard for the consequences in terms of the already profound social divisions and inequalities in the country.
Conclusions

Miroiu (1999) describes the ‘mental cramp’ she experienced in discussing Romanian problems with western academics, and her realization that Romanian realities could not be grasped in their conceptual frameworks. I think this is in part an issue of methodology. Bourdieu’s approach to constructing the ‘object of research’ implies a progressive articulation or rapprochement of topics of research with theories and methods in the course of defining and refining the ‘object of research’, rather than immediately approaching the topic of research armed with ready-made theories and methods. What is implied is that theories and methods appropriate to the object of research and particular to this object of research should be progressively constructed out of existing resources of theory and method, which can quite legitimately include theories and methods hitherto used only ‘elsewhere’, be that in different parts of the world, different areas of research, or different disciplines.

We also need to draw distinctions, with respect to theory, between different types of theory. Metatheories (such as ‘critical realism’ as a philosophy of science) and general theories (such as the theory of discourse I have sketched here, or regulation theory) generally travel better than ‘local theories’ (e.g. theories focused upon particular social fields in particular sorts of society, such as theories of education, media or social welfare in social democratic societies). This is not to say that research in particular sorts of society may not lead to specific critiques of metatheories or general theories. There are for instance apparently general theories whose covert particularity is revealed by working with them in new contexts — recently influential economic theories are a case in point. And even with general theories one needs to carefully distinguish what is general about them from particularities which attach to them because of the specific research topics they have been used to address and the specific localities of such research. This is certainly true for CDA: the categories of ‘order and discourse’, ‘discourses’, ‘genres’, styles’, ‘interdiscursivity’ are amongst those which belong to the general theory, whereas categories such as ‘marketisation’ or ‘conversationalisation’ which have figured quite prominently in CDA research do not, nor does the use of Systemic Functional Grammar for linguistic analysis of texts. If ‘conversationalisation’ proved to be a useless category for discourse analytical research in Romania, it would not be a problem for the theory; if ‘interdiscursivity’ did, it would.

CDA’s transdisciplinary way of working makes it difficult sometimes to separate general from particular. For instance, I would say that ‘recontextual-
ization’, a category which originated in Bernstein’s sociology of pedagogy (Bernstein 1990, Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999) has become a general category of CDA because it has been fully reinterpreted in discourse-analytical terms and built into the relational structure of the categories of the theory; whereas ‘conversationalisation’ has not. Moreover the transdisciplinary way of working and the associated methodology I have pointed to entails that in the course of progressively arriving at one’s ‘object of research’ one is also seeking to find a coherent synthesis between CDA as a general theory and other theories which bear upon one’s topic — let us say theories of media and mediation, theories of politics, theories of identity, theories of learning — so that caution is always needed about non-reflexively ‘importing’ inappropriate or misleading particularities.

Finally, let me note the limited nature of what I have done in this paper, and point to directions in which this research will be developed.

1. I have looked at recontextualization only with respect to policy texts. One would also need material from within particular institutions (e.g. educational), businesses, localities, political parties etc to arrive at a fuller assessment. Such an extension of the data might also provide evidence of a more active appropriation of these discourses, hybrid relations between these and other discourses, and strategic differences in their recontextualization, than I have been able to show in this paper.

2. A commonplace in commentaries on transition is that they are, in the much-used expression of the nineteenth century Romanian literary critic Maiorescu ‘form without content’ — as modernisation and westernization in Romania have always been, many would add. The language of modernisation is readily ‘imitated’ from the West, but without much change in social realities. Such claims make it particularly important to go beyond public policy documents in looking at recontextualization, and especially to research the operationalization of discourses such as the ‘information society’ and the ‘knowledge economy’, not only by looking, for instance, at how imaginaries for ‘e-government’ are being operationalized in the setting up of a government web portal (), but also through ethnographic research in localities, companies etc., which can give insights into the relationship between discourses, rhetoric, and reality.
References


Jessop, B. 2004. Cultural political economy, the knowledge-based economy, and the state (to appear)


**Appendix**

Text 1: extract from the Lisbon Declaration: (‘A STRATEGIC GOAL FOR THE NEXT DECADE’)

The new challenge  1. The European Union is confronted with a quantum shift resulting from globalisation and the challenges of a new knowledge-driven economy. These changes are affecting every aspect of people’s lives and require a radical transformation of the European economy. The Union must shape these changes in a manner consistent with its values and concepts of society and also with a view to the forthcoming enlargement.

2. The rapid and accelerating pace of change means it is urgent for the Union to act now to harness the full benefits of the opportunities presented. Hence the need for the Union to set a clear strategic goal and agree a challenging programme for building knowledge infrastructures, enhancing innovation and economic reform, and modernising social welfare and education systems.

The Union’s strengths and weaknesses  3. The Union is experiencing its best macro-economic outlook for a generation. As a result of stability-oriented monetary policy supported by sound fiscal policies in a context of wage moderation, inflation and interest rates are low, public sector deficits have been reduced remarkably and the EU’s balance of payments is healthy. The euro has been successfully introduced and is delivering the expected benefits for the European economy. The internal market is largely complete and is yielding tangible benefits for consumers and businesses alike. The forthcoming enlargement will create new opportunities for growth and employment. The Union possesses a generally well-educated workforce as well as social protection systems able to provide, beyond their intrinsic value, the stable framework required for managing the structural changes involved in moving towards a knowledge-based society. Growth and job creation have resumed.
4. These strengths should not distract our attention from a number of weaknesses. More than 15 million Europeans are still out of work. The employment rate is too low and is characterised by insufficient participation in the labour market by women and older workers. Long-term structural unemployment and marked regional unemployment imbalances remain endemic in parts of the Union. The services sector is underdeveloped, particularly in the areas of telecommunications and the Internet. There is a widening skills gap, especially in information technology where increasing numbers of jobs remain unfilled. With the current improved economic situation, the time is right to undertake both economic and social reforms as part of a positive strategy which combines competitiveness and social cohesion.

The way forward 5. The Union has today set itself a new strategic goal for the next decade: to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion. Achieving this goal requires an overall strategy aimed at:

- preparing the transition to a knowledge-based economy and society by better policies for the information society and R&D, as well as by stepping up the process of structural reform for competitiveness and innovation and by completing the internal market;
- modernising the European social model, investing in people and combating social exclusion;
- sustaining the healthy economic outlook and favourable growth prospects by applying an appropriate macro-economic policy mix.

6. This strategy is designed to enable the Union to regain the conditions for full employment, and to strengthen regional cohesion in the European Union. The European Council needs to set a goal for full employment in Europe in an emerging new society which is more adapted to the personal choices of women and men. If the measures set out below are implemented against a sound macro-economic background, an average economic growth rate of around 3% should be a realistic prospect for the coming years.

7. Implementing this strategy will be achieved by improving the existing processes, introducing a new open method of coordination at all levels, coupled with a stronger guiding and coordinating role for the European Council to ensure more coherent strategic direction and effective monitoring of progress. A meeting of the European Council to be held every Spring will define the relevant mandates and ensure that they are followed up.

Text 2: Chapter 4, section 1, of the Romanian ‘Strategia Națională Pentru Promovarea Noii Economii și Implementarea Societății Informaționale’

4.1 Obiective globale

Utilizarea largă a tehnologiilor informaționale și de comunicații (TIC) conduce la implicații profunde în viața social-economică, la transformări fundamentale în modul de a realiza produsele și serviciile și în comportamentul uman. Valorificarea superioară a acestor tehnologii poate asigura progresul economic-social ce caracterizează societatea informațională, cu condiția îndeplinirii unor obiective și orientări de natură strategică prin politici adecvate stării societății în care trăim:

1. Consolidarea democrației și a instituțiilor statului de drept prin participarea cetățenilor la viața politică și facilitarea accesului nediscriminatoriu la informația publică,
imbunătățirea calității serviciilor publice și modernizarea administrației publice (e-government, e-administration);

2. Dezvoltarea economiei de piață și trecerea progresivă la noua economie, creșterea competitivității agenților economici și crearea de noi locuri de muncă în sectoare de înaltă tehnologie prin dezvoltarea comerțului electronic, tele-lucrului, a unor noi metode de management al afacerilor, de management financiar și al resurselor umane, integrarea capacităților TIC în noi produse și servicii, dezvoltarea sectorului TIC.

3. Creșterea calității vieții prin utilizarea noilor tehnologii în domenii precum: protecția socială, asistența medicală, educație, protecția mediului și monitorizarea dezasfârzelor, siguranța transporturilor etc. și, pe această cale, integrarea in structurile euro-atlantice și în Societatea Informațională Globală.

4. Consolidarea și dezvoltarea unei ramuri a economiei naționale care să asigure realizarea de produse și servicii competitive pe piața internă și externă, cerute de evoluția lumii contemporane. O ramură a economiei bazată pe produse și servicii care valorifică TIC pe piața internă și, mai ales, la export, ar permite ocuparea resursei umane în activități caracterizate de eficiență maximă, comparativ cu alte ramuri, prin faptul că produsele și serviciile specifice SI conțin o cotă ridicată a valorii adăugate, asociată cu consumuri minime de resurse materiale și de energie. O asemenea opțiune corespunde prevederilor privind evoluția societății umane în secolul 21, fiind susținută de experiența ultimilor zece ani a unor țări de dimensiuni mici, cum sunt Irlanda, Finlanda sau Israelul. (vezi Anexa nr. 3).

În ultimii ani au intervenit schimbări importante în evoluția societății, cu un impact major asupra modului în care gândim, muncim, interacționăm, petrecem timpul liber și în mod special, asupra modului în care realizăm produsele și serviciile. Schimbările majore care au produs acest impact și care vor marca evoluția societății în perspectiva noului mileni sunt legate în principal de globalizarea competiției și a pieței și de progresele obținute în domeniul TIC.

În acest context ce definiște Societatea Informațională, asistăm la impunerea cunoașterii ca un factor critic, determinant, al creșterii economice și al standardului de viață. De la o diviziune a lumii în raport cu accesul la cunoaștere și la utilizarea noilor tehnologii din domeniu (“global digital divide”) se poate ajunge prin strategii adecvate, elaborate la nivel național și global, la noi oportunități oferite dezvoltării societății la nivel planetar (“global digital opportunity”.The Okinawa Summit of the G7/G8”, iulie 2000).

Globalizarea și noile TIC impun realizarea produselor și serviciilor la nivelul standardelor existente pe piața externă/globală, în special pe piața internă a UE, în care aceste standarde sunt la nivelul cel mai ridicat.

Realizarea produselor și serviciilor inovative la acest nivel nu se poate asigura decât prin menținerea și dezvoltarea unei capacități de cercetare-desvoltare-inovare susținută și de un transfer tehnologic activ către producătorii de bunuri și servicii. Conștientizarea acestei stări impune elaborarea unei strategii a dezvoltării economiei naționale și a unor sectoare viabile ale acesteia care să facă față competiției pe piața internă și externă, mai ales a UE.

Având exemplul țărilor amintite mai sus și prezentate în anexe (Irlanda, Israel, Finlanda), România trebuie să facă o opțiune fundamentală pentru dezvoltarea unei ramuri a economiei care să realizeze produse și servicii cerute de societatea informațională, bazată pe tehnologiile informației și comunicațiilor.
4.1 Overall objectives

The widespread use of ICT produces profound implications for socio-economic life, and fundamental transformations in the way of producing goods and services and in human behaviour. Capitalizing more on these technologies can ensure the socio-economic progress characteristic of information societies as long as objectives and orientations of a strategic nature are adopted through policies appropriate to the actual societies in which we live:

1. Consolidation of democracy and the institutions of the state of right through the participation of citizens in political life and the facilitation of non-discriminatory access to public information, the improvement of the quality of public services and the modernization of public administration (e-government, e-administration);

2. Development of a market economy and progressive movement towards the new economy, growth in the competitiveness of economic agents and the creation of new jobs in the high-technology sector through developing electronic commerce, tele-work, and new methods of business management, financial management and management of human resources, incorporation of ICT capacities in new goods and services, development of the ICT sector.

3. Improving the quality of life by using new technologies in areas such as: social welfare, health, education, protection of the environment and monitoring of disasters, transport security etc, and thereby integration into Euro-atlantic structures and the Global Information Society.

4. Consolidation and development of a national economic framework which ensures the production of goods and services which are competitive on internal and external markets, as the evolution of the modern world demands. A branch of the economy based on goods and services which capitalize on ICT for the internal market and especially for export would permit a maximally efficient use of human resources, compared with other branches, because specifically information society goods and services contain expanded added value associated with minimal use of material resources and energy. Such an option corresponds to forecasts about the development of human society in the 21st century, and is confirmed by the experience of several small countries over the last ten years, such as Ireland, Finland and Israel (see Annex nr 3).

Important changes in the development of society have taken place in recent years, which have had a major impact on the way we think, work, interact, spend our free time and, especially, on the way we produce goods and services. The major changes which have produced these effects and which will shape the development of society in the new millennium are linked especially to the globalization of competition and the market and progress in the field of ICT.

In this context of the Information Society we are witnessing the implementation of knowledge as a critical, determining, factor in economic growth and the standard of living. From the division of the world on the basis of access to knowledge and use of new technologies in the field (“global digital divide”), we can, with appropriate strategies developed at national and global levels, move towards new opportunities for social development at a planetary level (“global digital opportunity”, The Okinawa Summit of the G7/G8, July 2000).
Globalization and new ICT mean producing goods and services to the standard of external/global markets, especially the internal market of the EU, where standards are the highest.

The production of innovative goods and services at this level can only be achieved through maintaining and developing a capacity for sustained research-development-innovation and for active technology transfer between producers of goods and services. Making people aware of this entails developing a strategy for development of the national economy and for viable sectors within it which can compete on internal and external markets, especially the EU.

Given the example of the countries referred to above and presented in the appendix (Ireland, Israel, Finland), Romania should make a fundamental choice to develop a branch of the economy which produces the goods and services demanded by the information society, based on ICT.

Endnotes

1 Godin (2004) lists some seventy five terms for societal transformation between 1950 and 1984 alone, including 'post-industrial society', 'neocapitalism', 'management society'.
2 The stance of key states (notably the USA, European states, Japan) and international institutions and agencies (the World Bank, the IMF etc) towards strategies and discourses is one important factor in the outcome of struggles for hegemony. Godin (2004) traces the displacement of 'national systems of innovation' (NSIs) by 'knowledge-based economy' as the favoured strategy of the OECD in the 1990s.
3 In Fairclough 2003, I suggest that analysis of the texturing of relations of 'equivalence' and 'difference' as the operationalization in textual analysis of the view of the political (which one can extend more generally to social action) in Laclau & Mouffe (1985) as constituted through the simultaneous operation of the 'logics' of 'equivalence' and 'difference'. I see this as a case where textual analysis can be enriched through transdisciplinary dialogue.
4 The discourse of 'social exclusion' which is widely used in the EU is not widely used in Romania. The discourse of 'poverty', which was for instance displaced by the discourse of 'social exclusion' in the UK in the language of New Labour (Fairclough 2000), is by contrast widely used, though it appears only once in this document — the issue of poverty is not otherwise referred to.
5 I use the term 'state of right' as equivalent to the German term 'Rechtsstaat'.
"As tribes and nations the Indians must perish and live only as men!" (qtd. in Berkhofer 1978:151) This remark by a missionary in 1846, with all its racist and ethnocentric overtones, rather crudely summarizes the attitude of many other Christian missionaries in the frontier territories of the United States in the 18th and 19th centuries. The process of becoming “men” in the white European sense, however, was not as straightforward a matter as many missionaries envisioned it, for they were running up against peoples who already had centuries-old religious systems of their own. In the wake of military and/or economic defeat and the resultant social collapse, these Indian groups did not simply surrender their belief systems but often incorporated them into the new ideologies being preached amongst them by the missionaries to produce syncretic religious blends. Using one such example — the religion developed among the Seneca by Handsome Lake two hundred years ago — Anthony F. C. Wallace classified these and other syncretic belief systems as revitalization movements which attempt to restore an equilibrium to the native culture (1956:264). In the case of the Seneca, the rejuvenated religion allowed them to maintain a sense of tribal identity and thus prevented them from being swallowed whole by the dominant white society.

In many aspects of its origin, the Indian Shaker religion of the Pacific Northwest bears a strong resemblance to the Handsome Lake religion. And, like the Longhouse religion, it is one of the few syncretic cults to have survived the closing of the frontier and continue in existence into the 21st century. Nevertheless, these two churches, which have today achieved what Wallace calls the “New Steady State” (1956:268), are different systems of belief: the Longhouse religion is comparatively strong with a concentration primarily in one tribe, while the Shaker church is numerically smaller and spread out over a number of tribes in three states. If there were so many similarities in their origins, what accounts for the present day differences? Does Shakerism, in fact, qualify as a revitalization movement according to Wallace’s model? Since Wallace developed his ideas based upon the Seneca
experience, the answers to these questions may well lie in a comparison of the two religions, and this in turn may shed some light as well on some of the conclusions Wallace reached about revitalization movements.

Wallace’s model for revitalization movements includes five stages: “1. Steady State; 2. Period of Individual Stress; 3. Period of Cultural Distortion; 4. Period of Revitalization [. . .]. 5. New Steady State” (1956:268). The rise of Handsome Lake’s religion and the Indian Shaker church inside their respective cultures fits this pattern to a remarkably similar degree; indeed, inside the Revitalization period, which describes how movements galvanize a culture, creating new “mazeways” (Wallace 1956:270) that help individuals as well as groups adapt to the stresses of cultural change, there are also a great number of similarities. Both belief systems arose out of near-death-experience visions of an individual, who then preached a syncretic blend of Christianity and the native religion to adherents, who then began an “organized program of group action” (Wallace 1956:275). Wallace ascribes a central role in this process to a charismatic leader who adapts the new ideology to the needs of the population, and it is precisely in this point that the two movements differ. Handsome Lake fulfilled this role for the Seneca — as the name of the religion indicates — while a charismatic leader was missing in the Shaker Church. This single point alone is very likely the key to the differences in the two belief systems today.

It is no coincidence that eighty years separates the development of Handsome Lake’s religion and Shakerism from one another. This period roughly reflects the length of time it took white Europeans to expand their domination across the American continent and approximately marks the difference in time between the subjugation of the Iroquois and the Coast Salish Indians of the Pacific Northwest. The steady decline of the Seneca began in the 1750s and, punctuated by the French and Indian War and the American Revolution, continued for the next forty years until the Treaty of Big Tree in 1797 (Wallace 1972:179), two years before Handsome Lake received his first vision. Similarly, the Coast Salish found their way of life disrupted some thirty to forty years prior to the visions of John Slocum, who together with his wife founded what became the Indian Shaker church. The arrival of missionaries in the 1840s, the establishment of settlements such as Olympia — close to the home of Slocum’s Squaxin tribe — in the 1850s, and white-Indian warfare in the area during the mid-1850s all marked this period of cultural decline. Although Slocum probably was too young to have taken part in these wars as Handsome Lake almost certainly did in the Seneca’s conflicts with the whites (Wallace 1972:137), both of these men experienced the general deterioration and collapse of their cultures during their lifetimes. The visions these
men experienced — Handsome Lake at about the age of fifty, Slocum at around forty — came to them a full generation after the onset of decline. Born at the beginning of their respective tribes’ cultural disintegration, both men belonged to — and preached to — the first generation of their tribe that knew only decline.

The cultural devastations both the Seneca and the Coast Salish experienced in the period immediately prior to the prophets’ visions were marked by severe economic and social disruptions. The population of the Iroquois had been halved since the start of the Revolutionary War (Wallace 1972:194), and the Coast Salish suffered devastating epidemics of smallpox and scarlet fever in 1881, just months before Slocum’s first vision (Barnett 1957:342-43). With the steady increase in the surrounding white populations, both tribes became drawn into economic dependency on a foreign system and eventually were forced into the reservation system. Though still able to fish, clam, and hunt to a large extent, many Salish were starting to find work outside their traditional economic roles and became loggers or worked in the hop fields and other agricultural industries in the Puget Sound area. For the Iroquois, economic dislocation also brought severe social problems: unable to hunt due to the loss of large tracts of land and encouraged by the Quakers to work the land agriculturally instead, many men were turning to, or resisting, what had previously been considered women’s work and suffered a loss of social prestige and self-esteem. This made it even easier for many in both tribes to turn for solace to a vice that was already wreaking havoc in many Indian tribes, alcohol.

The personal situations of Handsome Lake and John Slocum mirrored this general social decline. Both lived in squalid circumstances and had taken to drinking heavily. The former was a hunter who in the days before his first visions appeared to be about to drink himself to death, while the latter was a logger given to binge drinking and gambling. The only noticeable difference between the two men at the time they apparently died and returned to life with divine messages was their social connections: Slocum was an entirely ordinary man, while Handsome Lake, destitute as he was both financially and morally, was the half-brother of a chief, Cornplanter. Thus the support Handsome Lake received early on may well have been a factor in the success of his religion becoming a strong cultural institution among the Iroquois. The more extensive development of his theological and social doctrines are, of course, among the many other reasons for the large success compared to the Shakers, but at the time of the first visions both religions had striking similarities in the new elements they introduced.

Neither the religion of the Iroquois nor that of the Coast Salish had any concept of a doomsday or heaven and hell until the two prophets emerged
with their visions. Given the situations the tribes were in, however, it is no surprise that they readily accepted these ideas. The cultural disintegration around them made the Christian idea of an eventual end of the world easily accessible and relevant to the two groups, and the presence of Christian missionaries gave not just the prophets but the entire tribe a background knowledge of these concepts. The Quakers had established a mission on the Seneca reservation shortly before Handsome Lake’s vision (Berkhofer 1976:135), while a Catholic mission had been opened in the South Puget Sound area in 1850, followed later by a Presbyterian mission in 1876 (Castile 1982:169). In this sense, the two men were simply acting as conduits for an acculturation process that was going on around them: whether they liked it or not, they were merely pawns in a larger social evolutionary process. Indeed, the initial messages they brought with them seemed more centrally focused on personal salvation: Handsome Lake preached that “[t]he four evil words are whiskey, witchcraft, love magic, and abortion-and-sterility medicine” (Wallace 1972:241), while Slocum had been confronted with “the error of his sinful life” and came out inveighing against alcohol and shamans (Barnett 1957:6). Both men had been commanded in their visions to preach abstinence among the Indians, though certainly this injunction against alcohol applied to the two prophets themselves. It is, however, in the nature of how the two visions appeared to them and how the topic of witchcraft and shamans was dealt with later that the two incipient religions began to diverge from one another.

Although both religions gained credibility in Indian eyes by originating in visions and thus represented continuity with traditional Indian beliefs, it is Handsome Lake’s vision which bears more elements of traditional Indian cosmology. In the first vision he encountered three angels who gave him the initial definition of four sins and informed him that a fourth angel would soon reveal more to him. The use of the number four is in keeping with Indian beliefs of the sacredness of that number. Additionally, he was enjoined to spread the word of his vision at the traditional Strawberry Festival. A few weeks later, he was taken in his second vision on a Sky Journey, which is associated in Seneca mythology with the regeneration of life (Parker 1978:27). Here he encountered, among other things, the dog he had sacrificed at the White Dog ceremony the year before. A half year later, Handsome Lake received in his third vision the even more explicit message that the angels were unhappy with the vices prevalent among the Indians and the loss of land to arrogant whites, and that he should preach adherence to the traditional Midwinter Ceremony. The form and content of the visions was thus explicitly related to past Seneca experience.
To be sure, there were elements of Christianity and aspects of the new situation the Seneca now faced inside the framework of the Indian vision. George Washington appeared as a symbol of the good intentions of some of the whites, a crucified Jesus warned Handsome Lake against allowing his people to follow the whites, and a church with no doors or windows signified the hopelessness of pursuing Christianity. Mixed in with this nativistic message were a few symbols of the whites’ religion as well, such as the narrow road leading to heaven and the broad road leading to hell (Wallace 1972:243-44). All in all, this syncretic blend of religious imagery was weighted toward a return to an Indian past while leaving open the possibility of accepting secular elements the whites had to offer.

The content of John Slocum’s initial vision, on the other hand, was more in line with standard Christian theology. He entered into a similar coma-like state, just as Handsome Lake had when friends and family considered him dead for a few hours, but Slocum encountered only one angel who informed him of the error of his life-style. Slocum was also enjoined to urge Indians to repent their sins and give up alcohol, but this was as far as the Indian orientation of his vision went. Instead, he was told to preach acceptance of Christianity amongst his people, and the image of a church which appeared to him was a positive rather than a negative symbol: Slocum was told to have the others build him a church in which he could then preach the message he had received. There were no explicit references in the vision to any traditional Indian ceremonies.

Although it immediately excited interest in the South Puget Sound area, John Slocum’s religion could easily have vanished as quickly as many other newly founded religious cults had in the years previous to his vision. Interest in his religion waned within a few months, even his own interest, and within a year Slocum had returned to his earlier drinking and gambling. This may be due in part to his poor leadership of the church, as Homer Barnett suggests (1957:7), though it may be that the Christian orientation of his beliefs neither differentiated the religion enough from the mainstream Christian churches or other cults in the area nor provided a link to earlier Indian beliefs as Handsome Lake’s religion had. But the incidents surrounding his second collapse and return from an apparent death provided the key to the religion’s uniqueness and probably to its success. It was his revival a few minutes after his wife became apparently possessed and began shaking uncontrollably that provided the miracle people needed to believe in the religion. New life was breathed into the church, and shaking became its hallmark.

As June Collins points out, the fact that physically shaking seemed to provide a cure for a sick person is an element directly borrowed from earlier
shamanistic practices (1950:405). Many of the beliefs and practices of the Shakers that began to develop after Mary Slocum’s shaking, such as brushing each other in order to get rid of the evil that sticks to the body of a person (Barnett 1957:170-71), are in fact retained from religions practiced in the Northwest before Christianity arrived and which were still being practiced in the latter half of the 19th century. Shamanistic shaking and curing the sick were the elements needed to make the religion more palatable to some, if not many Indians in the area.

Additionally, the manner in which the shaking occurred provided another link to the traditional beliefs of the Coast Salish. As George Woodcock (1977:77) notes, “the experience of death and rebirth [is] common to shaman experience.” Thus, John Slocum’s near-death-experience lent him authority in the eyes of potential adherents, establishing him as a shaman-like figure. The validity thus gained may well have been the wedge which allowed Christian elements — such as a belief in Jesus, use of the cross, services on Sunday — to be fused with native traditions. It is worth noting, however, that John Slocum himself initially rejected the idea that his wife’s shaking had cured him, believing instead that her shaking was evil (Barnett 1957:34). His later change of mind is indicative both of Slocum’s own originally more Christian orientation and the need of those around him to find a link with shamanistic traditions.

Handsome Lake certainly profited as well from having undergone a near-death-experience, for the Seneca traditions were also based upon shamanism. Both the Iroquois and the Coast Salish had, in fact, traditions which differentiated between shamans and witches, the former as positive, the latter as negative figures. Where the two incipient religions differed was in their responses to these two elements of the older native belief systems: the one gained credibility by turning against a traditional enemy, the other established itself by supplanting an earlier authority.

Hatred of shamans and witches was common in the Seneca and Coast Salish during the respective eras as well as to both Handsome Lake and Slocum personally, and in the latter cases may have related to personal vendettas. Fear of witchcraft had grown greatly in the years preceding Handsome Lake’s vision, and he himself had a niece who supposedly had been poisoned at the time by a witch (Wallace 1972:236); John Slocum was caught at the time of his illness and vision between his father, who believed his son could be cured only by a traditional shaman, and his wife, who insisted on Christian forms of faith healing (Barnett 1957:32). The predicaments the two men were in, especially the latter, readily reflect the tension in their societies at the time between old and new beliefs. The general paranoia about witches and shamans may well have been a crystallization of the frustration
many felt at the impotence of the old system in dealing with the signs of social
dissolution around them. Whether the hatred initially originated in personal
disputes or from societal problems, these emotions played themselves out in
the evolution of the two religions and subsequently took different directions.

Handsome Lake quickly became a witch hunter and undertook to perse-
cute witches wherever he could. He soon overplayed his hand, however, and
was forced by popular opinion to halt the persecutions. Nonetheless, belief in
and fear of witchcraft was part of Seneca traditions, and the campaign against
witches gave Handsome Lake authority in the eyes of his people, placed him
firmly in the role of a conservative renewer of the old ways, and allowed him
to discredit opposition within the tribe. The establishment of the ritual of con-
fusion also permitted him to defuse the social problem of witchcraft without
making it a divisive issue among his people (Wallace 1972:261). Here the
addition of a Christian element — confession — was used to solve an old prob-
lem without having to get rid of any traditional beliefs. The new religion could,
in the future, become a maintainer of old traditions.

This was not the case with the Shakers, who seized on old beliefs as a
way of fighting against those who held power in the traditional system, main-
ly the shamans. The effect of introducing shamanistic elements such as shaking
into a nominally Christian cult was to make the cult more accessible to
Indians and provide the previously powerless individual with a weapon to
fight the tyranny of malevolent shamans (Barnett 1957:352). The frustration
of watching society crumble around oneself and seeing the ineffectiveness of
the shamans in preventing this could now be overcome by usurping the old
powers of the shaman and using them in the guise of the white man’s religion.
This empowerment of individual Shakers explains why the Shakers so devout-
ly emphasized that their religion was a Christian one and why they were firm-
ly united against shamanism in the first decades of their religion: they needed
desperately to differentiate themselves from the leaders of the old religion in
order to justify their existence. All this stood, of course, in contradiction to
the fact that they were quite similar in some basic practices and beliefs to the
old ways and produced the curious case that most ordinary Shakers, though
professing to be Christians, rejected the Bible. Illiteracy may have been one
reason for this, though certainly a latent anxiety about fully accepting the
white man’s religion plays a role as well. The only major schism that has
threatened the Shakers, in fact, has been the emergence of a faction that wants
to accept the Bible, though the majority of Shakers remain opposed to it.
Three out of four favor a direct relationship of the individual with God and
oppose a written text intervening in this relationship (Barnett 1957:143).
Thus it is evident that both new belief systems imported Christianity, while at the same time usurping the power of the shamans. Ultimately, however, the effects of this change were different. Slocum’s experience ultimately broke the power of the shamans by opening up the experience to anyone who believed; in a manner reminiscent of evangelical religions of the 19th century, power was passed onto the individual through “getting the shakes.” Rather than being an importation from Christianity, however, this phenomenon is very much in keeping with a Northwest Indian belief in gaining access to an individual’s own guardian spirits (Collins 1950:402). Handsome Lake, on the other hand, used the authority given to him by his experience to attack witches. Instead of creating an egalitarian form of shamanism, he reinforced the old beliefs by attacking an old enemy, thus appearing to confirm their existence. Where Slocum broke the power of the old hierarchy, Handsome Lake reaffirmed it. He restored traditional authority by simultaneously carrying out a pogrom against witches and preaching adherence to past ceremonies, albeit an adherence tempered with a tolerance for some of the benefits of white society, such as an agricultural lifestyle, building wooden houses, and education in new technologies (Wallace 1961:146-47). Thus by reaffirming the old ways, Handsome Lake was able to overcome resistance to importing new ways into Iroquois society.

Resistance to change, of course, could come from outside the society as well, and Wallace identifies the amount of resistance as an important factor in the success of revitalization movements (1956:278). In the case of Handsome Lake’s religion, there was very little direct suppression from outside, which naturally allowed for a freer growth of the religion. What did develop, as Robert Berkhofer observes, was a rivalry with other factions within the Seneca who had adopted a pro-Quaker or pro-Presbyterian orientation (1965:106). Within a few years this led to political conflicts based upon land deals with whites, but it never turned into a widespread repression of the religion itself.

In the Indian Shaker Church, on the other hand, active suppression accompanied white antipathy toward the religion. Whites often regarded the new religion as barbaric, with many sensing that the shaking in the religious ceremonies was an attempt to practice the traditional tamahnous which had been forbidden by the government (Ruby and Brown 1996:67). The government agent in charge of the reservation in the South Puget Sound area used rebukes and even jailing to discourage interest in the new religion, yet the obvious improvements in moral conduct that accompanied the spread of Shakerism eventually led the authorities to end repression. It has even been suggested that the overall repression of native religions in general, combined
with a hard-line attempt to Christianize the local Indians, provided an atmosphere which drove the Shakers to adopt a strong Christian orientation (Castile 1982:168).

Personal vendettas have also been cited as a factor in the growth of Shakerism, with Barnett suggesting that some people joined in order to oppose one of the local Christian missionaries (1957:48). While this may be true in a few cases, the growth and survival of the church appears to be more closely linked with its appeal to shamanistic-like beliefs and practices. The religion spread within a few decades to large parts of the Northwest cultural area, abetted largely by cures and the successful searches for missing persons that many believed the Shakers had carried out. Cures were essential in encouraging acceptance of Shakerism on the Olympic Peninsula and in Oregon (Barnett 1957:61), and an incident in which a Shaker from Western Washington helped the Yakima find the body of a drowned man enabled the religion to gain a footing east of the Cascades (Barnett 1957:70-71).

The use of cures to win converts underscores both the practicality and the conservatism of the Indians in choosing a religion, a phenomenon which was not limited to Washington and Oregon. Groups of Tlingit converted en masse to the Orthodox Church when the Russians vaccinated them against smallpox and thus showed their powers to be more effective than those of traditional Tlingit shamans (De Laguna 1996:223). Handsome Lake himself undoubtedly gained adherents because of the obvious improvements many Seneca saw after alcoholism declined amongst them (Wallace 1972:305). On the other hand, his attempts to close down the false face societies points out the limits of a people in accepting change and the need to retain as many of the older elements of a belief system as possible. It is this ability to consciously adjust the new belief system to the needs and desires of the people that separates Handsome Lake from John Slocum and accounts for much of the relative success of his religion as compared to the Shakers.

Handsome Lake learned early on to adapt the new religion to the needs of the Seneca. After his first set of three visions established the outlines of the religion by emphasizing the threat of an apocalypse as well as the necessity of personal virtue and honoring Seneca traditions in order to avoid it, Handsome Lake’s second set of visions established what Wallace terms a “social gospel” (1972:277-78). He eventually turned away from the excessive persecution of witches, dropped his attacks on the false face society, and abandoned his rejection of the whites’ education and technology. Instead, he responded to both the will of the people around him and what he perceived as their needs, and eventually emphasized issues surrounding domestic life, tribal unity, and acculturation to white lifestyles. Among the most important of these was the
first, for his pronouncements regarding mother-in-laws and what the division of labor should be helped break the matrilineal traditions of the Seneca and establish the credibility of the nuclear family. Handsome Lake alone did not initiate this transformation of Seneca society, but instead he laid the philosophical groundwork to accommodate the process of acculturation to a new economic system. It was now respectable for men to give up hunting and work in the fields.

Change, on the other hand, swept away John Slocum’s influence in the Shaker church before he could ever assert any real power, and he became more a figurehead than a theological force in the church. Although Marian Smith suggests that Slocum manipulated the introduction of shaking into the religion — “allowing his wife to demonstrate the new power by curing him with it” (1954:120) — in order to gain prestige in accordance with Coast Salish traditions, there is no evidence to support this idea. Instead, many factors in the later development of the religion indicate that it was more a ground swell movement feeding on the needs and desires of various individuals than a movement consciously directed by a single leader. The loose structure of the official church, the reliance on individual interpretation, and the general rejection of any form of written doctrine all suggest that, although the church was legally incorporated in 1910 in accordance with white European legal traditions, Shakerism was never a centrally controlled movement (Barnett 1957:9). Changes in Shaker beliefs often developed away from the original Christian orientation of Slocum’s first vision and towards traditional shamanistic beliefs: Slocum, for example, never claimed he could see the cause of a disease, though many converted Shakers who attempted to cure the sick later adopted this belief as the religion spread (Barnett 1957:194).

The lack of central control and any orientation to a specific tribe’s beliefs was likely the key which allowed Shakerism to spread to other Indian groups in the Pacific Northwest. Tribes from Vancouver Island to Northern California were familiar enough with shamanism and the basic tenets of Christianity, and thus could adapt the religion to their own needs. That Shakerism struck a receptive chord in other tribes’ displeasure with authoritarian shamans or white Indian agents is indicated in the variations of the story surrounding the birth of the religion. Yakima Indians, for example, claimed that Mary Slocum’s shakes scared away a shaman who had come to cure her husband (Barnett 1957:18), while other accounts state that it was an Indian agent who took flight on seeing her shake (Barnett 1957:20). What exactly happened the day that Mary Slocum first got the shakes cannot be accurately reconstructed from all the second- and third-hand accounts or the firsthand testimony written down some sixty years after the fact, which made
no specific mention of either figure actually being there (Castile 1982:173). The persistence of the shaman or Indian agent figure in many retellings, however, suggests that the character had some metaphorical value for those who told and heard the tale. Combined with the lack of interest that Barnett noted among almost all Shakers in the specifics of Slocum’s experience (1957:21), this suggests that the religion is valued more for the power it gives an individual than for its role in preserving a group identity.

Variations occur as well in the retelling of the Handsome Lake story, a phenomenon in keeping with the nature of any oral tradition. The fact, however, that the retelling of the story occupies a central role in the rituals of the Handsome Lake religion demonstrates the importance of the religion in maintaining a sense of tribal identity. The retellings are held during traditional Iroquois festivals, the Midwinter Ceremony and the Green Corn Dance, as well as on a special holiday, the Six Nations Meeting, developed specifically by the adherents of Handsome Lake to bring all the Iroquois together (Wallace 1972:8).

The absence of a particular tribal orientation among the Shakers, however, does not mean that their religion is wholly without any ethnic or racial significance. Although the Shakers explicitly emphasized their connection to Christianity and never took on the anti-white sentiments of other messianic cults, they also have never believed that their religion is for whites. Shakers believe their religion is intended for them — all Indians, not a specific tribe — and for this reason they do not encourage whites to join (Barnett 1957:141). The roots of this belief in the exclusivity of their religion probably lie in the unspoken ties to the shamanistic past: one of the major attractions of the Shakers for many Indians was their ability to cure through shaking, but this curing was almost never practiced on whites since it was believed that whites were immune to shaman magic (1957:173). The connection between Shakerism and their Indian identity can also be seen behind remarks such as the following by a 20th century Shaker lamenting the passing of the old days: “There are only a few John Slocum Shakers left. Nowadays people don’t get the power or don’t get it good. Too many people are turning into white men” (Barnett 1957:202).

These underlying ethnocentric attitudes in the Shakers stand in opposition to Wallace’s assessment of the religion as non-nativistic (1956:280). Although not openly professed and certainly lacking an anti-white sentiment, nativism is clearly present in these attitudes and in those central aspects of Shaker beliefs and practices that retain elements of shamanism. Indeed, the course of the Shakers’ development follows the pattern Wallace himself mentions for nativism in some revitalization movements, where nativistic elements
are essentially absent at first and develop only later (1956:278). The chief difference lies in that the Shakers' nativism did not develop as a result of opposition by the dominant society but rather as a result of a spontaneous, unconscious grassroots initiative in a leaderless movement.

It is precisely in these aspects — unconscious development and leaderlessness — that Shakerism deviates from Wallace's revitalization model. Although he allows great leeway for various forms of revitalization movements, Wallace does specifically define these movements to "as a deliberate, organized, conscious effort by members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture" (1956:265) and emphasizes the role of a charismatic leader. While Shakerism certainly was a deliberate attempt to create a more meaningful system of belief, the result — a professedly Christian cult with an inner core of shamanistic beliefs and practices — does not appear to have come from a consciously conceived project. Wallace's use of the Seneca example, where Handsome Lake did deliberately adapt the religion's doctrines to fit the needs of his people, may have influenced him in this aspect of his model.

Nevertheless, the Shaker church can still be considered a revitalization movement. After undergoing various adaptations by groups that picked up the religion, it soon entered into the routinization phase that Wallace describes when the Shaker church became a legally incorporated entity. The chief difference is that what it transformed and revitalized was not a group's culture, but the lives of individuals. In the absence of a charismatic leader, the Shaker movement became a generalized expression of individual needs and desires; it enabled Indians in different Northwest tribes to break the hegemony of the old shamanistic social structure and empowered them to adapt to the new requirements of the individualistic white society around them. It never became the marker of a specific tribal identity or "an expression of a somewhat nostalgic and deeply emotional identification with Indianness itself" (Wallace 1961:150) as Handsome Lake's religion did when it achieved its New Steady State. Instead, the Shaker church was a tool for individuals to adapt to a new situation and to bring some of the old ways along with them in the process. The increasing distance to the beliefs of the past probably accounts for the gradual decline in the number of Shakers since the first few generations.

The similarities between Handsome Lake's religion and the Shaker church show that humans have a common need to reform their belief systems in accordance with new situations. A strong central figure may be needed around which an entire culture can coalesce in order to revitalize itself, but, with or without a leader, a religion — whether it reforms an entire culture or just individuals — will pick what it needs and rely on its own past as a bridge to the present and future.
References


The present study explores African American cultural projection with special focus on its implosive nature. In particular, I will investigate identity formation through the creation of the (imagined) religious community: The Nation of Islam. The ultimate question explored is how a new racial/cultural self of the Black Muslim is created through a religious genealogy and praxis.

Richard M. Merelman understands cultural projection as “the conscious or unconscious effort by a social group and its allies to place new images of itself before other social groups, and before the general public” (1995:3). Merelman’s definition points to a relevant aspect of cultural dynamics as it reveals the responsive nature of minority attitude in cultural production in opposition to a subversive mainstream cultural industry; but it fails to acknowledge the implosive nature of the response that initiates and/or accompanies projection. In its simplified form, his theory ultimately renders African American cultural projection other-oriented and deprives African Americans of subject position. This is due to the misapprehension of cultural dynamics that, besides a responsive nature shown by Merelman, also entails authenticity, i.e., identity formation with the emphasis on inner-group dynamics.

I conceptualize cultural projection a) in the function of intercultural dialogue (which may well represent an asymmetrical relationship); b) as a part of cultural implosion. The latter term is borrowed from Jean Baudrillard to denote the deconstruction of the image a cultural group maintains of itself (often induced by the other) in favor of a new revitalizing one; that is, implosion marks the collapse of an old identity and the construction of a new cultural universe which is centripetal as it works toward group cohesion, and liberating as it bestows subjectivity on its members. Cultural implosion refers thus to the establishment of a revitalizing genealogy, i.e., a motivated cultural universe. This cultural frame generates projection that is both centripetal in that it reifies self-conception, and centrifugal regarding the opposing culture as the two are juxtaposed and coercion is foreseen.

Islam did not take root in the African American community until the first half of the 20th century for various reasons. The major reason is the dominance of WASP culture. This is also supported by Raboteau, who asserts,
“Under British North American slavery, it seems that the African religious heritage was lost” (1978:47) — be it African tribal religion or Muslim faith. In connection with WASP dominance, Lincoln adds exclusionist racial policies in order to maintain the racial status quo (1997:280), which is why Muslims could not enter the US in considerable numbers until the middle of the 20th century, and a “determined myopia,” that is, keeping the slaves without religion in order to prevent insurrections (1997:281). Beginning with the 18th century the conversion of slaves escalated, rendering Christianity as the de facto only choice for a considerable time.

The reason for the re-emergence of Islam among African Americans lies in the identification of Christianity with white oppression, and the incapability of black churches to offer alternatives. As Anthony Layng points out, traditional black churches became synonyms for “escapism and compliance with racism,” whereas more radical, non-Christian organizations such as the Black Muslims offered “values appropriate to a competitive, urbanized life-style, a set of prestige-bearing symbols and an orientation which is not dominated by white America” (1978:174).

There have been three relevant Islamic organizations among African Americans: the Moorish Science Temple (1913), which, in Lincoln’s words, marked a “mélange of Black nationalism and Christian revivalism with an awkward, confused admixture of the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad” (1997:284); the pseudo-Islamic Lost Found Nation of Islam founded in the 1930s by Wallace Fard and later fame marked by Elijah Muhammad and Louis Farrakhan; and the American Muslim Mission (AMM), the offshoot of the Nation under Elijah Muhammad’s son, Wallace Dean Muhammad, that, through the decultification of the Nation, re-integrated into orthodox Sunni Islam in the 1970s.

It was in the 1950s, under Elijah Muhammad, that the Nation of Islam became firmly established. This organization did not represent orthodox Islam either. As Lincoln puts it, “Muhammad drew freely upon the Bible, upon religious and secular mythology, and upon his own unique pedagogical constructs fashioned from experience” (1997:286). The Nation was a nationalistic organization with overtly racist overtones supported by a theology that explained black deprivation.

Cultural implosion of the Nation of Islam is embedded in a theology that is centered on the idea of a distinct Africa as a national, cultural, and religious heritage. African Americans constitute in this theology “the lost-and-found people of the original Black nation of the earth” (“America”). Africa is conceptualized as the “originary non-place,” a term Homi Bhabha borrows from Michel de Certeau, which refers to “something ‘unspoken’ which then pro-
roduces a chronology of events” (1992:146). Africa as a metaphoric vehicle fulfills a dual function: it constructs an imaginary genealogy and establishes separation on a rhetorical level. In a Freudian manner Bhabha explains, “To ‘unspeak’ is both to release from erasure and repression, and to reconstruct, reinscribe the elements of the known” (1992:146).

Its physicality thus transcended, Africa is turned into a symbol of distinction, an ideological construct of separation, as well as a psychic valve of self-assertion. Of course, this is not only valid for Black Muslims. As Charles A. Long argues Africa remained a persistent religious symbol for African American slaves (1997:26). The literary example of Countee Cullon’s “Heritage” (1997) shows that not only did the religio-cultural relevance of Africa continue being intact in the 20th century but, also, the anguish of visible difference in the midst of a white racist society, and the psychic need of self-definition. It must be noted that Africa has always been the ideologem for nationalistic (and for non-Christian) organizations such as Noble Drew Ali’s Moorish Science Temple. One of the founding fathers of black nationalism and of “a black civil religion” (Raboteau, 1995:65), Marcus Garvey, who lived and worked in the first half of the 20th century for “racial purity, racial integrity, and racial hegemony” (DeCaro, 1996:12), identified Africa as the primary setting for African Americans, where they should cherish a successful future in separation from whites. Africa became for him the destination of repatriation.

While the Nation of Islam borrowed Garvey’s concept of separation and his nationalistic spirit, it transformed Africa into a mythical symbol of origin. Black Muslims contend that blacks were the first humans on Earth; in fact, intrigued by number mysticism, they claim that 66 trillions years ago one of them created the Earth. 50,000 years ago a scientist named Shabazz founded the Tribe of Shabazz, the first tribe on Earth. African Americans are descendants of this tribe, whereas whites come from Adam. Whites were made out of blacks by a black man called Yakub (Jacob) 6,600 years ago (“Christianity vs Islam”). Overtly speculative as this explanation of origins appears to be, its value lies in the articulation of a different, useable past in the wake of ethnic consciousness, as well as in myth’s healing value in search of explanations. As Asante makes it clear, “In the language of the African American speaker, myth becomes an explanation for the human condition and an answer to the problem of psychological existence in a racist society” (1987:98).

From my point of view, Africa for Black Muslims is the means to historicize the cultural self by providing an ontological framework in space and time. On the one hand, I agree with Warren that “To claim an historical past and affirm a national culture is important to the psycho-affective equilibrium of a
people” (1990:19), on the other, I insist that the discovery of an useable past for an ethnic group is important beyond psychological factors in that it is accomplished in the beginning in opposition to and in function of a mainstream culture. In the case of the Nation of Islam, the experience of the Other surfaces as an inherent building block in the conceptualization of black identity. Furthermore, and especially with respect to the Garveyite heritage, the Black Muslim alternative can be regarded as a treatise “to decenter the Euro-Modernist national subject, that is to obliterate the correlations among whiteness, citizenship, and national subjectivity. . .” (Hanchard, 1996:99). Thus the establishment of difference is the underlying (political) principle of the Black Muslim theology. They seek difference through the doctrine of separation, a counter-theology, and practices in their everyday life connected to these issues such as dress codes, or eating habits.

Separation is striven for in many ways: psychologically, socially, culturally, economically, and geographically. Psychological separatism is backed by cultural separatism by way of the emphasis on an autonomous cultural self. Social and economic independence can be traced back to Jim Crowism and the self-help tradition, since African Americans were not allowed to participate in institutions and could only rely on self-help. Black Muslims stress the importance of family that is seen as a sanctuary in opposition to the external, racist society. Geographic separation is an influence of Garvey’s idea of repatriation, but Elijah Muhammad wanted an area in the United States separated for African Americans. In reality, Black Muslims live in tightly knit conglomerates around their mosques in urban areas, or have moved together to rural areas [see McCloud (1996:65-73)].

Baer and Singer’s argument that the Nation represents “a counter-culture and a utopian community” (1997:273) is explicit but it disregards the organization’s political content. It is more appropriate to suggest that, in the Nation’s rhetoric, separation has been achieved through counter-supremacy, i.e., racism. For Reid-Pharr, Black Muslims represent a “black (counter) modernity” (1996:137) and anti-Semitism is “one of the fictions by which many people, including African American people, express their alienation within modern society” (1996:136). In this way, fictionalizing and mythicizing difference become the rhetoric vehicles of the search for a cultural identity which has direct political and economic implications. So when Muhammad demands that “Allah has said the white race is a race of devils, created to be destroyed” (“America”), or that “the white race was not created for the hereafter. They were created for hell, and hell for them” (“Christianity vs Islam”), his words are not to be taken at their surface value, but rather their rhetoric projects self-assertion based on a mythicized genealogy: “a long, long, long,
long old time before the white man was ever thought of, we were ruling, not only this earth, but everything in the universe” (“Christianity vs Islam”). Difference is sought by a counter-hegemonic rhetoric imbedded in a theologizing context:

we are not equal, we are not born of the same father and mother, we are not the same people by nature the same. The white race a weaker physical people than the original black people. They came from the original black people, and through the grafting; they were made weaker. And by being made physically weaker, they were taught wickedness by their father, they weren’t taught to do good; he taught them to be evil; he taught them how to murder and lie when they were even in the mother womb. . . . (“Christianity vs Islam”)

It is true, however, that the Nation’s ideology shows a well recognizable development from an extremist, overtly racist position toward a more democratic, yet nationalistic creed. This is valid for its three prominent leaders: Elijah Muhammad, Malcolm X, and Louis Farrakhan. As I mentioned before, Muhammad’s successor, Wallace, has gone as far as to cleanse the Nation from its heretic views and joined the orthodox Sunni Islam.

The change toward a more sober ideology (his theology did not change) appears markedly in Elijah Muhammad’s speeches of the 1950s and of the 1970s until his death in 1975. Muhammad attacked Christianity, white society and its segregationist policies, as well as he advocated separation through economic independence (self-support) and religious independence by way of departure from the white man’s religion, Christianity. For Muhammad Christianity has been the ideological tool for whites to colonize African Americans, as well as a political means of controlling and of dividing the African American community:

But Christianity divides you. We are the results or victims of Christianity. Who made us spiritually blind? It was white Christians who went after our people and put them in chains 400 years and brought them here. (“Christianity vs Islam”)

Unlike Marcus Garvey, Muhammad envisioned complete separation within the United States instead of repatriation of African Americans to Africa (“Integrating with Evil”). Integration was not an option for him for the utter distrust against whites; neither did his theology change over the time. The way Muhammad addressed the same issues showed a change in tone. For instance, in a speech of 1974, Muhammad gave up the rhetoric concerning whites as devilish:

Honor and respect the man. Because he still has his flag. There is much that can be interchanged between them and us in that way of respect. . . . You have to respect everybody. And everybody will respect you. . . . We must show
the world that we are a Righteous people trying to set up the characteristics in our people of righteousness. (“1974 Saviour’s Day”)

Muhammad’s cultural implosion retained opposition but he allowed for communication with whites. As a prophet of self-preservation and self-help, he carried on preaching “the freedom to DO something for Black self and the freedom to THINK” (“The Blackman’s Duty”) as pivotal points of black liberation, but his ideology was more subtly pronounced.

His successor, Louis Farrakhan, reached back to Muhammad’s theology, but he diverged from him at several points. His thinking can be characterized in terms of the black/white binary, too, especially poignant regarding his attitude toward Jews. His book, *The Secret Relationship Between Blacks and Jews* (1991), shows, as Henry Louis Gates wittily, Farrakhan’s “single unhealthy obsession” (1996:143), which is why Hudson calls him an “anti-Semitic firebrand” (1998-2000). Farrakhan enters politics more readily. Most prominently, he sided with Jesse Jackson in his presidential campaign in 1984, he registered to vote (Gates, 1996:143), as well as he launched the Million Men March on October 16, 1995. Both events show a change in tone in that Farrakhan sought to address a wider public beyond the members of the Nation. As Hudson explains in connection with the Million Men’s March, Farrakhan developed “a secular, coalition-based movement inclusive of the broad spectrum of African American political thought” (1998-2000).

The Nation of Islam’s history displays a clash between sectarianism and orthodoxy, as well as separatism and integration. On the one hand, the Nation as an Islamic organization is continuously confronted with the question of orthodoxy. In the 1990s Farrakhan visited several leaders of the third world. Though he must have encountered orthodox Islam as Malcolm X or Wallace Muhammad did during their journey to Africa and the Middle East, Farrakhan’s emphasis has remained on racial solidarity biased against whites, for which a distinct religio-cultural identity serves a prime tool. On the other hand, integration as opposed to separation has been a constant question domestically. This question came to the foreground and became burning especially in the 1960s during the Civil Rights Movement, when the Black Muslim alternative appeared sectarian in contrast to the non-violent action and civil disobedience program of Civil Righters striving for racial equality and integration. In the turmoil of the 1960s and its aftermath the Nation chose the nationalistic agenda and a non-orthodox creed, which has kept these questions ever since unresolved.

The exclusive emphasis on family and the non-participation in social institutions accentuates for Black Muslims that separation from the Other is the natural state of African Americans. However, Farrakhan conceptualizes
separation as economic separation in the first place and not as physical separation. In an interview with Henry Louis Gates, in which Farrakhan calls for reparations for African Americans that establish the basis for a self-serving system, he verbalizes this explicitly: “To take a more responsible position for ourselves [. . .] is the only way to destroy the racist mind. You don’t destroy it with laws. You destroy it with concrete achievements that demonstrate your wisdom” (Gates 1996:151). Economic independence based on traditional self-help instead of Garveyite repatriation and implosion instead of exodus form his platform.

Especially in early times of the Black Muslim phenomenon, believers tended to evaluate themselves on the basis of the dichotomy of black and white. The “unhomely” feeling concerning America, i.e., the “estranging sense of relocation of the home and the world in an unhallowed place” (Bhabha 1992:141), including the experience of racial oppression has led them to invent a new identity that is based on a novel, transpatial genealogy. They have projected a new image of themselves that, in the first place, advocates difference and separation. However, this kind of cultural implosion still conceptualizes black identity in the function of the significant Other, i.e., the white society. This presents one explanation why Black Muslims cannot grasp the imagination of the African American community. West evaluates the phase of the Nation under Elijah Muhammad:

[black supremacist doctrine] is crippling for a despised people struggling for freedom, in that one’s eyes should be on the prize, not on the perpetrator of one’s oppression. In short, Elijah Muhammad’s project remained captive to the supremacy game—a game mastered by the white racists he opposed and imitated with his black supremacist doctrine. (1993:99-100)

Even if under Farrakhan the Nation both returned to Muhammad, in that Farrakhan refused Wallace Muhammad’s Sunni Islam, and departed from him, in that he entered politics and opened to other segments of the African American community, the Nation has remained fixated on racial difference, and, with that, it often rejects the achievements connected to the West and modernity:

What the Nation of Islam has done most successfully [. . .] is to reshape the anxiety that the black subject exists only on the periphery of Western modernity into general antipathy for the very structures of modernity, including the notions of civility and rationality that mitigate against anti-Semitic discourse and practice. (Reid-Pharr 1996:137)

For the majority of African Americans racial identity is but one aspect of their identity. Ali A. Mazrui (1996) proves, too, that African American Muslims share a number of subject positions deriving from a stratified identi-
ty according to nationality, race, religion, and Americanness; and as Byran O. Jackson, denouncing race as the “primary source of group identification for all black Americans,” claims: “the black experience is multidimensional or pluralist in its orientation” (1987:634). Any cultural implosion can be successful if it entails relevant factors of the experience of a (minority) group: most prominently, the experience of race/ethnicity, gender, and class, as well as religion and culture.

References:

Mazrui, A.A. 1996. ‘Between the Crescent and the Star-Spangled Banner: American Muslims and US Foreign Policy,’ in *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 72.3 (July), pp. 493-506.
In the 1920s, for the first time in American history, the black tradition in the arts appeared as separate from the white culture, with a complex identity and even with a dominant influence.

The great War, with its ideals of self-determination and emancipation of nations, was a catalyser for the black renaissance of the 1920s. Another favourable condition was the racial transformation of Harlem into a black community, called by Alain Locke (1925:17) “the race capital” of the world (between 1920 and 1930, 118 thousand whites left Harlem and 87 thousand Negroes arrived).

“The New Negro discovered his own cultural heritage, including white tradition as well as the black one” (Douglas 1995:303). The war determined a new sense of culture as an international activity and gave to African American writers and artists a worldwide audience, a powerful aid in their fight against racial and social injustice. The result was a non-separatist movement: the New Negro did not want distance from white America, but more power and recognition within it.

The strategy of black Manhattan was to emphasize Negro achievement and the fact that Negro culture, no matter how troubled it might have been, contained the real riches of American life.

In his anthology “The New Negro”, Alain Locke explained the riches of the black heritage and underlined the importance of the recently discovered abstract art of Africa for the European avant-garde fine-arts. He claimed that the influence of African art saved European artists from “decadence and sterility” and that the New Negro became “a conscious contributor, collaborator and participant in American civilization” (Locke 1925:73).

What the two generations of Harlem blacks, the older, more genteel group led by DuBois at The Crisis and the younger, more radical team of Fire! had in common, despite their self-conscious differences, was the belief that the artistic and literary achievement could do more for the black cause than any economic or political gains they might achieve.
The Harlem Renaissance is based upon the idea that “a people that has produced art and literature has never been looked upon as distinctly inferior” (Johnson 1922:54).

According to D. L. Lewis (1997:37), the Harlem Renaissance evolved through three stages.

The first begins in 1919 with soldiers returning from the Great War and ends in 1923 with the publication of Toomer’s *Cane*; it was deeply influenced by white artists and writers, all of them fascinated with the life of people of colour.

The second stage, from early 1924 to mid 1926 was presided over by the Civil Rights Establishment of the Urban League and the NAACP, a collaboration of “Negrotarian” whites and the Talented Tenth.

The last phase ends with the Harlem Riot of March 1935; it was increasingly dominated by the African American artists and writers themselves.

Being “essentially inspired, dominated and ultimately corrupted by white patronage” (Lewis 1997: 47) and because it adopted unrealistic objectives for its time, the Harlem Renaissance failed in its purpose of improving race relation. This aim was attained after World War II, by its successors (Martin Luther King’s campaign, the “Black Arts” movement of the late 1960s, which emphasized the separate nature of black artistic self-expression, etc.)

Harlem authors were determined to close the gap between white and black literary productivity and they published in the years 1925 — 35 a long series of works, including twenty six novels, ten volumes of poetry, five Broadway plays, and a great number of short stories and essays. DuBois and Johnson wrote novels and poetry as well as history, political commentary, and propaganda. Harlem’s younger writers, led by Hurston and Hughes, tried to avoid dependency on white literary models by drawing their art directly from black music and folklore.

But, as Ann Douglas states in *Terrible Honesty*, “Harlem’s new literature, whatever its sources, never exerted on the broader culture anything like the influence of the contemporary black music ... Most of the literature of Harlem did not survive its time; much of it went out of print for decades” (Douglas 1995:85). This process was determined by economic, social and cultural causes, among which racial inequalities were on the first place. Douglas mentions the cases of masterpieces written by Hurston, Hughes, Larsen, and Thurman which “are among the best literature to come out of New York in the modern era, yet they were reissued and recognized only after World War II” (One can add to this list the best writings of Toomer and McKay). Lewis says that “what is known with certainty is that Larsen wrote one of the three best novels of the Renaissance” (Lewis 1997: 231). Nella Larsen also can be considered as
one of the most prominent figures of the American literature; her career, destroyed by the accusation of plagiarism for *Sanctuary*, illustrates the unequal treatment accorded to black and white writers. And so the American literature lost a promising writer, announced by two important and well received novels: *Quicksand* was prised by DuBois as the “best piece of fiction that Negro American has produced since the heyday of Chesnutt” (DuBois 1973:359).

*Passing* was highly appreciated by one reviewer for capturing, as did no other novel of the genre, the psychology of racial passing. Larsen’s novels are based on a sort of Hegelian dialectics, containing a recurrent pattern of the unity of contraries. For instance, “the contradictory impulses of Larsen’s novels are clear in the psychic divisions of her characters, divisions especially apparent in Helga Crane of *Quicksand*” (McDowell 1996:xvii). Most critics explain this dualism by Helga’s mixed racial heritage; therefore the origins of the plot and of the characters’ behaviour can be located in the racial dualism, in the heterogeneous society differentiated in ethnic groups and classes. Alienated from both races, Helga is defeated by her struggle to reconcile the psychic confusion that this mixed heritage creates. Helga is divided psychically between a desire for sexual fulfilment and a longing for social respectability. As McDowell notes “Helga’s psychic struggle seems the same war fought by Nella Larsen between narrative expression and repression of female sexuality as literary subject” (McDowell 1996:xvii). And the novel, like its protagonist, seems to have a twofold character, that of a female sexual confession and that of a novel of racial uplift.

Helga’s repressive environment is replaced by Harlem which in Harlem Renaissance mythology is the site of sexual freedom; but later on, wanting to avoid her sexual identity and feelings, Helga escapes to Copenhagen. The inner Helga’s divisions are reflected in an extreme duality of hot / cold, dark / light, south / north, and essentially black / white.

In Larsen’s second novel, *Passing* (1929), this duality is analysed in a dialectic relation, passing the racial barrier appearing as a possible way of unifying the contraries.

The novel represents a support for a quite complete and scientific theory of passing, a phenomenon which is discussed repeatedly in the text. For instance: “She wished to find out about this hazardous business of *passing*, this breaking away from all that was familiar and friendly to take one’s chances in another environment, not entirely strange, perhaps, but certainly not entirely friendly” (Larsen 1996:157); “It’s funny about *passing*, we disapprove of it and at the same time condone it. It excites our contempt and yet
we rather admire it ...” (Larsen 1996:185); “Instinct of the race to survive and expand” (Larsen 1996:186).

Even Clare’s tragic end can be interpreted as expressing the author’s thesis about passing as a deadlock, as an unreliable solution. By adopting this point of view the ending of *Passing* appears as a natural one, announced during the novel by Irene’s repeated states of fear, by her or Gertrude’s forebodings and even by her first remembrance of Clare: at the beginning, Irene evokes Clare’s father, killed in a silly saloon-fight; quite symmetrically, the novel ends with Clare’s death, possibly pushed through the window by Irene.

It is true that the endings of *Quicksand* and *Passing* were criticized for sacrificing the unconventional heroines to the most conventional fates of narrative history: marriage and death, respectively. For instance, Nathan Irving Huggins considers that “Nella Larsen constructs a perfunctory and entirely unsatisfactory denouement” (Huggins 1971:160). But a deeper analysis can justify these endings. Clare’s death appears as a logical consequence of the unreliable or even impossible passing in the circumstances of the racial dualism. Maybe the title can be interpreted as referring also to passing away.

On the other hand, the main plot unfolds at a psychological level; it provides a sort of psycho-analytic reading. The reader acknowledges Irene’s judgements and feelings; Irene’s psyche is actually the place of the action which becomes “the walled prison of Irene’s thoughts” (Larsen 1996:224). Clare and Brian are seen through Irene’s eyes, even their love affair is presented through Irene’s reflections or pains and it is not certified by some concrete facts. And this psychological world needs a final event to anchor it to the real world; Clare’s death is such a shocking event and its ambiguity allows a modern open-ending.

Another explanation of these apparently abrupt and contradictory endings is linked to issues of black female sexuality, to the peculiar pressures on Larsen as a woman writer during the male-dominated Harlem Renaissance. This double oppression, racial and sexual, explains why even in Larsen’s time, the Freudian 1920s, the Jazz Age of sexual abandon and “free love”, black women’s novels preserve their reticence about sexuality. So “while these endings appear to be concessions to the dominant ideology of romance-marriage and motherhood-viewed from a feminist perspective, they become much more radical and original efforts to acknowledge a female sexual experience, most often repressed in both literary and social realms” (McDowell 1996: xii). One can conclude that Larsen’s novels, including their controversial endings, are valuable expressions of Harlem Renaissance epoch.

If a critic like Huggins does not appreciate the high value of Larsen’s novels and dedicates only four pages to her work (1971:157-161), this can be
explained only by his superficial reading; this superficiality is certified by mis-
takes like “the choice to become white ... turns out to be essentially sterile.
The Bellews have no children” (Huggins 1971:159). Or Clare has a daughter
named Margery, ten years old, who studies in Switzerland and who is men-
tioned many times in the text (Larsen 1996:156, 166, 167, 168, 197, 208, 210,
225, 234, 236). And Margery is related to some possible alternative endings
of the story: Clare has to go to Europe in March to take Margery and so
Irene’s problem can be solved; Irene hopes for a reason for Clare’s earlier
departure, even “if it were that Clare’s Margery were ill, or dying” (Larsen

Huggins uses the term schizophrenia for the racial dualism or for a char-
acterization of Larsen’s novels (1971:159, 161). In reality the relationship
passing / remaining black is dialectic, not dichotomic. Clare finally shifts from
passing to coming back despite the dangers she assumes for being again “that
other that I once thought I was glad to be free of” (Larsen 1996:145). On the
contrary Irene participates to social uplift programs such as the Negro
Welfare League and she clearly chooses to remain black; but she uses a sort
of passing “for an Italian, a Spaniard, a Mexican, or a gipsy” in public places
(“it was the idea of being rejected from any place”) (Larsen 1996:150). Or,
when she faces Clare’s racist husband, she said humorously: “so you dislike
Negroes, Mr. Bellow?” (Larsen 1996:172).

The two solutions are connected also by their impossibility of bringing
happiness. Clare — the embodiment of passing — is desperately alone; finally
Irene is alone and unsafe too, and she concludes “I’m beginning to believe
that no one is ever completely happy, or free, or safe” (Larsen 1996:196).

Nella Larsen realizes a complex relationship between the dual protago-
nists — Irene and Clare — which allows a large scale of interpretations, going
from schizophrenia to a lesbian reading (McDowell 1996: xxiii). Irene, the
central consciousness of the narrative, tries all the time to break her danger-
ous relation with Clare but, at the same time, she is deeply attracted to her:
“Actually they were strangers. Strangers even in their social consciousness”
(Larsen 1996:186). Clare is selfish, wilful and disturbing (176), exquisite,
golden(203), incredibly beautiful (176), daring and having (153), stepping
always on the edge of danger, with strange, hypnotic eyes (161), catlike (144),
etc. Irene passes the whole range of feelings, a “flood”: “sense of irritation”,
resentment changing gradually to a silent, somewhat grudging admiration,
“inner disturbance”, fear, raising anger, fascination, rage and hate.

One can thus perceive Irene’s self-portrait: safe, altruistic, with a “feeling
of permanence”, a “sense of security” and a life “which she had so admirably
arranged for them all”, having “a special talent for understanding” her hus-

band and a powerful social consciousness (Larsen 1996:187). But Irene can be analysed as an unreliable narrator “confused and deluded about herself, her motivations and much that she experiences” (McDowell 1996: xxiv). So Irene appears not to be so perfect as she imagines she is.

The same narrator sketches (at the level of Irene’s feelings and states) suggestive and succinct portraits of the two husbands. There is again a dual pair — the narrow minded racist and the black talented man “ever wanting something that he couldn’t have” (for racial motives) which underlines the racial problem of the novel (Larsen 1996:148).

The style of the whole novel is highly suggestive and concise. One can mention the revealing description of Chicago on a hot day in August or the very precise phrases describing the elapsed time: “twelve years of marriages, births, deaths, and the war”, “filling in the gap of twelve years with talk” (Larsen 1996:155); on the emphasis of the heterogeneous “bright crowd” of a dance party in Harlem: “Young men, old men, white men, black men, youthful women, older women, pink women, golden women, fat men, thin men, short men, stout women, slim women, stately women, small women moved by” and the conclusion: “Everybody seems to be here and a few more” (Larsen 1996:204).

Irene’s serious and sensitive tone is improved by the use of satire or irony. For instance, after being in a dramatic situation, “Irene made some small attempts to repair the damage that the heat and crowds has done to her appearance “ or one can mention the use of a “magic carpet” for a pleasant world (Larsen 1996:147).

*Passing* has a very interesting theatrical construction. There are few characters but they symbolize social or even abstract concepts. The novel is divided into three parts like the acts of a play, each part containing four sections, resembling the scenes by a sort of unity of time and place.

Nella Larsen draws a vivid and multivalent picture of the problems of the “so cursed Ham’s dark children” (Larsen 1996:226), especially of those who have to suffer as women and for the race as well.

In her construction, in her research of the racial and feminine identity she captures the essence of Harlem Renaissance, with its promises, realizations and limits. And, as McDowell underlines, “she has to be regarded as something of a pioneer, a trailblazer in the Afro-American female literary tradition” (1996: xxxi).
References:


It is already common knowledge that the media present various aspects of reality from very different perspectives, dictated by interests that often remain unknown to the audience. One factor which influences enormously the mediation of events in the press consists in ‘power relations within the social system [...] including relations of class, gender, and ethnicity’ (Fairclough 1995:12). This type of mediation is ideological because it attempts to maintain such power relations to the advantage of the ‘power-holders’ (Fairclough 1989:51-52). One of the main goals of Critical Discourse Analysis, the theoretical framework used in this paper, is to reveal how this effect is achieved linguistically.

In most cases, analysts of media discourse focus on how power relations are enacted in news reports on domestic affairs, on how they function within a certain society. However, such relations can also take shape at an international level. There is a new discourse of power that emerged in Europe several decades ago: the discourse of the European Union. It is a discourse that imposes obligations on and grants rights to not only member states, but also and especially candidate states, which must satisfy very strict criteria in order to be accepted in the Union.

My interest in how the British media chose to represent the power relations between the European Union and a candidate state such as Romania has been aroused by the scandal caused in Romania by the broadcast and the publication in the British media of an event concerning human rights, European integration and the Romanian Roma community. I have therefore carried out a case study on two news reports of the event, dated September 30, 2003, the very beginning of what would degenerate into a national and international scandal. The news reports come from the BBC News World Edition online and from the Scottish broadsheet, the Scotsman. My reason for choosing these particular news reports is that the BBC broadcasts drew a very angry response from the Roma community, while the Scotsman news report was widely quoted in the Romanian press. I have used as tool of analysis the CDA framework established by Norman Fairclough:

“(1) Focus upon a social problem which has a semiotic aspect. [...]”
(2) Identify obstacles to it being tackled, through analysis of:
   a) the network of practices within which it is located
   b) the relationship of semiosis to other elements within the particular
      practice(s) concerned
   c) the discourse (the semiosis) itself
      (i) structural analysis: the order of discourse
      (ii) textual/interactional analysis — both interdiscursive
          analysis and linguistic and semiotic analysis […]

(3) Consider whether the social order (network of practices) in a sense
    ‘needs’ the problem. […]

(4) Identify possible ways past the obstacles. […]

(5) Reflect critically on the analysis (1-4).” (2003:209-210; see also
    Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999:53-73)

The present analysis lays emphasis on the first two stages of the frame-
work mentioned above and, within the second stage, on the linguistic analy-
sis.

(1) The social problem with a semiotic aspect that has triggered this
    study is the representation in the British media of a social practice specific to
    the Roma community, namely the ancient tradition of marriage between
    underage children. The social practice is located in this case within the
    Romanian Roma community: the wedding of king Cioabã’s 12-year-old daugh-
    ter to a 15-year-old groom. The event was widely mediatised both in Europe
    and in the States and led to intense debates on the issue of human rights vs.
    tradition. For the purposes of this case study, I have focused only on the two
    news reports in the British media that I have mentioned above. The problem
    here is the way in which they legitimise, primarily for the British audience, the
    power of the European Parliament (through the voice of its representative,
    Baroness Emma Nicholson) especially over the Romanian authorities, but
    also over the Romanian Roma community.

(2) Obstacles to it being tackled
   a) The problem is located in the networks of text production and con-
      sumption in the British written press; on a more general level, it is located in
      the network of British media practices. The latter interacts with the network
      of the European Parliament’s human rights legislation practices and with the
      network of British government practices. Obstacles may be identified in the
      manner in which British media practices are influenced in the process of text
      production by political practices (the position of the UK within the European
      Union) and by the network of consumption practices (what they project as
ideal readers). These problems will automatically persist at the level of discourse (see below).

b) There are also obstacles in connection to the role that semiosis plays within the practice concerned. With respect to media practices, critical linguists have identified two main aspects that are fundamental in the mediation of events: the economic aspect and the political one (Fairclough 1989, Ch. 3 and 1995, Ch. 3; Fowler 1991, Ch. 8). Both aspects are relevant to the present analysis. The economic factor has to do with the newspapers’ struggle to ensure a large readership. In the British media, the topic of the Roma community falls into the category of exotic, entertaining subjects, with considerable appeal to readers. However, not any representation of the Roma community would fulfil the audience’s expectations from this point of view, but only one that would enable readers to reinforce their stereotypes about what such a community should be like.

On the other hand, newspapers reflect a certain perspective on the world, which is where the political factor operates. The UK is a member of the European Union and Romania only a candidate state, which almost invariably finds itself in the middle of some international scandal. Under these circumstances, it is to be expected that British readers (but Western European readers as well), have acquired over the years, through images in the media, a certain ‘common ground’ knowledge about Romania. Therefore British newspapers, which address what they project as an ideal audience, constantly reinforce this ‘common ground’ or ‘common sense’ beliefs (Fairclough 1989, 1995; Fowler 1991). In the case of the two news reports analysed here, the main assumptions are the following: the European Parliament is right, Romania has done badly again, and the Roma community’s traditions are savage. Such stereotypes and common sense assumptions actually form an ideological basis that justifies to British readers the clear-cut position of power held by the European Union’s representatives in the mediation of the event.

c) The discourse

i) The structural analysis: the order of discourse

Fairclough defines the order of discourse as ‘a particular combination or configuration of genres, discourses and styles which constitutes the discoursal aspect of a network of social practices,’ (2003: 220). The two news stories are part of a genre chain that implies the selection and transformation of political speeches, interviews, European legislative provisions, press agency reports and other news reports. They may also influence other political speeches and news reports (see the attitude of the Romanian politicians and of the Romanian media). The two news reports are part of a chain of previous reports on the Romanian Roma as emigrants who pose a serious problem to
the Occident and will in their turn have an impact on future reports on similar issues. Notable in terms of discursive practices is the dominance of certain discourses, considered central (discourses of the power holders) over discourses seen as marginal — the discourse of categories such as minorities and emigrants.

ii) Interdiscursive analysis

The two texts analysed here have the typical structure of the hard news report: Headline — Lead — Events — Commentary (Bell 1991: 169-171). They also draw upon the genre of interview (the participants’ and the observers’ opinions are extensively reported in the two news stories), which is not uncommon in the case of hard news reports. However, given the considerable number of quotations, we may consider the reports instances of a mixed genre — in-between hard news and news feature, which would be a direct consequence of the journalists’ intent to present the topic as entertaining.

- Linguistic analysis

At this level, the first important aspect deals with how different genres and discourses are merged into a particular text, i.e. with ‘intertextuality’ (Fairclough 2003: 47-55). For the purposes of this analysis, I am interested in how different voices and the different discourses specific to each different voice are combined into the texts of the two news reports. First of all, there are a significant number of voices present in both texts: Baroness Nicholson’s voice, the voice of the Cioabă family’s spokeswoman, voices of the bride’s friends, voices of Roma officials (only in the Scotsman news report) and of Romanian human rights activists (only in the BBC news report), to enumerate only the most important ones. Almost each of them stands for a different discourse: the discourse of the European Union, the discourse of discrimination against women, the discourse of tradition and the discourse of human rights.

The preferred method of integrating most of the voices in the text is, in both news stories, direct reporting, apparently an indication of objectivity and of openness to dialogue. However, there is one voice which is incorporated in the text with the help of indirect reporting, in spite of the importance it has for the whole message: the voice of MEP Baroness Nicholson. Of the three instances in which her statements are included in the Scotsman news report and the six in the BBC news report, Baroness Nicholson is directly quoted only once in each case (the BBC news report also partially quotes her descriptions three times, but not the whole utterance). Is this form of indirect reporting indicative of anything relevant for the present analysis?

Baroness Nicholson’s voice is contextualised mainly by means of the ‘narrative report of speech acts’ (Fairclough 2003: 49), such as ‘demanded’
and ‘warned.’ Thus she is given, in the two news reports, a position of authority, which in reality she may not have so intransigently adopted. Actually, what she expressed as a modalised demand (‘I hope and believe that the Romanian authorities will immediately remove this little girl from danger’) becomes through indirect reporting a prescription: ‘The Euro MP Emma Nicholson [...] yesterday demanded that the police step in to remove the girl from harm’ (the Scotsman) or ‘British MEP Emma Nicholson demanded that both Ana-Maria and her husband be taken into care’ (the BBC news report). Moreover, the position of power revealed by means of indirect reporting perfectly matches the main authorial claim, namely that Romania disrespects fundamental human rights in the Scotsman and that Romania fails to fulfil its commitments to the European Union in the BBC news report. In both cases, the European Union finds itself forced to require Romania to toe the line. This attitude is obvious in the headlines: ‘MEP demands police take gypsy girl, 12, from teenage husband after rape claims’ (the Scotsman) and ‘Action demanded over child bride’ (the BBC news report) and will prevail in the text of both news reports.

Secondly, the linguistic analysis looks, from the perspective of CDA, into what Fairclough calls the ‘three types of value that formal features may have’ (1989:112), i.e. experiential, relational and expressive. The experiential value indicates how the producers of a text represent in the text their experience of the world (‘knowledge and beliefs’). The relational value shows how social relationships are ‘enacted’ in the text and, on a superior level, in the discourse. Finally, the expressive value is concerned with the text producers’ evaluation of the topic of the text and, implicitly, with how the identity of the social actors is established in the text. The three values may and often do co-exist in the formal features of a text and they may be traced at both the lexical and the grammatical levels. This classification stems form Halliday’s distinction between the ideational, the interpersonal and the textual functions of language (Halliday 1994). CDA prefers the concept of ‘values’ and, later on, of ‘types of meaning’ — representation, action, and identification (Fairclough 2003).

The focus of this analysis, which is not exhaustive, will be on representations (the experiential value) with some brief comments on social relations and identities.

Experience is reflected in a clause by means of process types, which are carried out in the grammatical system of transitivity. They consist of the process itself (the verb phrase), the participants in it (noun phrases) and the circumstances (adverbials and prepositional phrases). There are six main types of processes: material, mental, relational, verbal, existential and
behavioural. Together they project an image of the world that the readers may or may not accept as valid (Halliday 1994; Fairclough 1989, 1995, 2003; Fowler 1991).

How is the Roma community represented in the two news reports?

I will begin by analysing the representation of the bride, after all the character that caused the events.

She is mainly featured as Patient/Affected in material processes: ‘forced into a marriage to a 15-year-old boy’ and ‘had been raped’ in the Scotsman and ‘was reluctantly married’ and ‘was forced to consummate the marriage’ in the BBC news report. In the BBC news report she also appears as Target in passive verbal processes of the type ‘had been promised in marriage’ and ‘was persuaded to return.’ As well, she is given the attributes ‘sad’ and ‘sullen’ in the relational process: ‘Ana-Maria looked sad and sullen during the ceremony’. In both reports she is obviously portrayed as a victim, which was to be expected. What is interesting from this point of view, however, is the suppression of agency from the clauses mentioned above. One would presuppose that her family promised her into marriage, her father forced her to marry and her husband raped her. The impression conveyed by the exclusion of agency is that the whole community contributed to the girl’s predicament. While it is true that the Scotsman also includes a sentence in which the father is the agent: ‘However, her father, Romanian Florin Cioabă, had the girl brought back and forced into the wedding,’ the impression of general involvement cannot be erased due to the large number of passive constructions without an agent. The only material processes in which the girl participates describe her unsuccessful attempt to flee from the church.

Another significant aspect of her depiction is that both news reports clearly choose to use her name — 4 times in the Scotsman and 5 times in the BBC news report — in order to heighten the readers’ feeling of sympathy for her.

Florin Cioabă, her father, is pictured as Actor in a material process by which he coerces his daughter to get married (see above). He is also the main Actor in material processes describing the organisation of the wedding: ‘Mr Cioab […] had invited hundreds of guests to a three-day wedding party...’ (the Scotsman) and ‘as her father conducted the wedding service’ (the BBC news report). The Scotsman also presents him in verbal processes as Sayer. The Receivers are journalists and the Verbiage consists of relational processes that describe the effects of the marriage from the Roma king’s point of view: ‘Today is a really happy day for the royal house, one of the happiest of my life… It’s better for the children to marry young.’ But the Scotsman also mentions him as Sayer in two reported verbal process where he defies medical
authorities: ‘[he] defied an investigation,’ and refused ‘to allow medical authorities to examine her.’ The outcome is a representation of Florin Cioabâ as an insensitive father, with absolute power over his family and a high position within his community. At this point I must mention that the Scotsman quotes two Roma officials who defend the marriage and also the image of their king who ‘wouldn’t have done something against her [his daughter’s] will.’ Nevertheless, their credibility is undermined by the authorial claim, which, as seen above, clearly favours the rather negative image of the Roma king.

The Roma community is present to a considerable extent in the two news reports. The Roma social actors are either named: the ‘princess’ Ana-Maria, the ‘king’ Florin Cioabâ, the groom Biri Mihai, the Cioabâ family’s spokeswoman, Dana Chendea, the bride’s aunt, Luminia Cioab, and the representative of the Roma Centre for public policies, Vasile Ionescu. The groups are in their turn specific groups: friends of the bride’s, wedding guests, hundreds of guests, bridesmaids, family members, Roma officials, and observers at the wedding. While such a representation may point towards a non-discriminatory and objective depiction of the Romanian Roma community, its purpose is actually different. On the one hand it convincingly demonstrates to British readers that, at the beginning of the 21st century, such a community, with all its problems, does exist. The victim, deserving of their sympathy, is real, her king-priest-tyrant father is real, and the bloodied bedsheet, the slaughtered pigs and thousands of bottles of wine are also real, and they are all located in Romania. The representation verges on entertainment and the named characters add to the sensationalism of the story. On the other hand, the colourful presence of the Roma community is contrasted with the absence of the Romanian authorities. The conclusion further supports the authorial claims in the two stories: ‘Look what serious problems they have on their hands and they choose to ignore them!’

The Romanian authorities are represented in mental processes as non-Experiencers: ‘authorities traditionally turn a blind eye’ (twice in the Scotsman and once in the BBC news report) and in verbal processes as non-Sayers: ‘the government would not comment on the incident.’ By contrast, the police appear as Actors in a material process, but on the wrong side: ‘Police directed traffic outside Ana-Maria’s wedding, taking no action to prevent it.’

The Romanian authorities are described as classified groups: ‘the authorities,’ ‘the police’ and the ‘government.’ Such categorisation is, according to Fowler, ‘a discursive practice for discrimination’ (1991:93). They have all failed, as usual. What is even worse, by a relationship of metonymy, they are eventually referred to as ‘Romania’.
It can be further illustrated that a more individualised presence of the Romanian authorities is deliberately avoided. Firstly, the *Scotsman* mentions king Cioabă’s defiance of the medical authorities willing to investigate the rape (Could it be that some higher authorities actually ordered the investigation?). Secondly, the BBC report quotes two Romanian representatives of organisations fighting for human rights who support the authorial claims and criticise the attitude of the Romanian authorities (Would it have been impossible to find at least one Romanian official eager to comment on the event?).

The other main actor in the two news reports is MEP Baroness Nicholson, actually representative not only of the European Parliament, but of the European Union as such and of the Occident. In the absence of the Romanian authorities, her voice emerges as the only official voice in the two reports. From the point of view of representation, she is depicted as Sayer in mainly reported verbal process (see above as well), in which the implicit Target is the Romanian authorities, while the Receivers are not only the Romanian authorities, but officials in the European Union, journalists and, ultimately, citizens of the European Union. She ‘demanded,’ ‘warned,’ ‘wrote,’ ‘asked’ and ‘described.’ In terms of the representations included in the Verbiage of these verbal processes, it is important to notice that they give the wedding the following attributes: ‘an exceptionally grave breach of children’s rights,’ ‘a high misdemeanour,’ ‘[something] utterly disgusting,’ and ‘a further blow to Romania’s credibility in the area of children’s rights.’ The authorial voices of the two news reports complete her representation of the wedding by ‘simply’ adding the information that ‘Among Romania’s Roma [...] child marriages are common’ (the *Scotsman*) or that ‘the practice of school-age marriages remains common in the Roma community’ (the BBC news report).

After analysing the other representations of social actors in the two news reports, it becomes conspicuous that Baroness Nicholson’s representation places her in a position of power both over the Romanian authorities and the Romanian Roma community. Her own representations of the Romanian Roma and of Romania are further supported by the authorial ones. Her identity, as ‘the Euro MP Baroness Emma Nicholson, an activist on behalf of Romanian children’ in the *Scotsman* and as ‘British MEP Emma Nicholson’ in the BBC news report is constructed as superior to the nameless group of the Romanian authorities, to ‘the self-proclaimed Roma king,’ and to anyone else in the reports. With respect to verbal processes, while most of those quoted in the text ‘say’ and ‘add,’ Baroness Nicholson is invested with the power of ‘demanding’ and ‘warning,’ by the mere fact that the authors of the two news stories incorporate her statements as reported speech acts.
As far as the relational values of mode and modality are concerned, Baroness Nicholson uses the declarative mode mainly with the function of making demands for action rather than with the usual one of giving information. Her position of authority with respect to the other social actors in the two texts is explicit. Since she defines her position only with relation to the Romanian authorities and not to the Roma community as well, one may draw the conclusion that the Roma community is discriminated against. Even if their behaviour and their traditions go against European legislation, nowhere in her message does Baroness Nicholson communicate anything to them or demand anything of them. Such an attitude absolves them, as ethnic minority in Romania, from any responsibility in the process of integration, while burdening the Romanian government twice as much.

In terms of expressive modality, one notices the MEP’s high level of commitment to the truth of her statements. She uses non-modalized assertions and modalized demands (see Fairclough 2003, Ch.10) to convince the audience of the rightfulness of her opinions. Examples of assertions would be: ‘Implementation of the human rights for everyone is essential for full entry into the European Union,’ ‘Sadly, Romania still has a number of grave weaknesses which will hinder her progress unless urgently addressed’ and of demands: ‘I would expect the senior workers and the police to move in immediately and remove her from harm.’

Her evaluations put forward as desirable the implementation of human rights, Romania’s immediate action towards European integration and the intervention of police and social workers to separate the two Roma children from their families. At the same time, she considers undesirable the Roma tradition of marriages between underage children and Romania’s decision to overlook the tradition. The situation in Romania is described in the two news reports as favouring what the Baroness evaluates as undesirable. The authorial assumptions, especially in the BBC news report, are that Romania should implement European legislation, but that it actually doesn’t, and its human rights record is not, at present at least, appropriate for membership: ‘Romania is committed to implementing laws that conform to European Union standards. It wants to join the EU in 2007 and its human rights record will have to be judged appropriate for membership.’ Such assumptions further substantiate Baroness Nicholson’s own assumptions, evaluations and attitude.

The last three stages in Fairclough’s CDA framework — (3), (4) and (5) — aim at finding possible solutions to the problem.

First of all, does the social practice ‘need’ the problem? Subjects such as the Romanian Roma community and issues of Romania’s European integration create on the part of British (and generally Western European and
American) readers certain expectations about the ‘exoticism’ of the Roma community and their problems, but also about Romania’s difficulties in joining the European Union, which always require external intervention. The media would only have to economically benefit from mediating events in such a way as to activate their readers’ schemata. The media would also favour the political interests of their owners. I have not analysed the BBC news report and the Scotsman news report separately because, in spite of obvious differences between them, the effect of their mediation of the event concerned is ideologically very similar. They both promote Baroness Nicholson’s discourse as dominant, which, on the background of their readers’ schemata, seems absolutely normal and so does Romania’s inability to deal with its own problems.

Thinking of ways past the obstacles analysed above, a different selection and integration of discourses (and of the various voices) in the texts of the two news reports would have led to more balanced representations of the event. For example, among the aspects that have been completely disregarded one could include the existence in Romania of numerous programmes aimed at integrating the Roma community. Also, the Roma community in Romania is confronted with other serious problems (discrimination, education and health problems), to which the Romanian authorities have been trying to find a solution for years. It should not be forgotten that before 1989 the Roma community was refused its identity and after the revolution they became an ‘ethnic minority in transition,’ unstable and insecure (Pons 1999), in a country in transition as well. Their traditions will change, but probably not as quickly as the European Union might expect. If, apart from Baroness Nicholson’s discourse of power (surprisingly not open to any dialogue), the two news reports had mentioned any of these aspects, the representations would have been closer to an objective reflection of the event.

The analysis of the language and structure of the two accounts of the Romany wedding has revealed that their claim to objectivity is unsubstantiated. The balance tilts towards the European Union’s discourse of power, which imposes itself on the multitude of discourses to which it had apparently been added only for the sake of a wider perspective. However, this analysis has been carried out strictly in the context of academic research and cannot contribute to solving the social problem it has explored, which would ultimately be the purpose of any CDA.
References


Texts

The *Scotsman*, available at: http://news.scotsman.com
A HOAX OF HATE: HENRY FORD AND “THE INTERNATIONAL JEW”

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Roots I:
The McGuffey Factor

Henry Ford’s (1863-1947) schoolboy education was shaped by the notorious anti-Semitic (Jews were “Shylocks”), racist (Native Americans were “savages”), and sexist (“proper” female & male roles) McGuffey Eclectic Reader (1836-1920) that educated five generations of Americans. McGuffey was convinced that education and religion were essential for a healthy American society. This sanitary national ethics involved a direct exposition, in his Readers, of the prejudices concerning Judaism typical of the American nativist society in the 19th century. It consisted (Skipp Porteous 1998:2) in an anti-Semitic, and Christ centered ideology expressed through such statements as: “It will cost something to be a Christian; it will cost more not to be so.” (McGuffey, Third Reader 1982:64) and “There are no principles but those of CHRISTIANITY, to be depended upon in cases of REAL DISTRESS” (Emphasis in the original, 1982:66), where Christianity is championed as the only dependable religion. Jewish veneration of the Scripture is denigrated: “The Old Testament has been preserved by the Jews in every age, with a scrupulous jealousy, and with veneration for its words and letters, bordering on superstition” (McGuffey 1982:69)

McGuffey suggests that the rise of Christianity was not only predicted in the Old Testament. It was a result of Jewish infidelity toward God, a common anti-Semitic theme. The Reader mentions “…the Jews as the keepers of the Old Testament.” Then, “It was their own sacred volume, which contained the most extraordinary predictions concerning the infidelity of their nation, and the rise, progress, and extensive prevalence of Christianity” (75). In this example one obliterates Jewish moral law, and all other moral teachings before Jesus as Christian “was purer, sounder, sublimier, and more perfect than had ever before entered into the imagination, or proceeded from the lips of man” (82).

Other such instances of anti-Semitic propaganda, incorporated within educational texts, are highlighted in Lesson XVIII (McGuffey, Fourth Reader
1982), dealing with the Divine inspiration of the Gospel, asking: “Why is it inconceivable that the book (i.e. the Bible) is fiction?” The textbook ideologue answers: “The Jewish authors were incapable of the diction, and strangers to the morality contained in the gospel.” (McGuffey, Fourth Reader 1982:67, our highlighting). A short story (“The Blind Preacher”) recounts a blind minister’s sermon about the trial and crucifixion of Jesus. The short story reinforces the notion that Jews are responsible for the death of Jesus: “We saw the very faces of the Jews, the staring, frightful distortions of malice and rage.” (McGuffey, Fourth Reader 1982:205, our highlighting) The McGuffey Readers contained The Merchant of Venice passages describing Shylock as an “inhuman wretch, incapable of pity,” filled with irrational hatred for the Christian Antonio. The Shakespearean drama becomes a religious anti-Semitic confrontation.

The Readers promoted, in the harsh spirit of Protestant moral-religious conduct, values like hard work, frugality, thrift (Scots-Irish Presbyterian background), but also an exclusive and elitist assessment of Christianity. They had been meant to suit the educational needs of rural and frontier areas children (McGuffey himself grew up in such an Ohio state region). Their impact was remarkable. The reason: they were topical. Their narrative approach to everyday life, the alluring pictures, cheered, and stimulated children’s imagination. They were probably the last examples of popular writings so closely connecting morality with religion. (Baldwin 2001:2) This basic educational context was extremely fertile for the cultivation of racism. Children learned their alphabet literally and ideologically.

Henry Ford was among the last generation of children to be educated by the McGuffey Readers. Their author was one of his greatest heroes. “As an adult,” he “could quote spontaneously line-for-line from his Readers. He was an obsessive collector of McGuffey first editions and reprinted all six Readers from 1857, distributing sets of them, at his own considerable expense, to schools across the United States.” (Baldwin 2001:6). In his future indomitable commitment to the publishing of “The Dearborn Independent” weekly and The International Jew anthology of anti-Semitic propaganda, he surely watched himself proudly emulating his idol. “The Old Guff”, this “messiah of education” (Baldwin 2001:4), had deeply impregnated the American industrialist’s conscience with the seeds of the nativist-Protestant notions, the “sublime chorus of truth” (Baldwin 2001:4): rugged conformity and clear-cut dogmatic definitions of right and wrong. This mechanic, down-to-earth, constractive, and crude perception of humanity, combined with the nativism of the 1920s, contributed to the pure Americanness concept, feeding the tremendously energetic converting effort, minutely organized within the two flag-wav-
ing paragons of Ford’s extra-professional achievement: the Ford Sociological Department and the Americanization School.

Roots II: The Sourcebook of Social Darwinist dogma and Anti-Semitism

Ford was 38 when he met Oliver E. Barthel, a younger mechanic, engineer, and draftsman, formerly his student in the night-time metalworking class at the Detroit YMCA. He was asked to help and get involved in the new project. While cooperating, they had religious and political conversations. During one of these talks Barthel handed Ford a paperbound pamphlet entitled *A Short View of Great Questions*, by Orlando J. Smith, with the advice “to read...and take solace” from it. Later in his life, Ford insisted that the slim volume “changed his outlook on life” (Baldwin 2001:17).

The book was a popular hodge-podge of reincarnation theory, social Darwinism, and anti-Semitism. Smith believed in man as the center of his own universe and that “he need not grovel or abase himself.” “We reap as we have sown. Each man is — mentally and morally exactly, and to large degree physically — what he has made himself...The strong have made themselves strong, the weak are responsible for their own weakness” (Baldwin 2001:18).

Smith is an anti-Orientalist. He “does not have patience with the Eastern cults of mysticism,” or with “the mythology of the Jews.” Judaic skepticism on soul immortality stirred this remark. Actually, the Hebrews’ insistence on the credibility of “One Book” set in motion a damaging succession of “conflicting creeds” and centuries of “fierce and bloody wars” determining the dire modern fate of Europe (Baldwin 2001:18). The “Jewish race obstructed the integration of purer, ideal values of classical antiquity into the modern-day world” (Baldwin 2001:19). Henry Ford proved an unusual consistency in his passion for this peculiar jumble of theosophy, social-Darwinism and anti-Judaica, when he obtained from Barthel a never to return leather-bound copy of Smith’s *Eternalism* (1902 sequel to *A Short View*).

Here is the first revelation of a paradoxical, mysterious side of the American entrepreneur’s character. The Enlightenment man in the American industrial age, the epitome and acme of pragmatism and rationality, thoroughly, creatively and efficiently engaged in the originating process of a top utilitarian domain, the car industry, was fascinated by a second-hand popular version of metempsychosis and sheer racism.

The American Zeitgeist (1863-1920) as Nativism and Anti-Semitism

The time’s gospel of progress was synonymous with the Christian (generally Protestant) way. In this spirit of moral renewal, Henry Ford and his sib-
lings were raised on a daily dosage of the American Tract Society’s *The Illustrated Family Christian Almanac for the United States*. The almanac’s “Historical Tales for Young Protestants” predicted that the obsolete Jewish religion would give way to “the new Israel” of America.

Populism was the ideology that could have reinforced such a biased education, reminding Ford of his days as a farmer boy on his native Dearborn farmstead. The city tycoon in the making would reconstruct his self: he became the friend and helper of the naïve, virtuous farmer, manipulated and exploited by the Jewish plutocrat. He had worked obsessively on a tractor model (called initially *automobile plow*) since before 1907, when he created an experimental one. In 1917 he designed and produced a tractor that was affordable to the masses and revolutionized the industry. When he received word that some of his tractors had been seized in Berlin, Ford told a Syracuse newsman, “I’ll blame it on the Jewish business men— you blame it on anyone you want” (Richards 1976:95).

Ford’s nostalgia for a golden agricultural past would hardly have suited his position as an industry reformer. However, there was at least one major theme of the Populist doctrine to be detected in his anti-Semitic activity and discourse: the conspiracy theory of history. It was backed by an important oppositional axis around which the hate/hostility related aspects of Populist theory revolved. The “rural melodrama” (Hofstadter 1955:73) of the mythical confrontation between simple virtue and perfidious vice occupied the prejudiced minds of politicians. The enemy was an international octopus of money power, of shrewd parasites engaged in an oppressive world conspiracy. The American historian Richard Hofstadter comments, in one of his classical studies, on the psychological significance of such quasi political attitudes:

“There are, moreover, certain types of popular movements of dissent that offer special opportunities to agitators with paranoid tendencies who are able to make a vocational asset out of their psychic disturbances...” (Hofstadter 1955:71)

To what extent was Henry Ford really influenced by the Populist rhetoric? Baldwin (2001) mentions that John Lanse McCloud knew him well from 1914 to 1947. He pointed out “an anti-Semitic thread observable in the garment of Populism.” (Baldwin 2001:29) In 1878 young Henry was fifteen. He might have found out about the Central Greenback Club of Detroit’s manifesto attributing the American railroad scandals and the economic depressions following the Civil War to the “Rothchilds across the water” (Baldwin 2001:29), the Jewish banker’s name constituting a convenient euphemism for “international banker”. There are also other sources claiming that during the
agrarian ferment of the years 1870-1896, at an impressionable age, he might have heard Populistic speeches (Baldwin 2001:29). The common prejudice, based on the kind of ignorance Ford himself acknowledged in his famous statement, “History is more or less the bunk”, was that the Jews (initially an agricultural nation) abhorred agriculture. This is why, according to this misconception, they resided comfortably among the “detested middlemen”, “Yankee businessmen, tradesmen and corporations.” The second volume of *The International Jew* contained an article entitled “Jew Versus Non-Jew in International Finance” stating blatantly: “It is characteristic of the Jew to gather in numbers, not where land is open nor where raw materials are found, but where the greatest number of people abide...The explanation most often given is this: the genius of the Jew is to live off people; not off land, nor off the production of commodities from raw material, but off people. Let other people till the soil, the Jew, if he can, will live off the tiller” (*International Jew* 1921:31).

The Civil War and the Reconstruction involved extreme social change and nationalist sensitivity incurring dislike of Jews, whose loyalty and patriotism were doubted.

Economic frustration enforced the mainstream cliché antagonism: the gullible Christian (as self-image of goodness) victimized by the pagan, evil Jew (based on a broad repertoire of fabled, lethal qualities). Turn of the century massive East European Jewish immigration increased the apparent pressure on nativism. Following the pogroms caused by the assassination of Czar Alexander II (1881), the incoming Russian Jews, bringing in the exotic shtetl culture flavor, so different even from previous mental representations of the Jews in the American mainstream consciousness (based mostly on the perception of German Jewish settlers) contributed to the impression of minority esotericism and foreignness.

A popular textual exemplar of that period’s intellectual *habitus* is offered by Reverend Josiah Strong’s book *Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis* (March, 1866). It was a bestseller: 175,000 copies were sold over the next three decades. One of the reasons of its success lay in the extremely topical message. Protestant America was to struggle to preserve and protect its mission: stop the corruption of the cities by “tainted spots in the body politic” (Baldwin 2001:33, our highlighting). What were the tainted spots? They were the 270, 130 in New York City, major Jewish congregations in America. Strong’s solution was radically racist: “Christianize the immigrant and he will be easily Americanized. Christianity is the solvent to all race antipathies” (Baldwin 2001:33).
Strong supported the idea of the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race, God’s truly chosen people. There is a God given destiny for the Aryan race. In the Jews it must acknowledge and make ready for the impending Armaggedon. The victory is sure: a new, more powerful type of Man will emerge. Maybe the Henry Ford Man whom the industrialist was producing, inside the papier-mâché Melting Pot, along with his “simple, egalitarian, and uniform” Model T, churned out on the moving assembly line every two hours and thirty-five minutes.

Henry Ford, the “Right Path” Führer-Educator

Apparently positive welfare measures were being taken in the Ford Motor Company, Henry Ford’s industrial empire, on January 15, 1914: the work day was reduced to 8 hours, the immense Highland Park factory in Detroit switched to three daily shifts instead of two, basic wage increased from 3$ to 5$ per day. This last, and most attractive initiative, included a manipulating proviso: a plan to allow the workers to share in the company profits at a rate that promised a five dollars per day revenue. The five-dollar profit sharing plan was designed by the company to include only those who were “worthy” i.e. would “not debauch the additional money” they received. Actually, to qualify for this economic scheme, an employee had to put up with an exhaustive renovating educative process of the Hitlerian-Maoist brand. The sanitizing “package” included a rigorous domestic inspection, evidence (to be provided by specially hired “investigators”) of “good habits” (sober, clean, thrifty i.e. saving money through regular bank deposits). In Jeffrey Eugenides’ Middlesex, the following conversation is taking place between the investigators and an immigrant worker’s family:

’How often do you bathe, Mr. Stephanides?’...’
‘Every day, sir.’
’How often do you brush your teeth?’
‘Every day, sir.’
’What do you use?’
’Baking soda.’...
’From now on, use this,’ the [investigator] said. ‘it’s a dentifrice. Here’s a new toothbrush.’...
’Brush along the gum lines. Up on the bottoms and down on the tops.
” Two minutes morning and night. Let’s see. Give it a try.’
’We are civilized people.’
’Do I understand you to be refusing hygiene instruction?’
... The short one now reappeared from upstairs. He flipped open his pad and began: 'Item one. Garbage in kitchen has no lid. Item two. Housefly on kitchen table. Item three. Too much garlic in food. Causes indigestion’” (Eugenides 2002:95)

Ford denied any advertisement or welfare reasons. It was all, he stated, for “social justice” and “satisfaction of mind.” The Wall Street Journal version, a moralistic plan meant to link industrial betterment with the straight and narrow path, relied on the educator’s explanatory shibboleth: “You make the man and you needn’t worry about your business” (Baldwin 2001:37).

One major measure Ford took in order to fulfill his high-handed ethical ambition, was to found and organize the Ford Sociological Department. In 1913, the Ford Motor Company established a Sociological Department “to promote the welfare of employees” (Galloway 2001-2004). In addition to providing thousands of immigrant laborers with home visits, the department supported English and acculturation classes that culminated in spectacular melting-pot pageants. Ford’s Sociological Department also published pamphlets such as a ‘Typical Case of Poverty Relieved by the Hiring of an Unemployed Man by the Company’ (cf., last visited on January 14, 2002).

As overseer (for personnel issues) Ford hired Reverend Samuel Simpson Marquis (1866-1948), formerly dean of St. Paul’s Episcopal Cathedral in Detroit (“I want you, Mark, to put Jesus Christ in my factory!” [Baldwin 2001:38, our highlighting]). Marquis supported Ford’s watchword of Social Gospelism: a new society must be built based on the teachings of Jesus Christ. He was especially inspired by his boss’s vision, a strange Christian Machine combination of technology and religion. Consequently, one of Marquis’ sermons (1912) was called “The Man: On the Scientific Self-Management of a One-Power Three-Cylinder Engine” (evoking the Model T structure, efficiently conceived and produced in the super-organized, extra-efficient, top automated technology of River Rouge Plant) (Baldwin 2001:39).

Most of the unskilled workers at the Ford plant were of East-European, Central European, and Italian descent. Ford founded the compulsory Sociology Department School classes for Americanization “to impress upon these men that they... should be Americans, and that former racial, national, and linguistic differences are to be forgotten” (Baldwin 2001:41) Actually immigrant workers were compelled to get assimilated into an idealized Anglo-Saxon model. The pageant suggested a messianic civic religion conversion to the American way of life: A huge wood canvas and papier-mâché “Melting Pot” was built. There were flights of steps up to the rim on both sides. One served a gargantuan picnic to audiences of families and co-workers. The audience settled themselves in the grandstands. A brass band started playing. A
procession moved forth from a gate at one side of the field, men from the foreign nationalities wearing their various native costumes, singing their national songs, and dancing folk dances. The master of ceremonies, Clinton C. DeWitt, the Henry Ford’s school principal, dressed up as Uncle Sam, led the group to the ladder on one side of the big pot. He directed them up the stairs to the rim and down inside. He called the men out again, one by one, on the other side. They came out of the “transmuting pot” dressed in derby hats, coats, pants, vests, stiff collars, polka-dot ties singing the *Star-Spangled Banner* (Baldwin 2001:42)

**The Messianic Opinion Molder**

Ford also thought of setting up a weekly forum, the *Dearborn Independent* (1919-1927), for his own ideas, to mold public opinion, with Edward G. Pipp, from *The Detroit News*, as an editor. They intended to teach moral lessons and ethically improve the American society by “spreading the gospel of tolerance” (Baldwin 2001:71). Allusive articles, signed by Henry Ford (in “Mr. Ford’s Own Page”), started appearing. One mentioned unnamed hidden influences and dark forces, metals not assimilating in the Melting Pot, “Bolshevik” aliens “messing up our industries” (Baldwin 2001:81) and impending over America. The change of tone may have been, at least at the simple, factual level, in tune with other telling events.

Baldwin (2001:86) reveals that Ernest Gustav Liebold, Ford’s personal secretary since 1910, a business college graduate of German Lutheran stock, brought Boris Brasol to the magazine editorial office (1919). Brasol was a Russian expatriate, a loyal monarchist and the darling of conservative patriots concerned for the American nation about the import of the Russian revolution. He started translating into English the Russian forgery *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*, created and published in Kiev, in 1917, by the Okhrana (Secret Police) of Imperial Russia. It purports to be the minutes and proceedings of a Jewish conclave led by the Grand Rabbi and held during the Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland, in 1897. The alleged malicious purpose: to structure a “blueprint” for world domination, reducing all non-Jews to slavery. The edition translated by Brasol (the 4th) was “edited” and expanded by Serghei Nilus, a Russian mystic. In Nilus’ version, one insisted on the “Judeo-Bolshevist” threat. A copy reached a Senate subcommittee, which investigated it, expressing skepticism in February 1919. At this time, Brasol met Liebold and the expatriate’s essay, “The Bolshevik Menace to Russia”, was published in the April 12, 1919, issue of the *Independent*. Liebold “replied” in the next issue with “Speculation vs. Production: Which Creates Wealth?” He stated there: “No one needs to be warned today about the dan-
ger to international peace which comes from the insistence of the owners of gold that will be out everywhere earning interest” (Baldwin 2001:86, our highlighting).

On the other hand, at about the same time, Ford started to openly express his anti-Semitism in conversations with peace activist Rosika Schwimmer (the Jews caused WW I), the naturalist John Burroughs (the Jews are to blame for the inefficiency of the Navy; Jay Gould, the railroad magnate and Presbyterian, was a “Shylock”), and Thomas Edison (“I wish they [the Jews] would stop making money” [Baldwin 2001:90]).

As *Dearborn Independent* stagnated, he took a veteran *New York World* reporter’s (Joseph Jefferson O’Neil) advice: “Find an evil to attack, go after it, and stay after it...” (Baldwin 2001:91) Ford’s obsession with the health of his newspaper came into direct convergence with the inspiration for the Jewish campaign. He discussed with Liebold about a series of articles attacking the Jewish people. Ford ordered one article per week. The writer designed by him was William Cameron, a dedicated British Israelite. This group believed that contemporary Anglo-Saxons descended from the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel and that Great Britain and the United States were the true Holy Land. The “Modern Hebrews” were usurpers. Jesus was not a Jew, but the forefather of the modern Germans, Scandinavians, and British (cf. Baldwin 2001:263).

Baldwin (2001:101) points out that William Cameron followed the orders with some dislike (1920). He took to drinking and Pipp resigned. Articles followed on: “Bolshevism and Zionism”, “Jewish Supremacy in the Theatre and Cinema”, “Jewish Jazz Becomes Our National Music”, “Jewish Gamblers Corrupt American Baseball”, “Jewish Power and America’s Money Famine”. They were constructed around some general assumption applied to a specific domain (finances, economy, art, etc.), where the Jews were presented as perpetrators of terrible plots against honest, naive, patriotic Americans. On June 26, 1920 the *Protocols* began to appear in the *Dearborn Independent*.

In the same year, “the Dearborn Publishing Company produced its most damaging literature to date, a twenty-five cent, 250-page paperbound anthology of articles published in the *Independent*. The Preface presented is as “the partial record of an investigation of the Jewish Question” (Baldwin 2001:144-145). The collection was never copyrighted. It was translated into 16 languages, including six editions in Germany alone, between 1920-1922. Was there a significant national readership? The fact is that Ford made his Model T customers subscribe to the newspaper and advertised the book at state fairs and theaters.
Protests, attempts at negotiating came from Jewish American leading organizations and personalities. Ford had to stop the publication in 1927, with a public apology he had never really authored. He obtained Adolf Hitler’s openly declared sympathy (a copy of The International Jew in German translation was found in Hitler’s office) and the Grand Cross of the Order of the German Eagle, the highest honor the Reich could bestow on a foreigner (1938) (cf. Baldwin 2001:103).

He continued to produce anti-Semitic statements on more or less public occasions. Ford’s obsession with cleanliness (moral, national, physical) and strict organization explains, at least in part, his hate for the Jew, perceived as a paragon of difference qua social disorder and impurity, by the prejudiced, Christ-centered, Calvinist consciousness of the industrialist. It also seems to have suited the traditional Lutheran aversion to Judaism and the messianic vanity of his two main associates to this hoax of hate: Ernest Gustav Liebold and William Cameron.

References

Contemporary Native North American writing — be it literary, critical, ethnographical, or political — is historically conscious writing, carrying the burden of colonialism; consequently, always in search of survival techniques: possibilities for dialogue between Native and Western interpretations of past and present. (“Native American” and “Western” will be used not as cultural but as civilizational categories: Native American civilization as opposed to Western civilization; it is also irrelevant to make a distinction between US Natives and Canadian Natives in this context.)

The understanding of any such text first calls for a clarification of the perspective from which to handle opposing historical narratives born of opposing concepts of different worldviews. Is it possible for a Westerner, like myself, to see, understand, and grasp the otherness in the Native? If “all history is theoretical and all theories are positioned and positioning,” as Keith Jenkins maintains (1992:70), and one always necessarily selects a position, then can one speak for multiple viewpoints (sometimes for several tribal ones along with the Western), only in one, the critic’s voice? If Wallace Stegner is right in stating that “unlike fiction, history can have only one voice, the historian’s” (qtd. in Berkhofer 1998:190), then is the hope for multivocality erased? Or should we “simply exchange frameworks by ‘going Native’”? (Berkhofer 1998:182). Berkhofer rejects that alternative and so do I. Instead, he offers the concept of translation, which is “the name of the game in representing otherness.” (1998:182). Translation is a “delicate and paradoxical task, for the process involves switching from the representation of another’s representation according to one’s own world to the representation of another’s representation according to his or her own world... To know another in terms of that other’s outlook and viewpoint necessitates transcending one’s own categories and perceptions” (Berkhofer 1998:182). This is what I hope to achieve in this paper, by trying to follow Ruth Roach Pierson’s advice on how to do it: through “epistemic humility” and “methodological caution” (1991:94), constantly searching for the Native voice, allowing it to get into dialogue with the Western discourse on its own terms. My aim is to apply this method when examining the historiographical status of Native Americans. My questions are the following: whose history is American history, what is
Native American historiography, and how can it have a voice without assimilating to the Western tradition of writing history?

The first point to be clarified is what faults Native Americans find with Western historiography. Their major target is what Calvin Martin termed “historiographic colonialism” (1987:33). A handful of meanings have been broadly associated with this category in scattered Native American writings. In my understanding its major components are the following: 1) American historiography has been mostly concerned with White history dating from 1492, ignoring the several thousand years of Indigenous history (pre-contact issues have been mostly discussed by anthropology, ethnography, or ethnohistory and not historiography); according to Donald F. Fixico, “different schools of thought like the Germ Theory and Turner Thesis have encouraged historians to ignore the original inhabitants of the entire Western Hemisphere” (1998:85); 2) 90% of post-contact Indian history has been written by non-Indians; 3) as a history of Indian-White relations, which, from the Native perspective, is a narrow focus on their “diplomatic history or foreign policy” (Fixico 1998:89); 4) what has been written is usually biased, rests on documents put together by colonists and explorers, not incorporating arguments from Native oral history (Axtell 1997:14); Angela Cavender Wilson (1997:101-2) calls this the practice of “double standard,” widespread among American historians, implying disinterest in a nation’s own material, if that nation happens to be Native, but deep interest in national documents in case of other, e.g. European nations; 5) Western historiography has used an “imaginative double vision,” as Christopher Vecsey points out (qtd in Axtell 1997:23), using “deep research and empathy to see other people as they saw themselves, but ...[using]... hindsight and objectifying scholarship to see them as they could not see themselves, as only we can. Thus we achieve historical vision, at once ‘loving and scrutinizing,’ ... without needing to commit professional and cultural suicide” (Axtell 1997:23). This way historians can rest assured that the “hegemony of Western historiography” (Nabokov 2002:239) stays undisturbed.

The same thing happened in the writing of history as in any other sphere of life, the Native have been treated in an oppressive and contradictory manner by the dominant White society. On the one hand, they have been silenced into anonymous collectivity, as Albert Memmi pointed it out (qtd in Loomba 2001:137), into stereotypes through “thingification,” to use Aimé Cesaire’s phrase (qtd. in Loomba 2001:133), thus have been “fixed into perpetual otherness” (Loomba 2001:173). They have been kept outsiders. On the other hand, Native Americans have been continually “civilized,” assimilated, forced to become insiders, part of American reality, of American history. The outcome has been their deprivation of their Native voice, Native identity, in a
language they are now forced to speak in order to survive in a space that is both inside and outside and is neither inside nor outside. As Dennis Lee puts it:

To speak unreflectingly in a colony... is to use words that speak only alien space. To reflect is to fall silent, discovering that your authentic space does not have words. And to reflect further is to recognize that you and your people do not in fact have a privileged authentic space just waiting for words... You are left chafing at the inarticulacy of a native space which may not exist. So you shut up.

But perhaps—and here the breakthrough—perhaps our job was not to fake a space of our own and write it up, but rather to find words for our spacelessness. Perhaps that was home. (2002:400)

Home in spacelessness is created by the maintenance or reintegration of traditional Native in-placeness into their out-of-placeness in the Western world. From their perspective, Native Americans have always been at home and in place. They have to keep to that or, in other cases, relearn that. An important constituent in this process is the writing of “Amerindian autohistory,” to use George E. Sioui’s term (1992:21), to write Native Americans back into American history on their own terms, in accordance with the Native American concept of history, which is deeply rooted in oral tradition.

It is crucial to understand the basic elements of the Native vision of history in order to understand the nature of its difference, which has been an alienating factor, but which is to be given space. First and foremost, Native histories are not histories of only the human past, set in a linear relationship with the present, objectified to the degree of scientific distance. “Native histories incorporate the experiences of other both human and nonhuman beings, as well as the experiences of their ancestors,” as Wilson tells us (1997:03), set in a “combined reality of the physical and the metaphysical” (Fixico 1998:120). The human being, as viewed by Native Americans, is not superior to other animate or inanimate creations. The human being is just one strand in the web of life, with responsibility for the maintenance of its health and balance in its circular movement through history. The health and power of each strand is in its story. Its story, however, is not a collection of data and facts, but their combination, filtered through and glued together by a visionary understanding of the essence of the strand’s existence in the midst of certain happenings. This is the reason why Native American oral stories are seen as “living entities with a power and spirit of their own” (Wilson 1997:111). They come alive in multimedia presentations (with dramatic enactments, drumplay, and so on) during storytelling events. As the story is alive, it cannot be fixed, but allows for variations. Peter Nabokov finds that an “innately democratic virtue” of oral tradition, the way the different versions show an “inti-
mate awareness of the community’s different, perhaps contradictory microhistories” (2002:49). Multiple versions, Nabokov goes on to say, also enable “a society to check and adjust its course through uncertain times” (2002:47), to have a “stabilizing impact upon the unfolding present” (2002:46). Harold Adams Innis saw this as “a continuous revision of history by actively reinterpreting events and then incorporating such interpretations into the next generation of narrative...[this] flexibility allows for a gifted storyteller to adapt a given narrative to make sense of a confusing situation” (Cruikshank 2002:7).

“Misremembering,” states Michael E. Staub, “points to a larger truth” (1994:66). “Larger truth,” then implies not only being true to the essence of a strand in the web in a historical moment from a tribal or personal viewpoint, but also being true to its “eternal presentness,” to the undisrupted circularity of time, which does not alienate past from present.

The ceremonial, healing aspect of the Native American storytelling mode is also traditionally integral to the Native sense of history: the planting of the past (an event, a mythic story, or some cultural tradition) in the present (a storytelling event or a ceremony) so as to have it bear fruit in the future (the tribal community restored to balance, harmony, and a sense of wholeness — to a prototypical past model). Claude Levi-Strauss coined the phrase “history for” to grasp this phenomenon (1966:257). What we are dealing with here is a fine example for the Native American sense of “circular time”: while the past is a route to the future, the future in turn is a route to the past. Ramond D. Fogelson sees the birth of Native American historical narrative in the thickening of experience into “epitomizing events” in this “corridor, which allows for two-way traffic” (Nabokov 2002:71). “Epitomizing events bring certain forces together in dramatic combination: they condense various subtle changes into a single transformative act” (Fogelson qtd. in Howe 2002:163). The geographical location of the “epitomizing event” is always of utmost importance. Thus Native history goes hand in hand with a strong sense of place — understood as “spherical” (Allen 1983:7) — a core component of Native American Weltensichtung, as “the Indian’s relationship to the world is ... structured by sacred geography” (Highwater 1981:127). Geographical spots acquire sacred quality through those encounters with place that contribute to the formation of the tribe’s identity. The location, for example, where a tribe came to the earth, becomes the navel of the universe, the source of power; and the farther the tribe is forced to live from it, the weaker its members get (an important aspect of relocation tragedies). An eloquent illustration of the Native American concept of place can be found in N. Scott Momaday’s The Way to Rainy Mountain. In a conversation with Momaday, Charles L. Woodard points out that Rainy Mountain, the sacred Kiowa location, is “not
really a mountain, but a knoll or a hill,” then concludes in agreement with Momaday: “The fact of it is not the truth of it.” (1989:68) The “truth of it” is that Rainy Mountain is a landmark in Kiowa culture evolving into a “horse culture” in the Plains region. It represents “the tremendous energy of the Kiowa past. History, culture, traditions. Cultural energy.” (Woodard 1989:69)

Visionary oral history in its circularity and geographical awareness is each individual’s personal responsibility to keep alive by remembering the stories. As Geary Hobson declared: “Heritage is people; people are the earth; earth is heritage. By remembering these relationships — to the people, the land, the past — we renew in strength our continuance as people. ... Remembering is all” (1979:11). Howe labels this sense of historiography as “tribalography”, implying a form that pulls “all the elements together of the storyteller’s tribe, meaning the people, the land, and multiple characters and all their manifestations and revelations... in past, present, and future... symbiotically connecting one thing to another... a precedent for wholeness” (2002:42). She also illustrates this universal sense of wholeness and its cyclical historical dimension in her comment on Craig Howe’s statement that “tribalism will not die, even if all the Indians do”: “What I think Craig Howe is alluding to is that our stories are unending connections to past, present, and future. And even if worse comes to worst and our people forget where we left our stories, the birds will remember and bring them back to us” (2002:47).

Having explored the core elements of the Native vision of history, the question naturally pops up: how are Native Americans to write themselves back into the history of North America on these terms, into a historiography that is already dominated by Western ideals?

When the Native approaches the Western world, the cyclical is seen to be replaced by the linear; the search for an essential, not factual sense of wholeness and balance in the web of life is subdued by evolutionism and the frantic support of modernization through constant power struggles related in narratives disguised as objective science. What alternative future can such a historiography offer for Native Americans? According to Alain Touraine, Western historicist thought “identifies modernization with the development of the human spirit, the triumph of reason with that of freedom, the formation of the nation or the final triumph of social justice” (1995:62). History thus seems to have a direction and is moving toward an end, as it was first voiced in a systematic philosophy by Hegel, and has been recently picked up by Kojeve, Fukuyama, and Patterson. But if so, when that end is reached, history should seize to exist. There have been two understandings of the “death of history.” One is in accordance with the Hegelian tradition of history culminating in, coming to an end “with the universal recognition of human freedom”
(Moses 1995:5). The other is the postmodern idea mostly advocated by Baudrillard, Acker, and Lyotard: “the death of history as a sign... as it no longer refers to anything outside itself, having been divided or indistinguishable from its referents” (Lucy 1997:42), having disappeared into its own simulacrum” (Smith 2001:78). Different as these interpretations may be, they spring from and move within the boundaries of a common tradition (no matter if they argue for or against it) and appear to be jokes in the Native eye. Native North American histories have nothing to do with the Western sense of power struggle and the idea of striving for human freedom, as Natives did not live in oppressive feudal societies against which they would have felt the need to fight. The simulacrum story does not make sense, either, as Native histories do refer to a reality outside them.

Actually, “death” is one of the most frequently used notions Native Americans associate with the Western world. Not only has it been integral to Western colonizing intentions, bringing death to Native people and cultures, but it is seen to be inherent in Western Weltanschauung. Elements of Nature, geographical locations might bear some significance, but do not have spiritual power, are inanimate, and thus dead. Power is defined in financial, political, and technological terms, not in spiritual ones. These terms have no life in them as they reflect states rather than aims, routes, and interrelations. Dreams and visionary powers are dead as they are discarded from the realm of reality. Stories are trusted when fixed in writing, disempowered, no longer alive, unable to respond to challenges of the present. And, as we have already noted, death is the fate of history, too.

Still, in order to survive, Native Americans have to assert themselves in Western ways, too, for proper recognition in this Western reality, and historical presence is a significant component of that recognition. There are two Western methodological possibilities for Native Americans to write “Amerindian autohistory.”

One is the partly Postmodernist, partly New Historian wave, which opens up new vistas for Native American historians through its deconstructionist rebellion against traditional historiography, allowing Native intellectuals to incorporate the traditional elements of their oral histories into Western historiography. It understands history as “an inter-textual, linguistic construct” (Jenkins 1992:7) that can be decoded and recoded (White 1978:58) since “no account can ever be checked against [the past] but only against other accounts; there is no fundamentally correct text... variations are all there are” (Jenkins 1992:11). Which variation becomes history depends on the ideological conceptions and prejudices of the historian (Moses 1995:4) when deciding “who is written out of history and who must be violently removed”
(Michaelsen 1999:148). Thus, the “history of the past is revitalized by being also a history of the present” (Hamilton 1996:5). In accord with the Native American concept of history, the past is treated “as a text to be examined for its possibilities of meaning” (Munslow 1997:16).

The other Western methodological set of tools is offered by the computer world: Native histories are presented as hypertexts, “electronic texts that combine visual, aural, and textual media and that can be read in a variety of ways” (Howe 2002:167). Hypermedia applications are often used in Native American gallery exhibitions.

We are witnesses to significant paradigm shifts both in Native American and Western historiography: the former incorporates new methodologies for the strengthening of its traditional ways and for writing itself into American history, as a result of which the hegemony of the latter is gradually broken. To the question: “Whose history is Native American history?” the answer is in the making.

References


Introduction

In this paper I hope to contribute to the study of one of the most rapidly growing American religious communities, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. By drawing on the Shepherd brothers’ interpretation of Mormon commitment mechanisms (1986), which they based on Kanter’s typology, the paper maps the various interpretations this typology offers with regard to the Mormon community and identity, including the members’ relation to the Church and to their Others. The discussion draws on propositions put forth by Giddens (1984), Hall (1996), Zizek (2000) and Foucault (1982), among other scholars, and is presented from the position of an author who is neither an American nor a Latter-day Saint.

1. Mormon commitment mechanisms

In her analysis of 19th century utopian communities, Rosabeth Kanter (qtd. in Shepherd and Shepherd 1986) located a number of mechanisms which were at play in maintaining group membership. Her typology of these commitment mechanisms was applied to the LDS community by two ex-Latter-day Saint authors, Gary Shepherd and Gordon Shepherd, who concluded that the very same mechanisms were in operation in the Mormon community. On the basis of the roles these mechanisms play, the authors grouped them into three categories, each maintained by a pair of mechanisms — one of which is viewed as positive for members, the other as negative. These three categories are as follows: (1) mechanisms which retain membership through investment and sacrifice; (2) mechanisms which produce group cohesiveness through communion and renunciation; and (3) mechanisms which exercise social control through transcendence and mortification (Shepherd and Shepherd 1984:103-128).

The Shepherd brothers argued that group membership is retained through investment of both labor and material resources, which typically
cements members to the Church. Through various practices, such as tithing, long hours of free labor done as a calling (church duty) or volunteer work, members feel that they personally invest in this Church and group, and, therefore, consider it their own. As a result, they also take an active interest in the course it is taking and its continued prosperity. In return for their investments they are rewarded in various ways: callings to higher positions are considered an acknowledgement of one’s worthiness, as is the temple recommend or one’s level of priesthood (Shepherd and Shepherd 1984:107-108).

Membership retention through sacrifice refers to the cost of membership, the sacrifice one must make in order to belong. It “stimulates the rationalization of costly commitments, ...[and] increases the perceived value of group membership” (Shepherd and Shepherd, 1984:104). In general, if something can be attained through sacrifice, it is believed to be of high quality and well worth the effort. Examples of sacrifice among the Saints may be austerity, chastity, and abstinence from tea, coffee, and alcohol, which all represent part of the trade-off of being a Mormon. However, the Saints tend to read these not as various types of sacrifice, as they see these practices as only seemingly restrictive. They claim that abstinence ensures them a life free from certain illnesses, sexual austerity ensures them a life without sexually transmitted diseases, etc. They, therefore, find these actually liberating and reassuring (cf. Shepherd and Shepherd 1984:105-106).

The second strategy the Shepherds located is related to group cohesiveness. They maintained that its positive side is communion, meaning the community one gains upon joining the Church, which offers its members a strong sense of security and unity. This is achieved, for example, through a series of events in which they participate together, including church events, communal work and regular social gatherings. The Church provides numerous examples of communal work, as each stake (local community) operates some kind of production project, the products of which are distributed through the Church’s welfare program, which includes a system of bishop’s storehouses which donate goods to members in need daily. The extensive system of meetings may easily take up all one’s free time, thus eventually limiting the social circle of members to other Mormons. Shared time together, shared work and vision not only strengthen membership, but also build group cohesion and unity (cf. Shepherd and Shepherd 1984:112-116).

The price of group cohesiveness is defined as renunciation, a form of social sacrifice one makes for membership. It signifies the circle of friends and family one may lose by joining the Mormon Church if they disapprove of it. This is usually accompanied by the isolation of the group from the larger society as well, through various mechanisms, such as (1) geographical isolation,
brought about, for example, by the Mormon migration to the West; (2) rules which reduce possible contact with non-members to the minimum, such as rules of abstinence; (3) a sense of self-sufficiency, which rests on a well-run system of production, such as the Church’s own industrial network called Deseret Industries; (4) rituals of purification, which are part of their temple ceremonies; and (5) a distinctive manner of dressing and speaking, which mark members as being different. The Saints, however, regard their membership as a social position which offers them not only the possibility of eternal life, but also a sense of ontological security: they consider themselves to be members of a group which is powerful and is thus capable of taking care of each and every one of its members when in need (cf. Shepherd and Shepherd 1984:109-112).

The Shepherds defined social control as the third strategy, the positive side of which is transcendence: the individual is placed into the larger context of a community which provides one with (1) security on earth as well as (2) the promise of eternal life and godhood. Transcendence is inherent in the faith, which not only provides the framework for social practices and existence, but also legitimates them and claims exclusive rights over them (cf. Shepherd and Shepherd 1984:122-128).

The negative aspect is mortification, which “is involved in the reconstruction of personal identities based on member conversion to community values and submission to community discipline” (Shepherd and Shepherd 1984:116). Methods the Church employs to ensure conversion and submission include public confessions about one’s faith, regular visits from home and visiting teachers, and regular interviews necessary for certain events, such as entering the temples, along with de-individuating mechanisms aimed at group homogenization. These practices which I would regard as manners of surveillance are, however, often interpreted by the Saints as ways to demonstrate and prove one’s faith and devotion, based on which one may not only be recognized and rewarded for one’s spiritual merits, but may also ensure personal salvation (cf. Shepherd and Shepherd 1984:116-122).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Positive side</th>
<th>Negative side</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) retain membership</td>
<td>investment and</td>
<td>sacrifice;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) produce group cohesiveness</td>
<td>communion and</td>
<td>renunciation;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) exercise social control</td>
<td>transcendence and</td>
<td>mortification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDS Church ←</td>
<td>LDS members →</td>
<td>their Others</td>
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Figure 1. Mormon commitment mechanisms and their relational implications
This typology presents the reader with a number of points to consider with regard to the positioning of the individual Saints in relation to their Church as well as to their Others — thus, also expressing certain aspects of their identity and the way it is constituted. What follows is a discussion of some of the more apparent implications and their location within theoretical debates regarding the realm of the social: the constitution of social groups and identities.

2. The Saint and the Mormon Church

The first set of questions to emerge regards the words used in this typology and what they signify. Shepherd and Shepherd refer to the mechanisms as commitment mechanisms which indicate actions performed by individual members in order to prove their commitment to the given social formation. However, the three groups into which these mechanisms are grouped relate to (1) retaining membership; (2) producing group cohesiveness; and (3) exercising social control, which are realms that characterize a social group, and not the individual members (Shepherd and Shepherd 1984:103-128). This seems to present a discrepancy if not a contradiction; however, I would argue that (1) this should not be interpreted as either, but should rather be understood as an example of the way the social is constituted: the way individuals and social formations are actually bound together, through the very same mechanisms or series of practices; and that (2) this illustrates how meaning assigned to these practices is not fixed, but is acquired through articulation and context. Moreover, I would also argue that the various mechanisms are in operation not as discrete forces bound to specific practices, but appear in all practices in various ways.

In order to illustrate these claims, I would offer a closer reading of the holy undergarment. The undergarment is a one- or two-piece article of clothing which every worthy Saint wears every minute of his or her life. It is worn directly against the skin, and other articles of clothing are added over it. It is made of white cotton, decorated with embroidered symbols which are also found in Freemason symbolism: “a Masonic square over the right breast, a compass over the left breast, a Masonic gauge or rule over the navel, and another over the right knee” (Decker 1995:386). These symbols are believed to provide immediate protection for the given body parts, acting as a shield.

The special power of the undergarment derives from its sacred nature. It is received in a ritual the first time a Saint visits a temple. During the first part of the ritual, the person undergoes a purification process, during which one is cleansed with water and anointed with oil; then the garment is placed on the
body. During this last act, a sacred passage is recited, which explains the significance of the garment. The Saints maintain that the primary purpose of the garment is to function as a constant reminder of their faith and commitment. It also “acts as a protection from evil and harm, but only insofar as it symbolically represents the power given by the endowment as one keeps the commandment of God” (Barber 1989:138-9). The sacredness and the secrecy surrounding the undergarment as well as the supernatural powers it is believed to have vested in it not only reminds one to remain a faithful Saint and member of the Church, but also offers protection for the worthy individual from illness, evil spirits and undesirable thoughts, thus guaranteeing both physical and spiritual cleanliness. However, once one loses faith in Mormonism, or “removes the garments or mutilates them or in any way disrespectfully uses them, he removes the power they represent” (Barber 1989:139).

The practice of the holy undergarment, thus, may be understood as a practice of investment: through it, one expresses one’s investment of his or her body in the faith. The fact that the very first layer of clothing that may touch a Saint’s body is a symbol of his or her faith expresses not only how faith becomes physically present at the most intimate level, but also constitutes a high level of self-discipline. A number of dissenters from the Mormon Church claimed that the most difficult step in leaving the faith was removing the undergarment. They felt completely naked even though they were fully dressed; they felt vulnerable, weak and exposed to the outside world. This illustrates well how the practice of the undergarment, acting as a reminder and representing a special power, offers a sense of spiritual and physical safety to the LDS believers.

The undergarment is also a significant practice in that it marks the Saints as different from others, also providing the basis for a number of exclusive experiences only they may share in. These include practical matters, such as shopping for clothes which do not reveal the undergarment or doing sports, to more elaborate notions, such as the feeling of belonging to an exclusive circle of believers, a sacred and in some ways secret society, features which radiate a sense of significance and exceptional position to both members and outsiders. The resulting sense of group communion is in part the result of ingroup standardization and resultant homogenization, to which the series of experiences related to the undergarment also contribute.

As already mentioned, the primary function of the undergarment is to act as a constant reminder for the Saints to remain faithful to the tenets of the Mormon faith as well as to the Mormon Church. In return, the faith promises worthy members eternal life through salvation, which the undergarment thus also signifies. The promise of transcendence has been coupled by a cele-
tial version of the American dream insofar as worthy Mormons are also given the promise of becoming gods and goddesses and ruling their own planet in the unlimited realm of the universe. As such, it also marks the constant presence of the Church and faith in one’s life, even in the most intimate moments, and therefore operates as a key control mechanism through which the Church becomes materialized and present in the member’s lives, also constituting a rather subtle form of surveillance.

I believe that this illustrates how the very same practice unites the individual and the collectivity, with both parties contributing to the reproduction of both the collective and the individual membership. The model which captures this type of understanding of the social was offered by Anthony Giddens (1984) in his theory of structuration. Giddens suggests that social relations in modern societies are formed across time and space through the model of the duality of structure. This model unites the individuals, viewed as actors, on the one hand, and social institutions or collectivities, on the other, in a duality that envisions the micro- and macro-levels as located on two sides of the same coin: the unity of the two provides the whole. The force which unites these two levels and is also expressed by them is defined as structure, meaning the set of rules and resources outside of time and space, which is recursively re-established through social systems. Structure is materialized in social practices, which are understood as situated activities and reproduced relations between actors and collectivities. Although Giddens developed this theory in order to capture the production and reproduction of contemporary modern states and its institutions, I would argue that his model is applicable to capture the reproduction of independent social structures and collectivities within societies as well, especially if they cut across state borders and cultural boundaries — as does the Mormon Church.

One shortcoming of Giddens’ theory is that it does not touch upon the organizing principle behind structure, which would be significant in order to understand why a structure exists in a given manner and what accounts for differences in sets of structure. In the case of the Mormon community, the principle behind their practice is their faith. And faith, I would argue, in a wider context, can be regarded as a type of “ideology ‘in-itself’”, which Slavoj Zizek defined as “the immanent notion of ideology as a doctrine, a composite of ideas, beliefs, concepts, and so on, destined to convince us of its ‘truth’, yet actually serving some unavowed particular power interests” (2000:10). If ideology can be regarded as the power which informs structure, it implies that primacy should be assigned to social systems and institutions, therefore questioning the full autonomy and power which, according to Giddens (1984), is invested in the individual when positioned as an agent.
The example of the holy undergarment also illustrates how a given practice may serve a number of ends and acquire a number of meanings—a notion which may evoke Ernesto Laclau’s concept of “free-floating signifiers” (1977). However, meaning is not acquired exclusively by the hegemonic articulation of the given ideology, as Laclau envisioned. Faith as the ideological discourse (“the structured totality”), I would argue, precedes articulation (“any practice establishing a relation among elements”) and offers only the primary meaning; and it is the actual articulation and its moments (“differential positions...as they appear articulated within discourse”) (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:105) which give way to the scale of various meanings of the same practice and determine the actual meaning. As for which meaning emerges in the course of articulation, this greatly depends on the context and the parties involved in the process of interpretation. It is within the same framework that, as a consequence, it is also possible for the various mechanisms to overlap and to be in operation within the very same practice at the very same time.

3. The Saint and its Others

The second set of implications regards the positive and negative sides of the mechanisms discussed. As pointed out earlier, the Saints themselves tend to monitor their practices as positive outcomes of their faith and commitment; they do not regard their membership as: (1) sacrifice; (2) renunciation; or (3) mortification. These seem to be interpretations of the practices assigned to them by non-Mormons, be they dissenters or outsiders. This proposition points to the consideration of the relation between Mormons and their collective Others.

The practice of the holy undergarment is a means that contributes to the maintenance of group cohesiveness and unity and, as such, also represents a tool for community building and identity construction. This practice is one of a number of distinct features of the Mormon community; they, thus, can share in it with no other group. Moreover, this practice, just like a number of other practices, including their dress code, abstinence or monthly fasting, not to mention the regular meetings and various callings, places limitations on their ability to sustain relationships with non-members. A closer reading of LDS practices reveals that they constitute a clear-cut boundary between the Saints and their Others: their social contact with non-Mormons is indeed minimal and the Mormon community remains a relatively closed and homogeneous collective within American society, with a set of distinct practices of their own.
The significance of the boundary in defining a community was first proposed by Frederick Barth in the mid-1960s in his study on the definition of ethnicity (1996). He argued that it is the boundary rather than the culture it encloses that characterizes a community. However, even though he conceptualized the boundary as a dividing line which is always in flux and reflects changes in pertinent power relations, the boundary is still visualized as a marker of clear-cut division and separation. Therefore, although the boundary is not about meeting points between social groups along its two sides, the typology offered by the Shepherds urges one to move in that direction. Therefore, Stuart Hall’s conceptualization of identification as “a process of articulation, a suturing...[which] operates across difference, entails discursive work, the binding and marking of symbolic boundaries” (1996:3) seems to be more to the point here.

The ability of the Mormon faith and Church to constitute clearly marked boundaries on the basis of difference constituted through their belief and practices was observed earlier. Through the establishment of a community sentiment and of spiritual, emotional as well as intellectual ties, the Church has been able to bind people together in a symbolic community with a distinct identity. Mormon practices, however, acquire meaning in a process determined by the specifics of the “moment”, including the context and the person interpreting. What the Shepherds’ typology indicates is that the same mechanisms and practices are read differently by the Saints and their Others, which leads us to the significance of saturation, by which I mean meeting points along the boundary, where insiders and outsiders meet, intersect, and develop their understanding of the Other.

I see the grounds for the appearance of differing interpretations of the very same practices and mechanisms as located at these points of saturation, where two cultures meet, blend or clash. The nature of the interpretations emerging is actually indicative of the nature of the relation between the two groups. In the present case, it may be concluded that generally speaking, most Mormon practices are viewed by their Others in a negative light and with suspicion, as is the community itself. This resulted in a wave of persecutions throughout the 19th century and a series of theological problems still presented by a vast amount of literature, on both sides.

Mormon identity is the product of what Michel Foucault (1982) described as disciplinary, confessional and pastoral modality, in which people are inserted into subject positions, even though maintaining some extent of agency. In the case of pastoral power, he claimed that an absolute legitimacy derives from the figure of God which allows for an authoritative, hierarchical structure to emerge which, then, provides the guidelines for and shapes the
social, and through that, the individual as well. Convictions, such as “[T]he Church seems to be just about the only thing you can depend on — it’s the only sure thing,” (Taber 1993:80) express the members’ absolute submission to and trust in the Church, which provides them with a sense of security. Through this feeling, the Saints are also able to claim their position and to locate themselves with certainty within the social context of the larger American society, to position themselves in interactions and attain a cohesive narrative about their identity and reality, as part of a metanarrative which frames earthly life as an integral segment of eternal existence.

Conclusion

I therefore propose that these mechanisms comprise overall strategies, embedded in social practices, through which the Mormon Church is able to maintain a firmly unified community with a strong sense of collective identity, which functions as the primary reason for the ongoing membership of the individual as well as the ongoing existence of the collective. Through the Mormon Church, Latter-day Saint ideology is able to maintain an extensive set of practices in the fields of both sacred and secular life, thus providing trust, ontological security, knowledge and firm boundaries of identity for all the members, within which the Saints have a feeling of security, of being enabled, knowledgeable, powerful actors.

I argue that human beings participate in practices which they consider their own on the basis of self-identity, which is the driving force behind agency. I have found that Mormon identity is the personal translation and application of Mormon ideology within which one locates oneself or is located. The Saints claim that the reasons for everything they do can be found in their sacred texts — narratives out of which individual narratives of the self develop. In these the self locates itself, attains an objectified position, and acquires meaning within the given social matrix. Thus, the constitution of the self, the identity, originates in the faith and returns to it for regular confirmation. This also illustrates the cyclical nature of identity construction, the constant interplay between actor and structure.

References


In contemporary Britain there seems to be a strong belief in the country’s distinctness, but at the same time a feeling of confusion about what this distinct identity consists in.

As Pia Brînzeu (1997:43-44) remarks, the British have always tended to define themselves against Europe, ‘the Other’. It was Winston Churchill, Britain’s Prime Minister during the Second World War, who used the phrase ‘the Island Race’ for the first time. This sense of standing out is still visible today, and can be explained in part historically — it has resulted from imperialism, cultural isolation and international policies. In February 2001, Timothy Garton-Ash was writing in his article ‘Is Britain European?’ (in The Guardian) that ‘our history has long been told as a story of British — or is it English? — exceptionalism. A story of separateness, starting with the separation of the offshore island from the mainland, but then, following the end of the Hundred Years war, of political separation [...]. And a story of continuity, by contrast with the fickle mutability of the continent, constantly changing regimes and borders and monarchs and constitutions. A heart-warming story of the slow steady organic growth of institutions, of common law, parliament, and a unique concept of sovereignty, vested in the crown and in parliament’.

As Britain was a multinational state, ethnicity could not be central, although the English language acted as a cohesive force. Roger Eatwell (1997: 52) mentions five main elements that together led to the formation of Britain: firstly, religion (Protestantism), secondly, the belief in the superiority of the British Parliament, a symbol of liberty, thirdly, the demonisation of the Other (France — Catholic and autocratic), then, the identification of the British with moderate and pragmatic forms of thought, and finally, the idea of progress, that is the association of Britishness with trade and prosperity.

Historian Linda Colley (apud Miller 1997:166) traces the British identity back to the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when it was created with the special purpose of ‘bringing the Scots and the Welsh into a framework which they could share with the English’. She identifies three main components of Britishness (often considered with its narrow meaning of Englishness) from which it is evident that the British have always seen themselves as different from
the rest of Europe (geographically and politically — nowadays, an awkward partner of the European Union, refusing, at the moment, to adopt the euro).

The first element referred to by Colley — Protestantism (which seems to have developed a political dimension besides the religious one) — denoted the superiority of British politics and it was seen as conferring liberty on the British subjects in contrast to the absolutism that prevailed everywhere else. In terms of character, the British seem to have been described, in time, as democratic and pragmatic in comparison with the Europeans (and in particular the French), who are Cartesians and prone to absolutism.

Colley’s (apud Miller 1997:166) main idea is that ‘British identity was formed and consolidated in the century-long struggle against the French’. In Eatwell’s (1997:51) opinion, the pursuit of freedom was often seen as a specifically English characteristic. Moreover, military success against the French, the winning of imperial possessions at their expense, the collapse of the French Revolution into dictatorship were taken as a confirmation of a British identity that embodied the root principles of liberalism, namely Protestantism, limited government, and free commerce overseas.

The second component mentioned by Colley (apud Miller 1997:166) which has often been considered as central to Britishness is monarchy, an aspect developed fully in the late nineteenth century. The English/British monarch’s powers have been circumscribed in important documents from an early stage. The Magna Carta in 1215 made it clear that the king was not above the law, while the Act of Settlement (1688) established the consent of the Parliament as the basic principle of political authority. Here again, we can draw a parallel with the continent, where ruled the Divine Right of Kings. British monarchs from George I onwards (including George III who represents, however, a partial exception) took up the job of upholding the constitution and protecting the laws. Provided they did that, their personal character and behaviour were largely irrelevant. In the late Victorian period, the king came to stand for the essential values of the nation.

The third element of British identity, as listed by Colley, is the idea of empire. David Miller (1997:167-168) distinguishes two stages in the way the British understood the empire. In the beginning, the underlying idea was to transmit to other parts of the world the principles that made up Britishness itself, that is Protestantism, constitutional government, free commerce. In this context, the American Revolution came as a shock to the British who were reluctant to fight a war against colonists upholding the same principles. In its second phase, the empire was seen as the rule of the civilised over the uncivilised who were not fit to govern themselves. The mission was then not to transmit British core values, but to supply a partial version of these, namely
good administration and impartial justice, so the colonists could govern themselves. As far as this second image of empire is concerned, for the vast majority of the British population, the colonies constituted a rather remote entity where relatives might have emigrated. The fact that a large number of Britons voluntarily fought in the wars of imperial expansion could be interpreted as proof of the strength of national consciousness, while the fact that sacrifices were made relatively equally across classes and regions supported the sense of common identity.

In time, however, these components of Britishness have altered. If we can still talk about a ‘residual’ Protestantism in British political culture, this erosion of British identity has in Miller’s (1997:170-173) opinion three aspects: firstly, the poor economic performance after World War II came as a severe blow to the idea that Britain’s institutions and culture would lead to commercial success. Secondly, Britain’s constitutional arrangements became less unique in a larger, European context where many countries are liberal democracies. Finally, as they withdrew from the overseas colonies, the British passed on to them the parliamentary institutions which collapsed into military rule or one-party government. This final aspect came to question the popular belief in the intrinsic values of British institutions.

British identity is now in a process of redefining itself so as to include the new identities of immigrants who have settled in Britain and have brought with them not only their customs and traditions (for example, the Chinese New Year celebrated especially in Liverpool, where the largest part of the Chinese immigrant population lives, or the Notting Hill street carnival in London), but also their language as a main element of identity (there are around forty languages spoken in present-day London) (Storry, Childs 2000:261).

Britishness is nowadays a much debated concept and raises problems for the inhabitants of the islands as British identity is in danger of fragmentation because of several reasons such as devolution and its consequences, European integration and American influence. Andrew Marr (Shandu 2000; Moss 2000) argues that British identity has been invented for one reason — the empire; since this no longer exists, the term ‘Britishness’ is redundant and means nothing to most islanders, who rather feel English, Scots, Welsh or Irish; it is the others, the immigrants, who are British. The term seems to remain, nevertheless, a symbol of political identity only.

When asked what Britishness means to them, people tend to refer more and more to ‘cultural Englishness’ (Miller 1997:172), that is cultural stereotypes of Englishness, a set of private characteristics and ways of doing things that are thought to be typically English (drinking tea, watching cricket or
patronizing fish and chip shops, for instance). These stereotypes, however, do not include the identities of the minorities.

As I have mentioned previously, Britishness is most often considered with its narrow sense of Englishness. Given this ‘confusion’, I was interested to find out the opinion of Romanian students on this matter. I used the questionnaire as a method of research and distributed it to 226 students of various ages (111 eighth-form pupils from Scoala cu clasele I-VIII No. 24 in Timisoara, 50 fourth year students from the Faculty of Letters, 50 students from the Faculty of Sociology, and 15 students from the Faculty of Physical Education and Sports; all students study at the University of the West in Timisoara). For practical reasons, I carried out my research in Romanian so that all the respondents could understand exactly what they were asked to do. Another ground for this was the fact that not all the respondents had sufficient knowledge of the English language in order to complete the questionnaires in English. A copy of the questionnaire (in English) is available at the end of this paper.

Many of the respondents seemed to believe that ‘British’ and ‘English’ were quite the same thing. Fourteen-year-olds described the British/English as being tolerant and displaying an outward looking approach to the world (57.1%), manifesting enterprise, creativity and will power (57.9%), scientific curiosity (49.2%), respect for work (48.9%), fair play (37.8%) and honesty (25.6%). Surprisingly enough, forth year students (22-25-year-olds) appeared to be more influenced by stereotypes and, consequently, they thought of the British/English as very polite and calm (71.3%), having dark humour and carrying endless conversations about the weather (66.3%), or characterized by hooliganism, especially at football matches (33.7%). When asked about the first word they would associate with the British, first year students answered: ‘tea’, ‘fair hair’, ‘polite’, ‘punctual’, ‘boring’, or ‘drinking beer’.

It is important to know that the majority of these students have never been to Britain, that they have rarely met a British native. Their contact with Britain was reduced to the films they had seen, the jokes they had heard, or the books they had read. Their opinions may be considered similar to those of the majority of Romanians who are largely influenced by the media.

Cultural stereotypes have a great influence on our thinking about a nation’s hetero-image. Relying on such stereotypes, films and jokes in particular may lead us to develop prejudices about a certain people. Cultural stereotypes cannot stand for the British identity. Historians now believe that we are witnessing the de-insularisation of Britain, but it is still uncertain whether what is replacing it is Europeanisation or Americanisation. The balance seems to bend in favour of an ‘American future’, due to the current special political relationship between Britain and America, and the continuing skepticism about
Britain’s commitment to the European Community. In this context, the notion of Britishness remains debatable, and many British are ‘fuzzy’ about what the term means to them.

References:

THEME: Britishness

The purpose of this questionnaire is to find out your attitudes and opinions about the British. Please tick or answer the questions below in your own words according to case.

Personal Data:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex:</th>
<th>M</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age:</td>
<td>18-25</td>
<td>26-40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Student:</td>
<td>1st year</td>
<td>2nd year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty:</td>
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</table>

1. Have you ever been in Britain?
   
   Yes ☐ No ☐

2. Have you ever met a British native?
   
   Yes ☐ No ☐

3. What are the first words that come to your mind when you think about the British?
   
   _______________________________________________________________
   _______________________________________________________________
   _______________________________________________________________
   _______________________________________________________________
4. How would you characterize the British from what you know/ have heard from others/ radio/ television, etc.?

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5. From the characteristics below, please tick the ones that, in your opinion, represent the British:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fair play</th>
<th>Respect for work</th>
<th>Respect for work</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance; outward looking approach to the world</td>
<td>Extreme politeness, distant attitude, calmness</td>
<td>Extreme politeness, distant attitude, calmness</td>
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<td>Honesty</td>
<td>Hooliganism</td>
<td>Hooliganism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enterprise, creativity, will power</td>
<td>Dark humour; conversations about weather</td>
<td>Dark humour; conversations about weather</td>
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<td>Scientific curiosity</td>
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Thank you for filling in this questionnaire. 😊
VOLATILE ROMANTICS
BOWDLERIZING SHAKESPEARE: HERE, THERE, AND EVERYWHERE

GEORGE VOLCEANOV
“Spiru Haret” University, Bucharest

Thomas Bowdler, the editor who produced the notorious 1818 edition of Family Shakespeare, has posthumously become the symbol of literary censorship on grounds of ‘morality’ and prudishness. His name has become the root of several lexemes included in the most important English and American dictionaries: bowdlerize, bowdlerism, bowdlerization. To bowdlerize has been used for quite a while signifying ‘to remove all the parts of a book, play, etc. that you think might offend someone’ (Longman 2003:171); ‘to remove matter considered indecent or otherwise objectionable from (sic) by expurgation or alteration’ (Webster’s Third 1993:262); or, ‘to expurge (a play, novel, etc.) by removing or modifying passages prudishly considered immodest’ (Webster’s Encyclopedic 1994:175).

Today we know that the surviving Shakespeare canon is the result of several factors that competed and sometimes concurred in its shaping. We know, for instance, that Shakespeare’s works, like those of his contemporaries, could not escape the rigours of Elizabethan and Jacobean censorship (Clare 1993, Dutton 2000). But Shakespeare was not censored only during his lifetime. His plays were continuously reshaped, adapted, and, ultimately, ‘bowdlerized’ by successive generations of dramatists and editors. The question that instantly comes to one’s mind is ‘Why did so many people feel the need to bowdlerize the Bard’s plays’? My paper addresses this question via a few further questions: 1. Was Shakespeare a dirty-minded (vulgar, obscene) author, who made incredible concession to the vulgar taste of the ‘groundlings’? 2. When did Shakespeare’s bowdlerization actually begin? 3. Was Shakespeare bowdlerized in Romania? If so, to what extent was he expurgated? 4. Was bowdlerization part of the Communist regime’s strategy of appropriating Shakespeare through translation?

Censorship was not the only social energy involved in the shaping of the Shakespeare canon. As a representative of early capitalism, as a freelance entrepreneur depending on the economic dimension of his corporate activity (as a main shareholder in the leading theatrical company of the age), and as a competitor in the showbiz of his time, Shakespeare had to cater to the public taste, to fulfil his audience’s horizon of expectations. Today it is clear that
he sought to gain immortality through the two poems dedicated to Southampton, while his plays were ‘wrought’ to the good purpose of immediate profit. Says Michael Bristol (1996:50):

The complexity of the plays might then be described not as an artistic achievement but rather as a shrewd strategy to curry favour with as many sectors as possible within a complex cultural market. This would suggest that a Shakespearean work is in effect an industrial rather than an individual product and that its specific form of appearance is in some fundamental way motivated and sanctioned by an ethos of success.

As David Scott Kastan has recently shown, in Shakespeare’s age ‘drama was still subliterary’ (2001:31). It was pure entertainment. Therefore, not surprisingly, Shakespeare has been censured repeatedly for his indiscriminate pandering to the vulgar taste of Elizabethan and Jacobean groundlings. Some of Shakespeare’s twelve faults listed by Samuel Johnson in his famous Preface to the 1765 edition of Shakespeare’s plays, point to the fact that the dramatist was morally unprincipled and opportunistic. ‘He sacrifices virtue to convenience and is so much more careful to please than to instruct that he seems to write without any moral purpose’, the jests of his comic characters are ‘commonly gross and their pleasantry [is] licentious’, and ‘sonorous epithets and swelling figures’ accompany disappointingly ‘trivial sentiments and vulgar ideas’ (Woudhuysen 1989:130-2). Johnson’s accusations were later revived almost simultaneously by Leo Tolstoy and Robert Bridges. The latter condemned Shakespeare as a genius that prostituted his art to please his public in an essay with a telling title, The Influence of the Audience on Shakespeare’s Drama (1907) (Knight 1998:270-276).

In his valuable study Shakespeare’s Bawdy, first published in 1947 and still in print after so many decades, Eric Partridge convincingly argued that ‘Shakespeare may have had a dirty mind, yet he certainly had not a filthy mind’ (1990:8-9). Whenever we refer to any single aspect of Shakespeare’s writings we are faced with the complexity of his views, options, and manner of handling delicate issues. Partridge’s following comment fits this kind of critical response (1990:4):

... in his attitude toward sex and towards bawdiness, [Shakespeare] shows that he was both an idealist and a realist; a romantic and a cynic; an ascetic and a hedonist; an etherealist and a brutalist; a philosopher and ‘the average man’; a saint and a sinner (...).

Partridge envisages a heterosexual Shakespeare and considers the theories about his homosexuality to be ‘ludicrous’. Those who first charged Shakespeare with homosexuality were themselves homosexuals (Oscar Wilde
Samuel Butler, and Frank Harris), people who, according to Partridge, were ‘pathetically eager to prove that “Shakespeare is one of us”’ (1990:12). In order to dismantle these allegations, Partridge puts forward the case for Shakespeare’s heterosexuality by pointing out his sophisticated treatment of love between man and woman. Thus, he lists no less than forty-five synonyms for penis and sixty-eight for *pudendum muliebre* (1990:23), and sixty-four nouns expressing both the copulation (the act) and the copulating (the action) (1990:26). I have also counted ninety-two ‘man-operative “copulatory” verbs and verbal phrases’, both transitive and intransitive (1990:27), thirty-three verbs expressing ‘woman’s share in the primary sexual act’, and fifteen ‘words and phrases that convey mutual participation and the two angles of approach’ (1990:28). In contrast with Shakespeare’s rich vocabulary, the most comprehensive Romanian slang dictionary up to date contains only fifty ‘man-operative’ and seventeen ‘woman-operative’ copulatory verbs (Volceanov 1998:289-90); however, the fifty Romanian synonyms for penis surpass Shakespeare’s list of forty-five terms (Volceanov 1998:298).

Shakespeare’s knowledge and treatment of love must have elicited many a blush in the long history of his art’s reception. Hence, his bowdlerization is, actually, not Bowdler’s invention. The very first Restoration adaptations of Shakespeare’s plays contain in themselves the seeds of Shakespeare’s constant, incessant bowdlerization. The neo-classic doctrine imported from France in the 1660s had to do away with ‘the lack of decorum’ apparent in Shakespeare’s plays. William Davenant, John Dryden, Thomas Shadwell, Edward Ravenscroft, Nahum Tate, and many more mercilessly ‘refined’ and ‘polished’ Will’s raw verbal material. In his Preface to *Troilus and Cressida* (1679), Dryden ‘undertook to remove the heap of Rubbish, under which many excellent thoughts lay wholly buried’ (Vickers 1974:250). Dryden actually plagiarized Edward Ravenscroft, who had written a year earlier that Shakespeare’s *Titus Andronicus* was ‘a heap of Rubbish’ (Vickers 1974:141). For Nahum Tate, *King Lear* displayed the same unacceptable quality, being described as ‘a Heap of Jewels, unstrung and unpolisht’ (Vickers 1974:344). Shakespeare’s bowdlerization continued well into the eighteenth century, when the Shakespeare Ladies’ Club was founded.

In a paper given at the University of Utrecht (Volceanov 2003), I tried to decide whether the Bard was or was not, appropriated by the Romanian Communists through the translations published between 1955 and 1960. The translation of sexual (bawdy), religious, and socio-political terms was the touchstone used to appraise the quality of the Romanian versions. This paper is a sequel to the aforementioned study, one in which I will focus on the question of bowdlerization alone.
In my Utrecht paper, I contended that the 1955-60 edition of Shakespeare’s plays mirrored the political pressures of the age as well as the opportunistic behaviour and/or unacknowledged anxieties and, ultimately, the moral fibre of those who had translated Shakespeare into Romanian.

To my surprise, Sonia Leviţchi, a witness of the 1950s Shakespeare projects, told me, in answer to a questionnaire, that the authorities did not censor the translators’ versions because ‘Shakespeare was too great a name to be censored’ (2003). I had yet another surprise when I took a random sample of 306 Shakespearean words and phrases listed by Eric Partidge and compared the English and the Romanian versions. Objectionable and obsolescent as it may seem, the statistical method (applied to twenty-nine plays and two poems) persuaded me that the Romanian translators were, mostly, truthful to the original, or, at least, honest in their endeavour. I counted 179 instances of meaning for meaning translation (which, of course, has been preferable to the word for word translation since King Alfred the Great’s theory of translation); thirty-four instances in which the Romanian translators have been extremely ingenious, nearly surpassing the bawdyness of the original; and ninety-three cases of mistranslation (misunderstandings or missed sexual connotations). I shall try to demonstrate that the Romanian translators could express themselves freely and that the cases of misinterpretation, or bowdlerization, representing 30.4 per cent of the surveyed sample, are the result of either shallow talent, self-censorship, or the lack of adequate translation instruments (dictionaries and glossaries, critical editions, etc.).

Here are some examples that endorse the idea that Shakespeare was not censored in Romania in the 1950s. Boyet and Rosaline exchange witty retorts full of sexual allusions toward the end of Act Four, Scene One in Love’s Labour’s Lost; their battle of wits is echoed by Maria and Costard. Shakespeare’s ‘hit it’, obsessively resumed by the participants in the dialogue was rendered by Ion Frunzetii and Dan Grigorescu as ‘trag’, ‘tragi’, ‘trage’, a vigorous ‘copulatory’ verb in Romanian. Boyet’s cue ‘But she herself is hit lower: have I hit her now?’ (IV.1.120), with its overt sexual joke reads ‘Câ ea-i mai jos atinsã, nu crezi că am dovadã?’ in Romanian. Boyet’s proposal ‘Let the mark have a prick in ’t’ (IV.1.134) was translated ‘Sã-i bateþi cui la mijloc’, the hint at penis and vagina being as overt as it is in English. In translating Costard’s humorous remark ‘She’s too hard for you at pricks, sir: challenge her to bowls’ (IV.1.140), they outdo the Bard by fully exploiting the endless linguistic resources of the target language: ‘La cui þi-a rupt ea cuiful, la bile-þi speli ocara.’ ‘Pricks’ and ‘bowls’ (penis and testicles) are masterly translated, with an allusion to a Romanian popular folk song about ‘breaking pricks tonight’. Another instance of exquisite translation is the Romanian rendering
of Holofernes’ ‘If their daughters be capable, I will put it to them’ (IV.2.81-2), in which sentence the meanings of education and penis overlap. The verb used in Romanian for ‘put it to them’ strongly emphasizes Holofernes’ pedantry and mannerism, while preserving the comic pun on sex: ‘Dacă fetele lor sunt vrednice, am de gând să le-o introduc’.

Virgil Teodorescu’s Romanian version of Romeo and Juliet has preserved not only the poetic atmosphere of the original but also much of its bawdy tinge. The translator has found an excellent solution for translating Mercutio’s reference to noon, ‘the bawdy hand of the dial is now upon the prick of the moon’ (II.4.118-20): ‘limba dezmatată a cadranului mare stă sculată la amiaza mare’. The Romanian translation has a much stronger sexual tinge insofar as it conveys the image of a penis erectus, whereas the original puns on the ‘lustful hand of a woman’ (Partridge 1990:93). And Virgil Teodorescu seems to have outdone Shakespeare in yet another instance. Says Nurse: ‘... To fetch a ladder by the which your love / Must climb a bird’s nest soon when it is dark’ (II.5.75-6). The Romanian version reads: ‘Să caut scara, scara de frânghie, / Pe care, pe-nnoptate, păsărarul / S-o cățăra în cuibul păsăricii’. In Romanian, the lover is turned into a poacher and the ‘bird’ into a ‘birdie’, the Romanian synonym for the pudendum, which combines sexual meaning with affectionate overtones — it is a word used by parents when they talk with their toddling little daughters.

Speaking about fashion in general and about a ‘worm-eaten tapestry’ in particular, Borachio, the villain in Much Ado about Nothing, says about Hercules that ‘his codpiece seems as massy as his club’ (III.3.147). The sexual pun is obvious both in the original and in the Romanian version, which reads ‘prohabul e mare cât mâciuca lui’. As in Love’s Labour’s Lost and Much Ado about Nothing, Leon Leviţchi shows no sign of prudishness or inhibition whatsoever while translating bawdy passages from Hamlet, too. Compare the original with the translation of the following exchange between Ophelia and Hamlet:

**OPHELIA**: You are keen,  
my lord, you are keen.  

**HAMLET**: It would cost you a  
groaning to take off my edge.  

(III.3.258-60)

The Romanian version is both inventive and truthful to the original. And the same translator gives us an exquisite reconstruction of the Boar’s Head
scenes in *2Henry IV*. Here is a brief excerpt from the original and its Romanian translation:

**FALSTAFF:** Here, Pistol, I charge you with a cup of sack: do you dis-
charge upon mine hostess.

**PISTOL:** I will discharge upon her, Sir John, with two bullets.

**FALSTAFF:** She is bullet-proof, sir; you shall hardly offend her.

**HOSTESS:** Come, I’ll drink no proofs, nor bullets. (...)

**PISTOL:** Then, to you, Mistress Dorothy: I will charge you.

**HOSTESS:** Charge me! (...) (*2Henry IV*, II.4.120ff.)

The Romanian version preserves many of the original sexual quibbles based on ‘charge’ (to coit with a woman, cf. Partridge 1990:78) ‘discharge’ (to ejaculate, *idem* 94), ‘bullets’ (testicles, *idem*, 73) and ‘pistol’ (penis, *idem*, 161). And it is as comic, vivid, and exuberant as the original:

**FALSTAFF:** Pistolule, o încârcătură pentru tine — ține paharul ăsta de Xeres, acum descarcă-te, închină în sănătatea hangiței.

**PISTOL:** Sir John, trag în ea două gloanțe.

**FALSTAFF:** Prietene, rezistă la pistol; n-o atingi cu una cu două.

**HANGIȚA:** Haide, haide, nu mă mai amenința cu rezistența și cu gloanțele.(...)

**PISTOL:** Atunci, în sănătatea dumitale, mistress Dorothy — mă descarc în dumneata.

**HANGIȚA:** Te descarci în mine?

Next, I shall present some examples of unwittingly or deliberately bowdlerized translations. Mihnea Gheorghiu ranks as the first and foremost among Shakespeare’s Romanian bowdlerizers. He actually purged not only Shakespeare’s text but also his biography. The man who produced the excellent translation of Walt Whitman’s *Leaves of Grass* often chose to turn a blind eye to the overt sexual matters brought up by Shakespeare’s characters, as in the translation of the following lines from *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*:

**LAUNCE:** ... of her purse she shall not, for I’ll keep that shut: now, of another thing she may, and that cannot I help. (III.1.357-9)

**LAUNCE:** ... am să veghez să-i fie mereu punga goală (...). Restul n-are importanță.

Shakespeare obviously implies that Launce cannot check his wife’s fidelity. According to Partridge (1990:200), *thing* was a famous synonym for the pudendum. It vanishes from the Romanian version, leaving room for a neutral statement which means ‘the rest doesn’t matter’. The same lack of
truthfulness to the original is apparent in the translation of Sir Toby’s pun on
Sir Andrew Aguecheek’s hair: ‘I hope to see a wife take thee between her legs
and spin it off’ (Twelfth Night, I.3.109-10). The Romanian version reads: ‘O să te trezești într-o zi cu vreo gospodină că ți-l infige într-o furcă, il ia între
picioare și ți-l trage pe fus.’ The English thee is translated as it. The entire pun
on hair, which refers to pubic hair, and spin off, which means ‘to cause to have
an emission’, i.e. to ejaculate (Partridge 1990:187) is deliberately missed by
the cautious, self-censored translator. In the same play, Malvolio’s reading of
Maria’s forged letter, with his famous comment on Olivia’s ‘very C’s, her U’s
and her T’s’ (II.5.96), was translated literally, although there has been a consen-
sus among interpreters as regards the meaning of these capital letters
(Partridge 1990:151-2; Carroll 1994:110; Cunningham 1994:286). As Partridge
suggests, C-U-and-T with ‘and’ pronounced ‘n’, elicits the spectators’
expected response. In recent years, the renowned art director Andrei Șerban
has prepared a new stage version of Twelfth Night, retrieving many of the pre-
viously missed wordplays.

Mihnea Gheorghiu similarly turned a blind eye to some of the sexual
allusions in King Lear. The Fool’s song teaches us that ‘She that’s a maid now
and laughs at my departure / Shall not be a maid long, unless things be cut
shorter’ (I.5.55-6). According to Partridge (1990:199), ‘thing’ (meaning
penis) is the key to understanding the Fool’s pun. In Romanian, the bawdy
song is metamorphosed into its exact opposite: Mihnea Gheorghiu’s maid is
doomed to become a spinster, in the wake of the singer’s (Fool’s) departure:
‘Dacă-i pe-aici vreo fată mare / Și să m-aștepte-ar vrea cumva, / N-o să mai aibă
cautare, / Că pân-am să mă-ntorc, mai va.’ ‘Pillicock sat on Pillicock-hill: / Hallo,
halloo, loo, loo’ (III.4.77-8) is one of Edgar’s cues in his scenes of
feigned madness. For Partridge (1990:160) its meaning is obviously sexual,
denoting the male and female genitalia (pill=testicle; cock=penis; Pillicock-
hill=the mount of Venus + the pudendum muliebre itself). And what do we
have in Mihnea Gheorghiu’s version? A lullaby (!) about a cuckoo, which
reads as follows: ‘Unde-s puii cucoolui, / Puii mamei, pui, pui, pui.’ In my forth-
coming translation of the parallel (Q and F) King Lear, I shall render this very
cue as a tongue twister with a strong sexual connotation, known to both adults
and children: ‘Pilimon cu pila lungă, / Și-a pilit pila pe pungă / Pila-n pungă,
punga-n pilă, etc.’ Lear’s cue ‘I will die bravely, like a bridegroom’ (IV.6.202),
with its pun on male orgasm (Partridge 1990:93) was translated ‘Muri-voi vite-
jește; ca un mire, / Voios voi merge’. Gheorghiu’s bridegroom is made to
‘advance’ or ‘go ahead’ instead of... coming (in the sexual sense of the word).

If one may have good reasons to suspect Mihnea Gheorghiu of ‘judicious
self-censorship’, given his political career crowned by his position as a mem-
ber of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, things are different in the case of Dan Lăzărescu’s blunders. Here one may suspect the translator of The Taming of the Shrew of shallow talent and lack of skills in his wrestling with the original. In one of the famous battles of wits in the play, Petruchio says ‘Alas, good Kate, I will not burden thee’ (II.1.203), alluding to copulation and pregnancy, as Partridge suggests (1990:73). The Romanian translation, quite inexplicably, reads ‘Un astfel de mâgar țâ-ar prinde bine’. The Romanian translator also omits to translate Petruchio’s cue ‘Women are made to bear’ (line 201) and his later retort ‘buzz’ (line 206), described by Partridge (1990:105) as a rude noise. ‘Fâs’, or ‘ete scârþ/pârþ’ would have been the convenient translation of the latter omission. Hortensio’s sexual quibble on ‘the order of my fingering’ (III.1.65), during the would-be music lesson he teaches Bianca, was translated in abstract and neutral terms, as ‘principii ale artei’, i.e. ‘principles of the arts’. Curtis’ retort ‘Away, you three-inch fool!’ (IV.127), which, according to Partridge (1990:200), mocks a ‘small penis’d man’, was translated simply as ‘Pleacã de-aici, nebunule!’, i.e ‘Away, you fool!’, although ‘puþulicã’, ‘puþache’, ‘pulicã’ might have been the better solution.

I am not intent on firing all my anti-bowdlerism ammunition at Gheorghiu and Lăzărescu as black sheep of their generation of Shakespeare translators. The truth is that even the best, the most versatile and talented translators were sometimes compelled to bowdlerize their Romanian versions, whether of their own accord or compelled by the spirit of the 1950s. Here is for, for example, Dan Duþescu’s softened version of Hotspur’s words: ‘Come, Kate, thou art perfect in lying down: come, quick, that I may lay my head in thy lap’ (1Henry IV, III.1.229-31) reads ‘Haide, Kate, îmi place când șezi întinsã. Vino repede, repede, sã-mi culc obrazul în poala ta’. Substituting ‘cheek’ for head’, Duþescu does away with the strong sexual connotation of the original. Lady Hotspur’s endearing warning, ‘In faith, I’ll break your little finger, Harry’, (II.3.90) contains in itself an innuendo that vanishes from the Romanian translation. Percy’s retort, ‘I care not for thee, Kate: this is no world / To play with mammets and to tilt with lips’, mixes chivalric rituals and sexual imagery, both of which are somewhat blurred by Duþescu’s choice of words: ‘Nu-i timp de giugiuleli și de săruturi’ (i.e. ‘there is no time for fondling and for kisses’, which sounds like petit bourgeois teenage romance). In the same play, Falstaff calls Prince Hal ‘you, bull’s puzzle’. Partridge advocates the sexual reading of this phrase, suggesting that it may refer to the Prince’s ‘penal largeness’ (1990:161), but the Romanian translator prefers to have it translated as ‘vânã de taur’ (‘bull’s sinews’). The Romanian augmentative ‘puþoiule’ (in the vocative) would have been a better solution: it has the double meaning
of penis and of a reckless teenager that must be put in his place. ‘Pizzle’ will later recur in 2Henry IV, where the Hostess, or Mistress Dorothy, and Doll Tearsheet call Pistol ‘Peesel’ (II.4) and their dialogue with him abounds in puns on ‘pistol’ and ‘pizzle’, both of which mean penis. Leon Leviţchi preserves the English Peesel in his translation and Virgiliu Ştefănescu-Drăgăneşti (1985:231) explains it as a pun on ‘pee’, i.e. urination. Even so, the translator should have coined a nonce word (verbal inventiveness was one of Leon Leviţchi’s great assets as translator) combining the meaning and phonetics of the two words in a name like, say, Piştol, Pipistol, or Pişiţoi. Ion Vinea operates a similar bowdlerization when he translates King Harry’s ‘I should quickly leap into a wife’ (Henry V, V.2.141) ‘mi-aş gâsi repede perechea’, i.e. ‘I should quickly find my match’. Partridge makes it clear that ‘leap’ mixes sexual and animal imagery, thus suggesting vigorous sexual activity (1990:73), as in ‘And some such strange bull leapt your father’s cow’ (The Merry Wives of Windsor, V.2.2). Incidentally, Vlaicu Bârna, the translator of the latter play completely misses the point and expurgates the original, referring just to a Jove turned bull ‘for the sake of his beloved Europe’. The same translator misses the opportunity to exact the sheer fun of a passage abounding in sexual allusions (IV.1.52-70), in which ‘case’ and ‘O’ stand for the pudendum (Partridge 1990:76-7), the Latin caret is homophonous with ‘carrot’ (standing, as the Romanian ‘morcov’ does, for the penis), horum obliquely refers to ‘whore’, Parson Evans’ peculiar pronunciation of ‘vocative’, namely ‘focative’ suggests the most frequently used four-letter word (Partridge 1990:107), while the again Latin hic-haec stands for ‘to hick and hack’, i.e. to womanize and copulate (Partridge 1990:120). The translation of such complicated quibbles is very demanding and by no means do I blame Bârna for his failure to render this passage properly. I am just mapping those textual territories which should be reconsidered with a view to future, and hopefully more truthful, translations. I am also aware that the translation of such a passage is a real tour de force. The only practical solution I can envisage while writing this article is for the future translator to drop the Shakespearean Latin words and look up in a Latin dictionary words that are homophones or paronyms of Romanian vulgar and obscene lexemes. Leon Leviţchi’s critical edition of The Merry Wives of Windsor has a number of endnotes by Virgiliu Ştefănescu-Drăgăneşti, some of which refer to the ‘vulgar’ sense of the homophones used by Shakespeare (1985: 558). But how can a stage manager turn to his account such endnotes in live performance?

Virgil Teodorescu’s almost perfect translation of As You Like It similarly invites the revision of some bawdy passages. Celia’s joke and sexual pun in her cue aimed at Rosalind, ‘So you may put a man in your belly’ (III.2.215) was
translated ‘Și-odată cu ele, să sorbi și un bărbat’. One must admit that ‘sipping a man’, as the Romanian version puts it, is not the same as ‘putting a man in the belly’. Incidentally, one of the strongest obscene verbs used in Romanian for copulation is the literal translation of the English ‘put’, namely ‘a (o) pune’. The hunting song of the foresters equates hunting with virility and sexual activity (IV.2.13-8). The song repeatedly refers to the horn (in the singular!) born by all men, by fathers, grandfathers, and ancestors alike. According to Partridge (1990:123), it does not allude to cuckoldry but to man’s penis erectus. The Romanian version is moulded on the very idea of cuckoldry, although Shakespeare’s own words ‘The horn, the horn, the lusty horn / Is not a thing to laugh, to scorn’ point to male pride and virility. The horn as a symbol of penis erectus will later resurface in Alfred Jarry’s surrealistic Ubu Roi. I cannot help praising Romulus Vulpescu’s masterly translation of Ubu, with the main character’s aggressive verbal tic, an oath continuously pointing to his sexuality, ‘Ce cornu’ burþii mele!’ — the exact echo of Will’s hunting song.

The comic dialogue between the Clown and the First Musician in Othello (III.1.1-21) abounds in vulgar and obscene allusions: the ‘tail’ hung by the ‘wind instrument’ is the penis non erectus dangling in the nearby of the anus (Partridge 1990:196-8). Ion Vinea who translates Shakespeare’s use of homophones (‘tail’/’tale’) into a couple of paronyms (‘suflat’/’suflet’), succeeds in keeping a jocular mood and elaborating on puns, but misses the vulgar/obscene innuendo of the Clown’s cues.

Taºcu Gheorghiu, a brilliant translator of Lampedusa and Pirandello, missed many of the sexual innuendoes in Pericles. When, in one of the brothel scenes, Boult tells the story of ‘a Spaniard’s mouth so watered, that he went to bed to her very description’ (IV.2.107-9), he means that the horny gallant started masturbating at the very thought of copulating with the promised prostitute (Partridge 1990:115). In Romanian, ‘era un spaniol căruia-i lãsase gura apã într-atât că, numai dupã cât am zugrãvit-o eu, a ºi căzut la pat’, i.e. the Spaniard was suddenly taken ill. The same translator blurred the obvious sexual imagery in Lysimachus’ description of the bawd as ‘she that sets seeds and roots of shame and iniquity’ (IV.6.92-3), in which the ‘seeds’ and ‘roots’ stand for semen and penis erectus (Partridge 1990:176). The Romanian version erases the sexual metaphors by means of transposition, using verbs instead of nouns: ‘cea care seamânã ruþinea ºi sãdeºte ocara’, i.e. ‘she that sows shame and plants inequity’. The verbs do not preserve the double entendre, turning a concret sexual image into abstract, moralist philosphizing.

The last illustration of softened, bowdlerized translation is from Cymbeline. I am referring to the Romanian version produced by Leon Leviþchi in the late 1980s, which is, in all respects, more valuable N. Ioan Argintescu-
Amza’s version of the 1950s. There is a cue uttered by Cloten, the monster-villain desperately in love with Imogen, a cue that is, probably, the most pornographic passage in Shakespeare’s entire work. In his attempt to win Imogen’s love, Cloten resorts to the magic power of music. Here are his instructions for the musicians who are to subdue Imogen with their art: ‘Come on; tune; if you can penetrate her with your fingering, so; we’ll try with tongue, too: if none will do, let her remain’ (II.3.14-5). Partridge insists on Cloten’s equivocal vocabulary: he points to the pun on ‘fingering’ (1990:105), which means ‘to caress intimately’ or, in rude slang, ‘to finger-fuck’, and, similarly, to the pun on ‘tongue’, which alludes to ‘cunnilingism’ (1990:206). It is, indeed, a difficult task for any translator to assume the responsibility for translating this passage truthfully. The Romanian version reads: ‘Dacă o mișcăți ciupind corzile, e bine. Încercăm și cu glasul’, i.e. ‘If you can move her by pinching the strings, it’s all right. We’ll try with the voice, too’. ‘Penetrate’, ‘finger’, and ‘tongue’ all vanish and the double entendre is, unfortunately, completely lost. A good opportunity to characterize the foul-mouthed Cloten is, indirectly, missed, too.

The examples of Romanian bowdlerism make it clear that expurgating the Shakespearean text was not part of a wider political and ideological scheme imposed by a totalitarian regime, but rather the outcome of personal skills and personal options. We have seen that one and the same translator is sometimes able to produce both surprisingly ingenious and disappointingly poor solutions. We have also seen that sometimes the bowdlerized outcome of a translator’s efforts may be linked to biographical facts, which may have prompted some of the best translators to caution and self-censorship. If recent studies in Shakespearean biography have reached the conclusion that Shakespeare himself chose to judiciously self-censor his own works every now and then (see the case of the lost play Edward III), we shouldn’t blame the translators who contributed to the dissemination of Shakespeare’s plays in Romanian. The last part of this paper will come full circle and demonstrate that bowdlerism is a ubiquitous aesthetic process, unfolding in all ages and all cultures. At least this is the impression I was left with after reading Balz Engler’s response to the paper I wrote for the Shakespeare conference held at the University of Utrecht in December 2003: ‘Why, by the way, was there such an urge to bowdlerize? Naïve fellow that I am, I would associate this phenomenon with middle class rather than working class values!’ A possible answer to this question would suggest that Communism is a false, unviable ideology and there will always lurk a petit bourgeois deep down inside the most fanatic Communists.
A paper presented at the same academic event by Laura Campillo (2003), a Spanish fellow-Shakespeare scholar, persuaded me that bowdlerization does, indeed, transcend geographical and historical frontiers, that there have always been and will always be good reasons for translators to bowdlerize the Shakespearean heritage. She discusses the translation by Guillermo Macpherson (one of the most acclaimed nineteenth century Spanish translators), who, like Mihnea Gheorghiu a century later, pursued both a political and a literary career. Like Gheorghiu, he managed to reach high positions in the socio-political hierarchy of his age, such as those of vice-consul and consul in Madrid and Catalonia, respectively. Like Gheorghiu, he often felt the urge to blur Shakespeare’s direct approach to earthly matters. In his translation of *Measure for Measure*, Mistress Overdone refers to the ‘houses of resort’ (I.2.100), i.e. brothels that are to be pulled down in the suburbs of Vienna. According to Laura Campillo, ‘Macpherson was loath to mention the least allusion to a brothel’ and translated instead ‘our houses’. When Lucio meddles in the conversation between the Duke and Mariana and adds to the Duke’s question ‘Know you this woman?’ his own witty clarification ‘Carnally, she says’ (V.1.213-4), Macpherson substitutes the innocent adverb ‘casually’, meaning ‘as it happens’, for the obscene ‘carnally’. Laura Campillo also points out that, like the Romanian Dan Lăzărescu, ‘when censorship does not suffice to silence the indecent dialogue, Macpherson eliminates it altogether’.

I think that the coincidental approach to bowdlerism in two papers dealing with historical, cultural, and literary facts belonging to different ages and spaces should endorse the proposal I submitted at the Utrecht conference, one that elicited positive response among fellow-academics: it would be interesting for scholars from various countries to compare their notes as regards the bowdlerization of Shakespeare’s plays not only in former Communist countries but also in those countries where the Church has had a word to say about mores and morals displayed in such public places as theatres.

References


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**Translations from Shakespeare**


**Endnotes**

1 I am well aware that ‘gauging’ or ‘measuring’ artistic skills is a risky and arguable thing, but I rest my case upon my conscience and expertise as a literary translator and author of slang dictionaries.

2 We ought not to overlook some biographical details, which may better explain the Romanian translators’ attitude towards their work in an age when dozens of thousands of Romanian intellectuals were rotting in jail, digging needless canals, or harvesting the rush in the Danube Delta. Despite his ideologically clean record, the former avant-garde poet Ion Vinea was banned from publishing original works for more than two decades. Tudor Vianu was persuaded to become a party member just eighteen months before his death. Dan Duțescu, the private secretary of Lucretu Pătrășcanu (one of the outstanding victims of the authoritarian party leader Gheorghiu-Dej), was unemployed for nearly a decade. Leon Levițchi, the most distinguished Romanian Shakespeare scholar, editor, and translator ever, had a career of many ups and downs: he was the son of an Orthodox priest and joined the ranks of the party only as late as 1968, only to be forced into early retirement a decade later, when one of his daughters perpetrated the ‘crime’ of marrying a Swiss citizen. Conversely, Mișnea Gheorghiu succeeded in building an impressive career as an *aparatchik*. All these biographical details may account, one way or another, for occasional instances of what I would dub ‘judicious self-censorship’.

3 Mișnea Gheorghiu’s Shakespearean biography, *Scene din viața lui Shakespeare*, first published in 1958 and reprinted in 1964 and 1968, constructed the image of a diligent, patriotic, thrifty proto-Communist with a deep concern for the past misfortunes and the future welfare of his people and of mankind, in general. Gheorghiu insisted on Shakespeare’s would-be lower social origin. The popular version of the Bard was conceived in the spirit of the then fashionable Socialist realism. The best example of biographical bowdlerization is, probably, the identity of the Dark Lady of the Sonnets, assigned to Anne Hathaway. Gheorghiu even took the pains to explain how the less than flattering physical description of Sonnet 130 fitted the condition of a woman who, having given birth to three children, was no longer in her prime.
In Henry James’s short story *The Figure in the Carpet*, a famous writer, Vereker, confesses to have hidden a complex secret in his novels. A young and enthusiastic literary critic is trying to decode the mystery that would change the approach to Vereker’s work entirely. Announcing the secret is a challenge for both the critic and the ordinary reader of fiction: “I can speak for myself: there’s an idea in my work without which I wouldn’t have given a straw for the whole job. It’s the finest fullest intention of the lot, and the application of it has been, I think, a triumph of patience, of ingenuity. I ought to leave that to somebody else to say; but that nobody does say it is precisely what we’re talking about. It stretches, this little trick of mine, from book to book, and everything else, comparatively, plays over the surface of it. The order, the form, the texture of my books will perhaps some day constitute for the initiated a complete representation of it” (1986:8); or “For himself, beyond doubt, the thing we were all so blank about was vividly there. It was something, I guessed, in the primal plan, something like a complex figure in a Persian carpet. He highly approved of this image when I used it, and he used another himself. “It’s the very string,” he said, “that my pearls are strung on!” (14)

As Pia Brînzeu (1995:14) notices, the existence of a mystery, be it even a literary one, transforms Henry James’s story into a thriller. But, unlike regular thrillers, where the convention has taught the reader to wait patiently for the end of the story when the writer reveals the secret and explains all complications, *The Figure in the Carpet* offers its reader — a professional like the narrator or not — no such satisfaction in the end. The narrator won’t find the secret, Vereker dies, and the only critic who finally caught a few sounds of this hidden music dies as well. The narrator’s disappointment is, however, exaggerated. The mystery itself is the key to reading Vereker’s novels. For the writer, the very fact that he told someone about the existence of a secret, his explicitness regarding his technique, spoils his pleasure of creating fiction. The absence of a mystery makes fiction, as well as life, boring. The figure is a bait for the reader, an invitation to a game that is similar to chess and gambling at the same time: “For the few persons, at any rate, abnormal or not, with whom my anecdote is concerned, literature was a game of skill, and skill meant courage, and courage meant honour, and honour meant passion, meant life.
The stake on the table was of a special substance and our roulette the revolving mind, but we sat round the green board as intently as the grim gamblers at Monte Carlo". (James 1986:23) If chess implies intelligence, patience, logic, gambling presupposes risk and danger. In the game, the writer and the reader — critic or not, again — are equal players, partners in a creative, constructive activity.

The metaphor of the Persian carpet in Henry James’s short story is the development of a *mise en abyme* in its strictest sense of placing a secret correspondence in the deep structure of a work of art. Tracy Chevalier’s *The Lady and the Unicorn* (2003) and Arturo Perez-Reverte’s *The Flanders Panel* (a book that appeared in 1990 and was translated into Romanian in 2003) are two novels that develop a similarly intricate and mysterious *mise en abyme*. The American writer offers an imaginary genesis of the medieval French tapestry, whereas the Spanish author transforms the plot of the restoration of a 12th century Flemish painting into a whodunit. Tracy Chevalier invents a history for *The Lady and the Unicorn*, while Arturo Perez-Reverte creates an afterlife for *The Game of Chess*.

In *Notes and Acknowledgements*, a short chapter that opens the novel, Chevalier confesses: “This story is fiction, yet based on sensible suppositions concerning the Lady and the Unicorn tapestries. It is not certain which member of the Le Viste family the tapestries were actually commissioned by, nor why they were made, nor exactly when — though the Ladies’ clothes and the weaving techniques indicate they were probably woven towards the end of the fifteenth century. Jean Le Viste was the only male who had the right to display the family coat of arms at that time. Nor do we know who made them, though the skill and techniques displayed indicate the workshop would have been northern, possibly in Brussels, where *millefleurs* were a specialty at that time. For all their expense and their glorification of the Le Viste coat of arms, the tapestries did not remain in the Le Viste family for long — on Claude’s death (some time before 1544) they passed to her second husband’s inheritors. By 1660 they had been hung in a chateau at Boussac in central France. They were rediscovered there in 1841 by Prosper Merimée, inspector of historical monuments. He found them in poor condition, for they had been gnawed at by rats and in some places cut up — apparently people in neighbouring villages used parts of them as tablecloths and curtains. The writer Georges Sand soon became their champion, writing about them in articles, novels and her journal. In 1882 the French government bought them for the Musée de Cluny (now the Musée National du Moyen Age) in Paris — where they still hang, restored and in a specially appointed room” (Chevalier 2003:278).
Apart from the Le Viste family (the father who ordered the commission to glorify the name of his family and Claude, his daughter, who inherited it), all the other characters are fictional, but it is their own stories that give life to the characters in the tapestries. The faces, the clothes, the gestures of the ladies in the six plates mirror episodes from the lives of four women who play an important part in the making of the tapestries, in fact two mother-daughter couples: on the one hand, Claude and her mother, Geneviève de Nanterre, the former in love with the painter appointed to draw the models for the Ladies and, on the other hand, Aliénor and Christine, the daughter and wife of the Brussels weaver in whose workshop the tapestries are created.

In *The Flanders Panel*, the 15th century painting by Pieter van Huys, *The Game of Chess*, contains a secret so formidable that even the artist preferred not to disclose and which only the 20th century X-ray technology can reveal: *Quis necavit equitem*, “Who killed the knight?” Julia, the restorer, brings the golden inscription back to light from under several layers of dark paint and also takes over the difficult task of deciphering it. The painting, presenting two men playing chess and a woman reading a book by the window in a décor very typical of the Flemish artists, denounces a murder. And, mysteriously, it also foretells one or more in the world of its watchers. The game of chess that is being played in the painting is continued five centuries later. Taking a piece from the adversary carries a lethal connotation. In order to solve the enigma — to find out who murdered the knight in the painting and who murdered Julia’s friend involved in its decoding, one has to play chess. Only by finishing the game started by Ferdinand Altehhoffen, Duke of Ostenburg, and his best friend, the brave Roger of Arras, can one finish successfully a case that even the police of Madrid consider impossible.

In *The Lady and the Unicorn* and *The Flanders Panel*, the *mise en abyme* is achieved in a different way. In Perez-Reverte’s novel, it comes in a shape similar to that of Jan van Eyck’s portrait of the Arnolfini family. You spot the mirror that reflects the story immediately. In van Eyck’s painting, the small, round mirror is behind the spouses’ joint hands, showing the backs of the two characters as well as another character who is not visible in the painting and who is supposed to be standing in front of the Arnolfinis. The mirror gives the scene a dynamic character, presenting it as a sequence in a series that forms an episode in the every-day life of the couple. In *The Game of Chess*, the mirror, situated on the left side of the painting, small and round again, reflects the players’ faces and the chessboard. Its effect is doubled by the window, placed on the right, that discloses a landscape beyond the scene depicted in the painting, the outside world surrounding the characters, validating, in a way, their realness. The mirror effect is also present in the repetition of the chessboard.
pattern in the white and black squares that form the stone floor of the room and it is prolonged outside the painting, in Julia’s room, through the Venetian mirror which reflects the young woman’s vulnerability and fears. It is in front of both the painting and her own mirror that Julia realizes she has become part of the scene. Furthermore, Belmonte, the owner of van Huys’s *The Game of Chess* and a fan of Bach’s compositions, associates music with a life size mirror where one can see one’s whole life.

In *The Lady and the Unicorn*, the mirror is not part of the composition, it does not appear beside the characters and the other elements in the tapestry. In fact, it is here rather than in the previous two examples that the mirror effect is properly used. The mirror presupposes an inversion rather than a juxtaposition: “Since we are always working on just a strip of tapestry the size of a hand’s length, which is then rolled inside itself onto a wooden beam, we never see the tapestry whole until it is done. We also work on it from the back and don’t see the finished side unless we slide a mirror underneath to check our work. Only when we cut the tapestry off the loom and lay it face-up on the floor do we get to see the whole work. Then we stand silent and look at what we have made” (Chevalier 2003:72) or “Philippe did all the drawing, as Nicolas did not understand that we weave back to front and so need cartoons that are mirror images of the final tapestries” (2003:122).

The way in which the mirror effect functions becomes evident in the two novels at different stages. In *The Flanders Panel*, the existence of a great secret is announced from the very beginning, although it is not worked out until much later. The riddle is made more complicated by the game of chess and the polysemy of the word *knight* which can refer both to a noble medieval warrior like the two men in the painting or to a piece on the chessboard (in the painting, one of the characters has just taken one and he is holding it in his hand). The correspondence between the pieces and the characters develops when we — as watchers and readers — realize that both the woman in the painting (Beatrice, wife of the Duke of Ostenburg, in love with Roger of Arras, responsible for the latter’s death, dressed in black) and Julia (the main positive character of the novel) are also pieces on the chessboard. They are the two queens: the black one and, respectively, the white one. The fact that Julia and her friends, the characters outside the painting, will continue and try to finish the game started in the world of Beatrice and Roger complicates the story even further. The mirror’s meaning is grasped through association. In *The Lady and the Unicorn*, the characters won’t know much about their relationship with the tapestries until the end, when they are suddenly faced with them and can have an overall view of their own stories. The making of the six large plates is long and difficult. After months of work, the artists won’t have
reached the top yet. The background will be finished, the millefleurs, the rabbits and the Ladies’ dresses, perhaps a hand stretching out, but not the faces. And it is at the top that the secret of each tapestry lies, where the faces of the Ladies are painted and woven. The relationship between the tapestries and the characters will be known only at the end, when the faces are visible. The secret is revealed in the mirror by virtue of a confrontation, through contrast.

Peter van Huys placed the golden inscription at the bottom of his painting with the hope that the mystery of the knight’s death will be solved. It takes a very good art restorer and a brilliant chess player to understand the reality encoded by The Game of Chess. When they do understand it, the two stories, inside and outside the painting, become one. To the levels of the painting (the floor imitating the chessboard, the characters playing chess, the characters standing for chess pieces, the mirror reflecting all this) the level of Julia’s real world is added. She becomes so integrated in the ensemble that she not only risks losing her life, like Roger of Arras, but she identifies with the black queen, with Beatrice Ostenburg, sharing her suffering and her remorses, her melancholy and isolation in the convent where the duchess spent the rest of her life after Roger’s death and the collapse of her husband’s dukedom, as recorded in the chronicles. Julia becomes a partner in the game, like Corvick and the narrator in Vereker’s construction of fiction.

Julia sees Beatrice before the scene depicted by van Huys’s painting, at her wedding, during the scene, sitting by the window and perusing an imaginary Poem of the Rose and the Knight, or just before her death, during a harsh northern winter. Beatrice’s eyes, although hidden, as she is reading, seem to meet Julia’s and make her realize the sadness in that look is her own. When the mystery of Roger’s death is solved, the secret that remains is in Julia’s world, but still closely connected to the Flemish painting. Alvaro, Julia’s former lover who offered her the historical background of The Game of Chess, has been murdered by someone who continues the game in the panel, the price being the life of all those who know about the enigma of Quis necavit equitem and, of course, the painting itself which, in the meantime, has doubled its price. Julia realizes soon enough that “the board stopped being a mere alternation of white and black squares and turned into a real place that stood for the course of her own life” (Perez-Reverte 2003:199, my translation from the Romanian edition). She understands that she is an extra character in van Huys’s painting, like the character in van Eyck’s painting, visible only in the small mirror on the back wall. She feels that “she had been there from the very beginning; since Peter van Huys imagined that episode. Even before the Flemish master skillfully prepared the calcium carbonate and the animal glue.
with which he was to imbibe the panel and then start painting it” (Perez-Reverte 2003:241, my translation).

In Tracy Chevalier’s novel, the six tapestries representing the seduction of the unicorn are the story of the painter’s relationship with four different women. Although Jean Le Viste wanted tapestries representing the battle of Nancy, he will end up having six feminine portraits. It is Geneviève de Nanterre, his wife, who will urge Nicolas des Innocents, the painter, to talk the nobleman out of his initial plan. Only at the very end, when the tapestries are brought from Brussels and hung in the grande salle for Claude’s wedding, will Geneviève see the consequence of her decision to change a battle scene into a love scene. Four of the plates are directly connected to their creator, Nicolas, but also to their initiator, Le Viste’s wife. The tapestry representing Taste, with a lady feeding a parakeet, stands for the beginning of the unicorn’s seduction. Paradoxically, however, it also stands for its ending, as the lady is Claude, the noble girl Nicolas wants but cannot have and whom he met because Geneviève wanted women in the tapestries instead of soldiers and horses. Both the painter and Claude are punished for their disobedience by Geneviève who invites Nicolas to Claude’s wedding banquet on Saint Valentine’s Day, offers him a seat under the tapestry representing Taste, and forces him to marry her lady in waiting.

Ascertaining the existence of a link between the tapestries and the face of some woman or other that Nicolas meets is a process continually belated. Although they work on the tapestries day and night, the women in the weaver’s family find that they have been involved in the story of the seduction only when the plates are cut off from the loom. Aliénor cannot realize she has served as a model for Nicolas’s Ladies because she is blind. As for Christine, it is only when she sees the tapestry representing Sight, where her daughter is depicted, that she understands Aliénor must be pregnant. The scene is the actual end or climax of the seduction, with the unicorn subdued, lying at the Lady’s feet, his horn in her lap. Aliénor cannot grasp the connection between the unicorn’s position and her secret affair as she cannot hide her pregnancy from her family. Christine is just as surprised to see herself in Touch: “The Lady did look like me, with my long hair and long face, my pointed chin and strong jaw, and my eyebrows in high curves. I was the proud weaver’s wife, smugly holding a banner in one hand, the unicorn’s horn in the other. I remembered the moment he had captured, when I’d been standing in the door thinking of my weaving. Nicolas des Innocents knew me too well” (Chevalier 2003:233).

As an irony directed to Nicolas’s intentions, Geneviève likes this tapestry more than the one devoted to herself. The lady in her own panel is
detached from the story of the seduction and her banner reads “À mon seul désir”, which is something Nicolas and Claude overheard her say in front of her confessor. She was referring to giving up courtly and family life and isolating herself in the convent. For Nicolas, “À mon seul désir” is the most complex tapestry, being the metaphor of a renunciation: the Lady is taking off her necklace, bidding farewell to all the senses, thus letting go of the physical life. Jean Chevalier and Alain Gheerbrant (1995) interpret the Lady taking off her jewelry as a renunciation to one’s most intimate self, the unicorn finding its peace only at the highest spiritual level. For Geneviève — and for the novelist, therefore — the gesture of touching the necklace is ambiguous: it can be while putting it on, not just taking it off, thus leaving the Lady to oscillate between seduction and spirituality. She likes Christine’s tapestry, because she interprets her standing on the threshold (a realistic representation that Nicolas had painted, with the weaver’s wife about to enter the house, pleased that her husband had given her permission to weave together with the men) as a passage from one life to another, a passage that she, as wife of a nobleman cannot afford: “It would be a mercy to let me enter a convent. But Jean is not a merciful man. And he still needs me. Even if he despises me, he wants me next to him when he dines at home, and when we entertain or go to Court to attend the King. It would not look right for the place next to him to be empty. Besides, they would laugh at him at Court — the man whose wife runs off to a nunnery. […] Most men would be like that — older women joining convents are usually widows, not wives. Only a few husbands will let them go, no matter their sins” (Chevalier 2003:57).

Nicolas himself is present in all the tapestries. He is the unicorn. He always thinks of himself as such when he is in the company of a woman and the fact that other people see his unicorns as either too fat or looking rather like dogs or other animals (no one has, obviously, ever seen a unicorn) makes him experience a feeling of deep frustration. According to Chevalier and Gheerbrant (1995: 215-218), the unicorn is the medieval symbol of purity and luxury, perfectly embodied in the novel by the first two women who inspire the painter, Le Viste’s wife and his daughter, the former a spiritual virgin, the latter a more or less naïve noble maiden. The other two women, the experimented Christine and Aliénor, who chooses to lose her virginity as a form of protest against her father’s decision to give her into marriage to ugly Jacques Le Boeuf, counterbalance the original symbolism. Nicolas’s identification with the fantastic creature that receives, thus, a sexual connotation serves the same purpose. But then having Nicolas, the handsome seducer in this novel, as a fat, dog-looking unicorn rather than a stallion-looking one is an ironic commentary on his relationship with all the female characters — close to them
without knowing them well. The tapestries are a proof: “I thought I’d been very clever, but my cleverness had tripped me up” (Chevalier 2003:264). It is not only Christine du Sablon and her family or Geneviève who don’t realize they are depicted in the tapestries until the end; Nicolas himself doesn’t realize the secret until the very end. He was wrong in almost every prediction, in his interpretation of his own art, and especially in his actions. He pays for it by having to marry Beatrice, the woman who has protected Claude from him all this time. Unlike other creators who master the secret and launch it as a provocation, Nicolas, the painter of ladies’ carriage doors and small, colourful coats of arms at the beginning of the novel, becomes the victim of his own secret.

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During the European 1890’s, Oscar Wilde emerges as the outrageous spokesman of an age placed on the borderline between cultures and centuries, progress and dissolution, traditional order and demonstrative chaos. Labeled as a professional sinner, he stands out as a provocative but unfairly judged prophet of the years to come. Doing his share of justice, Richard Ellmann points out that “essentially Wilde was conducting, in the most civilized way, an anatomy of his society, and a radical reconsideration of its ethics. He knew all the secrets and could expose all the pretense. Along with Blake and Nietzsche, he was proposing that good and evil are not what they seem, that moral tabs cannot cope with the complexity of behavior. His greatness as a writer is partly the result of the enlargement of sympathy which he demanded for society’s victims” (1988: xvi).

It is in the same philosophical area and with the same strongly expressed conviction that Robert Musil chooses to place his stunning encyclopedic novel — *The Man without Qualities*. Elaborated between 1918 and 1942, the massive (yet unfinished) work focuses in retrospect upon the last moments in the e/in-volution of the Habsburg Empire. In 1913-1914, its heroes look back upon the closing of the previous century and the opening of a new era of change and tension that was to lead to the outbreak of the First World War, only twelve months later.

The 19th century seems to have outlived itself for at least 14 years: this is one of the main explanations for Musil’s clear reliance on themes, motifs, ideas that rather belong to the fin-de-siècle artistic patterns than to those of modernism, already generously embraced. There is also little wonder as to Claudio Magris’ characterization of Musil as the spokesman of European decadence (1981: 140). *The Man Without Qualities* arches over two stages in the development of modern identity, overcoming both in a surprising attempt to establish an utopian world of solidarity (cf. Jonsson 2000:1). While Oscar Wilde is the most widely read and most quoted apostle of the end-of-the-century spiritual trends, Robert Musil manages to produce a canonical novel of (Central) Europeanness. According to Bonnet (1979:2), it ranks among the three total literary projects of the 20th century, along with *Ulysses* and Proust’s cycle.
In terms of *zeitgeist*, Musil distinguishes himself as an accurate historian, paralleled by a gracious narrator. His perception of the past is highly melancholic, although he is one of the visionaries who envisage a possible continuity between centuries: “Each time it is like a miracle when after such a shallow, fading period all at once there comes a small upward surge. Suddenly, out of the becalmed mentality of the nineteenth century’s last two decades, an invigorating fever rose all over Europe. No one knew exactly what was in the making; nobody could have said whether it was to be a new art, a new humanity, a new morality, or perhaps a reshuffling of society” (Musil 1997:53).

This excerpt from *The Man without Qualities* perfectly illustrates the uncertainties and restlessness of the age. The downfall of morality is only one of the features of an apocalyptic world of confrontations between reason and feeling, science and art, action and contemplation. According to Hannah Hickman (1984:3), these are polarities confined within the lives of various fictional characters, in an impressive attempt to draw the public attention upon the necessity of a new moral system, in agreement with the achievements of the society. The means to that end is an evasion from the immediate reality into the realm of possibilities: Musil set himself to articulate narrative with non-narrative procedures in one of the greatest novels of decadence and loss (cf. Castex 1975:846).

The similarity between Wilde’s and Musil’s strategies in this respect is undeniable: both authors are chroniclers of a time of decay and regression, both offer a prose which can be regarded as symptomatic for a historical crisis. However, they never take it upon themselves to draw the explicit portrait of this period. Each forges and masters a fantasy, breaking away from the literature of mere representation and recreation of reality. The British uses the world of art as a sort of refuge, a framework within which heresy and vice are justified by superior and superfluous laws of transcendence. Dorian Gray’s portrait is the reflection of a broader reality which Wilde’s own existence surfaced, as the top of the iceberg: “Not content with the company of possible or actual lovers, Wilde prided himself on leading a life not double, but multiple [...] Constance, with his children, was always there, to neglect or not” (Ellmann 1988: 283).

Musil’s own approach to reality resembles that of the visual arts: like in the case of a painting, we witness the destruction of perspective in favor of a skillful rendition of multiple points of view. Musil sketches the background to his novel in such a manner that the characters’ immorality seems as natural as Dorian’s artificiality and sinfulness: “There is just something missing in everything, though you can’t put your finger on it, as if there had been a change in the blood or in the air; a mysterious disease has eaten away the pre-
vious period’s seeds of genius, but everything sparkles with novelty, and finally one has no way of knowing whether the world has really grown worse, or oneself merely older. At this point a new era has definitely arrived” (Musil 1997:56).

The comparative reader can notice a leap forward from the New Hedonism dominating the Dandy’s living-rooms to the alleged breath of fresh air brought about by the new era. However, the air is polluted by lingering depravation and inevitable void. Shallowness seems to gain in terms of hypocrisy: under the advertised banners of progress, there lies a drained, static society, torn between tradition and innovation in a tragic dialectics of the double. The common citizen finds himself caught in between his adverse reaction to such an order of things and his impossibility to act accordingly. Just as Wilde was a celebrated star of the Yellow Decade until its ultimate conventionalism annihilated him, Ulrich, Musil’s anti-hero is doomed to face the rigid heritage of the Empire-State.

In both novels, the clash between the rebellious nature of the protagonist and the frozen framework of unwritten laws leads to a segregation of the self, a loss of coherence and consistency explained by Stefan Jonsson in his research on modern identity: “Each time it [the subject] attempts to express its innermost being, it stumbles on clichés, stereotypes, inherited or prefabricated conventions for speaking about psychic essences, and finally loses itself in an interior landscape of petrified mental objects [...] In other words, there is no substance, no identity, behind what we call the ‘I’, the self, the ego, the individual or the subject. There is just a flow of general, impersonal elements” (2000:79).

Inevitably, the human being appears to be the result of an exterior molding of character, under the oppressive influence of social institutions and cultural conventions. Musil manages to articulate what Oscar Wilde was prefiguring in sheer experiment and precious conversation: his ‘man without qualities’ exposes the widespread reduction of morality to duty, to the plain obedience to a set of obsolete constraints. “Ulrich generalized this: all moral events take place in a field of energy whose constellation charges them with meaning. They contain good and evil the way the atom contains the possibilities of certain chemical combinations [...] Ulrich regarded morality as it is commonly understood as nothing more than the senile form of a system of energies that cannot be confused with what it originally was without losing ethical force” (Musil 1997:270/1).

Musil synthesizes the essence of his belief which acts upon the same principle as Oscar Wilde’s famous statement from the Preface to The Picture of Dorian Gray: “There is no such thing as a moral or an immoral book. Books are
well written, or badly written. That is all” (1994:5). Both authors strongly believe that there can be no clear-cut distinction between black and white, good and bad. Nietzsche’s influence cannot be overlooked in either of them: Roberto Olmi emphasizes the common idea that interdictions and prescriptions function as the weak exponents of impoverished morals having lost meaning: instead of favoring feelings, it tries to guard and subject them (cf. 1981:158).

Both Wilde’s and Musil’s characters meditate upon this subject; nevertheless, the Wildean hero is basically designed as a tool to serve the ideological purposes of the writer, most frequently misunderstood. Despite the atmosphere of debauchery that overflows the pages of the novel, there is an ethical dimension of reward and punishment which seems to go unnoticed: Dorian does not survive his sins in an outcome that should absolve Wilde of many unfair allegations. However, the dandified triangle of artists in The Picture openly glorifies sin as an element of progress. When talking of the preposterous À Rebours, Dorian speaks out the opinion of his literary creator and utters the following explanation: “As for being poisoned by a book, there is no such thing as that. Art has no influence upon action. It annihilates the desire to act. It is superbly sterile. The books that the world calls immoral are books that show the world its own shame” (Wilde 1994: 249/50).

There is a noticeable difference between Dorian and Ulrich in what regards their devotion to a cause. Dorian prefers fin-de-siècle conversationalism and theoretical speeches, while Ulrich is a man out of his time, who would rather act upon the birth of a new moral order. This shift of attitude might be put down to the essential disposition of the writers: to Wilde, art annuls morality, setting up its own laws and proclaiming the supremacy of aesthetics [“Those who find beautiful meanings in beautiful things are the cultivated. For these there is hope. They are the elect to whom beautiful things mean only Beauty” — Wilde 1994: 5].

On the contrary, Chardin’s approach to Musil and European Literature points out, quoting from the Austrian’s diaries, his innate aversion towards the theory of art as appearance or game and his conviction that the ethical man inside him opposed purely aesthetic experience (cf. Chardin 1998: 75). Either passive or active in defying frozen laws, Dorian and Ulrich support the same stand, which is to be found in one of the Musilian hero’s endless debates with his sister, Agathe: “All moral propositions, Ulrich agreed, characterize a sort of dream state that has already flown the coop of rules in which we tether it. — Then there’s really no such thing as good and evil, but only faith or doubt! cried Agathe” (Musil 1997: 828).

In order to get a proper understanding of Musil’s (and Wilde’s, for that matter) theoretical standpoint, one needs to disambiguate the use of the terms
“moral/ morals/ morality”. As Jacques Bouveresse points out, they can refer either to the system of rules meant to preserve and regulate the proper conduct of the society and its members, or to the living element which mocks the ‘moral morality’ from within (cf. 2001:19). In the Nietzschean line (cf. Olmi 1981:159), the building up of a system of norms meant to enclose existence is viewed as lie and aggression: “Morality is regulation of conduct within a society, beginning with regulation of its inner impulses, that is, feelings and thoughts [...] Like every other form or order, it arises through force and violence [...] In other words: everything is moral, but morality itself is not!” (Musil 1997:1112/3).

The Musilian character operates a distinction between ethics and morality, rejecting any confusion. Therefore, he strives to delineate between the rational and the non-rational (although they represent two spheres of humanity only separated by a fault of articulation, while merely belonging to the same divided self; cf. Cometti 1985:195). Jonsson considers that “Musil’s notion of subjectivity entails a similar ethics of transgression; that is why Ulrich and Agathe’s extended discussions on the nature of morality can only lead to a program that posits true morality beyond Good and Evil. ‘The good,’ Ulrich says to Agathe, ‘has become a cliché almost by its very nature, while evil remains criticism. The immoral achieves its divine right by being a drastic critique of the moral! It shows us that life has other possibilities. It shows us up for liars’ ” (Jonsson 2000:163).

Challenging traditional morality, this ‘man without qualities’ mirrors the fin-de-siècle need to abandon moral imperatives and rigid distinctions in order to make place for creativity, in a reversal of principles (cf. De Angelis 1981:149). This is the point in which our protagonists’ roles seem to shift. The contemplative Dorian is the practitioner of virulent challenge to all standards of proper living: Ulrich offers the theoretical background for a new order in which ideology becomes open, in accordance with the fluidity of spirit (cf. Bouveresse 1979:9). With their own weapons, both fight against the petrified images of a depersonalized epoch: the standardized man appears as the follower of good men, ideal patriots, disciplined combatants and perfect citizens (cf. Vatan 2000:113).

Regarding Oscar Wilde’s battle, Richard Ellmann makes the necessary ethical points. Firstly, that “without surrendering the contempt for morality or for nature, that had alarmed and annoyed his critics, Wilde now allowed for ‘a higher ethics’ in which artistic freedom and full expression of personality were possible, along with a curious brand of individualism and narcissistic socialism” (1988:305). Secondly, that “to the charge of immorality, he [Wilde] retorted, as Coleridge did with The Ancient Mariner, that Dorian Gray
was too moral. He [Wilde] summed up the message: “All excess, as well as all renunciation, brings its own punishment” (Ellmann 1988:321). To a certain extent, this attitude brings to life the solution envisaged by the Musilian hero: morals should be induced from facts and experience rather than deduced from intangible ideals (cf. Bouveresse 2001:18). Thus, one would deal with a type of objective morality derived from experiential acquaintance with a set of factors that can never be univocally interpreted.

This apparently paradoxical condition is illustrated in daring pieces of brotherly dialogue: “He was of course aware of the distinction between natural and moral laws, that the first are derived from observing amoral nature, while the second have to be imposed on less stubborn human nature; but being of the opinion that something about this opposition was today no longer accurate, he had been just about to say that the moral system was intellectually a hundred years behind the times, which was why it was so hard to adapt it to changed conditions “Didn’t you once say that the same act may be either good or bad, depending on circumstances?” Agathe asked. Ulrich agreed. That was his theory, that moral values were not absolutes but functional concepts” (Musil 1997:812/3).

It is not extremely difficult to detect a common tone in Wilde’s and Musil’s works as to the characters’ appetite for self-enrichment by means of experimentation. Trespassing against the boundaries imposed by morals or reason, Dorian and Ulrich share the cherished impression of freedom of choice (cf. Andriescu 1982:70). While Dorian appeals to minute detail to fill the inner void of his life, Ulrich prefers contextualization, placing more emphasis upon the circumstances of a situation than upon the mere action. They are both conscious of the fact that the soul resembles an empty vessel which would sink into anarchy, were it not filled by moral, religious, philosophical ideals.

Nevertheless, it is such noble contents that inevitably leads to the destruction of the container (cf. Bouveresse 2001:51). Neither character lacks a moral sense, but their perception of the issue is rather closer to immorality. Ulrich jocularly states his belief: “Man is not good, but he is always good; that’s a tremendous difference, don’t you see? We find a sophistry of self-love amusing, but we ought to conclude from it that a human being can really do no wrong; what is wrong can only be an effect of something he does. This insight could be the right starting point for a social morality” (Musil 1997:283).

Taking into account the paths that the writers open to their protagonists, one can more easily comprehend the choices left to humanity on the verge of a modern crisis: it can either obstinately hold onto its obsolete, paralyzed and
paralyzing moral order, or it can rely on the creative drives of its immoralists for salvation (cf. Bouveresse 2001:131). Both Wilde and Musil seem to be supporters of progress by means of giving in to one’s appetites. They share once more Nietzsche’s views upon the possibility for moral victories to be achieved by immoral means. Living in a ‘moral interregnum’ (Chardin 1982:171), at a time of historical in-betweenness, the characters display a predilection for a surprising mixture of idealism and realism:

“This idealism could also be described as harmonious, because it detested everything unbalanced and saw the task of education as reconciling all the crude antagonisms sadly so prevalent in the world; in short, it was perhaps so very different from what we still mean — though of course only wherever the great middle-class traditions are still upheld — by the sound and pure idealism, the kind that distinguishes most carefully between conflicts worthy of its concern and those that aren’t, and which, because of its faith in a higher humanity, does not share the conviction of the saints (along with the doctors and engineers) that even moral garbage may contain unused heavenly fuels” (Musil 1997:359).

Underneath the humorous wit of the parenthesis one can sense the pride of the intellectual, the ‘man without qualities’, the theoretician whose abilities to fantasize and fabricate alternative worlds stand in sharp contrast to the scientific, goal-oriented values of modernity. Decadent natures are reluctant to the amazing steps forward taken by science, which is perceived as the evil opponent of art. While artistic inclinations and practice ennoble the spirit, scientific and technological formation can drive the individual towards mechanization, annihilate his/her personality and eventually transform him/her into an automaton.

In this respect, Arnheim’s falterings between feelings and reason, between his inward need for the unequivocal and his passion for his beloved are highly illustrative of a general state of mind: “Arnheim was in a particular state of conflict. Moral wealth is closely related to the financial kind; he was well aware of it, and it is easy to understand. For morality replaces the soul with logic; once a soul is thoroughly moral, it no longer has any moral problems, only logical ones. Arnheim was suffering the fate of his whole era. This era worships money, order, knowledge, calculation, measures and weights — the spirit of money and everything related to it, in short — but also deplores all that” (Musil 1997:552/55).

Caught amidst such issues, both Dorian and Ulrich will go against the grain, worshipping the lofty, the spiritual, but also the bodily, the disorderly, the spontaneous. According to Bouveresse (2001: 291), they proclaim the triumph of individualism and instrumental reason, breaking taboos and letting desires
loose. Oscar Wilde imposes himself as the icon of decadent ideology; he makes the generalized atmosphere of moral corruption visible on the face of his character. It is primarily the sexual dimension of *The Picture of Dorian Gray* that shocks the readers, the multiple allusions to loose morals and homosexual desire. However, this perception can easily be considered biased by the a-prioric knowledge of the writer’s own sexual preferences and habits; Alan Sinfield, the advocate of *The Wilde Century*, offers a different insight on the matter:

“Dorian is urged by Wotton to adopt ‘a new Hedonism’, but he becomes stupidly infatuated with Sybil Vane and guilt-ridden after abandoning her. His troubles arise from sentimental self-indulgence and want of intelligence and self-control, not from aestheticism and amorality. The painting registers his guilt, but does not control it; it merely prevents it from showing in his body [...] To accomplish this theme, it is not necessary for Wilde to make any of his characters homosexual; that is the burden of my argument so far. In the nexus of aestheticism, decadence and leisure, as Wilde received it, that is an optional extra. In *Dorian Gray* no one exactly meets the bill — though, as I will argue in a moment, the whole book is pervaded with queerness” (Sinfield 1994:100).

There are openly-expressed or carefully suggested sexual connotations that make both *The Picture of Dorian Gray* and *The Man without Qualities* standing points in the debate of purity and sin. Wilde’s novel is permeated by homosexuality, but also by harsh, teasingly ironical criticism of the institution of marriage and its lack of consistency with actual human feelings. Musil’s utopia is a story of civilization, which has at its core blind love, destructive and guilty passion, adultery, divorce, double lives. However, the most fiercely debated upon issue is that of incest, an overstated interpretation given to the ‘sisterly love’ that dominates the last part of the novel — *The Criminals*. While this label can cover all sorts of misdeeds, there is also a literal, morbid fascination of both the Wildean and the Musilian universe with the moral ambivalence of the murderer (cf. Olmi 1981:159) — Wainewright and, respectively, Moosbrugger.

Yet, this is merely attraction towards alterity taken to extremes. Breaking the moral standard of normality becomes a personal glory in a world in which ethics equals a violation of the existing commandments. It is a whole epoch of degeneration in tastes and behavior, a time in which the people’s evolutionary sense is rather subject to medical and psychological analysis than to human appreciation: all in all, what Michael Foldy refers to as an unhealthy form of counter-progress (1997:73).

The admiration towards the provocative stands proof of a deeper dissatisfaction with an order of things meant to hedge ideas and impulses by
means of prejudice. It is the mentality of the last decades of the 19th century that the heroes try to rise against, it is the rigid conventionalism imposed by the dawning empires that they struggle to destroy by whatever means possible. Their revolt is not necessarily an expression of personal conviction; it is an attempt to offer an alternative by reversing the systems felt as oppressive. Norbert Kohl analyzes what he calls The Works of a Conformist Rebel from this point of view:

“The moral question of how to live, which preoccupied people in the 1890’s, becomes all the more pressing in Dorian Gray as the attempted solutions become all the more immoral. The novel is typical of the transition between Victorianism and the Modern Age in that on the one hand it represents a powerful challenge to Victorian orthodoxy, and on the other never really breaks free from its ideological premises. To counter utilitarian ideas, Wilde proclaims the uselessness of art and the charm of idleness; to replace evangelical fervour and moral righteousness, through which earthly life is regarded merely as preparation for life on the other side, he advocates consistent hedonism here and now; and against middle-class respectability he prefers the uninhibited self-fulfillment of the individual, whose only limitations are not by any consensum omnium, but simply by the range of his own potential. Undoubtedly all this reflects the split in Victorian identity, which was the inevitable result of the conflict between the Victorians’ severe public morality and their private need to satisfy their natural desires. Hypocrisy was rife” (Kohl 1989: 174).

As a conclusion and further starting point, Kohl’s understanding of demonstrative rebelliousness at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century brings to the fore the debated morality issues in both Wilde’s and Musil’s work: exacerbation of the senses and experimentalism, individualism, antinomianism, split identities — the immoralists’ favorite topics!

References


OF BYRON’S MANFRED, LAMB’S GLENARVON, PANTOMIME AND THE LIBERATION OF THE BYRONIC HERO

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This paper offers a reading of Manfred in the context of the early nineteenth-century stage, examining the use of the Gothic devices in Byron’s drama. It also suggests that Manfred might contain an ironic response to Lady Caroline Lamb’s scandalous novel Glenarvon. My suggestions that Manfred might be read in relation to Glenarvon are not meant to question the sources of the drama apparent to Byron’s contemporaries, and long since investigated by the critics. The indebtedness of Byron to the Gothic tradition, to Goethe’s Faust and Aeschylus’ Prometheus is unquestionable. The protagonist is widely acknowledged as the apogee of the Byronic hero (see Chew 1915:74, Manning 1978:71). However, I want to argue that Manfred is not so much the continuation of the tradition of the Tales, but an attempt to move beyond this tradition. Byron is using all the machinery of the Gothic in order to juxtapose it with the triumph of individual consciousness. The very use of the apparatus of a typical Gothic play might point to the inherent irony of the drama. This irony, moreover, might be perceived as both self-irony, and irony directed at the image of Byron created by early nineteenth-century English society, in particular as represented in Caroline Lamb’s Glenarvon.

Manfred and Glenarvon: Of the Liberation of the Byronic Hero

The drama is usually regarded as demonstrating Byron’s urge to come to terms with the scandal which led to his leaving England. He was aware of its biographical associations, which is confirmed in his letter to Augusta Leigh where he asked if Manfred had caused “a pucker” in England (Byron 1986:466-67). Indeed Manfred could be perceived as clearly directed at British society with characteristic Byronic audacity. In June 1816, Lady Caroline Lamb’s Glenarvon was published and immediately recognised as a roman à clef. The same month Byron heard of its publication from John Cam Hobhouse. According to Medwin (1966:182), Madame de Staël asked Byron if his “real character was well drawn in a favourite novel of the day.” Byron
felt “[t]hat there are many who pin their faith on that insincere production” (Medwin 1966:182). On 29 July 1816 he wrote to Samuel Rogers that he had read it (Marchand 1973-82, vol. 5:86). He started writing Manfred in August 1816, when he also began writing a prose allegory of his marriage troubles, which he destroyed hearing of his wife’s illness (Marchand vol. 4:466). Manfred together with Canto III of Childe Harold might be seen as attempts to vindicate himself, but Manfred with its hints of incest and the struggle of the protagonist to achieve mastery over himself and to come to terms with his past could also be perceived as an attempt to cause “a pucker,” in a way parallel to Lamb’s Glenarvon.

Lamb’s novel, with its construction of Byron as a villain-hero surpassing in his guilt all the heroes of the Byronic Tales, must have been on his mind when he was writing Manfred. In a letter to Murray (21 August 1817) he complains that “you all talk in the style of Caroline Lamb’s novels” (Marchand vol. 5:258), which testifies to Byron’s feeling that his image in London was at the time being constructed on the basis of the novel.

Manfred could be seen as a new departure for Byron in spite of the continuity of themes from his earlier poems, turning as he was to a new genre. Its publication on 16 June 1817 received much critical attention. To Byron’s contemporary reviewers, Manfred was the continuation of the tradition of his tales, and, depending on their political sympathies, they either condemned it as such, or praised it. Many journals objected to Byron himself alluding to his scandalous domestic affairs; Gentlemen’s Review reprinted the article from Day and New Times, which explicitly stated that

It [Manfred] appears to allude to offences for which society find no pardon; but we make the fullest disclaimer of extending the unhappy allusion beyond his imaginary hero. He has laboured, to our idea, to draw himself in “Manfred” as he had done in “Childe Harold”. We think this injudicious. (qtd. in The Romantics Reviewed 1972:1108)

Caroline Lamb had been even more “injudicious” in publishing Glenarvon, and one could argue that Byron would rather have the public presented with his own self-constructed image, aware of the fact that his protagonist would be perceived as such. Lamb’s allusions were easy to decode, and were the subject of such interest that Shelley told Byron that Hookham, the bookseller in Bond Street, offered him “no small sum if he would compile the Notes of that book into a story, which he declined” (Medwin1966:224). Byron’s “domestic” allusions in comparison to Lamb’s allusions are vague and obscure, though it might be debatable whether incest is a more offensive crime than murder, seduction, and treason. Certainly, for Byron, as for many
other writers at the time, it was much more appealing to the imagination (see Richardson 1985). Byron might be seen as playing a much more sophisticated game with his audience: presenting them with some hints about his personal life, and making them guess whether this is truth or fiction.

As Byron himself acknowledged, his mind was cumulative; his extraordinary memory supplied him with constant echoes and allusions. But the relationship to *Glenarvon* seems interesting for investigating Byron’s attempts to construct his literary self-image in response to the image constructed by Lamb, which, to make this process even more intertextual, had been constructed on the image not only of the man Lamb felt betrayed by, but also on the image created by Byron himself in his Tales combined with the apparatus of Gothic novels, and allusions to contemporary poetry. Thus *Manfred* involves Byron’s response to the Gothic, in which Lamb’s novel is steeped, and from the inspiration of which *Manfred* obviously derives. It was, after all, “Monk” Lewis, the most Gothic of novelists and a playwright himself, who introduced Byron to *Faust*, and whose visit might be seen as the main literary source of *Manfred* (see McGann’s notes, in Byron 1986:465).

Investigating all the links between *Glenarvon* and Byron’s works (and life) would require a separate study. The links between *Glenarvon* and *Don Juan* have been pointed out by Peter W. Graham (1991:66-67), who sees Byron’s *Don Juan* as his way of setting straight the record of him that Caroline Lamb had presented in *Glenarvon*. I would like to focus on the aspects of the novel which I find most relevant for the study of *Manfred*: firstly, the links between the songs which he sings and the Incantation scene in *Manfred*; and, secondly, his death scene.

The Incantation in *Manfred* has always intrigued the critics. It was first published in *Prisoner of Chillon and Other Poems* in December 1816, preceded by the note stating that it was “a chorus in an unfinished Witch-drama, which was begun some years ago.” McGann speculates that it might have been written in late 1813 or 1814 (Byron 1986:463-64), which would place it at the time of Byron’s writing *Hebrew Melodies*. Paul Douglass (1996:1-23; 9-10) establishes Byron’s *Hebrew Melodies* as the source for Lamb’s songs in *Glenarvon*, and points to the interrelationships between Lamb, Byron, and Isaac Nathan, who asked Byron to compose the lyrics for his *Hebrew Melodies*, and who composed the music for Lamb’s songs in *Glenarvon*. Lamb is almost literally “playing Byron” in *Glenarvon*, and the songs of Glenarvon imitate the rhythmical patterns of Byron’s poems. But the story seems to be more complex than the appropriation of Byron’s rhythmical patterns by Lamb; in the end they themselves were established for Nathan’s music.
Nathan wrote music for Covent Garden and Drury Lane, where most of the musical pieces occurred in operas, melodramas and pantomimes.

In Manfred’s first encounter with the spirits in Act I, scene i, the Seventh Spirit speaks of Manfred’s star of destiny:

The star which rules thy destiny,
Was ruled, ere earth began, by me:
It was a world as fresh and fair
As e’er revolved round sun in air;
Its course was free and regular,
Space bosom’d not a lovelier star.
The hour arrived — and it became
A wandering mass of shapeless flame,
A pathless comet, and a curse,
The menace of the universe (I.1.110-19)

The imagery and the rhythmical pattern seems to echo Glenarvon telling Calantha her destiny, when he first approaches her at a mask-ball disguised as a gypsy:

The star, that on thy birth shone bright,
Now casts a dim uncertain light:
A threatening sky obscure its rays,
And shadows o’er thy future days.
In fashion’s magic circle bound,
Thy steps shall tread her mazy round,
While pleasure, flattery, and art,
Shall captivate thy fickle heart.
The transient favourite of a day,
Of folly and of fools the prey;
Insatiate vanity shall pine
As honour, and as health decline,
Till reft of fame, without a friend,
Thou’lt meet, unwept, an early end. (1,217)

The lines of the Seventh Spirit precede the Incantation. In Byron’s text Lamb’s “dim uncertain light” of the star of destiny receives the proportions of cosmic disaster instead of a merely social scandal. Further on, in the same scene when Manfred claims that “there is no form on earth/ Hideous or beautiful to me” (I.1.184-85), the Seventh Spirit appears in the form of a female whom Manfred attempts to grasp but who disappears, and Manfred “falls senseless.” This is followed by the mysterious Incantation sung over his supine
Though thy slumber may be deep,
Yet thy spirit shall not sleep,
There are shades which will not vanish,
There are thoughts thou canst not banish;
By a power to thee unknown,
Thou canst never be alone;
Thou art wrapt as with a shroud,
Thou art gathered in a cloud;
And for ever shalt thou dwell
In the spirit of this spell.
[....]
By thy cold breast and serpent smile,
By thy unfathom’d gulfs of guile,
By that most seeming virtuous eye,
By thy shut soul’s hypocrisy;
By the perfection of thine art
Which pass’d for human thine own heart;
By thy delight in others pain,
And by thy brotherhood of Cain,
I call upon thee! and compel
Thyself to be thy proper Hell! (I.1.202-211; 242-51)

This Incantation is actually a curse, in which Manfred is accused of falseness and hypocrisy, and, like Satan, condemned to be his own hell. In the context of the drama it is clear that Manfred is cursed and guilty of some enormous crime, but this is not hypocrisy. However, in April 1816 on publication of “Fare Thee Well”, Byron was publicly accused of hypocrisy, as testified by the “Impromptu Address to Lord Byron” published in The Morning Post for April 18, 1816:

Would’st thou laud virtue more,
Or that thou could’st not write;
For nought’s so past enduring;
As a learned Hypocrite.
Fare thee well!

The charge of hypocrisy also appears in Glenarvon as the characteristic of Viviani/ Glenarvon, which Glenarvon himself offers to the duke:

An idol […] whom the multitude have set up for themselves, and worshipped, forsaking their true faith, to follow after a false light — a man who is in
love with crime and baseness — one, of whom it has been said that he hath an imagination of fire playing around a heart of ice — one whom the never-dying worm feeds on by night and day — a hypocrite. (3, 234).

The voice of the Incantation can be identified with that of the Seventh Spirit thanks to the similar meter, and to the fact that it is chanted after the appearance of the Seventh Spirit in shape of Astarte. For McVeigh, the voice of the curse is symbolically Manfred’s own (McVeigh 1982:605) in view of the fact that the Seventh Spirit claims to have ruled Manfred’s destiny. In Glenarvon, however, there are also some other verbal parallels with the curse. Elinor St. Clare warns Calantha of Glenavron’s treachery in a song:

By that smile which made me blest,
And left me soon the wretch you see-
By that heart I once possest,
Which now, they say, is given to thee
By St. Clara’s wrongs and woes-
Trust not young Glenarvon’s vows.
By those lays which breathe around
A poet’s great and matchless art-
By that voice whose silver sound
Can soothe to peace th’imprisoned heart-
By every bitter pang I prove-
Trust not young Glenarvon’s heart.
[....]
And when at length the hand of death
Shall bid St. Clara’s heart be still-
When struggling with its latest breath,
His image shall her fancy fill,
Ah trust to one whose death shall prove
What fate attends Glenarvon’s love. (2, 194-95)

This song itself might constitute an echo of the Incantation, as Lamb’s verse repeats the rhythmical patterns of Byron’s Hebrew Melodies. On reading Glenarvon, Byron must have recognised these as his own rhythms. He might have decided to use his 1813/1814 text with a certain irony. I would posit that if Manfred was to be received by the public as yet another personification of Byron, the Incantation could be interpreted as the curse placed on Manfred/Byron by English society, which perceived him not as he perceived himself, but according to the image constructed in Glenarvon. The fact that Byron is using the Incantation written for “an unfinished Witch-drama” does not undermine this hypothesis, as he might have decided to use a Gothic text
in the manner of popular pantomimes to show the Gothic image of his persona created by public opinion.

At the end of Lamb’s novel, Glenarvon is persecuted by the ghosts of his own past. Lamb’s imagery involves *Don Juan*’s imagery of ghosts of the victims and Hell claiming its due, which was familiar to contemporary audiences not only through the productions of Mozart’s *Don Giovanni* but also, as witness Coleridge’s *Biographia* and Byron’s own *Don Juan* in pantomimes. Byron might have perceived elements of such a pantomime in Lamb’s Gothic scenes, and gave his own version in rewriting them in a Faustus mode. In the early nineteenth-century Faustus would not only be associated with Goethe, and Marlowe, but also still remembered from popular eighteenth-century pantomimes.

Some of the ghosts of *Manfred* might owe their origin to the ghosts of *Glenarvon*. The Phantom of Astarte bears some resemblance to the beautiful angelic apparition of Calantha, though in contrast to Calantha’s moralising garrulousness, Astarte at first refuses to speak. Unlike Glenarvon, Manfred is able to face the spirits who come to fetch him. In the final confrontation scene Manfred refuses to obey the summons of the spirit who calls himself “the genius of this mortal” (III.4.81).

The Spirits do not recognise the authority of religion; but they have to give in to the supreme power of Manfred’s spirit. Manfred finally is able to achieve his liberation through death, and contrary to Glenarvon no words of damnation are pronounced over him. Defeating the spirits, among whom the most powerful is his own “genius,” who could be identified with the Seventh Spirit, Manfred might be symbolically liberating Byron from the curse of society, from the image *Glenarvon* was imposing on him, and creating instead an image of the most powerful of his heroes.

**Links with Pantomime.**

But this liberation is not without its ironies. Through its links with pantomime, both in particular use of verse and imagery, *Manfred* might be open to an ironic reading. After all, it was the pantomime which made wide use of songs and quickly changing Gothic and picturesque scenery and the magician or sorcerer was one of the common characters, as were various spirits. And writing to Murray, Byron himself referred to it as “pantomime” [sic] (Marchand vol. 5:209). In a letter to Thomas Moore, he again describes his drama in terms of the theatre:
I wrote a sort of mad Drama for the sake of introducing the alpine scenery in description: and this I sent lately to Murray. Almost all the dram. pers. are spirits, ghosts, or magicians, and the scene is in the Alps and the other world, so you must suppose what a Bedlam tragedy it must be: make him show it you. (Marchand vol. 5:188)

In theatrical pantomimes of the time, magicians and spirits often appeared, and scenery played a crucial part. For instance, in Peter Miles Andrews’s *The Enchanted Castle* (1786), which owes much to the influence of Walpole and Anna Aikin (later Anna Barbauld), we encounter the evil characters of a Necromancer, Magicians, and sprites, and the benevolent agent “the Genius of the Wood” who offers protection to Harlequin. Byron’s stage directions include a Gothic Gallery at midnight and Jungfrau’s cliffs in Act I, a cottage amongst the Alps, a lower valley with a cataract, the summit of Jungfrau and the Hall of Arimanes in Act II, and finally a hall and a chamber in Manfred’s castle, to move from the terrace in front of Manfred’s tower with the view of the mountains, and the tower, into its interior. Each of these settings provides a backdrop for Manfred’s confrontation with the supernatural, with other men, and, above all, with himself. Again, all these formed a part of stage spectacles for half a century and originated in the collaboration between David Garrick, as manager of Drury Lane and the painter and scene-designer Philippe Jacques de Loutherberg. Loutherberg’s illusionistic stage sets were meant to produce the effect of the sublime on the stage by the use of coloured transparencies, gauzes, and various light effects. I agree with Baines and Burn’s claim (2000:xxxv-xxxvi) that this style of stage design influenced Byron. Apart from a limited number of standard settings, such as the mountains, remote landscapes, forest, sea coast and caverns, Ranger (1991:19-32) draws attention to the alpine scenery at the close of T. Holcroft’s *A Tale of Mystery* and the use of cascades on the stage. This is not to deny the impact of the genuine alpine scenery on Byron’s imagination. From 18 to 29 September 1816, Byron went on a tour of the Bernese Alps, and he kept the record of this tour in his Journal for Augusta. But while recording these scenes in a drama, Byron would have been aware of what form their theatrical realisation would take.

All this is not to say that *Manfred* does not deal with the Faustian and Promethean issues, but that in this tragedy of remorse there might be some elements of farce, which might be confirmed by the existence of the discarded version of Act III, where Manfred calls the Demon Ashtorah to convey the Abbott to the peak of the Shreckhorn in order to stop his sermonising. The song of the Demon together with the Incantation scene might have constituted a part of the “unfinished Witch drama,” as Byron said. McGann
points to the link between the songs in *Manfred* and the scenes in Auerbach’s Cellar and in the Witch’s Kitchen in Goethe’s *Faust*. However, although Byron was certainly influenced by Goethe, my point is that the particular jumble of forms characteristic of *Manfred* owes either directly or indirectly to the most popular theatrical form of the time: that of pantomime. Mayer (1969:4) lists William Mountford’s 1685 adaptation of Marlowe’s *Doctor Faustus* entitled *The Life and Death of Doctor Faustus, made into a Farce* as the earliest piece containing a characteristic of the pantomime. In Theobald’s *Harlequin a Sorcerer* (1725) the witches are imported from *Macbeth*, the opening scene represents “rocky Caverns, by the Side of a Wood, illumín’d by the Moon; Birds of Omen promiscuously flying, Flashes of Lightning faintly striking.” In Scene ii, which takes place in a “long Gallery,” we witness:

Harlequin composing himself on a Couch; Thunder and Lightning; several Demons arise, seize and bear away Harlequin, they triumphing in the following Chorus.

Chorus.

With our Prey let’s take our Flight;
Then Hell will be in full Delight.

[As they disappear, the Palace of Pluto is discover’d, where several Shades and Infernal Spirits are rang’d on each Side, waiting the Approach of Pluto.

These two examples show how popular drama was quickly adopting elements from Shakespeare and Marlowe, which were to become a fixed part of pantomime tradition (Mayer1969:75). Goethe obviously mixes the different types of genres: tragedy, comedy, and satire, with much more boldness, which De Staël points out as one of his great achievements; in the final version of *Manfred* what is left, after the reworking of Act III, and omitting the comic elements, is the mixture of blank verse of tragedy with the verses of the Songs. Both dramas seem to owe part of their originality to drawing on the resources of popular theatrical forms. The Destinies on Jungfrau, who faintly echo *Macbeth’s* witches, might owe this relationship to various demons and spirits of pantomime. Scene iii moves us from the realm of picturesque again into the realm of the sublime, where on the summit of Jungfrau the three Destinies meet Nemesis. This scene makes one think of the encounters of demons in pantomimes based on *Macbeth’s* witches. Byron uses it for political satire:

The Captive Usurer,

Hurl’d down from the throne,

Lay buried in torpor,

Forgotten and lone;

I broke through his slumbers,
I shivered his chain,
I leagued him with numbers-
He’s Tyrant again!
With the blood of a million he’ll answer my care,
With a nation’s destruction — his flight and despair. (II.3.16-25)

Coleridge used a similar device in “Fire, Famine, and Slaughter. A War Eclogue” (January 1798), where the three calamities are personified in the style of Macbeth’s witches sent by Pitt. The pantomimic songs of spirits thus offered a convenient tool for political satire.

The ending of Manfred considered in view of possible intertextuality seems to be rather a rewriting of a traditional ending of a Faust or Don Juan pantomime than have anything to do with Goethe’s drama. If Don Juan in the manner of Lamb’s Glenarvon is taken to hell, and the same fate awaits Faustus of the traditional pantomime, Byron’s protagonist is not only recast in the mode of Faustus, but also shown as himself defeating the evil spirits. That element was missing in the first draft of Act III, where, just after the disappearance of the Abbott, Manfred’s tower catches fire and a crash like thunder is heard: Manfred dies with the words “Old man! ’tis not so difficult to die” addressed to his old servant Manuel. The revisions change the whole impact of the play; in the first draft the reader might indeed be justified to think of Manfred’s soul being carried away by the Devil, whereas the final version is rewritten as a mental triumph. Thus pantomime and the Gothic start to be rewritten into Byronic mental theatre. In Manfred Byron is aware that he is performing for the English audience, which is determined either to identify him with one of his heroes or their demonic remake in Lamb’s Glenarvon. Manfred manages to defeat the demons of his own Gothic past, and Byron tries to move beyond the image of the Byronic hero. The problem, however, is that for Manfred’s assertion of his freedom he uses the language with unavoidably Satanic echoes:

The mind which is immortal makes itself
Requital for its own good or evil thoughts —
Is its own origin of ill and end -
And its own place and time — its innate sense,
When stripp’d of this mortality, derives
No colour from the fleeting things without,
But is absorb’d in sufferance or in joy,
Born from the knowledge of its own desert. (III.4.129-36; see Thorslev 1963: 250-68)
These lines are an extreme expression of subjectivity and solipsism, but at the same time show the realisation of total responsibility for his own fate. This realisation has liberated Manfred from the Gothic monsters he has created himself.

References


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The present paper is a metatheoretical debate on what we call the “cognitive geodesics”, equivalent to Arthur Koestler’s “Eureka acts” and Colin Wilson’s “Eureka effects”, such as they can be met in the deep structures of romantic theory.

1. The Eureka effect or “cognitive geodesic” and the noospheric revolution

It seems that there is an archetypal mechanism of response to the problems posed by the environment, which Colin Wilson called the “Eureka effect”. This effect implies that the solving of any problem occurs in four stages: 1. gaining insight into the aspects of the problem; 2. appearance of frustration when the conscious mind cannot solve the problem; 3. relaxation; 4. extremely sudden appearance of an answer in the conscious mind. (Wilson made experiments with dolphins; these begin to behave in a creative way in order to receive food, cf. Colin Wilson, apud Robertson 1995:162). This sudden emergence is similar to the sudden, unexpected appearance of a lightning in the sky: Hegel offers in this respect a similar metaphor for a phenomenon that appears to be a Eureka effect by virtue of which something new emerges: “the sunrise [...] like a lightning, causes the structure of the new world to suddenly appear.” (Hegel 2000:14). Koestler called this phenomenon the “Eureka act”, and a good example of this process is represented by the discoveries of scientists like Poincaré, Ampère, Gauss, Kekulé, Hadamard, etc. (Koestler 1989:114-118). Referring to this process, the reputed physicist Fritjof Capra (1999) points out that revelations appear suddenly and not at the time when the researcher is dealing with his equations, but when he is relaxing in a tub, or while taking a stroll through the forest, on the beach, etc. (Many of the romantics had revelations during such periods of relaxation, e.g. during walks through the forest, while exploring mountain tops, etc.; see William Wordsworth, John Clare, P.B. Shelley, John Keats, etc.). During such periods of relaxation which follow intellectual activities requiring maximum concentration, intuition seems to take over the task of the intellect, producing ideas which clarify the problem and are the delight of any research work.
Intuition is thus responsible for creativity, completing by revelations rational cognition (i.e. the main component of scientific research, which, however, according to Capra, is useless without intuition; Capra 1999:25).

Poincaré even suggested a theory about the nature of unconscious guidance, in the framework of a lecture held at the Société de Psychologie, Paris, 1908, in which he spoke about the theory of the “Fuchsian functions”. He shows that the solution of the problem appears spontaneously and ready-made from the depths of the unconscious. He explains that mathematical discoveries consist in “happy combinations of ideas”. “Among chosen combinations the most fertile will often be those formed of elements drawn from domains which are far apart [...].” (apud Koestler 1989:164). These combinations are processed by the “subliminal I” (the unconscious in Frederic Myers’s acceptation), which is according to Poincaré an automaton that mechanically processes all combinations. The number of combinations is not infinite, so the probability to hit on a correct one is not infinitesimally due to the preparatory workings of the conscious mind that precede the phase of “unconscious incubation” (the first selection was already made by the conscious mind). Poincaré then explains that, although countless combinations form “in consequence of the automatism of the subliminal self, only the interesting ones [...] break into the domain of consciousness” (apud Koestler 1989:165). In this respect, one of the defining attributes of romanticism is precisely this quality of being “interesting”. Romanticism is thus, in accordance with Poincaré’s theory, a fundamental vector of the creative process, of the unconscious mind.

The nature of the filter which operates the rejection of useless combinations and allows only the right ones to enter the conscious mind is explained by Poincaré as follows: the selection in the cognitive sphere is made by “the aesthetic sensibility of the real creator. The useful combinations are precisely the most beautiful, I mean those best able to charm this special sensibility” (apud Koestler 1989:165). The fundament of any creative act, of any discovery, is thus the aesthetic faculty. No doubt, this hypothesis is more attractive, as Koestler with good reason noticed, than the mechanistic explanation offered by Galton (Koestler 1989:164-165). We find a similar hypothesis in Roger Penrose, who believes that in the formulation of our judgments the aesthetic criteria have a special value, because, when we speak about inspiration and intuition, it seems impossible to separate truth value, which governs the exact sciences, from these aesthetic criteria. Moreover, the aesthetic criteria apply not only in the case of judgments triggered by spontaneous inspiration (i.e. “Eureka acts/effects”, which we call “cognitive geodesics”), but also, according to Penrose, in the case of the much more frequent judgments occur-
ring all the time in mathematics or in the exact sciences in general (Penrose 2001:454-455. See also Penrose 1974). That is why we strongly believe that a reconsideration of the role of literature in general in man’s modern science is undoubtedly necessary.

According to Poincaré quoted in Koestler (1989) the fundamental sense of the beautiful resides in its being an ontic filter-code in the process of creation, of discovery, of understanding, of intellective selection. The sense of the beautiful is a “force” component of the deepest structure of human intellect, it institutes an ontological censorship. The sense of the beautiful acts as a psychic channel, an ontic archetype, a psychic prestructuring space in which the ontic correct structures are recognized (one of the functions of the archetypes is giving the preformative directions of all intellections / cerebrations / mentations). Thus, by agency of archetypes we understand the world, and, by extension, we also create it through understanding its meanings. In this respect, the fact is notorious that Wordsworth strongly believed that man “half creates” the world (cf. Tintern Abbey).

On the other hand, Arthur Koestler defines the “Eureka act” as a dual phenomenon, implying both abdication and promotion, which corresponds to the destructive-constructive character of all great revolutions in the history of thought. In the creative process certain temporary eliminations of conscious controls take place by which the mind is freed from certain constraints (which are necessary for maintaining the disciplined routines of thought processes, but which can become an impediment for the “creative leap”), while at the same time other types of ideation, from more primitive levels of mental organization, are activated (Koestler 1989:169). In Jung’s terms (1997), certain archetypes are activated that are located in deeper mnemic strata (in the unconscious). In other words, in this process certain elements of the thesaurus intelligibillum (i.e. the world of archetypes) are activated, while surface “images”, normally located in the field of the conscious mind, enter the field of the unconscious in a compensatory manner. Koestler thus describes the creative act as a group of “sinusoidal” (ascension and descension), concomitant and compensatory processes of the contents of the conscious mind and of the unconscious.

This hypothesis is in agreement with Jung’s ideas regarding the energy of the psyche (the libido), which acts by progression and regression, in a compensatory manner.

In his Seventh Letter, Plato, too, seems to describe a “Eureka effect”: after gathering perceptions and definitions, “after long intercourse with the thing itself and after it has been lived with, suddenly, as when fire leaps up and the light kindles, it is found in the soul and feeds itself there” (apud Bodkin
Similarly, Bergson describes the intuition that can result when all the materials have been gathered and all the notes have been made: then the spark, the fulguration appears, producing an intellectual sympathy with the innermost nature of the subject under study (Bergson 1913:76-77, apud Bodkin 1965:140). In this context, chaos theory speaks of “fulgurant points”, “bifurcations” that appear when the chaotic attractors are activated making the “creative leap” possible. A *Eureka effect* is thus a *cognitive fulgurant point*. This seems to imply that the conscious mind, by agency of the workings of the unconscious, finds a “geodesic” inside the cognitive labyrinth of the problem. This cognitive geodesic is a cognitive path uniting the question with one of the possible solutions. It seems that the demonstration is precontained in the answer proper. Any such process of finding a solution to a problem is apparently governed by a “geodesic dynamics”. The cognitive labyrinth is thus enclosed in a unifying manner, just as the superficial tension at the surface of liquids will, in conditions of imponderability, hold together the liquid volume to form a sphere, i.e. a solid body having a “geodesic” surface (i.e. the smallest surface possible for a given volume). This unifying enclosure by the conscious mind of the cognitive labyrinth makes it possible for the mind to scan the possible “cognitive gates” leading to the solution. In this point it is relevant to make reference to Coleridge’s imagination: its primary function is the esemplastic, unifying. Thus, in any such process of solving a problem imagination is essential (the romantics saw in it a fundament of cognitive life).

The emergence of a solution (triggered by a successful imaginative cognitive act) thus means finding a path in the labyrinth leading to an *enlightening* answer, a path which will be perceived as being a “geodesic”, and, as we will show, *light travels along geodesics*! However, if a question leads to more than one “geodesic” answer, then that question is in all likelihood stratified in structure: each cognitive stratum in the structure of the cognitive labyrinth may comprise a cognitive geodesic (probably “innate” in nature), which comes to light through the fulguration of the Eureka act. This state of affairs points to what in romantic theory is called the tendency towards infinite meaning (cf. Fr. Schlegel, qtd. in Lovely 1920:140): once meaning is discovered, romantics search for the meaning of meaning; afterwards, they search for the meaning of the meaning of meaning, ad infinitum. In other words, the romantic quest is an eternal deep quest for the cognitive “metaspace” (the space of spaces), the cognitive “metatime” (the time of times), the cognitive “metageodesic” (the geodesic of geodesics), the Eureka “metaeffect” (the effect of effects). In short, romanticism is the eternal deep quest for “metarevelation” (the revelation of revelations), implying a cognitive “metarevolution” (i.e. the cognitive revolution of revolutions).
In this context, Bodkin also analyzes the illuminating process by which a new thought is formed. She follows Graham Wallas’s analysis, which renders Hermann Helmholtz’s description regarding the manner in which he used to find solutions to his theoretical problems. Thus, Helmholtz says that there is a preparatory stage in which the problem is deliberately explored from all directions. Then there is a stage in which conscious thought is suspended, this being a stage of rest and recuperation after fatigue (which Wallas calls the “stage of incubation”). Then, “unexpectedly, without effort, like an inspiration”, often in the morning when one wakes up, or when outdoors, the “happy ideas” come (Wallas calls this the “stage of Illumination”; Wallas 1926:79-80, in Bodkin 1965:74-75, note 3). Bodkin believes that this process of illumination from the intellectual sphere has affinities with the “nocturnal travel” (descensus ad inferos or katabasis) before spiritual rebirth (anabasis) (Bodkin 1965:75, note 3), and this katabatic process is no doubt a fundament of romantic theory as an initiatory-cognitive doctrine (we point here at least to Blake’s Urizen, Shelley’s Prometheus, Keats’s Endymion, and Byron’s Cain).

Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart (1756-1791) seems to have lived in an unequaled abundance of such “happy ideas” and “fulgurant points”, being a brilliant example of an artist who experienced cascades of “Eureka effects” (as is natural, for music as “fluid” art) in a sort of simultaneous totality of the melodic content. This simultaneous totality seems to be characteristic for any authentic creativity. Mozart thus confesses that when he was feeling good, or when he was taking a stroll after a good meal, or in the nights in which he could not sleep, thoughts would flood his mind with utmost ease. He felt that he had no power over them. However, he used to keep in mind the thoughts he liked (the aesthetic-affective function Poincaré speaks about!). Immediately after choosing his theme, Mozart confesses, another melody would appear, connecting itself of its own accord with the first, in harmony with the necessities of the whole composition. Then, he says, his soul would be seized by the fire of inspiration. The composition would grow, he would develop it, conceiving it increasingly clearer, until he would have in his head the entire finished composition, regardless of how long it would be. His mind would see the composition at a glance, as if it had been a beautiful painting that was kept intact in memory. The composition would not come to his mind in a succession, but as a whole which his imagination allowed him to hear. (Hadamard 1945, in Penrose 2001: 456-457).

In view of the fascinating description above given by Mozart, we can say, in full agreement with Roger Penrose, that both true artists like Mozart and authentic scientists like Poincaré seem to possess a capacity to perceive the whole of their creation, a mental force to “enfold” in the moment an entire act
of creation, a capacity of temporal ubiquity (a “chrono-ubiquity”). We can here point again to Blake’s Urizen, who experiences the past, present and future in the present moment: the present thus becomes visionary, a kind of “singularity” into which are flooding both the “cascades” of “Eureka acts” (coming from the omega direction of the future) and the “cascades” of “Eureka memories” (coming from the alpha direction of the past). This process seems to be something frequent among the authentic romantic creators, who embrace a holistic view of life. (See Hölderlin, Novalis, Blake, Clare, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Eminescu, Dante, etc.). From the hyperperspective of this “singularity”, for the artist and the scientist the act of creation is an interliminal chrono-ubicuitous act of aesthetic illumination.

We call “Eureka memories” those memories of the past which, in the moment of the creative act (like Mozart’s moment of holistic illumination), “flow together” or converge with the “Eureka acts” proper. This means that the “Eureka memories” open in the mind of the creator the “omega thresholds” (the future thresholds, beyond which the structuring attractional forces of the strange attractors operate) which trigger the “Eureka acts” proper (i.e. the cognitive processes by which sudden, dense transfers of information are operated, leading to the birth of meaning-sense).

These “infotransferences” (Eureka acts) presuppose the activation of mental routes / charts / channels which are the shortest in terms of mental-psychic economy; this is the activation of what we call the “mental geodesics”, equivalent to the channels of Jungian archetypes as the shortest channels in the mental space. Our hypothesis that the mind operates with economic structures is derived from Rothschild’s discovery according to which only the regular images with a “good contour” produce stabile “after-images” (i.e. images that are maintained in the mind when the physical stimulus disappeared; cf. Koestler 1989:529). That is why, from a psychological viewpoint, we can say that the function of the clear line (and the function of the geodesics as a subcategory governed by the principle of highest economy) in Blake’s visual art is mnemonic-archetypal: it serves for memorizing the contents of artistic representations, for imprinting cognitive images in one’s memory. The distinct line (and the distinct geodesic) is an artistic mode of inserting into the psyche stabile images, which by recurrence may gain the value-strength of an archetype. Visual art thus turns its contents archetypal by exterior form: by means of the outside one works on the inside, the result being the creation of a progressive, active balance between the exterior and the interior.

More than that, we must notice that Blake uses forms characterized by a high degree of symmetry. It is thus possible for Blake to have tried to directly represent in his visual art after-images, i.e. the images that remain as imprints
in the psyche after the stimulus of the image ceased. Blake indeed stated that he was seeing the images of his art with the eyes of his mind. Blake's images are thus inner psychic images.

Likewise, our hypothesis that the mind operates with economic structures is derived from Goethe's fundamental discovery according to which a square produces inside the psyche an after-image that gradually changes into a circle, i.e. precisely an image characterized by a higher degree of symmetry and simplicity (Koestler 1989:529). The circle describes the most economic contour of a given geometrical surface, so it has the nature of a "two-dimensional geodesic", being also present in the sphere, which describes the most economic surface of a given geometrical volume. The sphere has thus the nature of a "three-dimensional geodesic".

Thus, the tendency of the psyche is to symmetrize, to simplify (small irregularities of contours and, implicitly, of surfaces and of volumes). A discontinuous image, with holes in its contour will appear in the after-image having a continuous contour. The empty spaces are thus filled in, the contour is closed. This means that the psyche operates according to laws of simplicity and economy having probably mainly the following functions: rest, relaxation, conservation of energy and conservation of efficiency, by using least energy with greatest effects. These laws of simplicity and economy are the defining elements of any geodesic. We propound for this very reason the following semantically extended classification: 1. the normal "one-dimensional" geodesic, i.e. the shortest line uniting two points on a mathematically defined surface, such as a straight line on a plane, or as an arc of a great circle on a sphere; 2. the "two-dimensional geodesic", i.e. the least surface/area of a given volume — the circle is a "two-dimensional geodesic", or a "surface geodesic"; 3. the "three-dimensional geodesic", i.e. the least volume of a given amount of substance — the sphere is a "three-dimensional geodesic" or a "volume geodesic". These laws of simplicity and economy can be met in the cosmic space, in conditions of imponderability; it is common knowledge that water (or any other liquid) will gain a spherical form in conditions of imponderability, i.e. a form in which its content uses least volume, least surface, least contour and is distributed in such a way as to create inside itself the tightest, simplest and most economical of possible unions of its constituents. Blake's art is thus a psycho-graphic art, the high degrees of dynamic symmetry with which it works being governed by a psycho-physical, materio-spiritual, morphodynamic economy or, in short, a "geodesic economy" (high simplicity governing deep complexity).

One reason for the existence of economy in the mental space is the fact that the symmetries which are more powerful are also more easily assimilated
by one’s memory (more symmetry implies more simplicity). Such structures, if they should contain spiritual significances (as is the case with Blake’s art), will be able to more easily open, or cleanse, the “doors of perception”, because the capacity of memory to work efficiently (a “light” memory is more skillful/efficacious in determining behaviour) will impact on man’s general cognitive powers, on his life as a whole. In this respect, in “The Marriage of Heaven and Hell” Blake said prophetically: “If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to man as it is, infinite. / For man has closed himself up, till he sees all things thro’ narrow chinks of his cavern.” (Blake 1979:154, plate 14).

The phenomenon called by Colin Wilson the “Eureka effect” described above also has affinities with the mechanism of evolution by leaps, when an adaptation response given to the environment takes place instantaneously, otherwise, as Ken Wilber (1995) rightly observed, nature would create incomplete forms (e.g. living beings with half new limbs / organs, etc., that could not survive or be efficient; half wings that cannot exert any function, and, as pointed out, it is the function that creates the organ, not vice-versa; nature creates only functional wholes; if the function disappears, its organ disappears). Koestler (1983) points out that, in this sense, the first to have stated that nature models organs in accordance with their being or not being necessary is Aristotle the “naturalist”. Aristotle the “Platonist” stated that the species are immutable, and denied that there was any continuity between *homo sapiens* and the animal kingdom. This Platonic dogma of immutability was denied by Epicureans like Lucretius, himself an advocate of the theory of evolution, and by the Scientific Revolution triggered by Tycho de Brahe, Kepler, and Galileo. Newton even came to state in his *Opticks* that nature is “delighted with transmutations”. After Newton followed the period of Leibniz, Locke and Kant, to name only a few, when the idea of a growing “Tree of Nature” was beginning to gain currency. All species were supposed to originate from the roots of this tree of Nature (Koestler 1989:131). Pope, in his similar doctrine about the Great Chain of Being, however, set clear boundaries between kingdoms: man is indeed a link in the Great Chain, but each link represents an autonomous level, a heterarchy in Wilber’s terms. Pope thus draws an insuperable line among species, similar to the line drawn by Kant between the phenomenal and the transcendental-noumenal world (dualism), and to that drawn by Aristotle between *homo sapiens* and the animal kingdom, as well as to that imposed by Descartes between mind and body. This line, however, is only an ontic barrier, one that the romantics transformed into a passageway that basically unites all forms of life, all nations, all religions, all times, into the all-comprehensive concept of the unity of being (cf. Stroe 2004:399-400).
2. Evolutionism and the geodesics of evolution by leaps versus the romantic
theory of total “interlinear” (linear–non-linear) revolution

“We are not thrown in the charge of evolution, we are evolution.”
Erich Jantsch (Jantsch 1982:34, in Cramer 2001:225)

As pointed out in Wilbur’s book (1995), Thales, Empedocles, Anaximander, Aristotle and St. Gregory can no doubt be considered to be among the precursors of evolutionism. In the 16th and 17th century the advocates of the theory of the Great Chain of Being realized that Plotinus’s hierarchy (a holarchy in Koestler’s and Wilber’s terms) represents the chart of the development of the universe, not only of the individual, as Origen had already long ago suggested that Plotinus’s hierarchy in fact unfolds over cosmic ages. Thus, theories about the evolution of the cosmos and of man had already existed a century before Darwin. Leibniz maintained that all species of animals developed forming sub-varieties of the original species. The whole universe actually, according to him, had been going through a process of becoming, because one could notice everywhere the creative advancement of nature, which Leibniz called transcreation, i.e. transformation. Around 1693, Leibniz stated that it was necessary for some species to disappear, and for others to be transcreated/transformed, because, as Lovejoy showed, the world was still incomplete, and the Chain of Being had to be interpreted as a process in which all forms were accomplished gradually in the order of time (Lovejoy 1964:256, qtd. in Wilber 1995:480). Maupertuis stated in 1745 that all of today’s species come from a small number, maybe a single couple, of ancestors. This thesis resurfaced in Diderot’s thought in 1749. Kant, too, propounded a theory of cosmic evolution: the universe started relatively simple and undifferentiated, and became progressively more varied, more complex, more organized. According to Kant, matter, too, “has even in its simplest state a tendency to organize itself through natural evolution into a more accomplished constitution.” (See Prigogine’s theory about the self-organization of matter in Prigonine & Stengers 1993). Thus, evolution for Kant “is eternally occupied with accomplishing new ascents of nature, bringing new things and new worlds into existence” (Wilbur 1995:480:481). Likewise, he says that Nature’s Fecundity (its Plenitude) has a single law: the progressive diversification (“complexification”, progressive differentiation). As Plotinus had shown, development implies diversity, it includes it and brings it to higher unification, higher embraces. This is the idea of Unity in Multiplicity (Wilber 1995:480-481), similar to Fr. Schlegel’s idea about the “infinite unity in infinite abundance” (Behler 1968:121-123). Through this concept the romantics surpassed
Descartes's insuperable line between mind and body; this Cartesian barrier, as we have pointed out, was transformed by the romantics into a passageway uniting all into what is known as the romantic concept of the unity of being (Stroe 2004:400).

Plotinus’s higher unifications, implicit in Kant, are precisely the greater integrations / unifications which in Freud’s system are fulfilled by Eros, the most primary instinct of love which accomplishes the connections-unifications-creative processes. That is why Eros is essentially romantic. This is the creative, anagenetic instinct, which is the first expression of evolution as a progressive manifestation of expansive, self-differentiating energy (Lovejoy 1964:281, in Wilber 1995:481, n. 16).

On the other hand, a Eureka effect answer took place also in the case of Friedrich Kekulé, who was trying to discover the molecular structure of benzene. He dreamed serpents of the ouroboros type that were biting their tail, and hence he deduced the ring molecular structure of the chemical compound. (Robin Robertson believes that Kekulé’s unconscious solved the problem and presented it to him symbolically; cf. Robertson 1995:163). The same effect seems, according to Koestler, to have operated also in the case of Michael Faraday, who saw in his imagination that the magnets are surrounded by a system of forces, and that the electric currents are like some curves in space (a phenomenon he called “lines of force”). He thus visualized the whole universe as being constructed in the pattern of these lines, or thin curved tubes through which all forms of light vibrations or energy radiations are propagated. (Faraday came to postulate the principle according to which light is an electro-magnetic radiation, and in this way also discovered the electric motor and the dynamo, etc.). As Koestler, with good reason, suggests, Kekulé’s serpents remind one of Blake’s paintings of serpentine figures, and Faraday’s curves of force evoke the vortices from Van Gogh’s skies (Koestler 1989:170-171). (See also Blake’s paintings representing vortices and space containing curved folds of various natures: fire, water, ether, transcendent metals, and the very fabric of space itself represented as curvilinear, undulatory). There is, in other words, a direct connection between the scientist and the artist: both create by agency of archetypal processes, by which breaches are inserted into the Weltanschauung known up to that time. Thus begins revolution in thought, thus take place the symmetry breaks which are vital in any evolutional process. David Bohm’s hypothesis is similar: there is an implicate order out of which the explicate order of the physical world appears by emergence (Bohm 1980, in Robertson 1995:166), i.e. by a sudden leap into existence.

We contend that in romanticism the cognitive fields of onto-cosmology are in their dynamics “geodesics”, i.e. functional structures operating accord-
ing to a principle of least cognitive complex effort yielding the greatest simplex effect (this is an archetypal Eureka effect structure). Thus, we define the “cognitive geodesics” of romantic contemplation as being those Eureka effects (morphodynamic psychic forces) which create semiotic “short circuits”, by the agency of which an infinitely deep meaning is for ever attained progressively. If romantic knowledge is defined as a cognitive sphere, then this sphere will be governed by a “geodesic dynamics”, a dynamics of Eureka effects, since illumination is a final goal. (This dynamics involves the existence of such attractors, in a transcendent space, which attract in an Einsteinian complex way, i.e. hyperspherically complex).

We contend also that these cognitive attractors, directing thought, work in romanticism according to a principle of transcendent economy, governing the complex dynamics of simplex Eureka effects. These generate maximum energy in the cognitive sphere by using least “transenergy”, i.e. the energy of the Jungian Self, the energy of the transcendental attractor. This is a natural property, if we consider that in romanticism the realm of the Self is considered to be abysmally germinal in nature, containing in a concentrated form the whole development of history. “Transenergy” is thus far higher in complexity and far higher in energy level.

Translating this transenergy into the energy of the mind implies, in the romantic phenomenon, a redefining of “frequency levels”, in the sense that the high/spiritual is transformed into the horizontal/the mind — Novalis’s romantisieren implies two simultaneous movements: making the high/spiritual/mysterious/uncommon seem low/physical/common/familiar, and vice-versa, making the familiar seem mysterious/spiritual. This is a vital form of “diluting” the abyssal denseness of the spiritual structure of “transenergy”. This process of translating from verticality to horizontality is a passage process, involving an “interfinite” dynamics. The dynamics of thinking established between mental space and “transspace” (cf. Ruyer’s [1998] term) is in the romantic phenomenon a paradoxical nonlinear process (“interfinite”, finite-infinite simultaneously, “strange”, in the sense of “strange attractors”) governed by the law of geodesics in the extended sense we propounded (we speak of “one-dimensional geodesics”, “two-dimensional” or “surface geodesics”, “three-dimensional” or “volume geodesics”, “four-dimensional” or “space-time geodesics”, “trans-dimensional” or “spirit geodesics”; all describe the depth morphodynamics of line, surface, volume, space-time, transspace, respectively). Thus, the cognitive processes, though they may seem to be labyrinthine in nature, are governed by the principle of the most economic structures possible (these are: the “Eureka line” = geodesic; the “Eureka surface” = circle; the “Eureka volume” = sphere; the “Eureka space-time” = hyper-
sphere; the “Eureka transspace” = total holonic “hyperconcentricity” of infinite order). This is a reflex of the great romantic principle of the perpetual reduction of the distance between man and divine perfection. This leads to the paradox of romantic “interlinearity” of revolution: cognitive paths are simultaneously linear and non-linear in nature, continuous and discontinuous, similar to those we find in fractal geometry, one line being a smooth line at one level and a zig-zag at a deeper level.

It seems, on the other hand, logical to apply the principle just described to the temporal sphere as well. Thus, reduction of the distance between man and perfection has to last for ever in romanticism, but approaching perfection has to become a reality, paradoxically, “infinitely as soon as” possible. This “speed” principle is a sign of spiritualization in romanticism: the density of Eureka effects (illuminations) tends to become infinite. In short, in romanticism we need a speed ever tending to infinity (passion) and a distance, ever tending to become infinitesimal, between man and his purpose (i.e. completeness).

The combination of the two aspects above (speed and distance) indeed indicate that romanticism implies a cosmology of “temporal and spatial geodesics”, therefore what we can call a “Eureka cosmology”: the omega point is to be reached by engaging into the “tracks” of these “temporal and spatial geodesics” (“Eureka lines”). These are the tracks of the archetypes/strange attractors, which can be called “Eureka attractors”, governed by “fractal interlinearity” (fractal linearity–non-linearity in simultaneity).

Verbal language in romanticism, on the other hand, is also to be seen as governed by spatiotemporal geodesics (“Eureka structures”), because verbal language is one of the strongest cognitive spheres, like visual language. The deep (hyper)structure of the “Eureka cosmology” described by romantic theory, implying interlinear (linear–non-linear) evolution/revolution, seems thus to be the following: any spheric space is governed by a “geodesic” dynamics of a superior “transsphere” (similar to an Einsteinian hypersphere), which in turn, in accordance with systems theory, is governed by a yet higher “geodesic” dynamics of a yet higher “transtranssphere” (similar to an Einsteinian hyperhypersphere), ad infinitum.

In this sense, Blake’s Urizen, who is the exemplary explorer of knowledge, seems to describe in his travels between various levels of existence also a system of geodesics. His travels (falls) from a psychic-physical level of existence to another always seem to describe geodesics: he always talks in terms of “up” and “down” and his journeys always follow the paths described by the globe of light by means of which he lights his way through the “endless abyss of space”, the “Abyss of Los” (i.e. of Time) (cf. “The First Book of Urizen”, plate
This aspect seems to be in agreement with the discoveries of modern cosmology according to which in the hyperspheric Riemannian-Einsteinian space, in which there are no straight lines, light propagates along the lines indicating the shortest path possible, the geodesics; these lines are closed curves, and this is the reason why a light impulse could travel around the universe and return to its starting point (Merleau-Ponty 1978:40). From this perspective, Blake’s Urizen can indeed signify the quasi-infinite journey of light through galaxies and various dimensions of reality. Urizen, as mentioned already, is always carrying a globe of light with him by means of which he lights his path through the “infinite abyss” (“The Marriage of Heaven and Hell”, plates 17-20, Blake 1979:156), the “fathomless abyss” (“America, a Prophecy”, plate 1, 15, Blake 1979:196), the “vast unfathomable abyss” (“Milton”, 1, plate 9, 35, Blake 1979:490), i.e. “the Sea of Time and Space” (The Four Zoas, IV, 265, Blake 1998:250-251; “Milton”, plate 15, 39-46, plate 34, 25, Blake 1979:497, 524; Letter to Thomas Butts 10 January 1802, Blake 1979:812), the deep cosmic space-time continuum. The passage through different levels of existence is possible in Urizen’s case because any of his travels/falls take place by entering a vortex, i.e. an interliminal structure of psychic-physical space-time, a gate between two successive psychic-physical levels/dimensions. Thus, Urizen’s travels/falls through vortices seem to indicate the “essence” of traveling/falling, describing tracks of passage between successive dimensions: these tracks are also “geodesics” in the “core” of the vortices linking two successive levels/dimensions. That is why we can call these structures “intergeodesics” or “passage geodesics”: curvilinear lines that, using the shortest way possible, unite two points belonging to two successive levels/dimensions.

If we speak in strictly dimensional terms, then an “intergeodesic” uniting two- and three-dimensionality is a curvilinear line that, using the shortest way possible, unites two points, one from the arc of a circle and one from the curvilinear surface of a sphere; an intergeodesic uniting three- and four-dimensionality (this is what we can call a “hypergeodesic”, uniting a hyperdimension with three-dimensionality) is, in turn, a curvilinear “hyperline” uniting two points, one from the curvilinear surface of a sphere and one from the curvilinear hypersurface of a hypersphere, etc. (The definition we propound here is theoretically valid for any passage structure between any two successive levels of n- and (n+1)-dimensionality). “Intergeodesics” are thus the shortest paths uniting n- and (n+1)-dimensionality (when n is larger than 2, we are dealing with “hypergeodesics”, “hyperhypergeodesics”, ad infinitum, according to systems theory).
This concept of “intergeodesic” seems to be relevant for both the process of falling (negative “Eureka vector”) and that of ascending (positive “Eureka vector”), since both must follow the track described by *rays of light*. (See Blake’s four Zoas in their cosmic journeyings). The possibility of such an interliminal (hyper)line between any two dimensions is suggested by the phenomenon of endoexteriority (when a system is simultaneously interior and exterior to another system) which we described in *Romantismul german și englez* (Stroe 2004) as defining the laws of the golden section. Thus, the very possibility that “intergeodesics” exist (“touching” two dimensions simultaneously), as can be inferred from Blake’s “luminal” dynamics of journeying (i.e. the dynamics of tracks along which light/spirit travels), we believe defines the very possibility of creation to be free to pass from one ontic level to another following the *path described by a ray of light*, i.e. a geodesic. Had such spatiotemporal “intergeodesics” not existed, there would have been no physical-mental space to journey through (i.e. through a psychic-physical vortex: only thus are oscillations possible on psychic/physical planes). These “intergeodesics” are the passage structures between levels of reality, they are interliminal, and thus romantic structures of reality governed by the law-freedom paradox.

References


C. S. LEWIS AS A CRITIC OF ROMANTICISM

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C. S. Lewis (1898–1963), a famous Oxford tutor and lecturer, and later Professor of Medieval and Renaissance Literature at Cambridge, made his name in three main fields: as a literary historian and critic, as a Christian apologist and moralist, and as a writer of fiction, both for children and adult readers. As the information from the annual bibliography of the Modern Language Association indicates, the number of articles and books on C. S. Lewis had been steadily growing since the late sixties, and in 1998, the year of the celebrations of the centenary of his birth, it reached its apogee. Diana Pavlac Glyer’s selected bibliography lists over 100 modern scholarly book publications on the author of Narnia stories (Glyer 1998:283-90). Richard Attenborough’s film Shadowlands (1993), which dealt with Lewis’s love for Joe Gresham and his suffering after her death, was an important sign of the ever-present interest in his life and work. The earlier instances of such considerable attention paid to the author of The Screwtape Letters and stories from Narnia are seen in the founding of several C.S.Lewis Societies in the United States and Canada, whose aim was to increase the knowledge and understanding of Lewis’s works and promote a further interest in his life and character. A renewed interest in J. R. R. Tolkien, due to the enthusiastic reception of the film The Lord of the Rings, has also helped to remind the reading public and the viewers of the strong bond of friendship that joined the author of Silmarillion and C. S. Lewis.

The interest in C. S. Lewis the critic is much less pronounced than in Lewis the man or Lewis the author of children’s fiction or of Christian apologetics. Among the books dealing with his contribution to the literary history and criticism, most attention has been paid to his role as a medievalist and a critic of Renaissance Literature (his most important and lasting contribution to the research in the field of Older English Literature came with The Allegory of Love, A Preface to ‘Paradise Lost’, The Discarded Image, The Oxford History of English Literature in the Sixteenth Century, Excluding Drama, and many essays). Lewis’s attitude to Romanticism is one of the aspects of Lewis’s criticism that has been dealt with only marginally, in critics’ passing remarks. Therefore, it is the aim of the present paper to provide a more comprehensive description of Lewis’s views on Romantic literature and Romanticism as a
movement in European culture and to offer a reflection on the importance of these views for Lewis’s concept of modernity.

As can easily be observed, the title: “C. S. Lewis as a Critic of Romanticism” is significantly ambiguous: it may denote either Lewis’s contribution to the criticism of Romantic literature or his critical attitude towards Romanticism. In its first meaning, the title may sound like a provocation to those familiar with Lewis’s critical work. It is generally known among Lewis scholars that he wrote only three articles dealing with Romantic literature: “Shelley, Dryden, and Mr Eliot” (1939), “A Note on Jane Austen” (1954) and “Sir Walter Scott” (1956). In all the three essays the Romantic authors, even Percy Bysshe Shelley, are praised for the virtues that are not obviously ‘romantic’. Thus Jane Austen is described as a novelist who in her subject matter and style should be seen not as a romantic author but as “the daughter of Dr Johnson” (Lewis 1969:186). Shelley is found to be a more classical poet than Dryden and Scott, and although praised in the essay as someone who first taught his readers the sense of a historical period, he is claimed by Lewis to have more in common with the values of the previous age (i.e. the Enlightenment) than with the Romantics. There is a similar dimension to Lewis’s appreciation of Scott’s novels: they are not perceived as romantic texts, but as the works which allow the reader to “breathe the air of sense” (Lewis 1969: 218). The conclusion that can be drawn from such a presentation of these authors confirms the suspicion, already suggested by Lewis’s limited interest in Romantic literature, that he was rather distrustful of the merits of the Romantic Movement.

However, unlike in the case of his openly pronounced partiality for medieval literature and culture, Lewis’s attitude towards Romanticism is not clearly described, but has to be deduced from a number of statements scattered throughout his work as literary historian, as writer of intellectual history and as moralist and Christian apologist. Since the scope of the present paper does not allow any extensive survey of the subject, only two texts are proposed here as material for a scrutiny: Lewis’s Preface to the revised edition of *The Pilgrim’s Regress: An Allegorical Apology for Christianity, Reason, and Romanticism* (1943), and his lecture “De Descriptione Temporum”, published separately by Cambridge University Press in 1955 and then included in his *Selected Literary Essays* (1969). Both texts are, in my opinion, the most representative statements of C. S. Lewis’s position with reference to Romanticism.

As is generally known, the term ‘romantic’ has come to denote so many qualities that it is difficult to come up with one definition of the concept. This has led Arthur Lovejoy to a contention that it is proper to speak of ‘romanticism’ only in the plural, which has been demonstrated in his essay “On
Discrimination of Romanticisms” (1923). It is not known whether Lewis shared Lovejoy’s skepticism, but he certainly thought the term ambiguous enough to require a new extended explanation. In his Preface to *The Pilgrim’s Regress* (1943) he defines the term ‘romantic’ in his own way introducing a sevenfold division of the meaning of this word in the literary context. He thinks that ‘romantic’ as a term covers the following qualities and/or literary and cultural phenomena:

1. Stories about dangerous adventure, like those of Alexander Dumas.
2. The marvellous (but not a part of believed religion); hence such characters as magicians, ghosts, fairies, and such authors as Malory, Boiardo, Ariosto, Spenser, Tasso, Shelley, Coleridge and Morris deserve to be called ‘romantic’.
3. Literary works with ‘Titanic’ characters, extreme emotions and idealistic codes of honour; another term that Lewis thinks can be used here is ‘Romanesque’. In this meaning such figures as Sidney, Corneille, Michelangelo, and such works as Dryden’s dramas (i.e. his heroic plays) are romantic, too.
4. Indulgence in the abnormal, in the macabre and in torture (this kind of theme is understood as ‘romantic’ by such scholars as Mario Praz and M. D. de Rougemont); therefore, such authors as Poe or Baudelaire are also classed as romantic.
5. Qualities such as egotism and subjectivism are characteristically romantic when they appear as features of the main characters in literary works: therefore Byron and D. H. Lawrence are both ‘romantic’ authors.
6. Every revolt against existing civilization or conventions is considered romantic, therefore such artists as Epstein, Lawrence and Wagner are romantic from this point of view as well.
7. Sensitivity to natural objects, when it is solemn and enthusiastic; in this respect Wordsworth, Keats, Shelley, de Vigny, de Musset, Goethe are all perceived by Lewis as romantic.

(cf. Lewis 1943:viii)

Lewis makes it clear in many places in his work that not all the characteristics from such a wide range of ‘romantic’ qualities appealed to him to the same degree. What is more, he was openly hostile to some of them since they contradicted his opinions about the value of art and life in general.

Thus, it has been known from his autobiography *Surprised by Joy* (1955) and from other sources (e.g. his essay ‘On Stories’) that he always had a special liking for the qualities covered by the first and second definitions; he con-
firms this in the Preface to *The Pilgrim’s Regress* and remarks that he came to love the ‘Romanesque’ when he became an adult. In the Preface he mentions that he always detested the fourth and the fifth kind of ‘romantic’ qualities in literature. Indulgence in the abnormal and in the macabre, often found in the literature of the Romantic period, was for him a symptom of ‘bad taste’. It also suggested to him a dangerous morbidity, opposed in every way to ‘the mental health’ which he thought good ‘romantic’ poetry, such as that of Edmund Spenser, was able to offer to the reader. Neither did he appreciate the cult of egotism and subjectivism which he found in the literature of the Romantic period often regarded as typical (e.g. Byron’s poetry). And he had no sympathy with the idea of romanticism as a revolt against existing civilizations and conventions. He considered it as destructive and disintegrating and, in the long run, dangerous to the values of European culture. He accepted, with reservations, the romantic sensitivity to natural objects if this did not turn to a clear deification of nature, i.e. pantheism.

The conclusion that can be drawn from Lewis’s own classification and definition presents him as a critic and writer who did not share most of the beliefs and convictions of the period called Romanticism. The romantic qualities he liked were found, first of all, in the literature and art of the Middle Ages and in the greater part of the work of the Renaissance. It is significant that when these qualities appeared in the works of ‘true’ romantics (such as e.g. Shelley or Coleridge) or post-romantics (e.g. William Morris) they were most often referred to as ‘medieval’ or ‘neo-medieval’.

In the Preface, Lewis himself does not stress the fact that one of the romantic qualities he mentions (the one listed under seven) is related to the experience that played a very important role in his life and his work. This was the experience of longing (‘Joy’ or ‘Sehnsucht’), the descriptions of which Lewis gave in his autobiographical works — *The Pilgrim’s Regress* and *Surprised by Joy*. In *The Pilgrim’s Regress* (which, unlike *Surprised by Joy*, is not written in the first person) the narrator refers to these experiences as the boyhood sense of the numinous:

> All unconscious with this teaching are the fits of strange Desire, which haunt him from his earliest years, for something which cannot be named; something which he can describe only as “Not this”, “Far farther”, or “Yonder” (Lewis 1943:11).

Critics have noticed that Lewis’ Joy was related to Goethe’s ‘Blissful longing’, to Matthew Arnold’s ‘wistful, soft, tearful longing’ and to the state of mind which had been a recurrent theme in the literature of the 19th and 20th century, found, for instance, in Blake, Wordsworth, Thomas Wolfe, Dreiser,
Apart from *Surprised by Joy* and *The Pilgrim’s Regress*, Lewis dealt with the theme of Joy in his poetry, science fiction, children’s tales and letters. In Lewis’s case this experience of Joy assumed a religious colouring: it was a longing for the transcendent and numinous, and after his conversion — of which he speaks in his autobiography — it gave a unity and significance to his life. It is also on the strength of this concept of ‘Spiritual Longing’ that Lewis is perceived as ‘a bookish dreamer’ (Adey 1998:23) and neo-romantic in the context of recent theology and aesthetics (Carnell 1974:148).

The other text that is an important source of information about Lewis’s attitude to Romanticism, is a lecture which he read at the inauguration of the chair of Medieval and Renaissance Literature at Magdalen College, Cambridge, in 1955. This address, entitled “De Descriptione Temporum”, holds a significant place in Lewis’s work as critic and literary historian. The lecture does not deal directly with Romanticism, in fact it does not even mention this term, but it reveals, better than anything else that he wrote, his approach to the Romantic Period. The Latin title, borrowed from Isidorus, the encyclopedist of the 4th century, suggests that the aim of the address is to describe the times, present and past, from the point of view of their importance for a scholar dealing with European (Western) culture, of which English literature formed a significant part. Lewis alludes here to a number of debates among historians and literary historians that had been carried out throughout several decades in the twentieth century and referred to such problems as the periodization of European literary history, division of the past into ancient and modern times, the crisis of humanism, acutely felt after World War I, and the identity of European civilization. Most of these issues were also connected with the controversy concerning the so called “problem of the Renaissance” (Ferguson 1948: 292), which divided Renaissance and medieval scholars in the first half of the 20th century. Was the Renaissance the first ‘modern’ period in the history of Western culture? Did it really constitute a decisive break with the medieval past? What were its constituent characteristics? When exactly can it be said to have begun?

Lewis himself was one of those scholars who passionately argued for the Renaissance as a continuation of the Middle Ages, particularly in English literary history. His famous statement, which survives in an anecdote, that “the Renaissance never happened in England, and if it did, it had no importance” (Gibb 1965: 61), sums up his critical position towards a widely spread view of the Renaissance, inherited from Jacob Burckhardt, as the first secular age that initiated the era of modernity. The chair at Cambridge, created specially
for Lewis, had in its title both Medieval and Renaissance literature, in recognition of his contribution to the bridging of the gap between the two periods.

In “De Descriptione Temporum”, Lewis first considers a few traditional divisions, or ‘frontiers’, between the epochs in European history, which — it could be argued — provided radical changes that led eventually to the modern age. In this context he mentions three possible caesuras which can be found the 4th century, the early 12th century and at the end of the 17th century. The first caesura took place between Antiquity and the Dark Ages. It was the time of the fall of the Roman Empire, the barbarian invasions and the acceptance of Christianity in Europe. The second division occurred between the Dark and the Middle Ages and was marked by such important phenomena as the recovery of Aristotle’s work, the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and a great development of sophisticated poetry expressing a new romantic sentiment (courtly love). The third ‘frontier’ can be found at the beginning of the Enlightenment and signified the time of the general acceptance of Copernicanism, the dominance of Descartes and the intensive development of science. Lewis agrees that the changes that marked these caesuras may seem radical in the context of the past, but nevertheless he rejects all of them as insignificant from the modern point of view. He perceives another caesura, which he calls “the greatest of all divisions in the history of the West”, at the beginning of the Romantic period, the time of Jane Austen and Walter Scott, and announces its appearance in a dramatic way: “But somewhere between us and the Waverley Novels, somewhere between us and Persuasion the chasm runs” (Lewis 1969:7).

Lewis puts forward four claims for this division of periods, for placing the Great Divide at the time of Romanticism. His claims are grounded in four fields: political order, the arts, religion and the technological system. In political order, he stresses the rise of a new, modern style of government, consisting in the change from ‘rulers’ to ‘political leaders’, which for us signifies a development of more democratic systems. In the arts, he points out to works “shatteringly and bewilderingly new” in visual arts, such as that of the Cubists, the Dadaists, the Surrealists. He is, however, most emphatic about the “unprecedented novelty of modern poetry — which is new in a new way, almost a new dimension” (Lewis 1969:9), as the novelty cannot be comprehended even by those who should be ‘in the know’, i.e. the literary critics. To illustrate his point he recalls a recent symposium on T. S. Eliot’s poem “Cooking Egg”:

Here we find seven adults (two of them Cambridge men) whose lives have been specially devoted to the study of poetry discussing a very short poem which
has been before the world for thirty-odd years; and there is not the slightest agreement among them as to what, in any sense of the word, it means. (Lewis 1969:9)

He protests that he is not concerned to say whether this state of affairs is a good or a bad thing:

I merely assert that this is a new thing. In the whole history of the West, from Homer — I might almost say from the ‘Epic of Gilgamesh’ — there has been no bend or break in the development of poetry comparable to this. (Lewis 1969:9)

The problem that Lewis signals here, without elaborating his point, does not concern the form of modern poetry, but its meaning, or rather the fact that the plurality of possible meanings and relativity of values has replaced the authorial intentions and objective truth of older poetic texts. In his Christian apologetic writings, e.g. in his essay “Modern Man and His Categories of Thought”, he refers to this problem as a typical modern phenomenon, related to the cult of subjectivity and resulting in ‘a denial of the validity of thought’ (Lewis 2000:619)

Lewis’s third claim for the Great Divide between the Old Western culture and the culture of modernity concerns the great religious change, which he calls ‘un-christening’. He points out that in modern times religious belief is no longer any kind of norm and modern post-Christians are, in his opinion, cut off from both the Christian tradition and the Pagan past. In spite of his initial declarations of neutrality, Lewis reveals here a deep pessimism about the future of Christianity, also expressed on earlier occasions, for instance in his lecture “The Literary Impact of the Authorised Version” delivered before the University of London in 1950, in which he called the Bible “a dethroned king” (Lewis 1969:144).

Lewis’s fourth claim is, as he says, his ‘trump card’, which consists in what he calls ‘the psychological effect of the birth of machines, or the Industrial Revolution.’ He thinks that this imposed on the human mind a new archetypal image — the image of new machines superseding the old ones. He considers this change of mental climate as absolutely revolutionary in Western culture:

Our assumption that everything is provisional and soon to be superseded, that the attainment of goods we have never yet had, rather than the defence and conservation of those we have already, is the cardinal business of life, would most shock and bewilder them [our ancestors] if they could visit our world (Lewis 1969:11)
At the end of the essay Lewis asserts his position as 'laudator temporis acti', humorously using himself as a paradigm of Old Western culture: asserting the values from before the Great Divide, he claims he belongs to the extinct species, to the 'dinosaurs', which perhaps can be still useful, or at least interesting to the young people he is going to teach to read the literature so different from modern literary texts.

“De Descriptione Temporum”, which proposed such a radical shift of boundaries, can be considered as the ‘credo’ of Lewis the literary and intellectual historian. Assuming a position of an objective describer of things (like that of Isidorus), he nevertheless reveals his critical attitude to ‘modernity’. It seems clear to the reader of the essay that Lewis sees modernity as initiated by the changes brought by Romanticism and the political, social and technological phenomena which accompanied the Romantic Movement (i.e. the three revolutions: the American, the French and the Industrial). Thus he ‘blames’ Romanticism for giving a fatal blow to the Old Western Culture embodied to him best in the artistic, intellectual and moral achievement of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.

There is no doubt that Lewis’s criticism of the Romantic cult of individualism and subjectivism, both in arts and in ethics, hinted at in his Cambridge address, but explicitly articulated in his Preface to The Pilgrim’s Regress, constitutes a very important aspect of his generally negative attitude to Romanticism as a cultural movement. It was obviously related to his view of art and life in which the existence of the objective truth and the belief in the power of human reason to discover that truth were of paramount importance. Lewis the critic and Lewis the Christian apologist met on this ground. His concept of the Great Divide placed at the beginning of Romanticism indicated that in the Romantic Movement he found the germ of modernity of which he disapproved on philosophical, aesthetic and moral grounds and in which he saw the danger of the destruction of West European civilization. That is why in “De Descriptione Temporum”, as well as in other writings, he called for a defence of the Old Western culture: the study and popularization of the greatest literary texts from the past were to help to preserve the values of the European world.

As has been reminded above, Lewis’s professed function as critic and scholar was to help the readers to make contact with the tradition of the Old Western Man. He had little sympathy for and little understanding of the literature of the Romantic Period, which he regarded as the first modern epoch. This view lay behind his and his friend Tolkien’s decision to revise the literary canon to be taught at Oxford; the result of this was that the course in literature for the undergraduates ended in 1815! Both famous medievalists did not
regard the literature of the greater part of the 19th century and the 20th century as requiring any special instruction since, in their view, modern students did not require preparation to read modern texts. Lewis’s disregard for the richness and complexity of Romantic and post-Romantic literature may be astonishing to the modern reader, but it clearly was in tune with the tenets of his ‘medieval mission’. On the other hand, as an intellectual historian he was clearly right in placing the most important caesura between the ancient and modern times at the turn of the 18th century, at the beginning of the Romantic period. In its most general meaning, ‘modernity’ does signify the development of the trends initiated by Romanticism in many fields of life and art. Modern critics speak of ‘the persistence of Romanticism’ as a characteristic feature of the literature and art of modern times (Ward 1995:167). Lewis did not live to see the flourishing of the culture of Post-Modernism, but judging by the popularity of his writings at the end of the twentieth century, his critical view of Romanticism and his message about the necessity to assert the values of the Old Western tradition are still important for many modern readers.

References


The problems raised by corporeality indicate a realm which is largely considered to be fashionable nowadays, although it is sometimes rather difficult to find literary criticism related to it. Libraries abound though in materials about body, provided by philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists and feminist writers. Thus the only solutions possible would be either to conceive our research regardless of what was written before in any of the neighbouring fields or to try and detect and transpose specific scientific theories into the domain treated by the novels under study.

The postmodern novels, more than those of other literary trends, seem to have laid a greater stress on bodies, their acceptance, their perception (either external or internal), their adaptation to new environments, their transformation, etc., all of which are closely connected to the issues that govern our existence, such as tolerance, immigration, exile, medical progress, etc. It is only fair to give it the place it deserves, which is the central stage of my research, especially because without a body we could not be. We could even change Descartes’ famous “Cogito, ergo sum” into ‘I have a body, therefore I am’ (as the body contains the almighty brain). I can only imagine the debates arising from this switch.

The phrase ‘volatile bodies’ might appear awkward at first glance, especially because bodies are hardly to be thought of as evaporating, however, it is not necessary to take it metaphorically, as the body is, in a great proportion, made of water, which does evaporate. And yet the term ‘volatile’ may as well refer to the rapid and unpredictable change for the worse, according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary (1999), a meaning which is more frequently found in fiction.

Given the double meaning of the phrase, it could be easily recognised in a series of contemporary novels. Still, it is to be looked at only restrictively, as it is mirrored in some postmodern writings which are considered representative for the trend: the Beckettian trilogy (1979) (Molloy, Malone Dies, The Unnamable) and Lawrence Durrell’s The Alexandria Quartet (Justine, Balthazar, Mountolive, Clea) (1968).

Samuel Beckett’s volatile bodies are skillfully hidden under Molloy’s, Moran’s, Malone’s, Mahood’s, Worm’s strange performances. Molloy and
Moran, the main characters of the first novel *Molloy*, have a lot in common, beginning with the evolution of their corporeal debility, their difficulty in remembering past events and ending with their locomotory disability.

*Molloy* has long lost his capacity of asserting his identity and states that “(...) even my sense of identity was wrapped in a namelessness often hard to penetrate” (Beckett 1979: 30). Here the reader’s attention is averted from the character as such to the issue of language. The “namelessness” mentioned above carries our thought to the impossibility of giving a name to the voice in *The Unnamable*, who, in fact, seems to dangle between the condition of Being and nihilism or Derrida’s “cinder” (the term he uses for ‘nothing’) (Banham 2002: 57).

As Gary Banham upholds in his article *Cinders: Derrida with Beckett*, with *The Unnamable* (2002: 57), we have arrived at the very “edge of language”, i.e. we are not inside, nor outside, but in “the space of the middle between words and world” (2002: 60). Language itself is seen as “an edge which cuts between the world and the one who speaks” (2002: 58). It all seems to boil down to the Beckettian characters’ impossibility of speaking, of communicating coherently, and to their following a direct, but hesitant course towards death.

Still, what is worthy to be noticed is the fact that Beckett slips this allusion to his last creature (Worm) from the very first novel of the trilogy, thus establishing a bond between *Molloy* and the *Unnamable*.

The volatile body in Beckett is the body that slowly ‘flows’ towards death, lingering on its way in order to puzzle or bore the reader with truncated stories about unknown referents. Molloy’s, Moran’s, Malone’s interchangeable bodies are all products of a weird absent unutterable presence that is trying so hard to imagine a story in *The Unnamable*.

Volatile bodies are closely connected to covered or lost identities — a tiresomely common issue in Beckett. All his trilogy personages have a hard time jogging their memory whether in search of childhood memories or of their true self. Their defective memory is however only a part of what makes their bodies volatile, i.e. suddenly worsen.

As we get closer to the last novel in the trilogy, the creator of these bodies — who in his turn is created by Beckett — seems to gradually retract the horizontal spiral, on each of whose circle he posed a different, yet similar character. The Unnamable can be viewed at as a black hole that engulfs all the bodies which previously entered the world of the trilogy.

As it has already been noticed, the fact that all the characters’ names start with an M (even Mahood, Worm’s first ID card) again suggests that we are dealing with a series of Men, all having corporeal problems specific to the
entire humanity. What gains special interest though is the fact that M is posited upside down, in Worm’s case, as if collecting all that is left of his manly inventions.

Worm is a mere voice that springs from a purely postmodern bodily construction — marked by the ever present symbol of the circle — a worm with a human head, whose body is kept in a jar. The schizophrenic dimensions of the image have already been dealt with, but usually with Beckett, the meaning should be looked for in the elements which are excluded from the picture — he was fascinated by abstract paintings and their power to invoke meaning through colours and shapes indecisively traced.

Thus Worm acquires meaning if he is to be studied in connection with his heroes — he is the brain that imagined them and by absorbing them into his strange world, he finally retains different body parts, each being significant for a particular stage of corporeal deconstruction through which Molloy, Moran, Malone, even Mahood, pass. This however might only be a mere hypothesis of what Beckett had in mind when he thought of the Unnamable’s looks, environment and dwelling.

Some critics argue that the Unnamable is a presence represented by a voice, which stands for the origin of Beckett’s later theatrical writings that put forth the issue of “voice-as-presence”, as Richard Begam (2002: 23) calls it. And it is indeed only their voices that mark the characters’ personality, while their bodies desert them step by step and their minds start to wonder about their owners’ existence. In the end even their voices fade away, as it happens with Malone’s syncopated last sentences, in the second novel of the trilogy.

Molloy’s loss of mobility towards the end of the book looks like Malone’s interrupted flow of thought towards his end. The one who seemingly gets closest to death is Malone, as we bear witness to his incapacity of finishing his sentences. Nevertheless, nothing can be sure with Beckett, there is always a flicker of contradiction or opposing subversive evidence. It might be just fatigue or an isolated moment of senility or simply recurrent amnesia?!

If we take this into account, Malone can easily be thought of as being Molloy — which underlies his volatile body — who frequently forgets what he is about to say or does not succeed in ‘bringing’ past events into the present. It is superfluous to mention that, as the latter can hardly state his real identity, he might as well be Malone, who also does not remember who he is. Moreover, Molloy finishes his story partially immobile, in a ditch and it appears only natural to find him again, this time lying in bed, as Malone is.

Consequently, we are uncertain whether we deal with a single body, assuming distinct identities, with a single body unsure of its identity or with two distinct bodies that apparently complete each other. It can be said that it/
they are volatile bodies that escape definition.

This type of relation, as exemplified above, can be recognised in the second part of *Molloy*, where Moran is supposed to find Molloy for unknown reasons. What is certain is that Moran’s physical malfunctions are quite similar to those possessed by Molloy. They both have to use crutches at some point, both need a bicycle to move around, which gives them the mobility that they are about to completely lose.

Ruby Cohn (1962: 119) observes that Moran slowly becomes Molloy during his quest for him, not to mention that the former does not manage to find the latter, which is of no surprise to Beckett’s connaisseurs. It is again no wonder that he cannot achieve his task, as all Beckettian characters are failures — cannot remember anything, cannot invent stories properly, cannot assert anything, but are masters at blurring our view of them.

And still, Beckett does not consider that he is inventive in promoting such a literary climate: “The confusion is not my invention... — he states — It is all around us and our only chance now is to let it in. The only chance of renovation is to open our eyes and see the mess... there will be new form, and... this form will be of such a type that it admits the chaos and does not try to say that the chaos is really something else” (Pilling 1976: 22).

The same feeling of confusion is given by Durrell’s *The Alexandria Quartet*. The multiplicity of points of view provided by the narrator deconstructs each character’s personality, leaving the impression that they are ever changing, fluid, volatile, whether evaporating in the hot Alexandrine atmosphere or irremediably leaving their destinies to fade into the sunset. A psychological creation spread with myths, the quartet puts forth a number of themes illustrated by a series of characters, who complete them from various perspectives, as G. S. Fraser points it out in Durrell’s *The Alexandria Quartet: from Psychology to Myth*. He, furthermore, states that “there are more characters than roles” (1968:138), implying the possibility of switching persons, of making them undertake each other’s part, even if played slightly differently, just as in the case of Beckett’s volatile bodies.

In *A Key to Modern British Poetry*, Durrell treats Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud as leading “architects of modern Western consciousness” (cf. Merriam-Webster 1993-2000: 3). While Einstein thought that the smallest unit that makes the universe is the wave and not the particle and thus “torpedoed the old Victorian material universe” (2000: 3), Freud “torpedoed the idea of a stable ego” (2000: 3), giving a new insight into the inner universe of (wo)man. Durrell applied the two theories to his literary world and obtained fluid volatile bodies, sometimes able to lose identity.
People that consider themselves individuals, once accepting the continuum of space and time, “may perhaps form ingredients of a single continuous stream of life” (Merriam-Webster 2000: 3). Although Durrell does not go as far as promoting the Buddhist attempt at becoming one with the universe, he does think of his characters as forming streams of life. Of them all, Justine, the main character of the novel with a homonymous title, seems to be the most changing. The writer’s prismatic view of the land of his creation permits the mirroring of Justine’s various facets. She is perceived by L. G. Darley, the subjective narrator of the first novel, an inexperienced Irish school teacher, as a powerful attractive and passionate femme fatale who can get any man’s heart without too much straining on her part.

While admiring her body, Darley notices a dark cicatrice above her knee. He thus presents her body — to employ a term extensively used by Lingis — as an inscriptive surface. Even though a volatile body, it has its markings that are, in Lingis’ words (Grosz 1994: 139) “‘civilised’ inscriptions which can be read in terms of psychical depths.”

Lingis’ theory discriminates between primitive savage rituals of body inscription and modern and civilised equivalents. He thinks, as Grosz points out, that the civilised body “is marked by and as signs, legible, meaning-laden interiorities, subjectivities capable of experiencing themselves in and as a determinate form, with particular qualities and capacities” (1994: 140). Consequently, we reduce the body to “a symptom of the self” (1994: 141).

Darley is thus capable of reading on Justine’s body. He partly understands her deeper self by looking at her cicatrice, thus getting an insight of her which exhilarates him (“It is indescribable the feeling I have when I see this wound...” Durrell 1968: 114). Her opaque personality allows itself rarely to be unveiled and, as he wants to know her so much, he looks for the book her former husband, Arnauti, wrote on her.

Arnauti’s book is suggestively entitled Moeurs and reveals a different Justine from the one Darley gets to know. Each man she has an affair with sees her differently, catches a distinct glimpse of her character and personality. Pursewarden, the representative of the mature writer in the book, considers her a “boring nymphomaniac, a sexual turnstile through which every distinguished visitor of Alexandria has to pass.” (Fraser 1968: 144), while for Nessim, her present husband, she is only a poor highly ambitious Jewish woman. Balthazar states in the workpoints of Justine that: “(...) her formidable manner is constructed on a shaky edifice of childish timidities” (Durrell 1968: 198).
Although passionately in love with her, Darley realises that she represents 'more than meets the eye', as he comes to grasp her complex nature. She is so intricate, that sometimes it is impossible to know her true mind.

Fraser (1968: 132) is of the opinion that she can be analysed on different levels: “At the psychological level, Justine is a sick woman, the prisoner of an imagination obsessed by a traumatic memory: at the numinous or mythical level she is Jung’s ‘self sufficient psyche’, ‘which, in the play of its images, reflects not the world but itself, even though it may use the forms of the world of sense in which to manifest its images.”

Later on, she is presented as part of a conspiracy together with her husband, the Coptic banker Nessim. She is not spied on by her husband — as Darley believes and makes us think — during her affaires with him and Pursewarden, but he pushes her in that direction in order to obtain useful information from the two, as they are investigating their plot. She appears to be using the two for distinct personal purposes.

Thus, Justine is gradually forced, by Durrell, to leave the pedestal where Darley carefully placed her, in order to become the shallow, practical Levantine woman she really is. Much later she leaves Alexandria for Palestine, where she becomes a worker in a kibbutz. As Fraser (1968: 134) noticed, “losing power as a myth, she gains interest as a possible actual person, a character of high comedy.”

Justine’s fluid character is a perfect example of volatile body. Though her identity is clear from the beginning, she can be compared to Beckett’s trilogy ‘ghosts’ in the extent to which Molloy, Moran and Malone are considered three instances of the same character, freely moving from one identity to the next and inevitably regressing towards death.

Justine’s volatile body is more easily perceived if we take into account that she moves from her status of a rich powerful woman to that of a neglected uncared for worker. She changes for the worse because it is preferable to being arrested in Egypt for illegal affairs and to witnessing her husband’s social and bodily decay (the husband becomes a taxi driver and loses an eye and a finger). However she will, later, go back to Egypt and try to redeem their situation.

During carnivals the changes of identity become a common issue in Alexandria. Toto, for example, a homosexual dressed in a domino and wearing Justine’s ring, is taken for her and killed by Narouz, Nessim’s brother, for having tried to seduce him. But carnivals or parties are not the only occasions for transvestites to come into the spotlight. Scobie, another queer, who also works for the British Intelligence, walks at night dressed as an old lady and is kicked to death by some sailors.
Durrell appears to drastically punish his characters who covertly try to express their modification of sexual direction. Both Toto and Scobie end up dead for using women’s clothes, and thus assuming false identities. They represent punished volatile bodies, opposed to such characters as Balthazar, who openly states his homosexuality and is portrayed as a cultivated and profound man, the only man-friend Justine can ever have.

Another character who feels the need of changing his identity is Mountolive, the British ambassador in Egypt — after meeting his long cherished love, Leila (Nessim and Narouz’s mother), whose beautiful face was touched by a malignant eruption and who got older and lost her youthful charm. Mountolive rejects her, cannot recognise her as his lover, in that aged and hurt body, and he temporarily loses his mind. He starts wandering about the ill-famed quarters of Alexandria, dressed as a local, without minding the risks involved by such a rash move and suddenly comes back to reality, as if waking up with a hangover, in a child brothel where he realises that he has no longer any clothes on.

Durrell seems to be trying to save his character by bringing him back to a conscious state in order to make him realise his degradation. Although somehow different from the other Englishmen in the quartet, Mountolive, a more collected and stiff person, also enjoys a volatile body by turning for the worse, evolving or rather regressing from a sensitive and kind young man to an intolerant and conservative one.

Just like Justine, Nessim seems to be playing several roles: a rich educated businessman, a hurt neglected husband, a conspirator, an influential Alexandrine, and, in the end, an impaired taxi driver. Darley believes that he loves his wife too much to allow her to have any affairs and that he keeps a close eye on her, whereas later we find out that he is perverse enough to push her towards her affairs for business and political purposes. Nessim does not have so many facets as Justine though. The focus is less on him and that might be one reason for the fact that he is a rather sketchy character.

Durrell intended to create a roman fleuve and succeeded. He added work-points at the end of his quartet novels with the exception of Mountolive, in order to make sure that he would be able to go on with his stories for ever. He might be thought of as a variant of Scheherazade of the Arabian Nights’ Entertainments.

What appears to be worthy of our attention is that Durrell seems to turn his characters’ evils against them or against their offspring (another type of punished volatile bodies). In this sense the inequality of treatment exerted upon Nessim and Narouz will later backfire, especially in Nessim’s case. It must be mentioned that Narouz was kept away from education, was supposed to only
take care of the land, was unsuccessfully operated on for rabbit lip and was afterwards neglected, ill-treated, transformed by circumstances and people into a despicable creature. Whereas Nessim attended classes at Oxford, was brought up into a gentleman, came to take care of the banking business and could easily make his way through the high society of Alexandria.

Nessim’s major evil consists in tacitly agreeing that his brother be killed for the sake of the conspiracy. His evil is still slightly reduced because he does not have the ‘courage’ to commit fratricide. In the end, Durrell resolves to punish him physically, as well as socially, by making him a taxi driver.

These Alexandrine volatile bodies are all punished, ‘severed’, one way or another for their thoughtless acts which hurt people deeply. For instance, Clea, the painter, the heroine of the last novel, has her hand harpooned. This may be a punishment for having violently rejected Narouz’s advances or for having created uninspired portraits, like the one she did for Mountolive. However, after this accident, she gains artistic insight and starts to mature as a painter.

Playing games with his characters is something inherent in Durrell’s manner of literary conception. His interest in fluid identities predisposes him to unexpected turns of the narrative, as it happens with the masks that he adjusts on the face of the victim made during the duck shooting party, that took place on Nessim’s estate. The reader is initially fooled into believing that Darley himself will be killed by the jealous Nessim, for having slept with his wife. The second variant is that it is in fact Capodistria, the man who raped Justine in her childhood, who is killed, and last, but not in the least certain, as we are already bewildered by so many corrections, that it is a man who looks like Capodistria who is murdered, in order to facilitate the latter’s flight from the country.

The story flows further with details intentionally hidden beforehand or thoughtfully made up afterwards — Capodistria needs to leave Egypt right away because he represents a threat for the safety of the conspirator. He is one of the agents who are on the brink of being discovered and arrested by the British. This is something typical of Durrell — no matter how deep we dive into his imaginary ocean, we realise that we have not touched the bottom floor.

The quartet may be seen in the light of Deleuze and Guattari’s body without organs (BwO) theory (Grosz 1994). Grosz explains that the BwO “refuses all property” (1994:170). Thus, given Durrell’s hesitation in establishing identities clearly, we might consider his imaginary characters as multiple examples of BswOs, governed by flows of intensities and desires, as long as these characters escape any patterning or means of identification.
There are two types of BswOs: “the emptied BwO of the drug addict, the masochist, and the hypochondriac, and the full BwO in and through which intensities flow and circulate, where productions are engendered.” (Grosz 1994: 170).

What we are dealing with, in our case, is the full BwO, which very well describes the Alexandrine way of life, intensified by the African heat, that in turn increases the inhabitants’ desires. The exotic, mysterious, absorbing setting of Alexandria furnishes the right location for such bodies.

The great number of poor and unidentifiable people makes it hard sometimes, even for the local police, to realize that one of them is missing. Children and adults disappear on a daily basis, often without trace. The bodies of these unfortunate people which provide fields for the clashes between hunger and sexual surrender represent genuine BswOs. Most of them are to be found in the hot dusty unpaved streets and in the obscure raving brothels. The rest remain lost in the bizarre magnificent sunset.

Turning our back to the libertine maleficent world of Egypt, after all, the origin of great wisdom illo tempore, our attention rests again on Beckett. Fraser (1968: 134), as well as Andrew Sanders (1996: 594), thought that Durrell and Beckett are worlds apart, but if we take into account only the treatment of their characters’ bodies, we may notice that Beckett’s old men also represent a particular type of BwO. They do not have clear identity, can hardly be said to enjoy any bodily ordering, especially the Unnamable, who juggles with his/ its corporeal parts.

Their volatile body can be compared to that of the masochist whose body is passed by pain waves (Grosz 1994: 170), though the Beckettian characters experience pain which is not self-imposed, it is determined by a decaying bodily condition, by a dysfunctional fleshy mechanism.

Their poor health and incapacity to accomplish anything, their isolation (even when in contact with other human beings) caused by their deficient memory, determines them to wish for death. They strive to reach their end, but cannot avoid failure. It is rather singular for our century, in which everyone fears death and uses myriads of remedies to distance themselves from it, to actually encounter a character that looks for it.

Madan Sarup (1996: 110) mentions that Baudrillard pointed out that, beginning with the sixteenth century, Western thought started to repress death. It looks like before that point in time, in primitive societies, the individual’s interest in death was something common. People were not afraid of it and it was considered an “integral part of everyday life” (Sarup 1996: 111). For us, however, the exclusion of death from “normality” has only made it haunt us all the more powerfully (1996: 110).
Considering death something natural and inevitable, moreover, desirable, Beckett’s anti-heroes turn it into their goal. Their volatile bodies however, have to wait for a while longer than the novel itself, to attain their purpose.

The old men’s attitude, as expected, is not constant during their odd quest for a ‘dignified’ death. They live moments of anguish and find various stratagems to keep themselves alive: straining their brains with irretrievable memories, inventing bizarre accounts and then pretending to be what they are not.

Referring to Molloy’s volatile body in his essay *Molloy’s Silence*, Georges Batailles (1986: 131) states that he himself would be Molloy if he took “no notice of cold, or hunger, or the numberless discomforts that oppress a man given over to nature, to the earth and the rain.” He further considers him “an anonymous figure” (my italics) that every one of us has at least once encountered in our lives. Thus this volatile body evaporates because of self-neglect or as Batailles (1986: 138) puts it, because of “that indifference in which man forgets his own name, forgets he is a man even.”

Durrell’s bodies are different from this point of view. His main characters’ bodies, although exposed to a sometimes unpleasant treatment, still have the power and the will to ‘wake up’ and go on with their lives or to produce modifications in their lives which they think appropriate. They all go through journeys that leave their mark on their personality, behaviour and intellectual perception. “These journeys more closely correspond to the movement of the soul in reincarnation” (Merriam-Webster 1993-2000: 4). Durrell’s interest in death is implied here, moreover, his inclination to believe that there is life after death; he thus perceives the volatile soul as wandering for ever, a fluid continuum inspired by Einstein’s and Freud’s theories.

*Justine*’s first title was *The Book of the Dead*, but Durrell changed it, although his initial interest remained unshakable. In an interview mentioned in *The Merriam-Webster Encyclopaedia of Literature*, he tried to reveal the importance that this subject carries for him: “The basic trauma, the basic neurosis’ in human life is death. If one can get ‘on top of it’ by facing its reality and also by subduing the ‘recalcitrant ego’, then one can achieve ‘celestial amnesia which is anti-egoism.’ One then ends up ‘swimming in the continuum’, another word for the Heraldic Reality.” (Merriam-Webster 1993-2000: 4).

Their inclusion of death as a major topic brings Durrell and Beckett together in spite of their other dissimilarities. They acknowledge the importance of this ‘bridge’ in our lives and try to present it as naturally as possible. Durrell considers it a link to another world, whereas Beckett is, as usual,
abstruse in his beliefs, but does have one of his characters ask himself whether he is not by any chance already in paradise.

Durrell’s vision of death is by far more optimistic, as he induces the idea that we actually never stop living, we shed our body at the one end of the ‘bridge’ and assume another, in a better condition at the other end. The image one gets is still frightening, as the unknown usually is.

The two writers seem to enjoy common interests after all, though developing them differently. In Beckett’s case, we actually deal with one single volatile body undergoing various changes which unfold for the length of three novels, while in Durrell’s, we have a multiplicity of characters, each showing a series of facets brought to surface by different circumstances in their lives. Their approach to volatile bodies brings them one step closer to each other, even if the spaces used are totally distinct: a stiff imaginary European space, on the one hand, and a free exotic African realm, on the other hand. The volatile body in their postmodern novels travels, surmounts obstacles, deteriorates, but goes on living as best as it can, to use Beckett’s words. It is a body that gradually evaporates only to ‘precipitate’ again, after passing beyond the final stop.

References

Olivia Manning’s *Balkan Trilogy* was published in the 1960s, at a moment when interwar Romania was of little significance to an English-speaking world that no longer had direct access to the realities behind the Iron curtain. To the British imagination, this space, if it existed at all, evinces all the features of a distopia, a lost world, a reverted paradise, now under the empire of dark forces.

Manning’s reading of pre-communist Romania in the first two volumes of the Trilogy — *The Great Fortune* and *The Spoilt City* — can be viewed as an attempt to retrieve this space, at least at a symbolical level, by making it more palatable to the reading public through a conventional exploitation of its potential for exoticism. The paper explores the interplay of *autoimages* and *heteroimages* that allowed for a construction of the Romanian space within the economy of the novel, as well as the allocentrical/ethnocentrical nature of the resulting images of Romania and Romanians, since their place on the axes of ideology and utopia account for the level of exoticism that Romania was granted by the author. From the same perspective we shall also examine the consequences of the imaginary positioning of Romania as a frontier space *par excellence*.

The construction of the Other in Manning’s novel can be understood in terms of Paul Ricoeur’s (1996) organization of stereotypical heteroimages along the axes of ideology and utopia. Thus, the image of the other is *Utopian* when it is allocentrical, Other-oriented — i.e. when the Romanian Other is seen as belonging to an alternative order, rich in potentialities denied to one’s own group; however, aside from a marked exoticism, in Manning’s reading the image of the Romanian Other is rather *Ideological*, ethnocentric and self-oriented, in the reading that Paul Ricoeur gives to these terms (1986:386). Utopian representations of otherness constitute the expression of all the potentialities of a group, unable to manifest within the existent order. Stereotypical representations of otherness, as a form of multiple and contradictory beliefs, admits *difference*, but simultaneously disavows or masks it.
Nonetheless, utopian or ideological representations of otherness, studied in context, depend on the pre-existing tradition, in terms of their degree of intelligibility for the reading public they are intended for.

As seen above, the Romanian space makes no exception, and the construction of exoticism in Manning’s novel is directly connected to a superficial knowledge of the Romanian Other, doubled by a constant emphasis on the stereotypical features of the spectred culture. At the same time the exoticism ascribed to the Romanian space evinces some recognizable features that render it less menacing and easier to accept by a British/Western reading public.

The land

Throughout the Balkan Trilogy, coming into contact with the alien culture entails not only a stereotyping of the external realities, perceived as belonging to the space of the Other (the hetero-stereotype of the Romanians); the writer’s own territory becomes a theme of stereotyped mental representations — the auto-stereotype, or auto-images — the images that a nation has of itself. (Other such studies have been done by Hugo Dyserinck on autostereotypes in texts by the Flemish Francophone authors M. Maeterlinck, E. Verhaeren, and G.Rodenbach.see Duţu 1986) My paper will therefore deal with the representation of the territory in accordance with the corresponding sets of imagotypes, paying special attention to the recurrence of stereotypes on the ‘orientality’ of the Balkans in the attributes ascribed to Romania and the Romanians, that are decisively relegated to the space of the Orient.

The device used in the literary shaping of the Romanian space is that of the exploratory journey in the unknown territory, a journey that enables Manning’s characters to pose their assessing gaze on the new space, interpreting it and assimilating it from their own cultural perspective. The young Pringles, Guy and Harriet, are returning to Romania in the summer of 1939. Recently and rather hastily married, their journey into the Balkan space turns out to be both an internal and an external exploration. Getting to know the new territory goes in parallel with their discovery of each other in their new life as a married couple; at the same time, the interplay of image and reality, present in their dealings with the new culture, finds its correspondent in the contrast and differences between their expectations of each other and the somewhat less glamorous realities of life together.

It is young Harriet, a 22-year old British woman, who is the centre-consciousness of the story and the representations of the new space are filtered through her eyes, often biased by the cultural assumptions of the author.
From the very first pages the country is spatially located at the limits of civilized Europe, presented as a buffer zone between the barbarian Orient and the comfortably familiar Occident. This image of Romania as the ‘margin’, ‘the frontier’, the ‘contact zone’ between cultures, religions, ultimately races, can be found in other works dealing with the heteroimages of Romania circulating in the western space and it has become part of the Romanian autoimage — the image they have of themselves. In Sorin Alexandrescu’s book, *Identitate în ruptură* (2000:11-13) the Romanian cultural space is presented not as marginal, which is assumed to have been the norm, but as a space of interference, at the border of at least two pairs of distinct cultural realms — the East and the West, the Catholic and the Orthodox. Lucian Boia’s book *Romania* equally deals extensively with this image of Romania as borderland. Romania is “… a country only partially integrated into European civilization, a country of the margins, still characterized by a pronounced substrate of primitivism and a strange amalgam of modern urban life and rustic survivals. [...]

The Romanian space presents itself as a marginal one. Throughout history it has always been on the edge of great political units and civilizations [...] whether in relation to Russia, Germany and Austria or Turkey, the Romanians have always been on the margins and now they stand on the margin of the European Union, as candidates whose chances of being integrated into the European construct remain uncertain” (Boia 2001:9-12) (my emphasis). In this case we could say that the meta-image of Romanians (i.e. the image that Romanians imagine that others have of them) corresponds—or at least is comfortably close—to existing autoimages (the image Romanians have of themselves) and heteroimages (the image of Romanians as visible in works originating in other cultural spaces).

The topos of the frontier, of the exotic borderline, porous yet dividing, is central to the creation of Manning’s Romania. In addition to that, an Oriental precedent is assumed in Manning’s description of this country, which she clearly includes from the very beginning in the imaginary space of the Orient. This ‘inherited’ Orient, which she borrows from the western mechanism of construction of exoticism is paralleled by the corresponding stereotypes and constitutes the reference point in her description of the new space. As Boia (2001:9) puts it, “[t]he Romanian space represents, for the West, the first circle of otherness: sufficiently close for the curious configurations and disturbing forms of behaviour which Westerners find there to be highlighted all the more strongly.” In Manning’s first two volumes of the *Balkan Trilogy* this disquieting view of the space of the Other is visible from the first chapter, when, at the window of her compartment, Harriet takes in the landscape — alluring yet dangerously wild:
“A pine forest came down to the edge of the track: the light of the carriages rippled over the bordering trees. As she gazed out into the dark heart of the forest, she began to see small moving lights. For an instant a grey dog-shape skirted the rail, then returned to darkness. The lights, she realized, were the eyes of beasts. She drew her head in and closed the window” (14).

The ‘civilized’ space and the wild space of the new territory, the train and the landscape, respectively, are thus juxtaposed, while their relation of mutual isolation and exclusion is symbolic for the whole approach that is to be used in the rest of the book. The method Manning chose to render the novelty of this ‘edge of Europe’ less threatening is that of connecting it to known elements of the familiar world the Pringles belonged to — the West, but also to their accepted version of exoticism — a romanticized Orient with its age-long accepted characteristics: “its eccentricity, its backwardness, its silent indifference, its feminine penetrability, its supine malleability” (Said 1978:206). To use Said’s terms, Manning’s Oriental Romania is a “locale requiring Western attention, reconstruction, even redemption” (idem). But, if Said’s Orient is viewed as a place isolated from the mainstream of European progress, Manning’s Romania, as a contact zone, is situated halfway between the East and the West, while her otherness is best appropriated by appealing to known parameters.

Thus, the new is understood by referring to known and accepted forms of otherness and of difference, a mechanism which contributes to the process of rendering the new space familiar, it is in fact a domestication of the exotic, as Said terms it (Said 1978:60) — i.e. by assimilating, by analogy with other areas of experience felt to be already understood and familiar (White 1978:5). For instance, Bucharest is, (albeit with an ironic undertone) “the Paris of the East” (30), “the edge of Europe, a region in which [Yakimov] already smelt the Orient.” (16), an unsafe country, because “[t]hese Balkan countries are wild” and, as one of the non-Romanians says, “[t]hey have dangerous wild beasts” (99). Romania is an uncivilized legacy of the Ottoman Empire where the lack of safety is due both to its geo-political location (the unstable, seething, dangerous Balkans), but also to the intrinsic wild character of its fauna and climate.

The stereotypes are complemented by more ‘objective’ arguments in favour of Romania’s historical and cultural allegiances to the Orient, such as the remark by Clarence (another member of the British legation), who argues that, “[i]f Romania had been as long under the Austrians as she was under the Turks, she might be civilized by now” (88).

The myth of an ‘Oriental’ Romania, situated at the frontier of Europe emerges again in Manning’s book, precisely because ‘Oriental’ is the key term
in defining the Romanian imaginary space. A contact zone of the Orient of Turkey and of the darker, less understood Orient of Russia, Romania, or at least Manning’s Bucharest, vacillates between images of sensuous decadence and mystical effusions. Picturesque figures, such as that of the Skopit trasura driver, illustrate the barbarous, wild streak of the Romanian spirit (30), while the indolence and the lasciviousness of Bucharest women, the general passivity of the people, and the colourful accounts of the streets and local customs seem to allude to the conventional feminine representations of Orient in western literature (Said 1978: 206ff).

Even the architecture of the place is presented as offering a direct connection to the Eastern part of Europe: “The market area around the river had a flavour more of the East than of the West. Guy had brought her here and shown her the houses, built in the style of Louis XIII, once the mansions of Turkish and Phanariot officials, now doss-houses where the poor slept twenty and thirty to a room” (122).

Yet, as mentioned earlier, this new space, an exotic blend of East and West, is befriended by being reduced to smaller, recognizable units; thus, the centre of Bucharest life is the British legation, while the language is just like Italian (16); the peasants, viewed as mere ethnographic artefacts, are rendered familiar by alluding to their Roman cultural legacy, a legacy that is nonetheless presented as dying in front of the unifying wave of western influences:

“Newly arrived in the city, the men were still in tight frieze trousers, short jackets and pointed caps — a style of dress that dated back to Roman times. The women wore embroidered blouses and fan pleated skirts of colours that were richer and more subtle than those worn by the gypsies. As soon as they could afford it, they would throw off these tokens of their simplicity and rig themselves out in city drab” (64).

This territory at the edge of Europe is one torn apart by climactic contrasts that parallel the two Orients at work in the shaping of the Romanian image. The weather is a mixture of extremes — melting hot in summer, freezing cold in winter; the Northern crivâţ, a hint at the Russian winter not too far away, opposes the scorching sun of the South, whose destructive power exposes men and plants alike to its relentless torture. It is an unbearably cold, unbearably hot climate that provides the backdrop against which the events in the novel unfold. “With late November came the crivâţ, a frost-hard wind that blew from Siberia straight into the open mouth of the Moldavian plain. Later it would bring the snow, but for the moment it was merely a threat and a discomfort that each day grew a little sharper” (107). In the summer, the city turns into a climatic hell: ”Everything seemed to give off heat. Harriet half
expected the canna lilies, in great beds of sulphur, cadmium and read, to roar like a furnace” (63).

Oriental elements in the good Romantic and pre-Romantic tradition, dominate the description of the people and of the mores: sensuality, terror, sublimity, idyllic scenes, picturesque decadence, such as the profusion of nobility titles and the decadent parties organized by Princess Teodorescu. The colourful market scenes combine with the ubiquitous crowds of beggars and gypsy flower sellers to create an un-Western background, verging on the exotic. Sexual permissiveness and the passivity associated with Romanian women are constantly alluded to, either indirectly in an anecdotal form, or directly, through the example of Sophie, or of the two princesses, Mimi and Lulie. As Harriet is informed on the very day of her arrival, Romanian morality “is based not on not doing, but on not recognizing what is being done” (38).

Similarly, the oriental stereotype of lasciviousness and loose morality is played on when the behaviour of Romanian young girls and the local secrets of the institution of marriage are explained to Harriet by another British official: “[T]hese Romanian homes are hot-beds of scandal and gossip. It’s all very Oriental. The pretence of innocence is to keep their price up. They develop early and they’re married off early, usually to some rich old lecher whose only interest is in the girl’s virginity. When that’s over and done with, they divorce. The girl sets up her own establishment and having the status of divorcee, she is free to do what she chooses.” The stereotype is further illustrated in the anecdote Inchcape offers his company: “But surely you’ve heard the story of the Romanian walking with his German friend down Calea Victoriei — the Romanian naming the price of every woman they meet? ‘Good heavens,’ says the German, ‘are there no honest women here?’ ‘Certainly,’ replies the Romanian, ‘but — very expensive!’” (39).

Another defining trait for this representation of Romanian as a superficially western-shaped Orient is the abundance of food. A cornucopia of cheap food available everywhere, Manning’s Bucharest life revolves around parties, terraces, restaurants, and is punctuated by snacks of various sizes and natures. Wild and uncivilized, inhabited by gregarious, fun loving crowds, this land of plenty is from the first chapter dominated by the recurrent image of the abundant and accessible food supplies. Food is cheap, food is everywhere, as a natural pendant to the child-like image of the inhabitants whom nature itself seems to be protecting from the harsh realities of life: “The heart of the display was a rosy bouquet of roasts, chops, steaks and fillets, frilled round with a froth of cauliflower. Heaped extravagantly about the centre were aubergines as big as melons, baskets of artichokes, small coral carrots, mushrooms, mountain raspberries, apricots, peaches, apples and grapes. On one side there
were French cheeses; on the other tins of caviar, grey river fish in powdered ice, and lobsters and crayfish groping in dark waters. The poultry and game lay unsorted on the ground” (32). The Romanian space, therefore, a metaphor of culinary abundance, offers itself to the consummation of the western gaze — both figuratively and literally. It is passively awaiting the organizing hand of the Other, just as the Romanians are said to let the foreigners run the country for them. The direct connection between representations of Romanians as a passive crowd and the physical abundance of the land, rich yet unexploited is hinted at, constantly, throughout the novel. And yet this savage abundance can at times be perceived as menacing (although no parallel allusion at a possible outbreak of violence from the Romanians seems to ever be likely to happen). Thus, when seeing a handcart of melons of all sizes at the entrance of the Cișmigiu Park, Harriet feels oddly disquieted. “I’ve never seen so many before,’ ‘That is Romania,’ said Guy. Repelled by their profusion, she had an odd fancy that, gathered there in a flashing mass of yellow and gold, the melons were not really inert, but hiding a pullulating craftiness that might, if unchecked, one day take over the world” (62).

**The people**

The Bucharest of Manning’s novel is inhabited by two distinct crowds, standing for two distinct worlds: the impoverished yet colorful peasantry and the arrogant snobbish middle class. Between these two realms there are meteoric appearances of sketchy members of the old aristocracy, such as Princess Teodorescu, Princess Mimi and Princess Lulie, charming, broke, willing to trade their nobility for money, and constantly presented as looking for someone interested in the trade.

As a general feature, Manning’s Romanians are always seen from afar, not really explained, with no direct insight into their psychology; usually they are part of a larger group — clients of a café or restaurant, students in an amphitheatre, passers-by strolling along Calea Victoriei. The collective element — the crowd — is dominant; in the street, in front of the royal palace, at the market, the silent crowd surrounding the dead Captain’s body, the audience present at the play staged by Guy.

Within this shapeless mass, however, Harriet distinguishes some better shaped subgroups: the beggars, ubiquitous, aggressive and repulsive, or the groups of peasants encountered in the Cismigiu garden or wandering in the street; the peasants are merely touches of local colour, exotic, quaint, not clearly differentiated from their background. As time goes by, this impover-
ished crowd is perceived by Harriet to be in a disquieting contrast with the image she had had of them prior to her arrival in Romania:

“Before she left England, she had read books written by travellers in Rumania who had given a picture of a rollicking, open-hearted, happy, healthy peasantry, full of music and generous hospitality. They were, it was true, mad about music. Music was their only outlet. They made themselves drunk on it. As for the rest, she had seen nothing of it. The peasants in this city were starved, frightened figures, scrawny with pellagra, wandering about in a search for work or making a half-hearted attempt to beg” (123).

The few characters that are individualized are not representative of the Romanians as a group, and they aspire to a British-like status: Sophie, who wanted to marry Guy and ends up marrying Clarence, in order to get a British passport; the Druckers, and the Kleins, families of Romanian Jews, somewhat marginalized by the good Romanians; Bella Nicolescu’s husband, a mere accessory to an English lady who committed the eccentricity of marrying a native.

This gregarious fun-loving, snobbish and childish crowd — again the stereotype of the child-like attributes ascribed to the primitive, uncivilized individual — is an eclectic mingling of several races, an ethnic mosaic reminiscent of an Oriental bazaar: “They’re not all Rumanians, said Guy. There are a great many stateless Jews; and there are, of course, Hungarians, Germans and Slavs” (27). The so called ‘real Romanians’ are however an exclusive caste, not willing to mix with outsiders. Bella Niculescu, the British closest to the real life of the Romanians — through her marriage with a Romanian officer — describes them as “snobby” and confesses that “[t]he real Romanians never mix with foreigners” (141).

Facing this double mechanism of inclusion and exclusion, Harriet Pringle has to deal with her own inability to seize the various degrees of difference at work in a world she can only grasp superficially. Yet her reading of it betrays her own cultural bias:

“Harriet was reminded of Doamna Flohr’s claim that the exclusiveness of the Jews was the exclusiveness of the excluded. What, she wanted to know, had the Romanians to be snobbish about? She said: “They must suffer from some profound sense of inferiority.” Such an idea was new and strange to Bella. She looked bewildered as she asked: ‘But what are they inferior to?’ ‘Why, to us, of course; to the foreigners and the Jews who run the country for them because they are too lazy to run it for themselves” (142).
Here we are dealing with a reversal of the negative imagogype of the foreigners rejected by 'the real Romanians', and its interpretation as proof of a positive feature, automatically situated on a superior hierarchical position, in terms of culture and civilization. Those whom the 'real Romanians' reject are those who are in fact their superiors, and by rejecting them the Romanians would in fact be trying to avoid a direct confrontation with their own autostereotypes of laziness and inferiority.

This comprehensive ethnic mosaic is scattered with exotic cameos, such as that of the lascivious young wife of Drucker, a Romanian “undulating with an Oriental languor” (99), of Florica the gipsy singer, or that of the Skopit trăsură driver, presented by Guy as “one of the sights of the city” (30), and whose story of religious self-mutilation shocks Harriet. “She gazed in wonder at the vast velvet backside of the eunuch before her, then she gazed out at the dark reaches of the Muntenia plain, on which the city stood like a bride-cake on a plate. ‘A barbarous country’, she said” (30).

The colourful collective character that is the Romanian crowd is dealt with on a double level; on the one hand, there is the local level, where Romanian customs and lifestyle are analyzed from the outside and contrasted against that of the British characters. Thus, the set of unwritten 'laws of the land' — such as the distribution of the sidewalk (26-7) or the formal ‘interdiction’ of ladies to do grocery shopping for themselves are pictured as ludicrous cultural barriers to be trespassed by nonconformist, liberal-minded British women.

“Though leisurely, the Rumanians were ruthless in their determination to keep on the pavement. Only peasants or servants could be seen walking in the road. [...] Guy, too temperate, and Harriet, too light boned, for the fray, were easily thrust out to the kerb, where Guy gripped Harriet’s elbow to keep her from slipping into the gutter. She broke from him saying. ‘I’ll walk in the road. I’m not a Rumanian. I can do what I like” (27).

On the other hand, at a larger level, that of the seething conflict in Europe, the Romanians as a people are viewed as merely secondary elements in an equation that is being solved elsewhere. As Mary Louise Pratt (1995) puts it in an article about the experience of marginality in colonial societies, in Manning’s novel too one feels that “history is taking place elsewhere”, even if Romania is not a colonial country on the margin of a clearly delimited Metropolis. Not only the individual characters are sketchy; the strategies of the Romanian government are also dealt with only cursorily. Their role in the destiny of their country is constantly overemphasized to be close to nil. Victims of the decision of an arbitrary king, of a game played in Russia,
Britain or Germany, the motley, noisy Romanian crowd is helpless like a child, gathering hopefully, and then resentfully, around the all-knowing British, supposed to have beset their colonial benevolence over them. The reaction of the crowd upon the announcement of the ultimatum given by the Russians to Bucharest is telling in this respect.

“Hearing English spoken, an elderly man leapt up from a nearby table and reminded everyone that Britain had guaranteed Romania. Now that Romania was menaced, what were the British going to do? ‘Nothing, nothing,’ he screamed in rage. ‘They are finished,’ [...] Harriet looked uneasily about her. When, ten months before, she had first arrived in Bucharest, the British here had been respected, now, on the losing side, they were respected no longer. She half feared actual attack — but no attack came. A certain sentiment, even affection, persisted for the once great, protecting power which was believed to be doomed.” (293).

Even the protection from the German — and to a certain extent, Russian — armies is provided not by valiant Romanian troops ready to fight to their death in the defence of their homeland, but by natural obstacles that in the end will only delay, not stop the invaders; thus, throughout the first volume Harriet repeatedly assesses the security provided by the snow-laden mountains north of the Capital, while the (temporary) security offered by climate and relief is repeatedly mentioned by various characters in the book.

Manning’s construction of Romanian is clearly marked by colonial attributes, yet it is not clear whose colony the country actually is. Naturally enough, Harriet is content to see that pro-British attitudes are prevalent throughout the Nazi-menaced Bucharest, as a confirmation of the British auto-stereotypes — nobility, dignity, love of justice. The relationship between the two cultures is a clearly hierarchical one, the dynamics center/periphery being maintained throughout the process of image construction in the novel. Thus, one example would be the image that the Romanians have of the British: as Bella’s Romanian husband argues: “[w]e know here that to be English is to be honest. You do things to your own disadvantage because you know them to be right. That is remarkable, I can tell you. So we love you [...] We envy you. You are a great, rich nation. We think you despise us but we love you nevertheless” (534). And it is, paradoxically, this alleged admiration for the British that is given as one quite likely explanation for the fate of the country in the war; the Romanian helplessness in front of the events is nonetheless repeatedly mentioned by the various speakers and commentators, like for instance in the dialogue between Harriet and David, a Secret Service officer, following the ultimatum:
“But are the Rumanians bound to accept this?’ ‘What else can they do?’ David asked. ‘The terms were dictated by Ribbentrop and Ciano. The Romanians were told that if they did not accept, their country would immediately be occupied by German, Hungarian and Russian troops’. ‘The Romanians might fight’, said Harriet. [...] ‘A war between Rumania and Germany would be like the life of primitive man; nasty brutish and short.’ ‘Why are the Romanians being treated this way?’ ‘They must be asking that themselves. I suppose they’re made to pay for their old friendship with Britain” (419).

Conclusion

Even if Romania was not properly speaking a colony, and even if, geographically and culturally, it was not part of what is currently understood as the Orient, the construction of Romanian exoticism in Manning’s *Balkan Trilogy* corresponds to Said’s coordinates of Oriental exoticism in general: eccentricity, backwardness, silent indifference, feminine penetrability, malleability. It is significant to analyze how these strategies of domestication of otherness in Manning’s work follow these older patterns of the colonial construction of exoticism in the Western literary tradition.

Thus, the territory of Romania is from the first pages included in the imaginary realm of the Orient, yet Romanian exoticism is of a particular blend, reconciling the sensuality of the classical Romantic Orient with the mythical religiousness and the superstitions of a ‘primitive’ people. But, as the action unfolds, and as the characters get to know the new territory better, a process of domestication of this exoticism takes place. For instance, series of similarities are found and emphasized in the construction of the Romanian autoimages, that symbolically connect this space to the Western culture in terms of language, customs, institutions. Nonetheless, the hierarchical assumptions structuring Manning’s discourse on Romanian otherness can still be identified within the text. Passive and enthralling, a land of plenty inhabited by a passive, fun-loving, gregarious people whose attributes often verge on the child-like representations of the primitives in colonial texts, Romania is a space open to all influences and to all interventions. From the larger political drama going on elsewhere, but on whose outcome the collective destiny of the country depended, and to narrower domestic events, such as the Captain’s murder or the abdication of the king, the Romanians are helpless, consistently out of touch with the direct events, merely witnessing the writing of history by someone else. The crowd, a recurrent motif in Manning’s *Balkan Trilogy*, though colourful and picturesque, remains a passive element, in consonance
with the larger feminine attributes ascribed to the Romanian space in general. From sensuality to promiscuity, from passion for music and life to a child-like dependence on outside support, Manning’s Romanians are sketchy, decorative, endearing. They move freely, but almost exclusively in groups, among the landmarks of exoticism and of familiariness with which Manning punctuates her narrative — derelict Pahanariot buildings, churches, open air restaurants, or the official buildings, the English Bar, the Royal palace. The country itself, a wild land, with wild beasts, a barbarous country with barbarous customs, a territory torn between Siberian winters and canicular summers, awaiting the arrival of the German troops, or of the Russian troops, totally defenceless but for the natural obstacle offered by the Carpathians during winter is an open space, the frontier par excellence, the acculturated and acculturable contact area between the East and the West, clearly belonging to neither realm, yet recognizably familiar to both.

References

By the first sentence ("Francisco Solano López put his penis inside Eliza Lynch on a lovely spring day in Paris, in 1854.") or by the first fifteen pages (written in sections corresponding to the man’s amorous thrusts), one may predict that The Pleasure of Eliza Lynch (2002) will be, at best, a sexual romance set in the second half of the 19th century. But the beginning is misleading and in being so it is just one of the many games Anne Enright is playing in this carefully constructed text, which fictionalises, in a typically postmodernist way, a particular historical context, that of the bloody rule of the Paraguayan dictator and of the contribution to it of his Irish mistress. Ms Enright seems to set out to undermine the ‘historical truth’ by going beyond the forms of representation that are traditional for historical fiction. However, the textual devices she resorts to derail the novelist from her course, and the aim of this paper is to analyse the process whereby these means turn against their user by the very pleasure this user gets in employing them.

The author of book is currently one of the most acclaimed Irish women-writers. Before The Pleasure of Eliza Lynch, she published a collection of short stories, The Portable Virgin (1991), and two novels: The Wig My Father Wore (1995) and What Are You Like? (2000). If the previous books are more or less confined to the area of the contemporary and their tone is a fairly contained affair, Eliza Lynch is a novel about (textual) power and about the writing of history, which enact the postmodernist concern for the “radically undetermined and unstable nature of textuality and subjectivity” (Hutcheon 1997:53). Enright explores the rather fashionable realm of historical fiction in both its semantic nuances: a fictional text rooted in history and history as fiction.

As pointed out by Frances Wilson in her article in the Guardian (2003), the interest in the story of Eliza Lynch and that of the dictator Francisco Solano López has been mysteriously revived recently. Besides Enright’s book, two biographies of the same personages came out almost at the same time, at the beginning of 2003 (The Shadows of Eliza Lynch: How a Nineteenth Century Irish Courtesan Became the Most Powerful Woman in Paraguay, by Siân Rees,
and *The Empress of South America*, by Nigel Cawthorne). This is worth mentioning for two reasons. First, the rather peculiar way in which ‘pockets’ of similar interests, or the ‘mainstream of coincidence’, are formed. And second, the way in which these coincidences enhance the notion of fictionality pervading the contemporary discourse on historiography.

The historical event at the basis of these three books is rather gruesome (for brief accounts of it, see Frances Wilson, 2003, and R.J. Stove, 2004). In 1855, Francisco Solano López, son of the Paraguayan dictator, returned from Europe accompanied by a mysterious and pregnant Irish courtesan. In 1870, Eliza Lynch left the country at last, following the murders of López and the son she had been carrying. As the lover of López, soon to become Marshal President, the self-styled “Madame” Lynch determined to transform the state’s dusty capital into an imperial city and herself into an empress. She thus began an extensive building programme of opera houses and palaces, which either remained unfinished or were never inhabited. During the fifteen years that she was a guest of Paraguay, whose history had been scarred by disasters even before her appearance, she presided over the deaths of one million of the republic’s citizens, acquired at scandalously low prices more than 32 million hectares of its land, looted its women of their jewels, and smuggled into European bank accounts many thousands of pounds’ worth of Paraguayan gold. López, a psychopathic and not exactly handsome drunk who modelled himself on Napoleon III, began his rule by declaring a suicidal war on all the other South American states. While his drained soldiers, thousands of whom were children, lay dying, Madame Lynch, plump on French dinners, toured the camps in her silks and finery with her grand piano in tow. Having destroyed the economy and the population of his country — it would take three generations to repopulate Paraguay — López launched his real campaign of terror. Convinced of a conspiracy to overthrow him, he ordered the torture and murder of those who were unfortunate enough to be still alive. López was, at least, egalitarian, and included among his victims his brothers, sisters, and brothers-in-law. Shortly before his own death, he ordered the assassination of his mother. What seems to fascinate these writers, though, is the subsequent mythologisation of Eliza Lynch, her amazing shift from tyrant to patriotic martyr. A century after leaving the wreckage of Paraguay, Lynch was proclaimed its national heroine and her body removed from its plot in the Parisian graveyard where she lay and returned, in a bronze urn wrapped in the tricolour, to her adopted country. Which only goes to show, as Cawthorne puts it, “that you can fall in a sewer and still come up smelling of roses”. (in Wilson 2003)
It is clear from the very beginning of the book that Enright is not interested in the historical events but rather she is using historical ‘facts’, in the sense defined by Linda Hutcheon in *The Politics of Postmodernism*, namely that of “filtering and interpreting” documents. (1997:62) This filtering and interpreting raises, of course, the question of selection. All events are potential historical facts, but only those events that have been chosen to be narrated become facts. Enright’s selection is undoubtedly conditioned by her knowledge of Lynch’s afterlife. She does not explain, nor does she offer justifications, but she knows she has to move the heroine from the predominantly negative label of historical categorisation into the ambiguous multifacetedness of the postmodernist narrative discourse.

To a certain extent, Enright’s novel can be said to belong to the category of the “revisionist historical novel” (McHale 1987:90), mainly by its form of re-presenting the Irishwoman’s brief and fairly catastrophic encounter with history. (Only to a certain extent, because Enright fails to go all the way through with the revision and reinterpretation of the official historical account, failure due, as suggested in the beginning of this paper, to her getting engrossed in the techniques as such). It does not take long for the reader to realise that it is form that the novelist is most interested in, the particular way in which to go beyond the traditional means at her disposal. Throughout the book, she seems to be struggling more with the technical subtleties she traps herself in than with either plot or character. If she is setting out to ‘humanise’ the ‘pleasure’ of Eliza Lynch (whether this is fairly innocent, such as love or good living, or guilty, such as theft, murder, ruthlessness), Enright appears to forget about her aim as she goes along, ending up by indulging in the pleasure of her own writing.

The process of selection mentioned earlier is carried out mainly by resorting to individual coordinates, to the personalisation of history. Enright wants to focus on the actual actants of the events as a means of turning them into facts. This highly personal (in both meanings) perspective in *Eliza Lynch* seems to emphasise the doubt about both the willingness and the capacity of history as such to reveal the multiple nature of truth. Although the historical document is undoubtedly in the shadow, or at a very deep basis, of the text, the book is mainly a novel of the self trapped in a situation of historical relevance. In a manner reminiscent of Modernism, this self is constructed mainly by putting the five senses at work. These are the vehicles whereby Enright re-presents the story of Eliza Lynch, and she is always eloquent in her choice of words rendering touch and sight, but also hearing (especially with the running tune of La Palomita that accompanies the heroine through her hours of glory and demise) and taste — all of which I will shortly return to.
Despite frequent shifts back and forth in time, the text frames the historical period it is referring to clearly — 1854, 1855, 1857, 1865, 1869, 1870, 1873, a temporal diversity paralleled by that of the narrative voices. After the opening chapter, written in the encompassing third person omniscient (which pops in, every now and then, at other stages in the book too), the text keeps switching between the first person (in the present tense, which is puzzling to begin with) and the third person limited narrative (in the past tense which has, nevertheless, an amazing effect of immediacy). The first person narration is Eliza’s own account of the journey down Rio Paraná and of her pregnancy. The third person limited narrative, Enright’s best achievement in this book, is filtered through the mind of Doctor Stewart, the Scottish “physician-accoucheur”, employed to assist on Eliza’s birth-giving.

It has to be pointed out at this point that this ‘personalisation’ of the historical and particular usage of the first person have a paradoxical effect. Instead of obtaining the closeness that might be expected, and that is usually associated with such devices, Enright manages to estrange the protagonist. There is something remote in Eliza’s own account, something that considerably delays the suspension of disbelief. It is Stewart’s voice that works better for the individual filter and interpretation that Enright wants to achieve.

The plot is “an ambitious but vulnerable craft” (as characterised by Kate Kellaway’s review of the novel in The Observer, 2002), rather like the boat in which Eliza sails from England to Paraguay. The reader has to look for it and find their own way about it in between lines that focus more on details of dresses, meals, music, and landscapes. This seems to echo the distrust in plotting posited by Peter Brooks (1984:7), and leaves the main weight of the production on what I introduced earlier as a preferred technique, i.e. the use of the senses.

If there is one sense that can be said to be dominant, it is that of touch. The whole text has a palpable quality about it, and if one takes this as a conscious endeavour on the part of the novelist, then one can link it to Enright’s desire to anchor her novel in some kind of soil, now that she has uprooted it from that of traditional historical fiction. To give just one example, before Eliza leaves France with her lover, we get to meet her dressmaker on Rue de Rougement, one of her many lovers, but a man who ‘romances’ her with cloth: “Nankin, taffeta, piqué, foulard.” (Enright 2002:7)

The romance with cloth never fades and is skilfully used as a means of characterisation. Eliza gives her costumes names and lets them speak about her state of mind and progress. The “Chère Amie”, for instance, is a “visiting toilette, in lilac barège with three deep flounces bordered with quilled ribbon in blue, gloves of grey with the same ribbon at the wrist, elastic-sided grey satin
boots". (2002:29) The impressiveness of her arrival in Asunción is rendered through the impressiveness of this costume, with which she will simply astound the residents of Paraguay, be they native or European. Her clothes are as necessary as, or even more necessary than skin, and, at times, they are a substitute for conversation. Eliza does not have much other than her speculative intelligence, her looks, and her sense of dressing. Enright echoes very well here the power dressing of the 19th century: Eliza must retain her hold over López, her future depends on it. The way she dresses and the effect this has on people is one way of doing it.

In Asunción she is shunned both by her lover’s family and by the ‘high’ society because of what she is and also, we can infer from the hints Enright drops every now and then, because of the sway she appears to hold over Francisco Solana López, most likely the future ruler of Paraguay after the death of his dictator-father. The sight and imagined touch of her dresses manage to impress ‘the audience’ but still keeps them at a distance. The ‘Irish whore’ realises she needs something more appealing than that to be accepted, so she resorts to food. Just like the costumes, the different dishes are extremely well managed by Enright as one of the engines that keep the text moving. When pregnant on the immobile boat on a foreign and threatening river, Eliza’s insecurity is mainly manifest in terms of her hunger, more than that, her desire for food she cannot have. The structure of the book itself, judging by the titles of the chapters, is conceived as a rich meal: A Fish (how the baby — the fish — was conceived), A Melon, Asparagus (one of the recurrent images in the book), Veal, Truffles, Champagne, Coffee. The culinary narrative culminates in Eliza’s last attempt to bribe her way into the ladies’ society in Asunción, the failed picnic, masterfully depicted by Anne Enright in an accumulation of exotic details. “Truffled turkey (...). Eggs à la neige, pepper-cured ham, smoked eels. As each was set down, a major-domo murmured the name and origin of the dish. The eels were from Russia, the ham from Xeriga, the foie gras from Strasbourg. There were also things that pretended to be from Europe but probably weren’t — a stuffed and larded ‘pike’, whose face had a more benign and local cast, partridge wings that looked just like tinamu, though the sauce of chestnut cream smelled real” (2002:78-9). Only to throw everything overboard when she realises that the ladies, however impressed by the feast, refuse to grant their acceptance to La Lincha.

If the visual and the touch and the taste come in at different times to illustrate different stages in the career of Eliza Lynch, the unifying element is the piano, the “fabulously real piano”, as Stewart calls it, pointing to its gripping presence in the unreality of such a grim story. The piano is so closely intertwined with the main character’s whole life that it seems to be Eliza her-
self. It follows her everywhere and it comes into the limelight as the central piece in some unforgettable scenes of war and horror. This is the cleverly indirect way in which Enright suggests the atrocities of the battles started by Eliza’s vanity (her ambitions for herself and her sons) and López’s own insanity.

The abandoning of the piano in the final throes of the war is a clear sign of López’s death and Eliza’s defeat — a sign reinforced by the increasing amounts of dirty clothes. “[W]ashing them is so difficult”, says Eliza; the main instrument of her power is now weakening. But the piano is also, as used by Enright, a most powerful symbol of the amazing afterlife of this woman, cradled by the very country in whose destruction she’d been so instrumental.

“High up in the Cordillera, the scrubby hills to the east and north of Asunción, there is a town called Piano. It was named for the fact that Eliza was obliged to abandon her piano there, a hundred miles from nowhere, and another hundred miles from anywhere at all. For all we know, the piano still survives” (2002:58).

Throughout the book, Enright emerges as a chameleon to rival Eliza herself. This is a dramatic departure from her earlier books and also what, in a way, prevents her from fully achieving the challenging aims mentioned above. What we get in the end is more of the pleasure Enright herself takes in her writing, rather than Eliza’s, which remains somewhat obscure and, therefore, unconvincing. The “revisionism” (McHale 1987) is abandoned in favour of a text that knows itself, but not much more than that. The intention, in other words, is definitely there, the execution, though, only partially. What could have redeemed this novel — a parodic dimension — is but too feebly present as well.

The Wig My Father Wore, with which Enright made her name, was cool, detached, jokey. What Are You Like? was more serious, maybe a little wiser and with feeble attempts to move into the outlandish, but still very much a contemporary piece. Eliza Lynch is strong, and steeped in history with a view to overthrowing the standard story it offers of the Irish courtesan. It is definitely a book in which it is worth being immersed. Its main ‘fault’, if one could call it that (and which would probably be perceived as a strength by the advocates of self-reflective modes of writing), is that Enright is transfixed by her subject. Eliza dazzles so much that she becomes hard to see. The scene in which we see her best is, I think, the burial scene — when she digs the grave of her lover and her son with her own hands. All the main motifs are brought together in this powerful fragment, when death and destruction are, again, beautifully rendered in terms of dressing. Thus, when his body is taken out of the water, López is described as “the last piece of clean linen in Paraguay. It
made it look as if he had died, not of a bullet but of some small, domestic indignity. It looked as though he had died of a stain”. And, after pushing them both in the hole dug by her, she stands up, “as though, Stewart thought, to show them all the state of her dress. ‘Look what you have done to my mousseline,’ her hands might have said” (Enright 2002:222).

Although one can argue that Enright falls short of achieving her grander aims, the language of her description is subtle and powerful, so is the way she builds some of her other characters — other than Eliza; she is, oddly but convincingly, most comfortable with Dr Stewart, the alcoholic Scottish doctor. In the portrait of this slippery, unreliable at times, medic, as well as in all the best straits of the book, this writer that was, when the book came out, compared to Marquez, writes like “a shrewd Irish Máquez — seeing to it that magic never overcomes realism”. (Kellaway 2002)

References


GEORGE DU MAURIER’S TRILBY: NEW GOTHIC AND NEW WOMAN

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Originally published in 1894, Trilby is one of those best sellers whose popularity was as short-lived as it was wide. Yet it is its very popularity that justifies the critic’s approaching it with a magnifying glass: the book is likely to be a typical survivor of its species, and therefore examining it may provide vital clues as to the environment which triggered it and its success. Trilby is a child of its own time both in its concerns and in its mechanisms of seduction. Like many writings of its age, it relies on Gothic effect, has Decadent overtones and a Francophile background, while, at the same time, it mirrors the age’s anxieties and obsessions.

The theme of the novel reflects the fin-de-siècle interest in hypnosis, heightened by the 1890 trial of Gabrielle Bompard “who claimed to have committed murder while under the hypnotic influence of her lover” (Vrettos 1994:102). It brings together Du Maurier’s largely autobiographical account of Paris, Quartier Latin and its artistic circles, and the story of Trilby, the young Paris grisette of Irish stock, who poses ‘pour l’ensemble’ in painters’ studios. Absolutely tone-deaf, the girl becomes a publicly acclaimed singer under the mesmeric power of the demonic musician Svengali, who has genius, but no singing voice. She is finally rescued by her true love, Little Billee, and his two painter friends, only to succumb to the deadly after-effects of the hypnosis.

The novel’s literary interest is limited, as its occasional charm in situation, description and character building is often outweighed by the apparent indecision with respect to the focus of the text. Du Maurier apparently has a hard time resolving whether his priority is the realistic account of the three British painters’ life in Paris (which actually occupies the greater part of the novel), or the Gothic story of Trilby, which the title announces as central. This mixture of effects and concerns impairs the unity of the novel, and sometimes works against the very Gothic effect in moments of high tension. However, the text deserves attention as it is symptomatic for late Victorian New Gothic and its gendered construction.

As Hurley (1996:3) notes, the fin-de-siècle Gothic mainly reflects anxieties related to “the ruination of the human subject,” to the inconsistency of
human identity in the wake of Darwinian theories and in the face of increasing uncertainty about religious values. “In place of a human body stable and integral (...), the fin-de-siècle Gothic offers the spectacle of a body metamorphic and undifferentiated; in place of the possibility of human transcendence, the prospect of an existence circumscribed within the realities of gross corporeality; in place of a unitary and securely bounded human subjectivity, one that is both fragmented and permeable” (Hurley 1996:3). In what follows, I shall look at these ideas (the loss of unity and coherence in the appearance of the human body; corporeality and its primacy over the spiritual; and the degradation of a coherent subjectivity) in an attempt to explore how Trilby constructs its Gothic effect, and how it stands in relation to the fin-de-siècle anxieties about the human condition.

Suggestions of gender instability appear quite early in the novel — even before the Gothic novel as such begins, that is before the entrance of Svengali and his occult powers. The first descriptions of Trilby speak of a strangely-gendered apparition and repeatedly hint at her looking, sounding and acting male. She has “a portentous voice of great volume, and that might almost have belonged to any sex” (Du Maurier 1994:14) and the “strange figure” of “a very tall and fully-developed young female,” who first enters the scene “clad in the grey overcoat of a French infantry soldier” (Du Maurier 1994:14). Her appearance suggests the same masculinity as her clothing — a masculinity bearing associations of health and uncomplicated naturalness: she has a “small bare head with short, thick, wavy brown hair, and a very healthy young face, which could scarcely be called quite beautiful at first sight, since the eyes were too wide apart, the mouth too large, the chin too massive, the complexion a mass of freckles” (Du Maurier 1994:14). Her physical portrait insists on roughness, massivity, solidity: “also she had a very fine brow, broad and low, with thick level eyebrows much darker than her hair, a broad, bony, high bridge to her short nose, and her full, broad cheeks were beautifully modelled” (Du Maurier 1994:15-16). We are told repeatedly that “She would have made a singularly handsome boy” (Du Maurier 1994:16). She has “a voice so rich and deep and full as almost to suggest an incipient tenore robusto; and one felt instinctively that it was a real pity she wasn’t a boy, she would have made such a jolly one” (Du Maurier 1994:16). Taking advantage of her masculine look, after the death of her brother, Trilby goes into hiding by dressing as a man for a while, and easily succeeds in her attempt to be taken for a boy.

Interestingly, Du Maurier exploits the uncertainty about and playfulness with gender boundaries that we usually encounter in so-called ‘decadent’ novels, although Trilby is otherwise not representative of the genre. Trilby’s male features are, at the same time, the source of her unusual attractiveness, bear-
ing the positive connotations of healthy rural blood and ‘New Woman’ bohemian independence, and the prerogatives of her downfall. Both Trilby and Little Billee bear the marks of the fin-de-siècle obsession with gender inversion (Dellamora 1990:216). Little Billee is surely less masculine than Trilby herself. Du Maurier paints him with loving irony, as mama’s boy, delicate and fragile, “small and slender” (in fact shorter than Trilby!), with “delicate, regular features” (Du Maurier 1994:7), “innocent of the world and its wicked ways; innocent of French especially, and the ways of Paris and its Latin Quarter” (Du Maurier 1994:10), and displaying an “almost girlish purity of mind” (Du Maurier 1994:10). Ironically, gender ambiguity seems to function both as the great strength and the great weakness of the two characters. Whereas their very freshness and power of fascination comes from their unusual relation to traditional gender boundaries, this is also a sign of their vulnerability. The first impression we have of Trilby — a big bony structure of remarkable solidity — makes the transformation in the hands of the feeble erratic Svengali even more uncannily Gothic, while Little Billee is powerless in the face of the hypnotist’s deadly influence.

Svengali himself is a multifaceted and contradictory entity, as suits an agent of chaos. He is dark, animal-like, of nondescript age and ambiguous nationality — Jewish, possibly Eastern European (he has a Gypsy violinist and a Hungarian band) — and at the same time hysterical, neurotic and slightly ridiculous at the beginning, with his outbursts of narcissistic rage and his funny German accent.

Therefore, the relationship between mesmeriser and mesmerised is an unlikely one: Trilby does not qualify as an average candidate for hypnosis. She is seen as a ‘person whose muscles are well in tune, whose spirits are high’, who ‘thoroughly knew her own mind’ (Du Maurier 1994:71), and who breathes an air of freedom (including sexual freedom) which seems incompatible with a victim of mind control. The fin-de-siècle typology of the suggestible was clearly gendered: the weak, and especially women, were supposedly prone to hysteria and easily hypnotised (Vrettos 1994:88). On the contrary, in the novel, Svengali is the one who is neurotic and collapses in fits of hysteria. Although he is the mentally unstable one, his choleric instinctual nature gains the upper hand, enhancing the Gothic effect of Trilby’s transformation.

Under Svengali’s hypnotic powers, Trilby is monstrified, de-humanised, decomposed into a set of inanimate body parts. The accounts of her apparition as a diva suggest as much: when she is in a trance, she is inarticulate, she has lost her ability to produce language, and to outsiders she seems dumb in both senses of the word. The French attribute used to define her dumbness (“bête comme un pot”; Du Maurier 1994:197) is even more suggestive.
Svengali has robbed her of her personality and mind, and has thus turned her into a beast. Not surprisingly, the highlight of Trilby’s repertoire is Chopin’s Impromptu in A flat, sung without words.

The imagery which suggests Trilby’s animality is amplified by imagery which suggests her thingness, the quality of mere tool in the hands of the hypnotist. In spite of Trilby’s innate lack of talent, her mouth is a perfect musical instrument, as Svengali decides when he invasively opens and examines it: “Himmel! the roof in your mouth is like the dome of the Panthéon; there is room in it for ‘toutes les gloires de la France,’ and a little to spare! the entrance to your throat is like the middle porch of St Sulpice when the doors are open for the faithful on All Saints’ Day; and not one tooth is missing — thirty-two British teeth as white as milk and as big as knuckle-bones! and your little tongue is scooped out like the leaf of a pink peony, and the bridge of your nose is like the belly of a Stradivarius — what a sounding-board! and inside your beautiful big chest the lungs are made of leather! and your breath, it embalms — like the breath of a beautiful white heifer fed on the buttercups and daisies of the Vaterland! and you have a quick, soft, susceptible heart, a heart of gold, mademoiselle — all that sees itself in your face!” (Du Maurier 1994:58). This is a remarkable mixture of material, vegetal and animal comparisons, enhanced by suggestions of death and embalming. What Svengali sees in Trilby, and what he will cultivate, is the infinite potential of a soulless music-making machine.

Indeed, when hypnotised, Trilby moves like clockwork, like an unfailing mechanical doll controlled by her master. Gecko, Svengali’s Gypsy violinist, says that “she could no more sing than a fiddle can play itself” (Du Maurier 1994:350). She turns into “the other Trilby,” “an unconscious Trilby of marble,” who would “think his thoughts and wish his wishes,” “just a singing-machine — an organ to play upon — an instrument of music — a Stradivarius — a flexible flageolet of flesh and blood — a voice, and nothing more — just the unconscious voice that Svengali sang with” (Du Maurier 1994:352).

As she is turned into a living musical instrument, she more than ever seems like an uncanny collection of separate body parts. There is recurrent mention of her teeth, her foot, her hair, her mouth, to the detriment of her person as a whole. Her body is deconstructed, decomposed into fetish components, out of which a recurrent one — the foot, “the handsomest foot in all Paris” (Du Maurier 1994:16) — seems to have mesmeric powers in itself. The reader is forced to perform vivisection upon Trilby, to perceive her as a sum of distinct pieces rather than as a coherent individual. For Svengali, passive and reified Trilby is almost an object of necrophilia. He is fascinated by her bone structure and dreams of her dead: “You have such beautiful bones’...
‘And, ach! what a beautiful skeleton you will make!’ (Du Maurier 1994:104). It is only suitable that he eventually woos her with funeral marches (Du Maurier 1994:105).

Thus, Du Maurier uses the full New Gothic arsenal on Trilby’s transformation. Her body has lost unity, while its chaotic developments absorb and annihilate her as a human subject. Moreover, the monstrified Trilby has equally monstrous effects on her audience: not only does her music exert aesthetic fascination, it also seems to cast spells, as audiences are said to unwittingly bestow upon her all their jewellery and valuables. What Du Maurier is exploiting here is the fin-de-siècle anxiety that the events on stage, including disease and hypnosis, may be duplicated in the audience by contagion (Vrettos 1994:81-82). Trilby’s voice “is irresistible; it forces itself on you” (Du Maurier 1994:251) and has strange physical effects: “it gives one cold all down the back! it drives you mad! it makes you weep hot tears by the spoonful!...And then... she makes you laugh” (Du Maurier 1994:195), “the flesh creeps” (Du Maurier 1994:249). The mixture of hot and cold, of laughter and tears, suggests the symptoms of disease rather than ecstasy. The voice has absolute hegemony over the listener, to the point in which “the mere melodic phrase had all but ceased to matter” (Du Maurier 1994:245). Even Little Billee’s “love for Trilby became as that of a dog for its master” (Du Maurier 1994:246). Not only is Trilby dehumanised — she has gained the power to dehumanise others in turn.

The more Trilby is under the influence of Svengali, the more feminine she becomes. She also turns exquisitely beautiful, and there are suggestions of exacerbated eroticism common in fin-de-siècle Gothic fiction, in which the woman appears as telluric and body-driven. The lure of ambiguous sexuality is replaced by the lure of exacerbated sexuality — the latter far more deadly than the former. It is at this point that Du Maurier’s text seems to transcend the state of a mere mirror image of the age’s obsessions. The evolution from androgyny to femininity, from sexual ambivalence to unilateral sexuality, which could have read like a restoration of balance, is in fact an involution, a transition from healthy to unhealthy, from natural to perverted, from human to non-human.

The same inverted reading applies to the relationship between urban degenerate and rural fit (Greenslade 1994:41). To the late Victorian mind, city dwellers were exposed to the negative effects of civilisation, of life in the crowded urban environment, they were victims of the decadence omnipresent in the labyrinths of the metropolis, while the blood of villagers remained unspoiled and healthy. Du Maurier’s protagonists live in Paris and are exposed to all the ‘dangers’ of the artistic medium, to which Trilby eventually
succumbs. Svengali’s devilish influence belongs to the city space, and seems unstoppable. Even the countryside beauty Alice, Trilby’s rural counterpart, who could have been the infusion of healthy blood redeeming Little Billee from the effects of the urban environment, fails. Alice remains a pale character whose only point seems to be to demonstrate the impossibility of yet another escape. Nor do Little Billee’s readings of Darwin’s *Origin of Species* on Dorsetshire meadows offer much help: both science and religion seem to be powerless in face of the uncanny effects of mesmerism. However, the initial image of the city and of bohemian life is hardly negative. There are no hints of evil inherent in the *Quartier Latin* way of life, and Du Maurier seems to regard libertinism as liberty rather than as the dangerous trespassing of conventional morality.

This series of paradoxes suggests that Du Maurier is caught between two types of literary rhetoric: that of decadence and that of the *fin-de-siècle* Gothic. There is, as I suggested in the beginning, an oscillation between two types of novel. To the decadent one belong gender inversion, city life, sexual freedom, and the New Woman, valued positively as signs of modernity, as ‘natural’ behaviour in the environment of the age. From the repertoire of the New Gothic, Du Maurier takes over imagery related to the evil East (Sage 1993:9), the machine, degeneration and animality, female sexuality, and hypnosis. The book starts by validating the world-view associated with the decadent discourse, and relies on the readers’ accepting this as the established order whose undermining by occult forces generates the Gothic novel. Yet, what is affirmed by one type of discourse (gender ambiguity and city life, to mention only the examples discussed in more detail above) is rejected by the other. By validating them both, Du Maurier achieves a chorus of diverging voices. Of these, one seems to celebrate transgression, whereas the other, with its lugubrious undertone, announces obscure and indefinable dangers.

It is this very oscillation between two types of discourse that makes the book interesting. If there is a statement that *Trilby* makes about the epoch in which it was written and was so widely read, then it is a statement about the simultaneous acceptance and fear of modernity, about the inevitable transgression of boundaries and the vulnerability inherent in it. The book may not speak of these issues consciously, or even coherently, yet we can safely assume that it owes its success to the fact that it addresses the anxieties of the age—anxieties related to the very direction in which the world was moving.

References


TRANSLATION AS/AND GLOBALISATION
My title — British American Studies — is directed at the current conference (Timisoara, May 2004). In my own country, South Africa — indeed, in Britain, the United States, the Commonwealth — students do not encounter British or American Studies. They encounter English Studies. What is English today? What is the challenge of Cultural Studies? Or, most recently, the challenge of Media and Communication? I should perhaps modify my title: the challenge to English Studies of Media and Communication. What is the response of English to this challenge? I apply these questions to changes over the last 20 years to English Studies in South Africa. Similar changes are discernible, however, in other countries in which English is the language of power: the language of education, commerce, and government.¹

When I began my career in English in the mid-1970s, syllabuses based on F.R. Leavis’s Great Tradition (1948) — ‘touchstone’ texts from Chaucer to T.S. Eliot — were under attack. In the volatility of South Africa’s interregnum — the old order dying, the new struggling to be born — syllabus contestation reflected political contestation. The Leavisites, who were branded scornfully as elite, conservative western liberals, usually of the ‘old school’, experienced the radicalism of both African anti-colonial struggles and Euro-American post-1968 anti-establishment politics: Fanon’s liberation of the people’s imagination from white oppression; US Black Power; South African Black Consciousness; Ngugi’s decolonising the mind and the placing of African works at the centre of the English literature syllabus. From Europe: attacks on the stability of the sign, including the referent of the nation with its canon of truth, by poststructuralism, deconstruction, and neo-Marxism. Like Fanon, both Foucault and Derrida had their thinking shaped by the French colonial experience in North Africa.

These were heady times. English Studies began to attend not simply to texts, but to contexts. Leavis’s high-art influence was challenged by Raymond Williams’s (1977) cultural critique: popular expression began to appear on syllabuses; African literature — traditional, popular and elite — saw the empire, to quote Rushdie, begin to write back. The anxieties of modernism about great cultures falling apart began to be challenged by the irreverent, consumer play
of postmodernism. Today, as Robert Young’s *Postcolonialism: A Historical Introduction* (2001) and Terry Eagleton’s *After Theory* (2003) argue, postmodernism needs to be distinguished from postcolonialism, the latter’s mission being that of justice in the post-Cold War condition: fierce opposition to global capital’s marginalisation of the sweat-shop people, the migrants, the wretched of the earth.

Back in 1975 English Departments had syllabuses of 30 ‘touchstone’ poems mainly by British poets (e.g. “My Last Duchess”); A Shakespeare tragedy (e.g. *Macbeth*); novels such as Lawrence’s *Sons and Lovers*; the Romantic Poetry of Blake, Wordsworth, Keats, etc; Austen, Dickens, Hawthorne, etc; the Great Modernists including Yeats, Eliot and Stevens; Beckett’s Theatre of the Absurd; and as an option a South African/African section (Achebe, Ngugi, Soyinka; Gordimer, Coetzee, Fugard).

Today the English syllabus resembles this:

**Introduction: English-language Proficiency** (for second-language speakers of English)

**Introduction to English:** the African oral tale; South African stories; the “text” of the shopping mall; a Bollywood film.

**Intermediate:** Writing the Self; Performance and Text; Representing the Environment; The Romantics and their Legacy; Victorian Narratives, Then and Now.

**Senior:** Literary Theory; Mediating South African Identities; Creative Writing; Literature and Journalism; Editing and Communication; Translation and Intercultural Communication; Modernisms; Postmodernisms; Post/Colonial Writing: Africa and the West.

Where are the ‘touchstones’? These appear in comparative contexts: e.g. Shakespeare might be present in Performance and Text, or in Post/Colonial Writing: Africa and the West. (*Is Othello* a play about universal jealousy, or about a colonial/postcolonial encounter: the Other from the periphery caught in the web of a decadent, and an over-sophisticated Venetian society?)

To pursue the approach in *The Romantics and their Legacy*, such a course in South Africa would no longer be confined to the English Romantics, but would also explore the fact that the Enlightenment and the Romantic revival had a major influence on the 1795 British occupation of the Cape. Accordingly, the syllabus would include, alongside Wordsworth, the settler
poet Thomas Pringle who, under the pressures of the frontier, discarded his late eighteenth-century pastoral manner and found energy in the harsh subjects of slavery and colonisation. It would include, also, hymns of the Xhosa bard, Ntsikana, whose conversion to Christianity produced syncretic African-animistic/Christian declamations of considerable power, as traditional praises to the chiefs were put to the service of praising God.

If in the above-mentioned syllabus we recognise hybridism or, in Bhabha’s formulation, hybridity, we recognise also — note the plural forms, Modernisms and Postmodernisms — principles of comparison, intercultural communication, the context/text dynamic, and the complicated relationship between historical understanding and literary-aesthetic appreciation. My point is that the designation, British Studies and American Studies, is too restrictive in a postcolonial world, whether in the South or the North.

Leaving aside specific content, the course design that I have sketched here, as I have suggested, is not peculiar to South Africa. Its basis of construction, in fact, is indebted to the three-track division outlined in Rob Pope’s influential, The English Studies Book (1998). That the discipline, or inter-discipline, English Studies always appears to be in crisis, Pope argues, is because the term English is an adjective having to act as a noun. Thus, English what? English literature, language, culture? The study of English in the contemporary world, Pope suggests, should expose students to language, literature and culture, the last category of which includes the pervasive media industry. A consequence has been a sharp decline in student demand for literature courses; a massive expansion of Media and Communication. This is not necessarily a consolation to Cultural Studies, and I return to my point about modifying my title: the challenge to English not of Cultural Studies, but of Media and Communication. Briefly, Cultural Studies — under the formative influence of the Birmingham Cultural Studies Centre — set Williams against Leavis: it studied not the high art-work, but the working-class voice, or testimony. Its materialist Marxist paradigm identified, as crucial to a class-based analysis of society, an understanding of the political economy of the media. Its ideology critique began to give less emphasis to Williams’s ‘structure of feeling’, greater emphasis to a sociologically-inclined quantitative investigation.

Currently, such a model of Cultural Studies is itself in crisis. The crisis is symbolised by the closure, because of lack of student numbers, of the Birmingham Centre. As the essays in Cultural Studies in Question (1997) suggest, Cultural Studies has lost its way somewhere between the political economy of the media and the filmic study of (marginalised) Others: forms of representation designated as Visual Anthropology. (See Ferguson & Golding, 1997.) The latter requires what has not been a particular strength of Cultural
Studies: the skills of intricate analysis that Williams bequeathed the field. In short, Cultural Studies as described here has become a victim of its own jargon-ridden vocabulary. It is unable to negotiate its way out of Cold War binaries: them and us, the bosses and the workers. In South Africa it finds itself, now, not attuned to the born-free generation: the students who were too young to have known apartheid and, whatever their skin colour, are now ‘cool’, body pierced, and cellphone connected. The real challenge to English Studies is the mutation, Media Communication.

Media and Communication, if it requires input from the political economy of the media also requires input from English in the analysis of texts, in the understanding of narrative, in competence in English expression and convention, and in sensitivity to diversity in the society. Is there a need, therefore, to distinguish between English and Media and Communication? Or should we permit Pope his three-tracks — literature, language, and (compositely) culture, communication and media — simply as an expanded field of English Studies? The reality is more complicated, however, than Pope is willing to entertain. We do need to distinguish between English and Media and Communication, which is not to deny that each can learn something valuable from the other.

It is probably true to say that English Studies, whatever its modifications over the last two decades, still locates its core in the value of a book culture. English Studies may be too sensitive to charges of elitism — particularly by practitioners of Cultural Studies — to dwell upon the aesthetic dimension. Its predominant practice, nonetheless, involves the interpretation of complex works while it offers complex deconstructions of apparently formulaic texts. English Studies is informed by a long tradition that can marshal into argument Plato and Aristotle, Matthew Arnold, the New Critics and, over the last twenty years, a French poststructural check on its own bourgeois reading habit. It contributes to the cosmopolitan variety of world literature. It is proud of its intellectual inheritance, especially when challenged by the smart-young things of Media and Communication, or the ideology critique of Cultural Studies.

When it entered the university in South Africa in the early 1980s, Cultural Studies was scornful of, even hostile towards, English Studies. To quote an early Cultural Studies student misquoting George Eliot: English lives too long among the dead! The caricature was not entirely appropriate. By the late 1970s — as I have said — ‘young Turks’ in English Studies had responded to the political pressures of the time. British and American canons, for example, were experiencing the centre/margin oscillation of Africa and the West and a ‘democratisation’ of the term Literature (the cap. L replaced by a lowercase l). Despite this Cultural Studies positioned itself as a revolutionary van-
guard. Its method relied heavily on the radical materialist historiography then fashionable in British ‘red brick’ universities: the South African dilemma was defined, accordingly, not as a race dilemma but as a class dilemma; white corporate capital (mainly English-speaking) was depicted as being in an unholy alliance with Afrikaner ethnic nationalism (both had white interests at heart). As the powerful mining house Anglo American was the major shareholder in most English-language news media, Cultural Studies turned its particular mission to ‘policing’ the press. Its conclusion was that despite a proud tradition of press freedom even in the darkest days of apartheid, the South African media were really the lapdogs of racist-capitalist conglomerates. Dissent might seem to have been permitted, but it was a toothless dissent.

When the unbundling of apartheid in its contradictions, its unpredictable alliances and oppositions, in its illogicalities, proved the Manichean analysis of Cultural Studies to have been too singular in its conclusions, Cultural Studies belatedly attempted to incorporate into its understandings the slippery semiotics of the text. Its adaptations, however, have not significantly dented its iron-cast reliance on the base of political economy and, ironically, have not prevented its being attacked from an unexpected quarter of its own field: journalism. Or, perhaps not so unexpectedly. It is Cultural Studies — more so than English Studies — that has suggested, perhaps unwittingly, that journalists are the lackeys of their corporate czars, not independent, critical, or individual talents. The attack is headed by the Australian, Keith Windschuttle (1999: 11-20), who charges that Cultural Studies politicises media education; that its mission is deliberately to misunderstand the workings of modern capitalist societies in favour of the romance of popular activism. As far as English Studies is concerned, Windschuttle adds with equal scorn, it is the romance of identity.

To turn to Media and Communication, this ‘field’, or collection of practices, currently occupies a position somewhere between the textual intricacies of English Studies and the production/consumption arguments of Cultural Studies. What then is Media and Communication? Students study the news genre, news values and ethics; in advertising they study the phenomenon of branding, consumer culture, and the workings of the ad. agency. They attend to writing and speaking in particular contexts. This includes writing for the media, in which students are taught the conventions of newspaper style and narrative, press releases, the techniques of the interview, writing for the Web, the skills of editing, sub-editing and proof reading, and the fundamentals of intercultural communication. Students are introduced to debates on theories of journalism and on news in a democracy. Practitioners in the field are ‘bought in’ to lend an industry edge to political communication, marketing
communication, or public relations as an aspect of an integrated advertising campaign.

The Media and Communication programme at my own University does not pretend to be a training ground for the newsroom or the ad. agency; rather students are introduced broadly to the roles and practices of communication in contemporary society. There are ‘hard’ media options (e.g. Marketing Communication) and ‘soft’ media options (writing for specific purposes). Media and Communication is part vocational, part intellectual, part marketing, part language, part political, part cultural. There are overlaps with the political economy of Cultural Studies: an understanding of the economic, social and regulatory aspects of the media is important to any programme of Media and Communication. There are overlaps with English particularly in the interpretation of texts. Nonetheless, Media and Communication, despite Rob Pope, is not simply a subset of either Cultural Studies or English Studies.

To illustrate further, ideology critique as practised by pre-Foucault Cultural Studies is largely about capitalist conspiracies. But Media and Communication cannot teach advertising solely through the negation of capitalism. Whereas English Studies continues to emphasise the reading of literary and cultural texts, Media and Communication emphasises the pragmatics of writing: the structure of the news report, the distinction between the news story and the feature story, the expectations of the editorial, the style of advertising copy, etc. In copywriting students are told at the outset, “Your job is to carry a message to the attention of your audience, stimulate Interest, solicit Desire, convince the audience that it is worth listening to, then encourage Action — that’s the formula AIDCA.” Or students might be reminded that people look at pictures before they read words, so never clutter the look, the logo is sacred. Or, the student might be asked: what is effective copy structure? And reply: your headline (or proposition), your main argument (which can incorporate bullet points to hammer specific issues home), your lead-out paragraph (relating in some ways back to the main proposition). Or, here are quick tips for the budding copywriter: never use two words if one is enough; never opt for a long word if a short word will do; be specific — talk, do not communicate; avoid jargon; don’t get obsessed with grammatical correctness. But, remember, to break rules of grammar and syntax in innovative ways requires an understanding of the rules. There is an art to the creative language of the media (see Gabay 2000).

I have introduced here a few of the vocabularies, skills and ambitions of Media and Communication. Staff in English Studies and Cultural Studies will find some elements more familiar than others. But Pope’s assumption that anyone in lit. crit. can pitch in and teach language, culture, communication,
or the media holds only if one subscribes to Pope’s own implicit hierarchy of importance. It is a hierarchy that retains literature firmly at the top. His sections on language, for example, are unlikely to satisfy either the grammar teacher or the linguist. Rather, his concept of language remains a literary affair concerned mainly with matters of appropriate register: e.g. rewrite Browning’s “My Last Duchess” from the point of view of the Duchess herself. Culture, communication and media mean to Pope extending the analytical tools of lit. crit. to encompass not only the verbal icon, but the statement poem or the nursery rhyme. The exercises have value, but do not engage in significant or sustained ways with the arguments of Cultural Studies about the relationship of political economy to textual interpretation, or the preoccupations of Media and Communication with the models, or even tricks, of effective messaging or marketing. I do not wish to reduce Media and Communication to tricks of the trade. It has its theorists including Berger and Baudrillard. It has or should have its questions, but not necessarily the questions that are important to Pope’s rebranded English. To take a single question: how in a consumer society does one combine critical and social responsibility with the traits of a great copywriter, when copywriting is inspired writing put to use as a selling skill? Just as a lecturer in journalism or advertising would have to retrain in order to contribute to a course in say the Romantic poets, so the English lecturer who contributes to Media and Communication will encounter several unfamiliar fields of expression and activity.

What can English Studies learn from the growth of Media and Communication? One lesson involves the vocational imperative in students’ lives. A qualification in Media and Communication does not guarantee anyone a job. It may equip students, nonetheless, for new or expanding categories of media requirement in both the private and public sectors. The opening up of a civil society in South Africa has seen an increasing number of advertisements for human resource and information management, professional communication, negotiation and presentational abilities, political and intercultural communication, project writing, Web design, in-house journalism, customer care, awareness-campaign design and management, and media liaison expertise. How might English Studies turn a potential threat — a media-saturated environment — into an opportunity? A defensive reply might be to echo Leavis, who believed that employment opportunities awaited the graduate schooled in Shakespeare and Wordsworth. Not necessarily, but who knows! The successful graduate would have to have the nous, at least, to adapt the classical idiom to the contemporary marketplace. As J. Paul Getty said, the top executive can certainly benefit from an education in the liberal arts. But taste, discernment, understanding and intellectual versatility must not forget
that, ultimately, business is business, that “business performs a service that has a commercial value” (1973:18). Advertisements for the jobs that I have listed above, unfortunately, place a price not on English literature, but on media and communication. In spite of J.M. Coetzee’s disdain in his novel Disgrace (1999) for communication studies, English will have to regard itself as part of a communication society. This does not mean pandering to the story overflow of the media in which, in successive sound bites, we are shown the Beckham-Loos melodrama or farce (painful, if you are Posh-Spice) and the Palestinian-Israeli tragedy.

Yet the story, in whatever form, is (or should be) the unique province of English Studies. The story is there, the value is in its telling. To know how the story feels is to know its truthfulness. Whether we are distinguishing between literary works or Web designs or news reports or advertisements or TV shows, English Studies can remind us that culture and communication are not simply dissolvable into power or ideology, or indeed into pragmatism. Rather, the category of art remains crucial to the truth of society. English Studies should continue, therefore, to insist on a somewhat elaborate view of quality. But a view of quality dignified by another view, too often in short supply in English Studies: that of humility, or a sense of service. In turning to the story — that is, the story as the most intense and comprehensive expression of the self in society — English Studies needs to identify the social project: does it apply the rule of diversity in what is becoming an increasingly multilingual, multicultural world? If not, the story might be less than truth telling. Next, identify the cultural purpose: are the stories usable? If not, value may be diminished. Does the narrative convince us of our shared humanity, whatever the style or genre, as we keenly feel our differences? English Studies without pretension to commandeering the field of language, communication, and culture should remind us that life is enlarged by the great idea, by the unexpected insight into human conduct. It should remind us that style shapes sensibility not because it is clever, but because it has resonance.

English Studies has an unenviable task: to compete in the marketplace while keeping alive the study of values and valuing. For the valuable society makes and creates a surplus of meaning. Such a surplus — the aura of the text — constitutes the core of English Studies. The challenge in South Africa is how to convince a society in dire need of job creation, healthcare, literacy and learning that another form of impoverishment is a diminishing of the moral and imaginative intelligence. How to retain an ethical dimension at a time when consumerism celebrates buying and spending without obligation to critical reflection? How to retain the news of the world in the formality of the arts? No one should underestimate the challenge, least of all English Studies.
Whether analogous challenges await British and American Studies I leave as an open question.

Notes

1 The South African Constitution recognises, as equal, 11 official languages. These include, together with 'sign' (disability) language, English, Afrikaans and several African languages (isiZulu, isiXhosa and seSotho being the largest). While the African languages in the “third world” sector of a very unequal society represent majority oral-speech, these languages are severely disempowered in the “first-world” sector, in which English increasingly dictates the affairs of state, business and education.

2 Fred Inglis (1993) urges Cultural Studies to recognise a more elaborate view of quality: that art is an aspect of culture. I am indebted here to Inglis’s argument in the chapter “Art or Culture?” (175-201).

References

My paper is concerned with the modern and postmodern reading practices; more exactly, it deals with the close reading of the American New Criticism and the rhetorical-ethical readings in the Yale-deconstructors’, Paul de Man’s and J. H. Miller’s works. While comparing the main principles of these practices, I pay special attention to the recurrent (circular) metaphors used to display their similarities — and their differences as well. I can say that my paper is ‘turning around’, is centred on the metaphor(s) of reading, and its circularity shows the curved path/course of my argumentation.

In the theoretically based approach of New Criticism the key terms are: “close reading”, structure and irony. That is, according to the New Critics, the text and its language are to be considered without any interest in the author’s age or life; for example, in a poem we should pay attention only to the usage of language and the structure created. The real meaning of a literary text is given by its semantic structure, which is, on the one hand, dynamic — every poem is a little drama — showing the reconciliation of opposites; and on the other hand organic, that is, nothing is irrelevant. Thus, every detail contributes to the whole. As in his article, ”The Heresy of Paraphrase”, Cleanth Brooks states that: “the structure meant is a structure of meanings, evaluations and interpretations; and the principle of unity which informs it seems to be one of balancing and harmonizing connotations, attitudes and meanings” (Brooks 1947:195). This poetic structure and its desired unity is not rational or logical, but — to use Brooksian similes — it resembles that of architecture or painting, a ballet or musical composition based on the “pattern of resolved stresses” (Brooks 1947:203).

In poems, tension, conflicts and stresses are given by the ‘problematic’ elements, such as metaphors, symbols, paradoxes and other figures of speech, because they easily get their connotative meanings from the context. For example, Wimsatt in The Verbal Icon says that in a good metaphor “two clearly and substantially named objects ... are brought into such a context that they face each other with fullest relevance and illumination” (Wimsatt 1954:111). In spite of the conflicting or opposing meanings by the end of the close reading, an equilibrium of forces, a unity is supposed to be given, and “this unity is not a unity of the sort to be achieved by the reduction and simplification
appropriate to an algebraic formula. It is a positive unity, not a negative; it represents not a residue but an achieved harmony” (Wimsatt 1954:114-115).

Using the above mentioned drama-metaphor, one could imagine that as if the conflicting forces, more exactly the possible semantic (connotative) meanings of the words were fighting, and that their tension resulted in a climax giving the theme, a leading idea or conclusion of a text. The whole process of close textual understanding is summarized in one word: irony. Nevertheless, in the modern New Criticism irony is overused. On the one hand, “it is the most general term that we have for the kind of qualification which the various elements in a context receive from the context” (Brooks 1947:209); that is, irony necessarily operates in every context and in every reading process. On the other hand, by the end of our close reading of a text we have to reveal the work’s (possible) “invulnerability to irony’. Brooks introduces this paradoxical idea in a wonderful arch-simile:

Irony, then, in this further sense, is not only an acknowledgement of the pressures of a context. Invulnerability to irony is the stability of a context in which the internal pressures balance and mutually support each other. The stability is like that of the arch: the very forces which are calculated to drag the stones to the ground actually provide the principle of support — a principle in which thrust and counterthrust become the means of stability (Brooks 1971:1044).

Let us pay attention to two things here: first, the figurative language used by the new critics in their close reading/writing; secondly, their obsession with a wanted/wished equilibrium and totality in textual understanding. While the first phenomenon leads us to the deconstructive attack on New Criticism, the second one foreshadows the moral implications of close reading.

Although we can find the New Critical approach quite positive and fruitful, we have to admit its basic idealistic naivety resulting from the modernist efforts aimed at solving the surrounding chaos of the world. Their desired vaulted arch symbolizing understanding can refer to perfection, but we cannot forget that it is suspended in the air between two solid, but imagined buildings. As I am obsessed with rhetoric, the arch-metaphor with its ideality reminds me of George Lukács’s notion of closed cultures expressed in his Heidelberg Aesthetics. In connection with the lost golden age of the Greek he says that “the circle with its closeness meant the essential transcendental core of their life, but for us (let me add, in modern times) the circle has been exploded: we cannot breathe in a closed world any longer” (Lukács 1975:496-7). It can be said that after the loss of communal understanding of life (cf. in the Greek polis) with the appearance of possible individual understanding, the circle is
opened. In modernity it becomes an imagined half-circle or a vault, then later — now in postmodernism — we should be contented with its fragmentary pieces: after closed (or non) reading, there is close-reading, then open reading.

In his early critical writing titled “Form and Intent in the American New Criticism” (in *Blindness and Insight*) Paul de Man claims that though the New Critics noticed the importance of and paid attention to such distinctive features of literary language as ambiguity or irony, these structural elements themselves contradicted the very premises on which the New Criticism with its central “totalizing principle” was founded. In the key paragraph he describes this process:

As it refines its interpretations more and more, American criticism does not discover a single meaning, but a plurality of significations that can be radically opposed to each other. Almost in spite of itself, it pushes the interpretative process so far that the analogy between the organic world and the language of poetry finally explodes. This unitarian criticism finally becomes a criticism of ambiguity, an ironic reflection on the absence of the unity it had postulated (de Man 1993:28).

Actually, it seems as if de Man had thought over the new critical approach of reading — reading its theory ‘closely’ -, and, on the basis of its faults or ‘blind spots’ and ‘insights’, he developed his later ideas. According to de Man, the greatest ‘blindness’ (and insight) of the New Critics was that, while they tried to pay “such patient and delicate attention to the reading of forms” (de Man 1993:29), the presupposed idea of totality forced them to find closed forms and to strive for order. The New Critics can be said to have used Heidegger’s theory of hermeneutical circularity, but they forgot that the (hermeneutical) act of understanding is a temporal one. As de Man remarks: “yet, the temporal factor, so persistently forgotten, should remind us that the form is never anything but a process on the way to its completion” (de Man 1993:28). And the symbol that can show the true nature of textual understanding is not the circle or the arch, but the spiral line that consists of seemingly closed/closing circles displaying the temporal and never-ending process of understanding, that is, the rhetoric of temporality.

In his essay titled “The Rhetoric of Temporality” (included in *Blindness and Insight*, 1993), de Man regards allegory together with irony as the key rhetorical tropes in our (textual) understanding. Here he is concerned with the differences between the two rhetorical figures, which he defines in their relation to time. Though both show the discontinuous relationship between sign and meaning, the experience of time in the case of irony means “a syn-
chronic structure, while allegory appears as a successive mode capable of engendering duration” (de Man 1993: 226) — that is, it is diachronic. Focusing on their temporality, from the (paradoxical) hermeneutical circle not only the New Critical irony, but also de Man’s reading of allegory and irony can be derived. In *Allegories of Reading. Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust*, de Man describes his — temporal, allegorical, that is — rhetorical mode of reading:

The paradigm for all texts consists of a figure (or a system of figures) and its deconstruction. But since this model cannot be closed off by a final reading, it engenders, in its turn, a supplementary figural superposition which narrates the unreadability of the prior narration. As distinguished from primary deconstructive narratives centered on figures and ultimately always on a metaphor, we can call such narratives to the second (or the third) degree allegories. (de Man 1979:205)

He also claims that allegorical narratives, being “allegories of metaphors” ..., “tell the story of the failure to read”(Ibid.). Although the quoted passage emphasises the allegoricity of reading, the superposed layers of reading-efforts are guaranteed by the ironic nature of language. While allegory is read as the trope of reading, irony becomes the trope of tropes — quoting the concluding sentences of de Man’s *Allegories of Reading*: “Irony is no longer a trope, but the undoing of the deconstructive allegory of all tropological cognitions, the systematic undoing, in other words, of understanding. As such, far from closing off the tropological system, irony enforces the repetition of its aberration” (de Man 1979:301). In our understanding, irony, the trope of the rhetorical vortex displays the dizziness of figurativity, as “it dissolves in the narrowing spiral of a linguistic sign that becomes more and more remote from its meaning, and it can find no escape from this spiral” (de Man 1993: 222).

The other important element of the New Critical ‘vaulted’, (arch-) metaphor is its possible covert moral implication. In his rhetorical deconstructive (close) readings, de Man speaks about the “practical ethical dimension of allegory” (de Man 1979:209), stating that “allegories are always ethical” (de Man 1979:206). But the ethical here is not related to the subject’s will or the relations between subjects: “The ethical category is imperative (ie., a category rather than a value) to the extent that it is linguistic and not subjective. The passage to an ethical tonality does not result from a transcendental imperative but it is referential (and therefore unreliable) version of a linguistic confusion. Ethics (or, one should say, ethicity) is a discursive mode among others” (de Man 1979:206).

Perhaps, now, I should discuss the ethicity of deconstruction, but I think, I had better take the ethicity of allegories as ‘a’ or another figure of speech.
However, despite the usual attack on deconstruction claiming that deconstruction turns from ethical problems in complete indifference, it rather turns to and regards such questions in their differences. That is, the ethicity of deconstruction can be named ‘ethics-in-difference’, as, being sensitive to variety, it pays more attention to differences and consciously accepts them. De Man’s rhetor-ethics certainly can be applied to his reading of his own text or my understanding of his reading. The other Yale-deconstructor, Joseph Hillis Miller undertakes the task of defining ‘the ethics of reading’ in several of his works, though he himself refers to the term as an ‘oxymoron’ (Miller 1990:237). In his study *Ethics of Reading* (1987) he tries to understand this oxymoron, but his writings are ‘only’ concerned with the understanding of reading. Instead of an interpretation of the ethics of reading, we are mostly given the definition of ‘the good reader’ but, I think, the author’s failure is definitely worth discussing.

Miller tries to understand the impossible and reads de Man’s ideas on ethicity in one of his chapters (“Reading Unreadability: de Man”). Analyzing the famous quotation from de Man, given above (1979:206), Miller calls attention to the way de Man rejects the traditional, basically Kantian theory of ethics. Though de Man still uses the words ‘category’ and ‘imperative’ alluding to the Kantian ‘categorical imperative’, Miller points out that for him the ethical category is neither subjective, nor transcendental — but linguistic. Being taken as a linguistic phenomenon, the ethical refers to a necessary element in language and life, namely that “we cannot help making judgments of right or wrong or commanding others to act according to those judgments (or) condemning them for not doing so” (Miller 1987:46).

In his chapter on de Man’s ethicity, he also emphasizes the existential importance of reading and the ‘fictional’ (cf. imagined sequence of allegories) nature of the (never-ending) process of understanding that “mix[es] tropological, allegorical, referential, ethical, political, and historical dimensions” (Miller 1987:44). As de Man claims, the ethical, just like the allegorical, is only one of the possible ‘discursive modes’: not a primary, but a secondary or a tertiary category, that is, they do not and cannot come first in textual understanding. Then what comes first? De Man clearly says that the reading process starts from “a figure (or a system of figures) and its deconstruction”, then due to its deconstruction it is followed (endlessly) by a sequence of “supplementary figural superposition” which tells “the unreadability of the prior narration”. And these narratives — actually generated by the primary one are called allegorical narratives or allegories telling “the story of the failure to read” (de Man 1979:205).
Therefore instead of using the expression ‘ethical value’, de Man speaks about ‘the ethical category’, regarding it as an imperative: as an obligation, it is taken as absolute and unconditional. Both Miller and de Man (and I myself) struggle with the real meaning of de Man’s ethicity — as can be expected in a text claiming the unreadability of reading. Miller quotes another interesting passage, where de Man clearly names his ‘true’ categorical imperative: “in the case of reading of a text, what takes place is a necessary understanding... an understanding is an epistemological event prior to being an ethical or aesthetic value” (Miller 1987:51-52). I think it becomes obvious that de Man knows only one imperative: the imperative of language with its — quite hermeneutical — ‘read!’ or ‘understand!’”. Returning to the central de Manian principle, Miller concludes that “to live is to read, or rather to commit again and again the failure to read which is the human lot... each reading is strictly speaking, ethical, in the sense that it has to take place, by an implacable necessity, as a response to a categorical demand” (Miller 1987:59). Our world is full of texts and systems of signs, which we are bound to understand: we cannot help reading, but we should accept that we cannot go beyond the borders of language. And we also have to accept that the ethical is only one of the possible but necessary referential modes of our reading.

Actually, while interpreting de Man’s theory of the ‘rhetorical close-reading’ from an ethical point of view, Miller himself cannot escape from falling into the traps of the rhetorical, of language. At the end of his reading on de Man’s ethicity, Miller answers his own question, using the tricky affirmative meaning of a double negation. He says that in de Man’s case “(the) ethics of reading imposes on the reader the ‘impossible’ task of reading unreadability, but that does not by any means mean that reading, even ‘good’ reading, cannot take place and does not have a necessary ethical dimension” (Miller 1987:59, my italics).

On the whole, Miller’s effort, aimed at showing the ethics of reading in de Man’s ethicity, cannot be seen as really convincing. Miller is apologizing all time that he is only a reader (and cannot be anybody else), which also means that he must be mistaken if he thinks his own reading as a definitive one. Despite of its being a ‘mission impossible’ he still insists on the necessity of the ethical in understanding, and works out his ethics of reading, relying on de Man’s ethical-linguistic imperative expressed in the allegorical reading. Thus, in the following chapters, after interpreting de Man’s ethicity, he explores passages from three novelists’ works with greater success — George Eliot, Anthony Trollope and Henry James. Maybe the undoing of a metaphor, that is, the allegorical reading, could have been more fruitful in the chapter on de Man’s ethicity; and actually it happens to be fruitful in the chapter on Kant’s categorical imperative (“Reading Telling: Kant”).
Miller quotes a footnote from *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, in which Kant tries to explain what he means by the expression ‘to act from respect (Achtung) for law’, claiming that “respect can be regarded as the effect of the law on the subject and not as the cause of the law... All respect for a person is only respect for the law of which the person provides an example” (Miller 1987:18, my italics). Here it is once again underlined that in our life we are related to the ethical through finding analogies and reading stories. We can judge a person or an act as ethical, because we find him or it being analogous to the incomprehensible law: as if human beings and their life events or narrated stories were used as rhetorical figures of speech (signs or tropes) referring to the moral imperative.

Accordingly, while deconstructing the Kantian categorical imperative Miller calls our attention to the use of ‘as if’ (als so) together with the past subjunctive mood (cf. Konjunktiv 2 in German). The English translation of the well-known apodictic formula* goes “I always should act as if my private maxim were to be universal legislation for all mankind” or in another way “I should never act in such a way that I could not also will that my maxim should be a universal law” (Kant 1978:21). That is, with this als so we must enter the world of fiction, and having created a fictitious context, a little novel, we shall be able to tell whether or not the action is moral. Miller again emphasises that narrative or story-making gives the basic activity of the human mind together with the ability of telling stories to each other and understanding them; that is, (again) we cannot help reading. He finds that “narrative serves for Kant as the absolutely necessary bridge without which there would be no connecting between law as such and any particular ethical rule of behaviour” (Miller 1987:28). Moreover, Miller finds it is quite interesting that in his system, Kant regarded his third critique, *Critique of Judgment* (work of art), as serving as a bridge between epistemology (the work of pure reason) and ethics (the work of practical reason) separated by a deep chasm.

Reading this relaxing — or bridging — conclusion of the Kantian ethics, we could take it as a regressive arch-metaphor, but Miller as a ‘good’ deconstructor gives it a twist/turn (cf. trope). In the last pages he discusses the performative act of promising offered by the Kantian categorical imperative. Unfortunately, the example Kant gives is one of false promise, which “does not exemplify that of which it is meant to be an example” (Miller 1987:36).

* “...ich soll niemals anders verfahren, als so, dass ich auch wollen könne, meine Maxime solle ein allgemeines Gesetz werden.” I basically rely on the English translation of the Kantian formula quoted in Miller’s work, but I also consulted the original German text, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Werkausgabe* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1982).
Miller, with great pleasure, displays Kant’s blindness or slip of the tongue, concluding that in the end the good reader is to be confronted not by the moral law, not even a good example of it, but by the unreadability of the text. The false promise is such a bridge (or non-bridge), of which two halves start from the two ends but they do not meet in the middle. The promise — here of the example, the bridge, the system, the author, or of my own text — is made in language, and it cannot promise anything but itself with its own unfathomed abyss. To quote Miller’s judgment: “The example, he (Kant) assures us, will serve as the safe bridge between (the universal law) and (the particular case). Instead of that, the example divides itself within itself between two possible but incompatible readings and so becomes unreadable. The bridge which was to vault over the abyss between universal and particular law opens another chasm within itself” (Miller 1987:35).

The picture of the opening chasms — just like de Man’s vertiginous allegories — makes us dizzy. I should agree with Werner Hamacher’s statement that in our readings there is only one imperative working, namely: “read!” or “understand!” and “in an ironic way, the imperative — of language and of understanding — does not allow us to decide whether it is allegorical or ironic” (Hamacher 1998:193). All I can say is that, in my text, in its allegorical reading, I have tried to connect Miller’s bridging Kant-reading with the vault of New Criticism. And now I let ‘my good’ readers decide whether I have succeeded in fulfilling or keeping my promise — hopefully, not a false one.

References

EKPHRASIS: A DEFINITION

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The aim of the present paper is to offer a definition of ekphrasis which should lend consistency and precision to the theoretical discussions about it. In my opinion, the definitions which can be found in various books and articles do not satisfy. The following examples, taken at random from older and newer studies, are relevant for my point: ekphrasis is “giving voice and language to the otherwise mute art object” (Hagstrum 1958:18); “the poetic description of a picture or sculptural work of art” (Leo Spitzer qtd. in Scott 1994:29); “the verbal representation of visual representation” (Hefferman 1991:297); “an umbrella term that subsumes various forms of rendering the visual object in words” (Yacobi 1995:599); “the name of a minor and rather obscure literary genre (poems which describe works of visual arts) and a more general topic (the verbal representation of visual representation)” (Mitchell 1995:152).

The above definitions are either wrong or incomplete. They consider ekphrasis as a mere verbal “description”, “representation”, or “rendering” in literature of an object of art and ignore the very complex intersemiotic relationships established by the authors of ekphrases between the verbal and the visual codes.

The definition that I propose and will discuss in detail here considers ekphrasis a partial transmutation of a visual source text (ST) — represented by a real or imagined artistic object (painting, sculpture, tapestry, urn, etc.) — into a verbal literary target text (TT), in prose or verse. The process implies three consecutive operations — the selection of the visual units to be translated, their description (based on a process of foregrounding), and their interpretation -, operations which emphasize the visibility of the translator, transform the aesthetic qualities of the ST into literariness, and lead the author and the readers from ekphrastic hope to disappointment and then to fascination.

The discussion of the above definition is also meant to underline the major differences between ekphrases and verbal translations.

1. Ekphrasis as a partial transmutation. The author of ekphrasis is not really a translator but a mediator between two dissimilar codes, visual and verbal. From a semiotic point of view, the process was defined by Roman Jakobson (2002: 114) as “intersemiotic translation” or “transmutation”, i.e.
“the interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of nonverbal sign systems”. I shall henceforward keep the distinction between translation (verbal/verbal) and transmutation (verbal/ nonverbal), the latter being also called ekphrasis when the ST is nonverbal and the TT is verbal and reverse ekphrasis when the ST is verbal and the TT nonverbal.

A complete and faithful transmutation is impossible because one cannot render in words all the elements of colour, form, and geometry (i.e., sizes, lines, spatiality, position, framing, relationship foreground / background, etc.) which appear in the object of art, be it a painting, tapestry, sculpture, urn, or shield. Their complete enumeration would transform the TT into a mere description of the referent and would destroy its coherence and poeticity. Accordingly, the end result would no longer be a literary text and the performed operation an instance of ekphrasis.

The incomplete shift from ST to TT may take various forms of negative transmutation: paraphrase, superficial interpretation of visual units, sub- and overinterpretation of the original text. In all cases, the discordance between ST and TT is determined both by the difficulty of establishing translational units and by the fact that ekphrastic authors do not need to describe the whole object in order to create poetic effects. Since they do not aim at offering a faithful description of the TT to some blind receivers, they can skip details in a manner inconceivable for verbal translators. They are free to delimit whichever parts of the described object they prefer and can focalize upon them as long as they feel it necessary to raise aesthetic emotions in the receiver.

When, for instance, P. B. Shelley writes the well-known poem On the Medusa of Leonardo da Vinci in the Florentine Gallery (Appendix I), he undertakes a series of microtransmutations which cover a large part of the pictorial text but do not exhaust the entire field of the painting. He mentions the midnight sky, the mountain peak, the hair, lips, and eyelids of the Gorgon, the lizard and the bat, but he omits the frogs from the lower right corner of the painting and the leaves from its upper left corner.

This is even more obvious when different poets attempt to describe the same painting. William Carlos Williams, Michael Hamburger, and W.H.Auden used Brueghel’s painting Fall of Icarus as a starting point for transmutations which generated the poems Landscape with the Fall of Icarus, Lines on Brueghel’s Icarus, and Musée des Beaux Arts (Appendix II). Although the ST is the same in all cases and the idea underlined is that the fall of Icarus has attracted no attention at all, in spite of the fact that it represents the death of a great artisan and courageous opponent of the gods, the poets do not focalize on the same elements of the painting and describe only parts of it. William
Carlos Williams notices the springtime, the ploughing farmer, the tinkling pageantry, and the shining sun, Michael Hamburger chooses the working ploughman, the daydreaming fisherman, the nostalgic sailor, the grazing sheep, and the gaping shepherd, while W.H.Auden, the most concise of them all, mentions only the toiling ploughman, the shining sun, and the ship that sails calmly on.

This implies that from a translational viewpoint ekphrastic authors commit abuses and plays tricks. They start from a different axiomatics of fidelity than the one cultivated by translators: they do not mean to render faithfully the chain of signifiers, the syntactic processes, and the discursive structures so important for linguistic translations, but to raise disturbing effects in the reader through emphasizing the difference between the two semiotic codes. Their activity of constant compromise between the visual and the verbal gives primacy to diversity and deviation over similarity and concordance. While translators have to fight seriously against the failure of negative translations, authors of ekphrasis can use differences creatively. They are free to invest units of transmutation with textual energy and displace, remobilize, and extend ad libitum the gaps between the verbal and visual codes. Since any transmutation is acceptable from the point of view of its relationship to the ST, the latter can be the starting point for an unlimited number of ekphrases and the potential source of a large intertextual series of verbal TTs.

2. Ekphrasis as the transmutation of a real or imagined object. The objects used for ekphrastic transmutations are either real or imagined. When the real ones are lost or destroyed, they function as the imagined ones, generating what John Hollander (1988:209) calls “notional ekphrasis”. This is the case of Herakles’ and Achilles’ shields described by Hesiod and Homer, the ivory cup given by the goatherd to the shepherd Thyrsis in Theocritus’ first idyll, the paintings in the Temple of Juno described in Vergil’s Aeneid, the relief sculptures in Dante’s Purgatorio, the frescoes in Shakespeare’s Rape of Lucrece, and the Grecian urn described by Keats.

The distinction between an imaginary and a real work of art as the object of ekphrasis is of high relevance. While the former has to be fancied, obliging the readers to undertake an active operation of reverse ekphrasis similar to that performed by theatre or film directors when transposing a literary text into a show, the latter can be seen and interpreted by the readers themselves. They become aware of the to-be-looked-at-ness of the object and decode it within a complex process of visual epistemology, including a comparison with the way in which the author him/herself has viewed and translated the image. In both cases, the readers want to find something unexpected in the author’s con-
3. Ekphrasis as the transmutation of an artistic object. The issue whether the ST has to be an object of art or not has been raised by W. J. T. Mitchell (1995:166-169). It is evident that a non-artistic object can have at least some of the functions performed by the ekphrastic object: to stir meditation on different items connected to the object or to poetry in general, to give moral indications to alter one’s life; to serve narrative purposes, such as to prophecy future events or to characterize the figures depicted by ekphrasis. Mitchell analyzes William Carlos Williams’ poem “Anecdote of a Jar” (see Appendix III) and concludes that although the jar is a simple object, devoid of artistic splendour, of pictured scenes or “leaf-fringed legends”, it can be invested with great symbolic power: it is “no mere object , but a highly charged form. It alludes to personified artifacts and specifically to the biblical trope of man as clay vessel, as a jar. The jar, like Adam, organizes the wilderness, and takes dominion everywhere.” (Mitchell 1995:167).

Similar observations can be made on other nonartistic objects described in literature: the jar visualized by William Golding’s Pincher Martin while drowning, the mirrors in John Fowles’s “Daniel Martin”, the pencils in Samuel Beckett’s “Malone Dies”, or the volcano in Malcolm Lowry’s novel Under the Volcano. However, a non-artistic object cannot serve the more subtle functions of ekphrasis, such as transforming the readers into powerful gazers or making them aware of stasis and artifice (Doody 1996:387), exploring the deep effects of art on the soul of the poet, showing the conceptual program of the painter/ poet as an artist, or providing a thematic microcosm of a basic paradox about poetry and truth to call attention to the fragile quality of the relation description — object (Hollander 1988), illustrating history, frustrating time, or suggesting that all artists, including poets and painters, are creators of a world (Kurman 1974:3). As only an object with real artistic value can generate such crucial experiences in the act of reading an image, the ekphrastic ST has to be a work of art.

4. Ekphrasis implies three consecutive operations — the selection of the visual units to be translated, their description (based on a process of foregrounding) and their interpretation-, operations which emphasize the visibility of the translator.

As I have shown elsewhere (Brînzeu 2001), the translational units to be described verbally are first selected, then arranged linearly and foregrounded in a certain way. This is the interesting part of ekphrasis. It is neither the explanation of the visual text attempted in the linguistic text nor the equivalence word-image that attracts the reader, but the operation of selection which
includes the *preservation* and *foregrounding* of certain visual elements in favour of others that are *ignored*. It highlights the subjectivity of the poets and their personal way of dealing with images.

However, the description of the work of art is not sufficient for a good ekphrasis. It has to be followed by an interpretation of some sort which should state the author’s personal opinion on the painting and draw the attention of the readers to the fact that there is something not immediately visible in the painting, something they can discover only after having read the poem. Moreover, the readers must become aware that the poet, who stands between them and the image, inscribes his/her mark on the text in such a way that it discloses new and subtle connections between ST and TT.

In the case of Shelley’s poem, the final verses underline the skyward gaze of the petrifying Gorgon. The horizontality of the Gorgon, not evident in da Vinci’s painting but highlighted by Shelley’s interpretation, has turned the very air into a mirror and the consequence is that by its own gaze petrifies the monster. It has also annihilated the idea that the viewers of the Gorgon should become its victims. They are safe now since the monster’s gaze is oriented towards the sky. This interpretation emphasizes a new dimension of the picture and generates astonishment, prompting the reader to understand that there is magic in the ekphrastic process.

5. Ekphrasis as the transmutation of a visual source text into a verbal literary target text, in prose or verse.

If the ST of a transmutation is an artistic object, the TT should be the same: the end result of the ekphrastic transmutation should always be a literary production. Whether it is in verse or in prose is irrelevant, what is important is that it should be different from a merely descriptive philosophical, religious, or critical text. If we compare the poems written on Brueghel’s *Fall of Icarus* and Maurice Hussey’s (1971:77) comment, we realize that the former have something which makes the experience of decoding the image a complex aesthetic adventure, while the latter does not.

Even if a descriptive text has evident poetic characteristics, it cannot be called an ekphrastic text. Let us take the following comment on da Vinci’s painting from Walter Pater’s *The Renaissance* (1987: 74):

What may be called the fascination of corruption penetrates in every touch its exquisitely finished beauty. About the dainty lines of the cheek the bats flit unheeded. The delicate snakes seem literally strangling each other in terrified struggle to escape the Medusa brain. The hue which violent death always brings with it is in the features; features singularly massive and grand
as we catch them inverted, in a dexterous forshortening, crown foremost, like a great calm stone against which a wave of serpents breaks.

We may rewrite parts of Pater’s comment as if they were verses and obtain a nice piece of poetry.
About the dainty lines of the cheek the bats flit unheeded.

The delicate snakes seem strangling each other in terrified struggle to escape the Medusa brain.

However, the experiment cannot be extended to the entire text and, in spite of the fact that the excerpt may give the impression of a poem, Pater’s description is not an ekphrasis. The artistic qualities of the object have to be found again in the literariness of the TT in order to ensure the artistic equilibrium of the two codes. If this is lost, we are not dealing with a successful ekphrastic transmutation.

6. Ekphrasis leads the poet and the readers from hope to disappointment and then to fascination.

According to Mitchell (1995:152-157), ekphrasis makes both the author and the readers undergo a process made up of three stages. It is first characterized by ekphrastic indifference, which grows out of the commonsense perception that ekphrasis is impossible and that a verbal representation renders the object in a different way than a visual representation: it may refer to an object, describe or invoke it, but it can never bring its visual presence before us in the way pictures can. Words can “cite”, but never “sight” their objects.

The second stage is represented by ekphrastic hope, generated by the capacity of ekphrasis to make us discover a “sense” in which language can do what so many writers have wanted it to do: to make us see.

The third stage is represented by ekphrastic fear that there may be no difference between the verbal and the visual codes and thus the mystery of ekphrasis may be lost.

In my opinion, the three stages have a different nature and order. They are characterized by a switch from hope to disappointment and then to fascination. Hope because when, at first, the author and the readers are faced with the two texts, they are attracted by the pleasure-promising operation of trans-
mutation. The tension between the visual and verbal codes attracts the gaze of the viewers who are challenged by the opposition between the spatiality of visual arts and the temporality of poetry. This means that they are won by the way in which the object of transmutation as spatial work becomes the metaphor for the temporal work which seeks to capture it in its temporality.

Once engaged in ekphrasis, both the authors and the readers realize the impossibility of a faithful transmutation. The numerous contradictions, disproportions, and tensions between the verbal and the visual codes announce the failure of the process and raise disappointment in the hearts of the persons involved.

Getting beyond the second stage, authors and readers will understand that in spite of its being an incomplete process, ekphrasis shapes a specific translational strategy, of an experimental order. It is the order of discovery, where success does not depend on the skillfulness of dealing with the capacities of verbal codes, but on deviation, contradiction, and abuse. It ultimately generates a work of art whose unexpectedness reveals the mystery of a point at which the verbal and visual arts converge in a happy and fertile marriage.

References


APPENDIX I

Leonardo da Vinci, *Medusa*

P.B. Shelley, *On the Medusa of Leonardo da Vinci in the Florentine Gallery*

I
It lieth, gazing on the midnight sky,
Upon the cloudy mountain-peak supine;
Below, far lands are seen tremblingly,
Its horror and its beauty are divine.
Upon its lips and eyelids seems to lie
Loveliness like a shadow, from which shine,
Fiery and lurid, struggling underneath,
The agonies of anguish and of death.

II
Yet it is less the horror than the grace
Which turns the gazer’s spirit into stone,
Whereon the lineaments of that dead face
Are graven, till the characters be grown
Into itself, and thought no more can trace;
‘Tis the melodious hue of beauty thrown
‘thwart the darkness and the glare of pain,
Which humanize and harmonize the strain.
III
And from its head as from one body grow,
As river grass out of a watery rock,
Hairs which are vipers, and they curl and flow
And their long tangles in each other lock,
And with unending involution show
Their mailed radiance, as it were to mock
The torture and the death within, and saw
The solid air with many a ragged jaw.

IV
And from stone beside, poisonous eft
Peeps idly into those Gorgonian eyes;
Whilst in the air a ghastly bat, bereft
Of sense, has flitted with mad surprise
Out of the cave this hideous light had cleft,
And he comes hastening like moth that hies,
After a taper, and the midnight sky
Flares, a light more dread than obscurity.

V
'Tis the tempestuous loveliness of terror,
For from the serpents gleams brazen glare
Kindled by that inextricable error,
Which makes thrilling vapour of the air
Become dim and ever-shifting mirror
Of all the beauty and the terror there-
? woman's countenance, with serpent-locks,
Gazing in death on Heaven from those wet rocks.
Peter Brueghel, *Fall of Icarus*

**William Carlos Williams, Landscape with the Fall of Icarus**

according to Brueghel
when Icarus fell
it was spring

a farmer was ploughing
his field
the whole pageantry

of the year was
awake tingling
near

the edge of the sea
concerned
with itself

sweating in the sun
that melted
the wing’s wax
unsignificantly
off the coast
there was

a splash quite unnoticed
this was
Icarus drowning

**Michael Hamburger, *Lines on Brueghel’s Icarus***

The ploughman plows, the fisherman dreams of fish;
Aloft, the sailor through a world of ropes
Guides tangled meditations, feverish
With memories of girls forsaken, hopes
Of brief reunions, new discoveries,
Past rum consumed, rum promised, rum potential.
Sheep crop the grass, lift up their heads and gaze
Into a sheepish present: the essential,
Illimitable juiceness of things,
Greens, yellows, browns are what they see.
Churlish and slow, the shepherd, hearing wings -
Perhaps an eagle’s — gapes uncertainly.

Too late. The worst had happened: lost to man
The angel, Icarus, for ever failed,
Fallen with melted wings when, near the sun,
He scorned the ordering planet, which prevailed
And, jeering, now slinks off, to rise once more.
But he — his damaged purpose drags him down -
Too far from his half-brothers on the shore,
Hardly conceivable, is left to drown.

**W.H.Auden, *Musée des Beaux Arts***

........
In Brueghel’s *Icarus*, for instance: how everything turns away
Quite leisurely from the disaster; the ploughman may
Have heard the splash, the forsaken cry,
But for him it was not an important failure; the sun shone
As it had to on the white legs disappearing into the green
Water; and the expensive delicate ship that must have seen
Something amazing, a boy falling out of the sky,
Had somewhere to get to and sailed calmly on.

Maurice Hussey, *Icarus*

At first we notice that the painter has reduced the onlookers to a single one of each category but presumes a knowledge of the poem in his audience. The ploughman plies his craft with concentration leaving his signature on the earth beneath him and the rest are equally preoccupied with their day-to-day existence. At this point one attempts to do justice to the philosopher within the distinguished painter. He almost hides Icarus by reducing him to a pair of writhing legs as he also obscures the dead man just visible among the nearest trees of the glade. In this manner and it is a device adopted elsewhere in his work he seeks to show a world devoid of interest in events of significance and regardless of values. Further puzzles await the careful viewer. Could so low a sun suffuse the centre of the picture with so much light or cause the melting of any waxen wings? I know of no answer to this except to see an invisible power at work causing the Fall.

APPENDIX III

William Carlos Williams, *Anecdote of a Jar*

I placed a jar in Tennessee,
And round it was upon a hill,
It made the slovenly wilderness
Surround that hill.

The wilderness rose up to it,
And sprawled around, no longer wild,
The jar was round upon the ground
And tall and of a port in air.

It took dominion everywhere.
The jar was gray and bare.
It did not give of bird or bush,
Like nothing else in Tennessee.
1. Introduction

The paper is partly a re-analysis and partly a continuation of the study contained in Vermes (2004). It aims to examine similarities and differences in the treatment of culture-specific expressions in the English translations of two Hungarian novels by the same author.

1.1 General questions

On a more general level, the study is meant to take a look at the following two questions:

(1) How do the translation operations applied to culture-specific expressions contribute to the implementation of translation strategies?

(2) How consistent is the application of the different operations across different texts, given a broad identity of macro-context between them?

1.2. The sources and the translators

Both books were written in the 1980’s. A szív segédigéi first appeared in 1985 and Hrabal könyve in 1990. They are both concerned with questions of existence in the Central-Europe of the communist era and also with more universal questions of life and death. (They have even been merged into a film adaptation called The Film of Anna.)

Helping Verbs of the Heart was first published in English in 1991 by Quartet Books, London and Grove Press, New York. The Book of Hrabal was first published in English in 1993 by Quartet Books, London and Corvina Books, Budapest. Interestingly, in the English title of A szív segédigéi the expression segédige, which literally translates into ‘auxiliary verb’, is rendered as helping verb. Even where it is obviously used in this linguistic sense in the original, for example on page 66 (“Segédigével tagadunk”), the translation
sticks to the form used in the title (“Helping verbs may express negation,” p. 67). The reason for this may be that the English term ‘auxiliary verb’ lacks the kind of double-bottomed interpretation that the Hungarian original has in this context, making reference to the language as well as to the capacity of speech for healing the wounds of the heart, and the translator, M. H. Heim, probably regarded consistency in usage more important here than preserving the ambiguity.

Michael Henry Heim is Professor of Slavic Languages and Literatures at the University of California, LA and has translated books into English from not only Slavic languages like Russian, Czech, Croatian and Serb, but also from German, French and Hungarian. Judith Sollosy, the translator of the other source text, is of Hungarian origin and is a graduate of Barnard College, New York, an extinguished liberal arts college for women. Presently she is a senior editor at Corvina Books, Budapest, Hungary.

2. Background

In this section, I will briefly introduce the theoretical framework, based on Sperber and Wilson (1986) and Gutt (1991), in which the present study is carried out.

2.1. Optimal relevance and optimal resemblance

One basic underlying assumption is that communication is an ostensive-inferential process, guided by the principle of relevance: “Every act of ostensive communication communicates the presumption of its own optimal relevance” (Sperber and Wilson 1986:158), where optimal relevance means that the processing of a stimulus leads to contextual effects that are worth the audience’s attention and, moreover, that it puts the audience to no unnecessary processing effort in achieving those effects.

Translation in this framework can be seen as the act of communicating in the secondary context an informative intention that interpretively resembles the original one as closely as possible under the given conditions, that is, it satisfies the presumption of optimal resemblance: the translation is “(a) presumed to interpretively resemble the original [...] and (b) the resemblance it shows is to be consistent with the presumption of optimal relevance” (Gutt 1991:101).

2.2. Culture as the mutual cognitive environment of a community

“A cognitive environment of an individual is a set of facts that are manifest to him” (Sperber and Wilson 1986:39). Any shared cognitive environ-
ment in which it is manifest which people share it is [...] a *mutual cognitive environment*” (Sperber and Wilson 1986:41).

*Culture* may then be defined as consisting in the set of assumptions that are mutually manifest for a group of individuals, that is, as the intersection of their cognitive environments, and *cultural differences* are differences between sets of mutually manifest assumptions. *Culture-specificity* thus means that an assumption which figures in the mutual cognitive environment of one community is not present in the mutual cognitive environment of another.

### 2.3. The meaning of an assumption

An *assumption* is defined as a structured set of concepts, which are associated with logical and encyclopaedic (and lexical) entries in the mind. The meaning of a concept is made up of a truth-functional *logical entry* and an *encyclopaedic entry*, containing various kinds of (propositional and non-propositional) representational information about the extension of the concept (e.g. cultural or personal beliefs), stored in memory (Sperber and Wilson 1986:83-93).

The content of an assumption is the function of the logical entries of the concepts that it contains and the context in which it is processed is, at least partly, drawn from the encyclopaedic entries of these concepts (Sperber and Wilson 1986:89).

### 3. Translation operations and translation strategies

#### 3.1. Translation operations

There are four translation operations defined by the different possible configurations of logical and encyclopaedic contents, represented here as [+]E, [+L, +E], [-L, +E], and [-L, -E], where L stands for logical content and E, for encyclopaedic content. The operations are explained below and illustrated by a few examples from *A szív segédigéi* and its translation, with each item followed by the respective page numbers.


*Translation* (TRL), in the proper sense, means rendering the SL expression by a TL expression which, preserving the logical content of the original, gives rise to the same, or approximately the same, analytic implications in the target text as the original did in the source text but which, by the same token,
will activate different encyclopaedic assumptions in the secondary context. Examples: pálinka 48: brandy 49; a nagy világon e kívül 64: none other in all the world 65; Mondd, kis kócos, hol van a mamád? 70: Hey there, Touslehead! Where’s your mama? 71; te 22: you 23; Fekete-erdő 86: Black Forest 87.

Substitution (SUB) means that the source language expression is replaced in the translation by a TL correspondent which is different in terms of logical content, but carries with it the same relevant encyclopaedic assumptions as the original. Examples: Kalodon 2: toothpaste 53; Babits Mihály 8: Mihály Babits 9; csak a szavakon lovagol (meaning ‘just riding on the words’) 28: all words and no show 29; életem (‘my life’) 104: pet 105; Pikóta 78: the pond 79.

Finally, modification (MOD) is the process of replacing the original with a TL expression which involves a substantial alteration of the relevant logical and encyclopaedic content of the SL expression. Examples: mamusz (a kind of felt slippers) 55: – 51; Ment-e a könyvek által a világ elébb? (‘Has the world advanced through books?’) 90: Did the world come into being because of books? 91; Máli 86: Mali 87; hanyatt-homlok (‘head over heal’) 54: – 55; (arc)ocska (diminutive ending) 40: (face) – 41.

3.2. Translation strategies: foreignising and domesticating

Domesticating is an assimilationist approach, conforming to the dominant values of the target culture, while foreignising is “motivated by an impulse to preserve linguistic and cultural differences by deviating from prevailing domestic values” (Venuti 1998:241).

A domesticating translation will aim at reducing the amount of processing effort, even if this means losing some contextual effects. A foreignising translation, on the other hand, will aim at preserving contextual effects, even if this means an increase of processing effort.

3.3. The use of operations in implementing strategies

As I have suggested in a number of papers (see, for instance, Vermes 2003), the translator’s strategy concerning the given translation task may be traced down through the regularities in the translator’s use of the different operations.

TRF [+L, +E] is a direct tool of preserving both logical content and contextual assumptions, ensuring the preservation of contextual effects, and thus seems to be the primary means of a foreignising strategy. TRL [+L, -E] is also used to preserve logical content and thus analytic implications, therefore it can also be regarded as a means of foreignising.
SUB \([-L, +E]\) and MOD \([-L, -E]\) are tools of providing easy access to contextual assumptions, ensuring a reasonable level of processing effort, and thus seem to be the primary means of a domesticating strategy.

4. Method

Every culture-specific expression in the two STs was recorded and matched with the corresponding textual equivalent (see Catford 1965:27) in the translation. Recurring expressions were recorded more than once only if they were treated in the translation in different ways. The expressions were sorted out according to the operation which the translator applied to them and were then categorised into nine classes.

The categories used are: administration, history, material and intellectual products, persons, situation schemas, social culture, social relations, topography, and units and measures.

5. Results

The numerical findings of the case studies are summed up in Tables 1 and 2.

5.1. The Book of Hrabal (BH)

Table 1. Numerical results of The Book of Hrabal case study (Percentages are relative to total number of cases within the given category.)

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<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>TRF</th>
<th>TRL</th>
<th>SUB</th>
<th>MOD</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>4:30.8%</td>
<td>6:46.1%</td>
<td>1:7.7%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
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<td>2:15.4%</td>
<td>7:53.8%</td>
<td>0:0%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mat./int. products</td>
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<td>12:36%</td>
<td>12:36%</td>
<td>5:16%</td>
<td>33</td>
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<td>0:0%</td>
<td>20:32.8%</td>
<td>4:6.6%</td>
<td>61</td>
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<td>2:15.4%</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>5:33.3%</td>
<td>6:40%</td>
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<td>4:44.5%</td>
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<td>11:34.4%</td>
<td>0:0%</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Units and measures</td>
<td>2:40%</td>
<td>0:0%</td>
<td>3:60%</td>
<td>0:0%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>67:34.5%</td>
<td>30:15.5%</td>
<td>80:41.2%</td>
<td>17:8.8%</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Total numbers indicate a balanced approach with TRF+TRL=50% and SUB+MOD=50%. TRF is most frequent with persons (60.6%), TRL is most frequent with material and intellectual products (36%), SUB is most frequent with situation schemas (84.6%) and MOD is most frequent with social relations (22.2%).

5.2. Helping Verbs of the Heart (HVH)

Table 2. Numerical results of the Helping Verbs of the Heart case study
(Percentages are relative to total number of cases within the given category.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>TRF</th>
<th>TRL</th>
<th>SUB</th>
<th>MOD</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mat./int. products</td>
<td>3:25%</td>
<td>3:25%</td>
<td>4:33.3%</td>
<td>2:16.6%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons</td>
<td>51:56%</td>
<td>0:0%</td>
<td>37:40.7%</td>
<td>3:3.3%</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation schemas</td>
<td>0:0%</td>
<td>0:0%</td>
<td>17:89.5%</td>
<td>2:10.5%</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social culture</td>
<td>0:0%</td>
<td>0:0%</td>
<td>5:83.3%</td>
<td>1:16.7%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social relations</td>
<td>0:0%</td>
<td>3:20%</td>
<td>7:46.7%</td>
<td>5:33.3%</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topography</td>
<td>5:50%</td>
<td>2:20%</td>
<td>3:30%</td>
<td>0:0%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Units and measures</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>59:38.6%</td>
<td>8:5.2%</td>
<td>73:47.7%</td>
<td>13:8.5%</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total numbers indicate a relatively balanced approach: TRF+TRL=43.8% and SUB+MOD=56.2%, with a slight slant towards domesticating. TRF is most frequent with persons (56%), TRL is most frequent with material and intellectual culture (25%), SUB is most frequent with situation schemas (89.5%) and MOD is most frequent with social relations (33.3%).

6. Discussion

This section will contrast the results of the two case studies in order to answer the following specific questions:

Is there a strategic difference between the two translations?
Are there marked differences in the way the particular operations are applied?
Are there marked similarities in the way the particular operations are applied?

6.1. Strategy

BH seems completely balanced, whereas HVH exhibits a slight bias towards domesticating, which is the result of a relatively lower number of translations proper (15.5% vs. 5.2%) and higher numbers with the other operations, especially with substitution (41.2% vs. 47.7%). In this sense, HVH seems to follow a more “play-it-safe” approach, by using more substitutions in the interest of reducing the amount of processing effort.

6.2. Differences

We find that these overall differences are mostly due to a difference in the treatment of the category of social culture and, to a lesser extent, of social relations. These differences are summed up in Table 3.

Table 3. Differences between the two target texts in the categories of social culture and social relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>TRF</th>
<th>TRL</th>
<th>SUB</th>
<th>MOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BH</td>
<td>HVH</td>
<td>BH</td>
<td>HVH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social culture</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social relations</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The difference in the overall frequency of substitutions is caused mainly by the more than double frequency of substitutions within the category of social culture. Whereas in BH there are some examples of transferred or translated items in this group (e.g. *proletkult* 32:23, *kocsma* (meaning something like ‘pub’) 10: *tavern* 4), in HVH these operations are not used at all.

There is also an interesting 50% increase of modifications in HVH in the social relations category (22.2% vs. 33.3%), along with an accompanying decrease of translations proper and substitutions. This is because while terms of endearment are characteristically substituted in BH (e.g. *fiam* 22: *dear* 14; *csillagom* (‘my star’) 23: *pet* 15; *bácsi* (‘uncle’) 137: *old man* 120), with only one of them modified (*fiam* (‘my son’) 29: — 21), in HVH a greater number of them is modified (e.g. *öregem* (‘old boy’) 22: — 23; *Mamili* 76: *Mama* 77;
bácsi 90: — 91). Also, while we find that the Hungarian expression ‘tegez’, which marks an informal, familiar relationship between speaker and addressee (in other words, it is a T term, in Brown and Gilman’s (1960) sense) is substituted in both translations (e.g. Ma tegezem Magát utoljára 80: Today was the last time I called you child 67 (BH); tegeztek 98: called me Lizi 99 (HVH)); the expression ‘magáz’, marking a formal relationship (a V term) is even modified in HVH (Most figyelek föl a magázásra. ‘Miért magázol?’ 126: — 127).

6.3. Similarities

The most striking similarity, of course, is that in both TTs, TRF is most frequent with persons (60.6% and 56%, respectively), TRL is most frequent with material and intellectual products (36% and 25%), SUB is most frequent with situation schemas (84.6% and 89.5%) and MOD is most frequent with social relations (22.2% and 33.3%). These numbers are summed up in Table 4.

Table 4. The categories to which the different operations are most frequently applied in the two target texts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>TOP CATEGORY IN BH</th>
<th>TOP CATEGORY IN HVH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transference</td>
<td>Persons: 60.6%</td>
<td>Persons: 56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Translation</td>
<td>Mat. / int. products: 36%</td>
<td>Mat. / int. products: 25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substitution</td>
<td>Situation schemas: 84.6%</td>
<td>Situation schemas: 89.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modification</td>
<td>Social relations: 22.2%</td>
<td>Social relations: 33.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other hand, if we examine the specific categories separately (apart from the three where HVH does not contain any items), we will find that in each case the operation which applies most frequently is the same in the two TTs. Thus, items in the material and intellectual products category are most frequently substituted (36% and 33.3%, respectively) or translated (36% and 25%), items in the persons category are most frequently transferred (60.6% and 56%) or substituted (32.8% and 40.7%), items in the situation schemas category are typically substituted (84.6% and 89.5%), items in the social culture category are most frequently substituted (40% and 83.3%), items in the social relations category are also most frequently substituted (44.5% and 40%), while items in the topography category are most frequently transferred (53.1% and 50%). These findings are tabulated in Table 5 below.
Table 5. The operations which are most frequently applied to the different categories in the two target texts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>TOP OPERATION IN BH</th>
<th>TOP OPERATION IN HVH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>SUB: 46.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>SUB: 53.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mat. / int. products</td>
<td>SUB: 36% TRL: 36%</td>
<td>SUB: 33.3% TRL: 25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons</td>
<td>TRF: 60.6% SUB: 32.8%</td>
<td>TRF: 56% SUB: 40.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation schemas</td>
<td>SUB: 84.6%</td>
<td>SUB: 89.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social culture</td>
<td>SUB: 40%</td>
<td>SUB: 83.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social relations</td>
<td>SUB: 44.5%</td>
<td>SUB: 40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topography</td>
<td>TRF: 53.1%</td>
<td>TRF: 50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Units and measures</td>
<td>SUB: 60%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Conclusions

Although the frequency numbers are only suggestive rather than conclusive, there appears to be a slight difference between apparent translation strategies, with HVH taking a bit more domesticating approach. Since macro-contexts are the same, both STs and TTs being the product of largely identical primary and secondary communication situations, the most likely reason seems to be a difference of personal experience between the two translators. This might stem from the fact that Michael Henry Heim is an American, while Judith Sollosy is a Hungarian brought up and educated in an English-speaking environment, a difference in background which may have caused a difference in their approaches to cultural divergence.

However, more obvious than the differences are the fundamental similarities between the two translations. Based on these, it would seem, then, that the use of the different operations with the various categories of culture-specific expressions is not random but, to some extent at least, systematic. These regularities may, on the one hand, be the result of the fact that some culture-specific assumptions are more “hard-core” than others. Situation schemas and social relations, for instance, appear to be at the heart of what we call a culture, being very deep-rooted in the cognitive environments of individuals, whereas others, like material and intellectual products, are perhaps less strongly entrenched. Obviously, in the case of such deeply entrenched assumptions, a foreignising move in the translation would result in a consid-
erable increase in the amount of processing effort needed, on the part of the
target reader, for working out the intended contextual effects, which may seri-
ously threaten the optimal relevance of the utterance, and therefore a more
effort-economic operation like substitution is used instead.

On the other hand, it also very possible that these regularities are at least
partly a manifestation of what Toury (1978) calls norms, which in turn may
be symptomatic of dominance relations between different cultures. Thus, for
instance, whereas in English translations of Hungarian STs the full names of
persons are rendered in the Indo-European order of first name first, family
name second (Kelemen Guszti 88: Guszti Kelemen 89 (HVH)), that is, the
target culture order is substituted, in Hungarian translations of English STs
the order is never reversed. (Interestingly, substituting the reversed order used
to be normal practice in Hungarian translations just a century ago, which is
clearly a hint at the existence of shifts in macro-contextual conditions.)

Obviously, this study is far too small-scale to serve as the basis for any
far-reaching conclusions in a statistically relevant way. But it does raise a num-
ber of interesting questions, I think. Analyses based on more extensive parallellcorpora, including texts from various authors, types, genres and language
pairs, could be used to establish evidence for the existence of translational norms and how these norms vary from genre to genre, period to period, or cul-
ture to culture.

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THE GLOBALISATION OF TRANSLATION

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Introduction

Translation is by nature international, but this article will address mostly the remarkable changes that have occurred in the fields of practical translation, theoretical Translation Studies, and the interplay between theory and practice with special emphasis on the seachanges since 1990. The article starts with an overview of the development of translation from the earliest time.

Interpreting must be the oldest form of translation, since it has existed ever since the first contacts between humans speaking different languages. Written translation presupposes no less than three literate people, namely the original writer, a translator, and a reader in the target language. It therefore presupposes two civilizations with fairly sophisticated educational systems as well as systems of writing. Therefore, it has until quite recently been dominated by the elite. It has been used for treaties, agreements, and dictates. The kind of translation activity which is best documented and therefore most heatedly debated is that of elitist documents, such as literature and, most importantly, religion. It is quite thought-provoking that two of the world’s largest religions are based on translation: Buddhist sutras were originally written in Sanskrit and were translated into Chinese (from c AD 150 to c AD 1100), and Christianity is based on the teachings of Jesus Christ who spoke Aramaic. The Aramaic ‘original(s)’ of the New Testament are not extant, but have been interpreted and translated from c AD 50 to the present day from Latin, Greek and Hebrew — and even English versions.

The overview and its historical setting

In order to place this article in a proper perspective, I believe a brief outline of the history of translation is in place. European thinking is still dominant in the field of Translation Studies so the history of translation is primarily related to European history and to written translation.
The first period is from the earliest translations until c. 1540

In terms of thinking, this period was dominated by translation of religious texts and the ensuing debates. Latin was the dominant source language and most translation was of scriptures and classical works into vernacular languages. Translation was mostly undertaken by clerics and the style was characterized by a considerable fidelity to the letter of the text.

Lutheranism was the major force behind the bible translation in national vernaculars, which were usually made by teams of translators whose work would then be the authorized version of the national church.

The second period is from c. 1540 to 1790

The increasing importance of the vernacular languages led to the emergence of national literatures. Although the translations of the classics continued, there was also literary translation between the vernaculars.

New genres were created. The English sonnet, for example, was created by means of translations of Italian sonnets in the 16th century. In the 18th, the English novel made it to Germany because the Kingdom of Hanover was part of Great Britain, and from there it was transferred to other countries.

Translation in this epoch was pronouncedly free. This was hardly because of a deliberate translation strategy, but rather due to the fact that translators were simply not well versed in the foreign languages. Even if they were, the likelihood that anybody would check on fidelity was small. Copyright barely existed and adaptation was frequently used to accommodate local tastes.

There was some semiprofessional translation. Some states began to have employees whose primary work was to translate or interpret in trade, in customs work, and in the precursors of today’s foreign ministries.

From the French Revolution to the Second World War: 1790-1945

The eighteenth century saw the slow emergence of the middle classes who came to constitute the bourgeoisie in Europe. The young men became more educated and, in so far as foreign languages were concerned, both the aristocracy and the middle classes focused on learning French all over Europe.

The French Revolution ultimately brought about the Napoleonic Wars. Napoleon’s troops moved at an incredible pace and conquered most of Europe. The reason is usually overlooked by historians, but in that epoch, before the nation states, Napoleon could count on willing interpreters
wherever he went. His troops were welcomed by young men willing to speak French and helping the troops getting provisions.

After the war, these young men settled down, perhaps in some traditional line. For those who had the talent, the new field of translation became a profession. These translators varied in competence. Also, the evaluation of what constituted adequate competence varied from country to country. Some countries introduced official examinations (certificates, authorizations) for translators to guarantee the quality of translations. These certifications represented a key concept in translation work: it is always undertaken because there is a societal or cultural need for it.

Standards in translation improved in the course of the 19th century. Improved educational systems reduced illiteracy and swelled the ranks of those who knew a foreign language, often the lingua franca in their region. In the United Kingdom, that language was English; in Northern Europe, German; and in Southern and Eastern Europe, French. Latin was no longer the dominant source language. Relay translation in which a translation into one language serves as the source text for a new translation into a third language was found on a large scale. Shakespeare made it to Romanian from German and French translations. The English translations from German of the brothers Grimm’s *German Tales* served for Japanese and from there to Chinese translations.

In terms of approaches to the text, technology and the natural sciences demanded exactness, a literal translation. Romanticism had strengthened the notion of the uniqueness of the original and therefore that, in principle, a translation was merely a pale reflection, inferior to the real thing.

**Europe 1945–1970: international co-operation**

World War I was conducted by national armies under national generals. After the war, the League of Nations was a Francophone organization because it was a diplomatic body. Then, in 1940 the Red Army set up a course for military linguists and schools for training translators and interpreters were founded in Geneva in 1941 and in Vienna in 1943. Translation was established as an activity in its own right, distinct from foreign language acquisition which is a crucial watershed transition for the discipline.

Due to the quick French defeat and the massive U.S. intervention, there were fewer languages of command during World War II. This war was fought between armies dominated by Russian and English on the Allied side, and German and Japanese on the other side.
The period following World War II was politically dominated by the Cold War. The military and scientific competition between East and West led to attempts to make translation by machines so as to avoid human labour and fallibility — but with little success.

There was international co-operation at various levels that called for linguistic mediation. Professionals trained in schools began to gain prominence.

A number of international organizations employed translators and interpreters. They introduced teamwork to an unprecedented degree at the same time that these language professionals gained visibility and status. New schools were founded and new languages taught.

The European nations gave up their former colonies, thus creating new nations that began to develop their own identities and understand and cope with their linguistic complexities.

1970-1990

By 1970 the third generation of translators who had received formal training entered the ranks. In the United Nations, Arabic became the sixth official language, and the precursor of the present-day European Union got the same number of official languages in 1973 when Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland became members of the club. The European Union institutions became obvious employers for translators and interpreters in Europe. Teamwork became even more widespread and began to be found in translation agencies.

Translation Studies emerged as a discipline in the academic world. Although it was still dominated by ideas of equivalence and linguistics, the discipline gradually came to view the translator as an active participant in the act of translation. This change was particularly obvious in Germany, where most translators still translate into their B- and C-languages. There were not enough translators working out of German in other countries to keep up with the growing need for translation that was to be used for the export of German products. German translators therefore needed to be aware of cultural differences between German and other languages’ ways of expressing things. The Germans developed a theory of translation, the ‘Skopostheorie’, to explain how translations must be adapted to other cultures.

Most important was the emergence of fora devoted to discussing translation and the increased visibility of organizations such as the International Federation of Translators and conferences for scholars of translation.
After 1990

Around 1990, the Cold War ended with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Newly independent states in Europe and in the former Soviet Union, each with national languages, emerged. Increasingly, there was an acceptance of the rights of minorities to speak their own languages. In some countries, this acceptance led to a sudden multiplicity of accepted languages and to a sharp rise in translations within the borders of nation states.

This is the period that I shall focus on in particular.

Until the 20th century

the only modes of translation were written translation and consecutive interpreting and sometimes also “whispered interpreting” which is nearly simultaneous with the original utterances.

The 20th century

At the beginning of the 20th century, with the introduction of silent movies, pictures alternated with intertexts. They rendered utterances (‘What are you doing?’ and ‘I feel sick’) and were a prerequisite for understanding the plot.

The introduction of talking films (1927), where the utterances are heard simultaneously with the action, added new modes of linguistic transfer:

One of these was synchronisation or dubbing, in which the original is provided with a target-language dialogue spoken by actors and recorded for target audiences in countries importing the film.

Another mode primarily connected with the importation of foreign films is subtitling in which the dialogue of the original is retained in the film’s soundtrack and the contents transferred to target-language writing. This is sometimes done from the written scripts, but these are often unreliable. Therefore, most professionals prefer to listen to actual speech in movies and the like. The transfer is thus (ideally) from oral source texts to a hopefully idiomatic, written translation.

A third mode found in films is voice-over, in which the original speaker is either muted or removed and instead there is a voice (of an actor or announcer) rendering the speech or dialogue in the target language. There are sometimes two voices, namely a man and a woman representing male and female characters respectively. In either case, the translator will work either from
written or spoken ‘origins’ and render them in writing for the persons speaking in the film or documentary in the target language.

The 20th century also saw the introduction large-scale of *simultaneous interpreting* where delegates speak into microphones linked to the interpreters’ booths and the interpreters render the speeches into the target language. This mode had its international breakthrough at the Nuremberg war crime tribunals in 1945 against the Nazi leaders of Adolf Hitler’s Germany. We may exemplify this by using the negotiations between an English and a Romanian delegation using their respective languages:

A Romanian delegate makes a speech containing a number of points in Romanian. He uses a microphone which is heard only by two English interpreters whose understanding of Romanian is perfect. They render the points made by Romanian into English immediately as they hear them (time-lag 2-10 seconds). Their English rendition is heard by the English delegates who use earphones (and thus do not hear the Romanian speech). An English delegate can then take the floor, answer the points and perhaps add some new ones. These are heard only by two Romanian interpreters who have a perfect command of English, and these interpreters render the points of the English speech into Romanian. This mode of translation thus introduces near-simultaneity between the source-text and the target text, the translational product. The rendition is oral to oral. There are other forms of simultaneous interpreting: there is often simultaneous interpreting at international press conferences, and in some countries, such as Austria, news programmes use media interpreting, showing e.g. British footage, but providing simultaneous interpreting.

Since 1980 it has become customary to have operas sung in the original language (that is, mostly Italian, German, or Russian). In these cases, a translation is displayed above and occasionally on the side of the stage, *opera translation*.

Some modes of linguistic transfer are confined to special areas: voice-over is employed for documentaries and children’s programmes in virtually all countries and for films in relatively poor countries. Subtitling is found in countries where the population is literate, notably small ones (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, all with less than 8 million inhabitants), for films appealing to ‘small’ audiences (German serials broadcast at night in Great Britain, European films screened for intellectuals in Buenos Aires, Argentina, etc.). Religious interpreting, which is a ‘no-no’ for European interpreters, is practiced in overseas Chinese communities.
Institutionalised translation

The Chinese translation of the Buddhist sutras, which as mentioned began around AD 150, is among the first known instances of institutionalised translation. Others were the Arabic centres of translation in the city of Baghdad in the ninth and tenth centuries, and in present-day Spain, mostly in Toledo in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Paradoxically, these Arabic translation activities saved many of the central works of Greek and Roman philosophy and science as well as much Arabic scholarship for the European renaissance (c AD 1400). The first well-documented truly multilingual political meeting in Europe was the ‘Congress of Vienna’ (1814-1815) where more than 200 European rulers and their delegates met in the capital of Austria to determine European borderlines after the Napoleonic Wars.

Today, there are many international organisations that have several official languages: the United Nations uses English for internal work, but issues political statements simultaneously in its six official languages: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish. The language work is done by a permanent staff of c 450 translators and 150 interpreters in addition to free-lancers. The largest professional staff of translators is found at the European Union institutions. They tie together 25 European countries by means of translation from and into the 20 official languages.1 These institutions have a staff of nearly 1,000 interpreters and 3,000 translators and terminologists.

Minority languages

At the same time there has also, both nationally and internationally, been a growing awareness of minorities’ right to have their own language, even within major nations. In Europe, Switzerland has always accepted four languages among its citizens (French, German, Italian, and Rhaeto-Romance). The modern European nation states were created in tumultuous processes lasting up to nearly two-hundred years after the Napoleonic wars. These nation states have often had difficulties in accepting minority languages: Official Spain only accepted the minority languages of some of its regions within the last twenty years and Latvia, which gained independence in 1991, only accepted the rights of its 40% Russian minority a few years ago. So the process of acceptance of minority languages is slowly but surely gaining ground. In the US, the ‘cradle of democracy’, which prides itself on its human rights, it is only within the last decades that everybody on trial in a court of
law has obtained the right to be present not only physically, but also linguistically (by means of translators and interpreters).

**Minor and major languages**

It is even more interesting that the division between major and minor languages is getting blurred: when six European nations laid the foundation stones for the European Union in 1952, Italian and Dutch both became ‘official languages’, but most negotiations and daily work were conducted only in German and French. When Denmark (5.2 million inhabitants), Ireland, and the UK entered in 1973, the tables were all of sudden turned as the English and Danes demanded ‘equal linguistic rights’ — and eventually got some concessions. At that stage, Denmark itself had accepted that its own linguistic minorities in the North Atlantic, the Faeroe Islands (44,000 inhabitants) and Greenland (56,000 inhabitants) should have near-autonomous status and their own parliaments for local affairs.

The world domination of English as ‘lingua franca’ should also be taken with a large grain of salt: far from all people who claim to speak ‘English’ are understandable to most other speakers of English, native as well as non-native. We are seeing a segmentation of ‘English’. I predict that there will be a ‘world English of top speakers and teachers of Received Standard English’ or, in the US, a ‘world American’. These branch out into national varieties of Australian, New Zealand, and South African English, all of which have an identity of their own, but are spoken by many or even most inhabitants in these countries. Then there are countries in which English is used for business purposes between people of the same ‘nationality’: Nigeria comprises more than 100 indigenous languages. South Africa has eleven official languages and, in addition, numerous ‘heritage languages’ which are the first languages spoken by people (at home and in families).

Experts in various fields communicate internationally at conferences, in journals and on the Internet in some variety of English which is often opaque to outsiders, but which has become the acknowledged standard in their respective fields: the essential message is encoded in equations, drawings, sketches and the like, rather than idiomatic and syntactically correct ‘English’.

We will therefore not be faced with one ‘world-English’, but with a very large number of ‘regional Englishes’ as second languages as well as social and educational segmentations of these types of English. Experts will use types of English that differ from those of tourists, and so on. In other contexts, most obviously international politics, industry, and business, the top politicians and executives will have to depend on the services of linguistic middlemen whose
foreign language and cultural competence is tops: There will be an explosion in the number of translators, interpreters, subtitlers, surtitlers and the like, in the globalised world of tomorrow.

National languages and even minority languages will not be replaced by a world English in the foreseeable future. There are clear indications that the minor languages are hitting back: whereas English was the dominant language on the Internet in terms of web sites, home pages and the like in the mid-1990s, the latest figures show that it is now down to 40% of the number of accessible home pages — to which we should add that most ‘chatrooms’ are local and not English at all.

**The last decade of the 20th century**

The most momentous and sudden changes in the world of translation and interpreting took place in the last decade of the 20th century.

The increased internationalisation and augmentation in translation work meant that language combinations which had not been taken into account previously gained importance, such as the languages of South East Asia.

The ‘machine translation systems’ came of age, and developed in ways that could be put to practical use around 1990.

The large-scale use of computers (and the complementary electronic tools including translation memories) by all the 4,000 language professionals at the European Union institutions meant that enormous corpora of translations became available to all staff.

Finally, in 1992, the world-wide web became accessible. Machine Translation took to the Internet in 1997.

The changes are daunting.

**Teamwork**

These changes can probably best be described by two key terms: *recycling* and *teamwork*. These were rarely key words in the West previously. There is now a dawning comprehension, notably in politics and education, that groups of people may share loyalties and can work together as equals, recognising differences in ability, competence, and knowledge. Teamwork has been particularly slow to seep down in most professional translation circles in the West where — until twenty years ago — one would meet translators who jealously guarded and treasured their specialist vocabularies. However, the practice has been well known for half a century in some translation agencies. The
United Nations as well as the European Union both of which have come into existence after 1945, have recycled translations in so far as new legislation would have to follow the precise wording of previous translations concerning the same topic. Until the large-scale introduction of computers, the mere identification of such previous translation (‘documentation’) was time-consuming as it demanded use of dictionaries, terminology lists, and complex indexing systems. Now the translators in these organisations can, immediately, store all documentation for assignment in their computers and access the whole store of the organisation’s previous translations of legally binding agreements. The computer will tell the translator immediately whether a sentence has been translated before and in which form: if legally binding, the phrasing of the first finalised directive cannot be changed. However, if it is an *ad hoc* translation, the translator can re-use previous suggestions or — perhaps — be inspired to write something new and more adequate. There are numerous Translation Memory systems on the market, with TRADOS, SYSTRAN and Déjà-vu dominating in Europe.

The European Union institutions now have their own advanced version of the SYSTRAN machine translation system which is used for ‘translating’ more than 500,000 pages a year for non-linguistic staff. This system is strictly for internal use, the products must never be released to others than the user in question, and it is not accessible to the public. It serves to give staff members an overview of the general contents of a document.

Small translation agencies usually specialise in one or two fields and cater for a limited number of clients. This means that there will often be previous translations concerning the subject matter. When they introduce translation memory systems (often abbreviated to TM) these function well for translation work. It takes a firm with four translators about six months before the investment begins to pay off, as they accumulate previous translation and can consequently increase the number of pages they translate per day.

**Internet translation**

The principles of Internet translation are, to some extent, the same as those mentioned above. Small surprise, for the machine translation system available free of charge is, usually, an earlier version of SYSTRAN than the one for sale on the commercial market. The procedure is extremely simple. One finds a source text and asks to have it translated — by means of what is termed ‘translate’, ‘translator’, or ‘language tools’ and has a translation in English, Spanish, or French. It will have been noted that I focus on these three languages only, although the Internet system prides itself on having numerous
language combinations. The reason is that, at present, English, French, and Spanish are the only language combinations that work well enough to give a general idea of the potential of Internet translation. In the case of English, this is clearly because so much has been translated into and from it. French is strong because it was previously used in international treaties — and more importantly — because all documents in Canada must be written in both Canadian-English and Quebequois-French, the latter having much in common with written French. Spanish is strong partly because of translation activity between South and North America and also because Spanish translators are good at providing the machine systems with feedback leading to improvements.

In order to provide my readers with a general impression of the potential relevance of Internet translation, I can give a real-life example: I pick an article in the national Spanish newspaper ‘El mundo’ (= The World) at the site ‘www.elmundo.es’:

“Y la sharia funciona perfectamente en Sokoto [in Nigeria]. ‘Este es el lugar más seguro del país. Aquí nunca hubo matanzas, como en el estado vecino de Kano [another province in Nigeria],’ asegura un cristiano que tiene aquí un comercio desde hace 25 años”

I ask for a translation from Spanish into English. In a fraction of a second, I get the following rendition: “And the sharia works perfectly in Sokoto. “This it is the place more surely of the country. Here never there were slaughters, like in the neighboring state of Kano,” assures a Christian who has been having here a commerce for 25 years.”

There are howlers, to be sure. But we can easily rephrase the above translation into something readable: “The sharia works well in Sokoto. “This is the safest place in the country. There have never been any murders here, unlike in our neighbouring state of Kano,” assures a Christian man who has had a business here for 25 years.”

At a guess nearly 10 million pages are ‘translated’ in this way on the Internet every day. Just think of what will happen when Internet translation is just as adequate between Romanian and English and other language combinations.

Predictions

The Internet will not put translators out of business — on the contrary, the world will need more translators. Their work will become increasingly specialised and with a steady shift towards more intelligent control of the
work done by previous translators as well as machines and technological tools.

It is a guess on my part that, since the power of the computer hardware is doubled every 18 months, we shall in the near future see programmes that can search a million bilingual home pages in a matter of seconds and suggest different translations which are equally adequate in different situations for the same source-language segment.

At the same time, we have to rethink our approaches to translation and translational products.

The autonomous translations

In a study of translations of the Tales of the brothers Grimm into Danish over a 170-year time-span (Dollerup 1999), I found that different translations of the same stories may co-exist, even be published the same year and sell well. My study also showed that translations may persist even when the original is ‘lost’. Thus some Grimm tales translated into Danish remained ‘alive’ in Denmark for nearly 80 years in the bourgeois Danish translation of the Grimm Tales, even though the stories had only appeared in one of the seven ‘authorised’ German editions.

This leads to the question of translations’ independence of the source-text. It is not confined to translations of fairytales. It also goes — more strikingly — for the Christian Bible (that is ‘the New Testament’) which, as mentioned, has no extant Aramaic ‘original’. Nevertheless, this book has permeated Western life for nearly 2,000 years.

In other words, translations acquire an autonomous life not only in terms of being selected for translation, but also in their translated forms.

Today, most things we buy come with manuals and in many countries come in several languages. They are made by agencies that outsource the translation work, and in them, texts in various languages co-exist. The only text that we read, is the one in our native language. The other translations exist only physically, but we do not imbue them with life as they are incomprehensible and irrelevant to us. The manuals are also changing: every time a new feature is added to the commodity in question, translators are asked to translate. Of course they do not retranslate the whole text: they merely insert or delete the appropriate phrases — there is not really any ‘original’ any more.

The well-defined source text of yesterday’s elitist contexts is gradually receding. Today many texts are handled by numerous people at different stages in the production of a ‘translation’: in the source language there may be several ‘authors’, the process of translation may involve various translators
and teams, and the target texts may be 'localised', i.e. adapted to the conventions and standards of the target culture.

The interplay of forces

A translation has to function in other cultures than the one in which it originated. Speaking about translation, a Chinese scholar Ju Miao (2000) has used the term ‘transplantation’: “When we transplant a tree, we suddenly cut it off from its natural, peaceful environment, its ecological system. The tree is no doubt seriously affected if not disastrously so. In its transportation to distant lands, the tree definitely suffers from the changes, though we make efforts to preserve its entirety. When we plant it in the foreign, remote soil, our principal concern is to make it survive and flourish in the foreign land. The tree must endure changes and get along with the new environment. It will become part of other ecological systems and play a new role, which is the purpose of the transplantation. The implications of this analogy in the context of translation will signify an inclination towards target orientation” (Ju 2000: 202).

I would like to add: if translational products are to survive, they should, as far as possible, be made by native speakers — people who are familiar with the target culture and able to phrase messages in a clear, fluent or, if you like, elegant way in order to carry conviction with target audiences.

Notes

The information in this article derives mostly from interviews with people in the world of translation such as presidents of national associations (e.g. Slovenia, Hungary, Russia, etc), staff at language institutions (e.g. South Africa, Denmark) and with staff and directors of the translation and interpreting services of organisations including the United Nations and some of the European Union institutions. The history of translation and Translation Studies are also based on my own work. There are numerous other versions.

1 Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Slovene, Slovak, Spanish, and Swedish.

2 The World Wide Web was created by Tim Berners-Lee while he worked at the leading European scientific laboratory for fundamental particle research in Switzerland (CERN). The system was originally developed around 1990 in order to allow large groups of researchers to keep up to date with recent developments in studies they participated in. The first useful public browser was set up c 1992.
References


Various library catalogues confirm that books by American authors and books about America in French and German could be found in Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania as early as 1790 (See Cernovodeanu, Verzea 1977). But the first Romanian translations from American writers were done only after 1829, when the end of the Phanariot Greek ruling (1821), the return of native princes and the weakening of the Ottoman domination over the principalities after the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829, opened the way for national and cultural development and marked the beginning of the modern age. The rise of a national consciousness that led to the 1848 revolutions and the Union of Moldavia and Wallachia in 1859, “can be seen as an increasingly successful affirmation of the Romanian people, one that culminated in the Union of 1918.” (Treptow 1996:239) In this context, the urgent need for self-affirmation of a national literature to be recognized as such among other European literatures was part of the complex process of forging and giving voice to that consciousness. The need for a national literature triggered the need for a more vigorous and flexible Romanian language, weakened by the domination of Slavonic and Greek in Moldavia and Wallachia and by the social and political marginalization of the Romanians in Transylvania.

Translations from other literatures, American included, played an important role in the process. Most translations of American texts were first published in the literary supplements of the new journals that came out after 1829, advocating the Romanian opening to Western modernity (to Europe in the first place, but also to America) — among them, Ion-Heliade Rădulescu’s Curierul românesc (1829) in Bucharest, Gheorghe Asachi’s Albina Românească (1829) in Iași, Constantin Lecca’s Mozaicul in Craiova, and, a decade later, Gazeta de Transilvania and Foaie pentru minte, înimă și literatură (1838) published by Timotei Cipariu and George Barițiu in Transylvania. Most of these translations, done from French or German versions, were short pieces of political writing, essays, texts that served moral or educational purposes, local color stories, tales and poems. Among the favorite writers were Franklin, Irving, Poe, Bret Harte, Twain, Longfellow.
Thomas Perry is of the opinion that, like in other Central and Eastern European countries (Perry 2001: 28), the role of translations in the growth of national culture was not so much to introduce foreign writers as to help better articulate and enrich the vernacular, giving it a new European status. This is, however, only a partial truth.

In my present inquiry into the 19th century Romanian translations of the American novel I attempt to prove that in the case of American literature, the politics of Romanian translations was dictated first and foremost by political motives. At a time when Romanians were looking for models of reform and national development, the young United States had already become a challenge to old Europe. Kogâlniceanu, one of the leading artisans of the Romanian national awakening and cultural revival, would call the United States “the most civilized and sincerely religious nation in America” (Kogâlniceanu 1967:162, my translation).

The reception of American literature in the 19th century Romanian lands has long been a subject of scholarly interest, yet within what seems to be a well-documented area of research, the novel received little if any critical attention. One reason may be the small number of translations: apart from a long list of popular, “Western” or “dime” novels by obscure authors, translated from German for popular consumption (Perry 2001:56) only two novels by reputed American writers were translated into Romanian during the 19th century: Harriett Beecher Stowe’s *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* (1853) and Edward Bellamy’s *Looking Backward* (1891); yet not even two, if we consider Bellamy’s book a utopian romance rather than a novel. As for the one-volume “translation” of Cooper’s five novels making up *The Leather-Stocking* series — *The Pioneers* (1823), *The Last of the Mohicans* (1826), *The Prairie* (1827), *The Pathfinder* (1840) and *The Deerslayer* (1841) — published in the collection *Biblioteca albastrã ilustratã* (“The Blue Illustrated Library”, 1889), it contains only abridged, illustrated versions of Cooper’s novels, reduced to no more than brief summaries of the plots.

Looking at the short list of only two American novels in Romanian translation one cannot help wondering why these two rather than others, and why so few? I would try to provide some answers by pointing out two important aspects of the reception of American literature in Romania. First, it is important to realize that all through the 19th century, with a few notable exceptions, American literature did not capture the attention of the Europeans, being regarded as more or less a pale offshoot of British literature. Furthermore, for most Romanian readers, the contact with it was mediated by the French and/or German languages and cultures with which many of them were familiar — hence, the small number of Romanian translations. Second, the emanci-
pation of American literature as national literature, marked by Emerson’s “Divinity School Address” (also known as the “Declaration of Independence of American Literature”, 1838), was almost simultaneous with the rise of Romanian national literature (after 1829). Hence, the rather late ascendancy of the novel in both literatures and the importance paid by both cultures to the political and educational/moral dimension of literature seen as an instrument of forging the national consciousness and introducing democratic reforms—which explains, to some extent, not only the small number of translations, but also the selection criteria.

Uncle Tom’s Cabin, a “plantation novel” and Looking Backward, a utopia, were international best sellers that enjoyed an enormous success and were translated into numerous languages. Uncle Tom’s Cabin sold 10,000 copies in a few days after its publication and 350,000 copies in the first year, being translated into 30 languages. Look Backward, sold 10,000 copies per month in 1889 and in the first two years it printed 300,000 copies, being, after Uncle Tom’s Cabin, the 19th century book with the highest number of printed copies (Dorobâț 2000:71). It was translated into 40 languages, Esperanto included (Conn 1989: 184). The Romanians translated the two books from French — Uncle Tom’s Cabin a few months after its publication in the U.S., and Looking Backward three years after its U.S. publication. An interesting detail that gives a measure of Stowe’s impact on Romanian culture is the publication of two different Romanian translations of her book, in Jassy, at a very short interval of time from each other. The first one was Coliba lui Moș Toma sau Viața negrilor în sudul Statelor Unite (Iași, Buciumul română, 1853), translated by Teodor Codrescu, with a preface by Mihail Kogâlniceanu, and the second, Bordeiul unchiului Tom sau Viața negrilor din America (Iași, Institutul Albinei, 1853) translated by Prof. Dimitrie Pop and illustrated with 50 lithographs from the French version of Leon Pilatte.

Both are books concerned with social injustice and social reforms, with political and moral issues. Uncle Tom’s Cabin draws on the tradition of the plantation novel, but as its subtitle, “Life Among the Lowly,” indicates, it focuses on “the lowly” rather than “the rich”, on the hard life of the slaves rather than on the idealized life of the plantation owners. Its protagonist, Uncle Tom, is a noble black slave whose love and compassion, courage and religious fortitude despite suffering turns him into a Christ figure. As Stowe confesses in her “Preface”, the object of her sentimental novel is moral and political: “to awaken sympathy and feeling for the African race, as they exist among us.” She finds in the power of sympathy and compassion a useful political instrument and agent of conversion._
A “novel of the middle-class left,” *Looking Backward* was the most popular and influential of the several utopian fictions that appeared between the 1880s and the early 1900s. It responded to the materialism and the social injustices of the new industrial order by projecting a socialist utopia of an America thriving on principles of justice and on economic equality and stability. The protagonist, Julian West, wakens from a century’s sleep in the Boston of the year 2000 to discover the advantages of an ideal “cooperative commonwealth” that replaced the unjust system of competitive capitalism, with a planned economy that allowed for the national wealth to be equally distributed among all the members of the society.

*Looking Backward* initiated in the United States a vogue of utopian debate that lasted until after the turn of the century. Bellamy’s plea for “a nationalist society of economic equality under socialism” strongly affected US economic thinking and led to the creation of so-called Bellamy “Nationalist” clubs and the rise of the Nationalist party. (Tindall and Shi 1999:977)

The social, political and moral impact of *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* and *Looking Backward*, both grounded in two worldwide political movements –abolitionism and utopian socialism — was undoubtedly the main reason why the books were translated into Romanian. The Romanian progressive intellectuals found in these books the necessary support for the Romanian versions of these movements. *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* was instrumental in speeding up the abolition of gypsy slavery in the Romanian principalities — in Moldavia in 1855 and in Wallachia in 1856, ten years before abolition of slavery in the US (Mihăilă 1995:19-24), and *Looking Backward* helped revitalize the Romanian traditions of utopian socialism, making an acknowledged contribution to the founding, in 1894, of the Social-Democratic Party of the Romanian Workers, the first workers’ party in this country, of its newspaper “Munca” and the socialist review “Lumea Noua”.

The fact that the books were works of fiction, emphasized in the case of *Looking Backward* by the publication of the translation in the popular collection *Romanul* (“The Novel”), was important mainly because fictional works could reach a greater number of readers. The social effect of the translation was certainly more important than its aesthetic value. Significantly, the first
edition of *Looking Backward* (*Privire Îndârât*, 1891) makes no mention of the names of the translator and the publisher. Romanian literature itself was in the making and its main concern was still to refine the literary language and to create one strong nation. At a time when Hawthorne advised American writers to shift their focus from “national” to “literature”, Ioan Heliade Rădulescu urged the Romanians to write no matter what, but to keep writing: “Scrieți băieți, scrieți, orice numai să scrieți!”

The Romanian reader will discover the 19th century American novelists only in the 20th century. The first translation of Twain’s *Huckleberry Finn*, for instance, came out in 1943, and so did the translation of *Moby Dick*. While Stowe’s *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* remained an all time favorite with the cultural activists of the communist regime, the books of Melville, Hawthorne, Howells, Twain, Henry James, started to be translated only in the 60s, the decade when Romania adopted a more independent policy toward the Soviet Union and attempted a rapprochement with the West. But this is an entirely different story.

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COHESIVE MECHANISMS IN LEGAL TRANSLATIONS

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Of the many fields in translation I have chosen to discuss here the language of the law which tends to violate many of the precepts of style and syntax applied to common language, and has therefore earned the reputation of being a “jargon”.

Legal translations raise very complex theoretical and practical problems and therefore an interdisciplinary comparative approach of the two legal systems and languages is compulsory for the specialized translators. Legal texts can be translated “to the letter of the law”, by preserving the textual features of the source texts and implicitly the intention of the emitter, or “in the spirit of the law” with a view to the social-cultural context where they are going to be received.

The paper focuses on a subgenre of the legal discourse, i.e. the language of court documents. The legal provisions are not the object of this discussion. Consequently, for the translation practice I chose case documents whose translation has generally been “to the letter”, as proved by most of the examined samples.

The paper will concentrate on the functions of the cohesive mechanisms in legal texts and their relevance in translation.

Theoretical background

Equivalence can be said to be the central issue in translation. Many different translation theories refer to it in a direct or disguised way, either supporting or attacking the notion on the basis of different philosophical assumptions about the relationship between language and reality. Thus, equivalence has been successively regarded as a necessary condition for translation, as an irrelevant concept because of its vagueness and ambiguity, even as a damaging, or impossible one. Some scholars have tried to find more appropriate terms to refer to the source and target text relationship: analogy, invariance, congruence, convergence, adequacy, appropriateness, optimal / relevant similarity, etc. (Dimitriu 2002: 95)

Equivalence has been studied from different points of view in relation to the translation process, and new adjectives have been assigned to the notion
(grammatical, textual, pragmatic equivalence, and several others). Out of all these I shall focus on the textual approaches since they have relevance in legal translations.

Translation scholars irrespective of orientation have agreed that communication by language is primarily a communication by texts.

According to Albrecht Neubert (1996), textual translations have been approached either holistically or generically.

From the holistic perspective Neubert (1996) identifies seven features that define textuality and are relevant to the textual approach to translation: intentionality, acceptability, situationality, informativity, cohesion, coherence, intertextuality.

“The concept of cohesion is a semantic one; it refers to relations of meaning that exist within the text, and that define it as a text”. (Halliday, Hassan 1976: 4) Cohesion markers have traditionally been classified into grammatical and lexico-grammatical.

Intertextuality connects the holistic perspective, to which all the other text characteristics contribute to the generic one. In a generic sense, intertextuality ties the TT (target text) with other “similar” texts belonging to the same genre or type. Besides this meaning of intertextuality, there is another obvious one which refers to all the allusions, quotations, references of a text to other texts.

A complementary area of research examines texts in terms of their belonging to particular genres and types.

According to Baker (1992) cohesion is a network of lexical, grammatical, and other relations which provide links between the various parts of a text. These relations or ties organize and, to some extent, create a text, for instance by requiring the reader to interpret words and expressions by reference to other words and expressions in the surrounding sentences and paragraphs. Halliday and Hassan (1976: 9) suggest that while cohesive ties do exist within a sentence, “it is the intersentence cohesion that is significant, because that represents the variable aspect of cohesion, distinguishing one text from another.” Although many models of cohesion have been outlined (Callow 1974, Beaugrande and Dressler 1981, Hoey 1991), the one provided by Halliday and Hassan (1976) is the most detailed one available. They identify five main cohesive devices in English: reference, substitution, ellipsis, conjunction, and lexical cohesion. Following this line, I will explain below some of these devices and I will try to explore their relevance for legal translations.

Given the peculiarities of legal documents, the present analysis will focus on the following cohesive procedures: coreferrerality, ellipsis, conjunction or textual connector, and repetition or parallelism.
In what follows I shall present a corpus-based quantitative and qualitative analysis of fragments of legal cases. They are taken from authentic documents in Romanian and they are accompanied by their translations into English. The translations belong to various authorized translators and have been authenticated by public notaries.

Unlike the legal provisions which have a prescriptive form, a clear and concise language, unique reference, and are non-redundant, the discourse of these documents is based on a larger text-typology and its purpose is to explain the legislative provisions, indicating the modalities of their application. These texts have a more complex structure, are characterized by the massive use of formulas and are less rigid, more individualized, more concrete, less systematized, more open to non-legal terms than legal provisions.

One of the interesting aspects about the use of linguistic resources in legal discourse is that text producers do not always follow economical principles in choosing their means of expression.

Analysis

1. **Reference**, and more specifically, **coreferentiality**, as a special case of recurrence, is a relationship between two verbal units with a common referent, developed at sentential or trans-sentential level. This relationship is both grammatical and lexical-semantic, since the recoding of the referent can be achieved by substitution with elements without a meaning of their own, namely, pro-forms.

Although Halliday and Hassan (1976) use a restricted notion of reference based on textual rather than extra-linguistic relations, they still acknowledge that the relationship of reference may be established situationally. Hoey (1988:162) defines co-referentiality as another type of reference relation which is not strictly textual but “a matter of real-world knowledge”. Baker (1992: 182) suggests that trying to draw a line between textual and situational is not particularly helpful for translation since reference can be viewed as a continuum stretching from full repetition to pronominal reference.

**Pro-forms** are known in modern linguistics as the whole class of words devoid of reference, which acquire reference only contextually, within linguistic context, through a connection with a referential source. So, reference is a device which allows the reader to trace participants, entities, events, etc. in a text.

Legal discourse is characterized by a higher frequency of pro-forms than common language.
Investigating pronominal, adjectival and adverbial pro-forms and their equivalents in legal translations, we found out that pronominal pro-forms are overwhelmingly frequent, followed by adjectival ones, while the adverbial pro-forms are quite rare.

Within **pronominal pro-forms** I focused on demonstrative, indefinite and relative forms, which are more frequent than personal ones.

The **demonstrative pronouns and adjectives** of proximity have the highest frequency in the examined documents and they confer textual cohesion. As far as their translation in legal texts is concerned, the equivalence may be easily obtained if the translator is aware of the general preference for certain patterns of reference of each particular language, as well as of the specific preferences that are sensitive to text-type.

Thus, besides the equivalence achievable at word level by the use of similar pro-forms in the target language (English), translators can resort to techniques like:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>TRANSPOSITION</th>
<th>EXPANSION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in aceste condiții, în prezența unor martori, am fost percheziționați corporal</td>
<td>și a declinat competența în favoarea acesteia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s-a constatat că aceste două sume sunt false</td>
<td>instanța a dispus menținerea acesteia pe perioada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cu motivarea că acesta s-a mutat de la adresa</td>
<td>incheierile premergătoare acesteia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iar privitor la culoarea bancnotelor găsite asupra mea, a declarat că acestea erau de culoare roșiiatică</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Differing from each other mostly by their relative position to the reference source, anaphoric and cataphoric relations characterize the legal discourse in most languages. The examination of the corpus proved that the anaphoric type has a high frequency in both Romanian and English legal texts, and the equivalence in translation is achieved with little difficulty.

The frequency of the **indefinite pronouns and adjectives** can be explained by their general and abstract character which also characterizes the legal disc-
Their translation in legal texts might seem redundant and they could be omitted in English especially when a phraseological unit is required by the context, or could be expanded in similar cases. Transposition is a right solution in formulas quoted from legal provisions.

| **OMISSION** |
|:---|:---|
| • este în afară de orice discuție că arestarea inculpatului | • it is beyond discussion that the arrest of the accused |
| **EXPANSION** |
| • de către un judecător sau de către o altă persoană | • by a judge or any other person [double indefinite pronoun] |
| **TRANSPOSITION** |
| • Orice persoană arestată sau deținută [Indef. Adj.] | • • Everyone arrested or detained [Indef. Pronoun] |
| • Orice persoană lipsită de libertatea sa | • • Everyone who is deprived of his liberty |

The relative pronouns and adjectives represent a category of reference which has a great relevance in legal provisions due to the length and complexity of the sentences. Court documents, which are presented in a more accessible structure, with sentences of a more moderate length, make use of a more reduced number of relative pronouns and adjectives. The role of these cohesive elements is to concentrate a large amount of information in one utterance. Still, their translation raises few problems, because word equivalence can easily result in text equivalence, from this point of view. English allows the use of adverbs instead of relative pronouns and adjectives, as well as their omission.

| **TRANSPOSITION** |
|:---|:---|
| • prin care am criticat | • where I criticized [adverb] |
| **OMISSION** |
| • un act ce urmărește | • an act aimed at |

Adjectival pro-forms are best represented in Romanian by pronominal demonstrative adjectives derived from adverbs which are easily translated by English adjectives.

| **TRANSPOSITION** |
|:---|:---|
| • că o asemenea cerere ar fi admisibilă | • that such a request is admissible [adjective] |
**Adverbial pro-forms** have a similar role and behaviour both in the legal texts and in the translation process. The most frequent adverb in Romanian court documents is *astfel* which functions in most cases as a pro-group form, substituting a whole syntagm. Its translation varies contextually.

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<th>TRANSPOSITION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>astfel</em> cum a fost acest articol interpretat</td>
<td><em>as</em> it was interpreted by [conjunction]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>astfel</em> cum acestea au fost interpretate</td>
<td><em>as</em> they were interpreted by [conjunction]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>astfel</em> șa încât, prin decizia nr. 62</td>
<td><em>so that</em> by Decision no. 62 [part of a conjunction phrase.]</td>
</tr>
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</table>

2. **Ellipsis** involves the omission of an item. This is the case of leaving something unsaid which is nevertheless understood. **Ellipsis** is a mechanism opposed to recurrence and its frequency in legal texts is quite reduced because the advantage conferred by concision is contradictory to the need for precision. Being a source of ambiguity, ellipsis has to be carefully treated in legal translations. However, court documents make use of nominal ellipsis, mostly in coordinative phrases and, rarely, of partial propositional ellipsis. These are the forms of ellipsis which leave the least way to ambiguity. They are used with caution in source texts and in most cases they don’t raise problems of equivalence.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Orice persoană arestată sau deținută</strong></td>
<td><strong>Everyone arrested or detained</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>dreptul de a fi judecat într-un termen rezonabil sau eliberat în cursul procedurii</strong></td>
<td><strong>shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial</strong> [transposition]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>poate și trebuie șa exercite</strong></td>
<td><strong>may and should exercise</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>independent față de puterea executivă și de părțiile din proces</strong></td>
<td><strong>independent from the executive power and from the parties involved in the trial</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. **Repetition or parallelism**, is somehow related to recurrence as a cohesive mechanism and it serves the same purpose of achieving clarity and precision. It is common knowledge that the language of the law tends to violate
many of the precepts of style and syntax that grammar teachers try to instill in their students. One of its characteristics is the use of identificationally over-specified referential expressions, i.e. expressions that seem to yield redundant information with regard to the recoverability of the referent. Repetition and parallelism are opposed to ellipsis and they dominate both legal provisions and court documents. The simplest and most frequent type is lexical repetition, while parallelism works as a repetition of a structural scheme associated with the replacement of lexical elements. Since any omission of such key elements might lead to mistranslations that can seriously alter the meaning of a legal document, legal translators stick to these cohesive devices disregarding the synthetic character of the target language, in this case English.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Repetition</th>
<th>Parallelism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Suma de 3 milioane de Lire italiane găsită asupra mea, precum și suma de...</td>
<td>• Tribunalul Timiș, sesizat cu apelul meu, nu s-a pronunțat asupra .....Curtea de Apel Timișoara, sesizată cu recursul meu,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• seriile bancnotelor găsite asupra mea se regăsesc între seriile bancnotelor găsite in</td>
<td>• The banknotes found on me amounting to 3 million Italian liras as well as the banknotes found...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Judecătoria Timișoara, sesizată cu cererea de prelungire a arestării mele preventive, în temeiul art. 159 din codul de procedură penală român, prin Incheierea nr. 2517 din 05 septembrie 2001, a dispus prelungirea arestării mele preventive cu începere</td>
<td>• the series on the banknotes found on me were similar with the series of the banknotes found at</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Întrucât cauza încetării de drept a măsurii arestării mele preventive a intervenit la 30 de zile după desesizarea Judecătoriei Timișoara prin pronunțarea sentinței, este evident că cererea mea de constatare a încetării măsurii arestării nu a</td>
<td>• The Timișoara Regional Court (Judecătoria Timisoara), at the prosecutor’s request to order my further detention on remand, under Article 159 of the Romanian Code of Criminal Procedure, by the minutes of the hearing no.2517 of 5 September 2001ordered my further detention on remand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Since the case for the ceasing by dint of the law of my pre-trial detention came up 30 days after the Timișoara Regional Court (Judecătoria Timisoara) disinvested itself by passing the sentence, it is obvious that my request to ascertain that my detention on remand ceased by dint of the law didn’t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Timis County Court (Tribunalul Timis), apprised of my appeal, did not rule ..... The Timisoara Court of Appeal (Curtea de Apel), apprised of my appeal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. **Conjunction** or **textual connectors** contribute to the achievement of textual unity both at formal and logical-semantic level. From a morphological
point of view both Romanian and English legal discourse abound in adverbs and adverbial phrases and simple or double conjunctions. On a semantic level the textual connectors establish a rather reduced number of relations compared to the typology which characterizes other genres. Within the legal genre, provisions display a great variety of compound connectors, most of which can be traced back to Old English: *hereinbefore, hereinafter, whomsoever, aforesaid, whereas, hereunto, etc.* Since the time has passed when the only audience was the legislator and citizens whose lives are directly affected are fully entitled to have access to legal information, the sub-genre of court documents tends to be formulated in the spirit of the Plain English Movement which represents an effort made to render legal language more accessible to the general public. Similar concerns exist in Romanian as well. Although, unlike the literary discourse, the legal one does not appear to violate normal patterns of connectivity, legal translators have to be keen on these apparently small and insignificant elements because their importance in court documents is much higher than in common language. Baker (1992:191) draws the attention on the one hand to the fact that the same conjunction may be used to signal different relations, and on the other hand, that these relations can be expressed by a variety of means.

In order of their frequency, the types of relations to be found in court documents are: additive, temporal, conditional, adversative, and metatextual, which is achieved by references to other sections of the text. This stands true mostly for appeal documents which sum up all the information about the case, starting with the succession of facts and continuing with the proceedings during previous stages of the trial. This accounts for the high frequency of additive and temporal textual connectors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADDITIVE</th>
<th>ADDITIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>De asemenea, am cerut Tribunalului Timiș să audieze</td>
<td>I also asked the Timiș County Court (Tribunalul Timis) to question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De asemenea am formulat și o cerere separată</td>
<td>I also lodged a separate request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De asemenea, nici art. 300 alin. 3 din codul de procedură penală român nu prevedea</td>
<td>Likewise, neither does Article 300 &amp; 3 of the Romanian Code of Criminal Procedure state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astfel, în dosar nr. 6006/2002 al Curții de Apel Timișoara același complet</td>
<td>Thus, in file no. 6006/2002 of the Timișoara Court of Appeal (Curtea de Apel), the same chamber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thus I drew up this petition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astfel, am formulat această cerere în scris</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In close connection with the metatextual connectors are the cohesive devices which create a special type of intertextuality. “Legal” intertextuality is a semantic-pragmatic factor belonging to textual coherence and it differs from literary intertextuality through the following features:

— it is deliberately built, which reveals the pragmatic notion of intentionality
— it has a practical goal achieved by: a) economy of devices, b) intra and intertextual coordination, c) exact and economic references to legal norms, caselaw / jurisprudence, and legal practice.

— it has a rigorous and systematic organization as it indicates precisely the sections and subdivisions of the text legal referred to

If in legal provisions there are only references to parts of other texts, in court documents the references are made explicit by quotation and reference. Although these elements are decisive in achieving textuality, they pose few problems in legal translations from Romanian into English because the devices are similar.

**REFERENCES**

- unde am fost introdus în arestul acestei instituții, în baza Ordonanței de reținere întocmită de către Centrul Zonal de Combatere a Crimei Organizate și Antidrog Timișoara din cadrul Ministerului de Interne Român
- în temeiul art. 159 din codul de procedură penală român, prin Încheierea din 05 octombrie 2001, a dispus prelungirea arestării
- pentru sâvârșirea infracțiunii prevăzute de art. 282 alin. 2 teza a II-a, raportat la art. 284 din codul penal român.
- Judecătoria Timișoara, prin sentința penală nr. 1494 din 20.05.2002, pronunțată în dosar nr. 24175/2001, în temeiul art. 282 alin. 2, teza a II-a, combinat cu art. 284 din codul penal român, m-a condamnat

**QUOTATIONS**

- Curtea de Apel Timișoara, în decizia penală nr. 852/R din 07 octombrie 2002, a motivat respingerea cererii de punere în libertate provizorie pe cauțiune prin aceea că, ciză: „infracluinea pentru care a fost trimis în judecată înculpatul și condamnat la 5 ani inchisoare în prima instanță, justifică prin insăși natura ei pericolul social pe care l-ar prezenta înculpatul dacă ar fi lăsat în libertate.”

**REFERENCES**

- we were placed in the custody of this institution on the basis of an order of arrest issue by the Timișoara Local Center for Fight Against Organized Crime and Anti-Drug of the Romanian Home Office
- under Article 159 of the Romanian Code of Criminal Procedure, by the minutes of the hearing of 5 October 2001, ordered
- for the charges under Article 282 & 2, 2nd thesis related to Article 284 of the Romanian Code of Criminal Proceedings
- The Timisoara Regional Court (Judecatoria Timisoara), by the criminal sentence no.1494 of 20.05.2002, court file no.24175/2001, based on art.282, paragraph 2, theses II, convicted me

**QUOTATIONS**

- The Timișoara Court of Appeal (Curtea de Apel), by the sentence no.852/R of 7 October 2002, motivated the rejection of my request to be released on bail on grounds that, I quote: “the offence for which the accused was indicted and convicted to 5 years imprisonment by the first instance, justifies by its own nature the social danger that the accused would represent if he were released from detention.”
Many translators regard discursive and textual features as being irrelevant to their task as translators, because they think that all they must do is to reproduce the sentences more or less word for word and any problems of the discourse or text will be automatically accounted for. But this is not the way accurate and functional translating is done.

Since cohesion is both a textual and a cognitive, semantic-conceptual phenomenon, we are led to consider that the translation of a legal document is linked both to the informational and the structural level of the discourse. Therefore a legal translator has to start by carefully examining all the discursive and textual features of the source text, because sometimes it may have serious errors. Nida (2001) mentions a report prepared in English by a commission investigating the possibility of Romania entering the EU. The reference is to a document, presumably prepared by the Romanian government, in which Romanian officials were demanding certain reforms in the EU. The translator of the English document into French sensed the inconsistency in the wording. Instead of demanding changes in the EU, the original document listed changes that the Romanian government was ready to make in order to become a member of the Union. After discovering what the real meaning of the document was, the translator adapted his translation to represent correctly the intent and the purpose that lay behind the garbled English text.

From such a perspective, referential processes appear not merely as the products of shared knowledge but participate in the construction of socially shared frames of interpretation. The translator, as the recipient of the source text and the producer of the target text has to be fully aware of the referential processes and has to correlate the reference strategies of the two cultures in order to meet the requirements of a fully functional translation.
References


1. Preliminary remarks

We live in a fast changing world in which things happen at a frightening speed. It seems that sooner or later every event influences our lives. There are moments when some might feel overwhelmed by the avalanche of information that ‘harasses’ us on a daily basis. Nothing seems simple anymore. Somehow, everything is apparently connected to everything else. The days when one could say ‘I know everything that is to be known in this world and then some more’ are long gone and we need to constantly refresh our knowledge about the world around us. However, due to the huge amount of information created every day, one cannot gather it directly any longer. If we are to make any sense of what is happening in our lives, we need to resort to intermediate channels and by doing this we accept someone else’s understanding of the facts. We no longer analyse the reality itself but an analysis of it, which unavoidably bears the marks of the agent that had direct contact with reality. To put it differently, we try to understand one thing, i.e. the real world (too dynamic and too complex to be encompassed in its entirety by means of one person’s intellect only), by replacing it with another one, i.e. with mass media instruments such as newspapers. Thus, if we are to make a comparison with Physics, we make use of a model in order to understand the real phenomenon: it is like studying the structure of the hydrogen atom drawn in a textbook instead of the atom itself. This process of replacing one thing with another in order to understand or to make one think of the former is described by Charles Peirce in his definition of the sign: “a sign... is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity.” (apud Sebeok 2002:53). Since newspapers stand for what happens in the world, we could admit that a newspaper is a sign.

Any sign, no matter its nature, cannot mean anything by itself since meaning is a matter of negotiation. Meaning is not transmitted to us — we actively create it according to a complex interplay of codes or conventions of which we are normally unaware. On the other hand, those creating this complex sign that we call newspaper might be suspected of being highly aware of these inventories of codes and mental patterns that are at work in the mind of
the common reader when coming into contact with the newspaper. Adding
the intrinsic subjectivity of the journalist writing a piece of news to the fact
that each newspaper, no matter how impartial it claims to be, has its own
agenda, be it of a political or an economic nature, one can easily realize the
profound artificial nature of news as compared to the event itself — which is
neither subjective, nor objective: it just happens.

2. Analysis

2.1 Working hypothesis. If there were an intrinsic relationship between
the event itself and the item of news regarding that particular event, all arti-
cles covering a certain event should necessarily be identical, i.e. there should
be no difference in terms of their connotations between two articles covering
the same event. Our paper tries to demonstrate not only that there is no intrin-
sic relationship between the event and the news item, but also that it is not the
reported event that determines the shape, content, significance or ‘truth’ of a
piece of news, but the news that determines the significance of the event.

2.2 Corpus. In order to demonstrate this hypothesis we chose two newspa-
papers of comparably equal importance and circulation, published on the
same day, August 30th, 2003, and analysed their main front page story in
terms of the significance they attached to it and of the semiotic codes they
employed so as to trigger a certain emotional reaction or attitude in the mind
of their readers. The two newspapers are The Guardian and The Herald. The
former is a well known British newspaper read mainly by the residents of
London and Manchester, while the latter is, as the publishers themselves
claim, ‘Scotland’s best-selling quality national newspaper’ founded, as the
masthead itself lets the reader know, in Glasgow more than 200 years ago.

2.3 Similarities. Both main stories concentrate on Mr Alastair
Campbell’s resignation from his position as press secretary and spokesperson
of the Prime Minister, Mr Tony Blair. At a first glance, the two newspapers
seem not to differ from each other: the layout of front page is incredibly sim-
ilar with the title spanning on the whole width of the page, written in bold cur-
vive letters, immediately followed underneath by a generous colour photo in
central position, surrounded by the text of the article, and dedicating the bot-
tom of the page to some car advertisements, separated from the body of the
main story by a shorter piece of news on some other events, not connected
with the Campbell story.
The similitude goes even further when we turn to the next three pages, where we discover a series of related articles grouped under the general headline ‘Campbell resigns’, shared by both newspapers. Of course, there are slight differences as far as the number of satellite articles revolving around the main story is concerned, but the overall impression is that both newspapers dedicate the same amount of space to the event and display an equal length of coverage. However, the similarities end here, at this superficial level, the headlines, the photos and the captures that accompany them being perfused with semiotic markers more or less obvious for the untrained eye of the common reader.

2.4 Dissimilarities. Several steps should be observed in the analysis of dissimilarities. The first step refers to the headlines offered by the two journalists. In the case of *The Guardian*, four are the headlines that refer directly to Mr Campbell and they read like this: “Goodbye to all that … Campbell departs”, “Tough guy with obsessive streak”, “Marathon man and fist-fighter” and “Praise and blame for a master of the dark art”. In *The Herald* we can read headlines such as “Campbell spins his last trick”, “Is the myth of the devious manipulator a load of spin?”, “£1m diary deal and expensive speeches will pay for an extremely good life” and the following subtitle “Blair’s trusted aide quits for his family and the chance to earn millions”. There are a few interesting nuances to be emphasised here. First of all, while both journalists try to establish a climate of familiarity and informality by using the name Campbell without any other polite formula or official title, viz. *Mr*, *press secretary* or *spokesperson*, the headlines chosen by *The Guardian*’s journalists make use of a narrative code which provide a framework of interpretation that is not too favourable to Mr Campbell. On the other hand, the narrative code presented by *The Herald*’s journalists creates a subtle pro-Campbell framework of interpretation. The following table compares the two somehow opposed treatments administered to Mr Campbell by the two newspapers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Herald</th>
<th>The Guardian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reference: the myth of the devious manipulator</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connotation: -</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference: Blair’s trusted aide</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connotation: -</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference: master of the dark art</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As it can be noticed, phrases do not always say what they seem to say at a first sight and they can rapidly switch from an apparent accusatory conno-
tation to a more ‘user-friendly’ one, as in the case of “devious manipulator”, whose apparent negative connotation is altered by the presence of “myth”, which due to its [-REAL] feature annihilates the original meaning of the phrase. The same mechanism is at work in the case of The Guardian’s labelling of Mr Campbell as a “tough guy”, but with an opposite effect this time. What seems to be an appreciative expression gains a completely new meaning in combination with “obsessive”, which cancels the potentially positive connotation of “tough” (since we are talking about a politician here who is supposed to be tough if necessary) and transforms it into open criticism. The other two cases that picture Mr Campbell as a bad guy are more obvious, but not less effective in building an against-Campbell reaction in the mind of the reader.

This pro- and anti-Campbell attitude of the headlines is noticed throughout the texts of the articles, demonstrating once again that carefully selected connotations of the linguistic signs can be effective weapons in this battle for meaning which journalism is sometimes. Nevertheless, nothing proves to be more efficient in twisting the significance of a certain event than a skilfully chosen photo.

The use of photos in journalism is never done at random. A good photo would give strength to the story or even save a bad article. Why are photos such powerful tools of suggestion? Daniel Chandler (1994) suggests that “unlike sequential syntagmatic relations, which are essentially about before and after, spatial syntagmatic relations include” other structural relationships which are basically complementary pairs such as up vs. down, left vs. right, above vs. below, east vs. west, north vs. south, left vs. right, in front vs. behind, close vs. distant or central vs. peripheral. The cognitive importance of orientational metaphors has been demonstrated beyond any doubt by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980, Chapter 4) and we shall employ their ideas in our analysis, without insisting upon their classification. A second framework we shall use is Kress & van Leeuwen’s spatial map (1996, apud Chandler 1994) which helps to decode left-hand and right-hand elements of visual signs such as photos.

By resembling or/and imitating something, on the one hand, a photograph is iconic, and by being directly linked to the signified, on the other hand, a photograph is also indexical. This double nature of a photograph makes it a powerful media tool, since the observer tends to place this medium of recording reality on a higher position on the scale of objectivity. But, as Roland Barthes (apud Bignell 1997: 98) said about the newspaper photograph, this is “an object that has been worked on, chosen, composed, constructed, treated according to professional, aesthetic or ideological norms
which are so many factors of connotation.” The photographer and the editor have to operate an entire series of choices from the paradigm of photographic signifiers such as focusing, lighting, angle, shot size, composition, lenses and so on. The result of these careful choices is a final signifier that serves less the interest of the reader and more the interest of the newspaper policy.

If we compare the front cover photographs of *The Guardian* and of *The Herald*, we notice there is a great difference between the messages that the photos convey to the reader. Thus, the former presents Mr Campbell leaving the Prime Minister’s building, the famous No.10, Downing Street. Although centrally placed in the photo (which should add importance to his person), he is photographed with his eyes looking downward and with the left hand raised towards the photographers as if protecting himself or hiding from them. This posture might denote a possible feeling of guilt or shame, doubled by an air of negligence, suggested by the unbuttoned jacket and somehow messy hair. The fact that Mr Campbell is two steps behind Ms Fiona Miller — labelled throughout the article as “his partner” — could also be interpreted as a sign of his submission to her initiative and of recognising her superiority (think for example of traditional oriental cultures in which wives, and women in general, walk several steps behind their husbands/’partners’). The general impression created by the way they are photographed is that of two perpetrators hastily leaving the crime scene.

The third page continues building an unfavourable image of Mr Campbell in a series of five photos presenting him in various moments, each adding a little something to the negative portrait that *The Guardian* is trying to create in the mind of the reader. We have assigned them numbers starting clockwise from top left so that it would be easier to follow the analysis. Thus, photo no. 1 shows only the middle section of Mr Campbell, i.e. the portion from elbows to knees, who is walking somewhere holding in his right hand an arch board file, out of which there hang some shreds of paper in a disorderly manner. The general impression of this photo is that of negligence and lack of neatness. When we choose to present only a part instead of the whole, we suggest that that particular part contains the quintessence of the whole. In this case, the file is a synecdoche inducing the reader to think that if the file is negligent and disorderly, so must be its bearer. In photo no. 2, we see a casual Mr Campbell, wearing a running suit, seconds after winning a race. “What’s wrong with this picture?” you might say. “It presents a happy ordinary fellow who looks just like us. He is human after all.” Yes, happy but exhausted, with no energy left and this image is not a very good one for a politician who is supposed to be sharp and always energetic, in the heart of events. Photo no. 3 delivers us a blurred, black and white image of a young Campbell from his
Cambridge years. This colourless fuzzy face belongs to a vulnerable slightly disoriented young man, neither adolescent, nor adult, who looks like anything else but a determined, trustworthy politician. Perhaps the most interesting photo in this series is photo no. 4, right in the middle of the page (a spot which is difficult to miss even when skimming the page and not reading it), in which Mr Campbell is hardly seen in the background, behind the smiling shiny face of Mr Blair. I must confess, the first image that came into my mind when I saw this photo was that of Middle Ages paintings showing various characters laughing, dancing and generally having a good time, while being watched from behind by a satisfied, mischievously looking devil standing in the shadow. Of course, I would not go that far and compare Mr Campbell to the devil himself, but one has to admit that he does have the air of the dark eminence that exists behind any important ‘powerful’ person. The fifth and last photo does its share of damage to Mr Campbell’s image on two levels: (i) first of all, it is not exactly a photo but a drawing, and this belongs to the same cognitive paradigm as a caricature does, and when one says caricature, one says mockery and lack of deference; (ii) secondly, this drawing displays a striking resemblance to those drawings made in a court of law. In this manner, one might easily make a mental association between Mr Campbell’s representation and the image of a lawbreaker.

The Herald’s visual approach to Mr Campbell, on the other hand, is, I dare say, completely opposite. Everything about the front cover photo of Mr Alastair Campbell: its position on the page, the shot size, the camera angle and the lightning, builds up his positive image. As far as the shot size is concerned, this is one of the most obvious codes characteristic of an image. The feeling of intimacy between the readers and the object of the photo is directly proportional to the distance: the closer the camera gets to the object, the more subjective the view. (in the case of this particular photo, it could not have gone more subjective than this). The angle of the camera is at the eye level, which connotes a status of equality between the reader and the object of the photo, i.e. the reader is given the illusion that Mr Campbell is ‘one of us’, a fellow who fights to represent the people’s common interests. He displays a confident look, while slightly smiling at the camera with a persuasive air of candidness. The role of light is also important. Its intensity is a key factor in connoting the tone of the photograph. If it is bright, the photo will connote happiness. If it is dark, the connotation will be that of sombreness. A contrasting combination of black and white would lead to a feeling of theatrical and dramatic, while a low contrast would connote realism (Carter 2000:3). This photo, although clear in the centre where Campbell’s face is, becomes somehow blurred the further it goes towards the margins, creating in this way a
halo effect around his figure. Thus, there is a feeling of self-confidence and serenity which grows the closer you get to the centre of the image. Since the centre of the image is, in fact, his face, the encoded message is that Alastair Campbell = comfort and confidence.

The articles on the second and third pages are grouped around a large photograph that is spread on both pages, presenting Mr Campbell on the plane with the prime minister, flying back home from a foreign diplomatic visit to the Azores. There is a crossfire of signifiers at work in this photo with the sole purpose of placing Campbell in a good light in the eyes of the reader. Since we belong to a culture in which texts are approached from up-left to right-bottom, we tend to treat visual signs in the same manner. Thus, looking at this photo, the first thing that one sees is Mr Campbell’s head which occupies the up-left corner and, from a semiotic point of view, this means importance and priority in a sequence of signifiers. On the other hand, Mr Blair is positioned in the right-bottom corner of the photo which is usually the last place that the eye of the reader reaches when scrutinizing a ‘text’. If we add to this the fact that Campbell is standing, while Blair is sitting, it becomes obvious that the photographer is trying to place the former in a stronger position in his relationship with the latter. The line below the photo, “Campbell watches Tony Blair”, translates into words the visual statement from above and further builds up the idea of ‘Campbell the supervisor’.

There are two more photos on pages 2 and 3 contributing to this process of creating a pro-Campbell attitude in the reader’s mind. One of them presents Mr Campbell after that race we mentioned when analysing photo no. 2 of The Guardian, but this time we have a different Campbell: he is no longer depicted as exhausted, but in a protective posture, embracing Ms Miller, both of them generously smiling. The couple displays an attitude of satisfaction after a thing well done and this mental state is likely to be eventually shared by the reader which means another point scored in favour of Mr Campbell’s image. The last photo under discussion is a very unsophisticated one but, nonetheless effective. There are two signs in this photo: Mr Campbell and a bagpipe. He is playing the bagpipe. In other words, he is controlling the instrument, making it work in the way he chooses. The bagpipe, however, is not a simple instrument in this context: it is a national Scottish symbol together with the kilt and the thistle flower. We have again a synecdoche at work: the bagpipe stands for Scotland; thus, by presenting Mr Campbell capable of controlling the instrument the photographer might be trying to make the reader accept — on an unconscious level, of course — the idea that he is also a man capable of controlling Scotland.
After having analysed the way these newspapers try to create a certain image by means of both linguistic and visual sings, the conclusion is that they take opposite sides on this matter. “What is so spectacular and unexpected about this result?” you might ask. “It is not the first time and not at all unnatural that two newspapers chose to have different opinions on a subject matter”. I could not agree more, but we have to take into account two more factors before finally drawing the conclusion. First, these are not two ordinary newspapers; they themselves act synecdochically, standing for Scotland and England. Secondly and more importantly, Mr Alastair Campbell is Scottish himself. This new element, which has been intentionally kept out of the analysis so far, casts a new light upon the different approaches of *The Herald* and *The Guardian*. What seemed to be a natural and healthy difference of opinions between two newspapers, so specific to a much-praised impartial press, now becomes an obvious manifestation of two deeply divergent political agendas. Neither newspaper can be impartial on the subject of such an important political figure. Therefore, they have resorted to a complex web of signs in order to serve their own semiotic purpose, i.e. to send a certain message to the reader in such a way that s/he accepts it naturally as his/her own perception of reality. Some of this message is transmitted explicitly by the text of the articles, although the written sign itself may become a very useful tool of manipulation and twisting of the meaning, but much of the deceiving is accomplished by means of visual signs which, as it has already been stated, are ‘guilty’ of being considered by the general public as the closest thing to reality, endowed with a higher degree of impartiality and fidelity than its written presentation.

3. Conclusions

One may say, and not without reason, that a multitude of readers means a multitude of interpretations. Nevertheless, as long as the readers belong to the same cultural and linguistic community, they would use approximately the same decoding mechanism, based on years of cultural conditioning, and would react in a similar manner to certain culturally bound symbols. The media specialists know this and they are constantly speculating this principle in an attempt to make the reader sympathize with their views upon the significance of reality. These specialists employ various codes in their making of a newspaper, by means of which they are mapping the reality for us, offering a substitute of reality that we are supposed to accept as being the real thing. Becoming aware of such codes is both inherently fascinating and intellectually empowering. We learn from semiotics that we live in a world of signs and
we have no way of understanding anything except through signs and the codes into which they are organized.

Living in a world of increasing visual signs, we need to learn that even the most “realistic” signs are not what they appear to be. In defining realities, signs serve ideological functions. Deconstructing and contesting the realities of signs can reveal whose realities are privileged and whose are suppressed. The study of signs is the study of the construction and maintenance of reality. To decline such a study is to leave to others the control of the world of meanings that we inhabit.

References


1. Introduction

The relationship between the two worlds in which human beings live — that of nature and that of words — has been the source of fruitful debates for quite some time. Earlier assumptions about this relationship were geared at seeing it as a kind of mathematical calculus, where truth can be arrived at if labels are correctly applied and calculations properly done. More precisely, language used to be considered a set of neutral symbols for representing reality — the words we use stand for things and events in the world, and the way we arrange the words stand for how these things and events relate to each other.

Later views, however, accepted the fact that the language — world relationship was not at all that simple and straightforward. Actually, the way we use words carries (both explicitly and implicitly) values and ways of seeing. Language lends itself to contradictory interpretations and uncertain meanings, it is intimately related to how we experience and give sense to the world. Language and worldview affect each other in an ongoing process of perception, reproduction and construction.

The following pages focus on one of the numerous aspects related to the link between language and nature — the central role metaphors play in shaping humans’ understanding of their relationship to the environment. From among the various metaphorical representations of nature in the corpora I analyzed — three variants of ecological discourse (scientific articles, green-speeches and ecology textbooks) — I shall here discuss the reifying and abstracting ones, those that point to nature either as a lifeless object or as an abstract entity.

The main purpose in undertaking this analysis is answering the question: “Are these two types of metaphor appropriate ways of referring to the environment?”

The kind of response I provide is influenced by the fact that metaphors, particular instances of language use, have a dual nature (as I suggested earlier about language in general). They are not only cognitive tools, but also emotional ones.
2. Metaphor

Lakoff and Johnson say quite simply that “the essence of metaphor is understanding an experiencing one kind of things in terms of another” (Lakoff, Johnson 1980: 5), and argue that “metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action.” (Lakoff, Johnson 1980: 3) Two related points are important here: the pervasiveness of metaphor and the fact that it is not just a linguistic phenomenon, but one that also affects how we think and act in the world.

With respect to the assertion of pervasiveness, the two support the idea that the human conceptual system, our thinking, works by using metaphor — “our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (Lakoff, Johnson 1980: 3). Our everyday functioning down to the least details is connected to metaphor — “Our concepts structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world, and how we relate to other people. Our conceptual system thus plays a central role in defining our everyday realities. If we are right in suggesting that our conceptual system is largely metaphorical, then the way we think, what we experience, and what we do every day is very much a matter of metaphor” (Lakoff, Johnson 1980: 3). In other words, they are not simply saying that our language unavoidably relies on metaphor to convey meaning (which it surely does), but that metaphorical concepts systematically structure our understanding. By using metaphors, we draw on our previous experiences and understanding of things and phenomena to explain, interpret and understand new experiences, things and phenomena.

The work of Lakoff and Johnson suggests that language, thought and action are intimately related. Similarly, Max Black’s (1962, 1979) “interaction view” is that of metaphor as a process of projection of a system of associated commonplaces or implications from a subsidiary domain onto a principal domain, thereby constructing a particular idea of the main subject. In doing this, “the metaphor selects, emphasizes, suppresses, and organizes features of the main subject by implying statements about it that normally apply to the subsidiary subject.” (Black, 1962: 44-45) Thus a metaphor acts to create a way of understanding one thing by projecting onto it a view of something else.

As indicated by Lakoff and Johnson, another way of looking at this is that metaphors tend to exert a sort of perceptual hegemony over how the things they are being used to characterize are seen. In other words, metaphors highlight certain perspectives and features, while blocking others, so that, in some cases, they cease to be perceived as what they really are and become lit-
eralized, or, as John Allan Lee (1988: 25) puts it, “what begins as a convenient metaphor may become the official definition of reality.”

Metaphors are undoubtedly part of our cognitive system, but they do much more than influence thought. Along with cognitive suggestions, they can also convey, evoke or carry feelings or values, so that they always bear particular connotations for the persons experiencing them.

Keeping this in mind, I think the appropriateness of a reifying or abstracting metaphor of nature can be judged along at least two lines. Without disregarding the threat of its becoming literalized, first, does such a metaphor serve as a useful tool for understanding nature as it really is – a whole that is undoubtedly full of life? Second, what kind of feelings towards nature does it evoke, does it suggest a positive and caring attitude, or does it lead to feelings of indifference, fear or even to exploitative actions against it?

I shall discuss the metaphors of nature as an object or as an abstraction against this double-sided background.

3. Reifying and abstracting metaphors of nature

If animism gained strength during the Renaissance, the time when humans’ metaphorical vision of the world shifted from a formerly theocentric orientation to one that was in every sense anthropocentric, from the early seventeenth century onward, a new attitude towards nature develops and central to it is the reifying metaphor, especially the machinistic one. Such metaphor can be found since the origin of philosophy. In microcosmism, people interpret the world as modeled on themselves, sharing their life, bodily organs and, perhaps, even intelligence. Machinism develops out of the same desire to comprehend the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar, but in this case the familiar is human experience in making and living with objects. Taken broadly, therefore, machinistic metaphor can include relating the world to the products of pottery, carpentry, architecture, and the like, as well as to more sophisticated products, such as levers and pulleys, clocks, steam engines, or computers. It follows that the history of the machinistic metaphor will be largely that of the history of technology, with people seeking to interpret the complex nature around them in terms of the most advanced human inventions.

The reifying metaphors I selected from my corpora, the majority of which are machinistic, include those of nature as a spacecraft, an air-conditioner, a house/home, a factory, a casino. The only abstracting metaphor I detected in my corpora is that of the environment as an economic system.

I shall discuss each of these metaphors.
3.1. Nature as a spacecraft

Lovelock’s lecture on the Earth contains the only instance of nature being metaphorized as a spaceship:

(1) “There are a few, mostly geographers, who see the earth as a whole, but the majority of scientists... still act as if the earth were a ball of white-hot, partially melted rock with just a cool crust moistened by the oceans. On the surface they see a green scum of life whose organisms have simply adapted to the material conditions of the planet. With such a view go metaphors like ‘the spaceship earth’: as if humans were the crew... of a rocky ship forever traveling an inner circle around the Sun; as if for four billion years life has existed on earth just to serve as our life-support system when we happened to come aboard.” (Lovelock 1992: 107)

The metaphor of nature as a spacecraft does not lead to an entirely correct understanding of the world around us. A spacecraft is a lifeless object invented and built by people, while nature is full of life and “populated” our planet long before any human being was born. Moreover, complex machines are made of parts. Therefore, metaphorizing the environment as a machine encourages atomization, thinking nature to bits rather than perceiving it as what it really is, a coherent whole. The only purpose it may properly serve is understanding the causal structure of nature — in the same way in which pushing the buttons of a machine makes it perform a certain action, one event in the environment triggers another.

Lovelock himself discusses the metaphor’s shortcomings at an emotional level. On the one hand, he says, “seen this way, obviously the earth might appear fragile” (1992: 107), and, if it is fragile, it is also perfectly controllable, I should add. People feel strong against their machine, they are there to push its buttons and make it move in the direction they themselves choose. On the other hand, the speaker states at the end of his lecture, imagining that people could be stewards of the spaceship earth is just a “dangerous illusion”. (1992: 121) To support his opinion, he has this to say:

(2) “Everyone these days is or aims to be a manager, and this may be why we talk of managing the whole planet. Could we, by some act of common will, change our natures and become proper managers, gentle gardeners, stewards, taking care of all of the natural life of our planet?

I think that we are full of hubris even to ask such a question, or to think of our job description as that of stewards of the earth. Originally, a steward was the keeper of the sty where the pigs lived; this was too lowly for most humans and gentility raised the ‘Styward’ so that he became a bureaucrat, in charge of men as well as pigs. Do we really want to be the bureaucrats of the earth? Do we want the full responsibility for its care and health? I would soon-
er expect a goat to succeed as a gardener than expect humans to become stewards of the earth, and there can be no worse fate for people than to be conscripted for such a hopeless task; to be made accountable for the smooth running of the climate, the composition of the oceans, the air, and the soil. Something that, until we began to dismantle creation, was the free gift of Gaia” (1992: 121).

Lovelock also takes on the difficult task of offering an alternative to a perspective on matters that he considers wrong. In the case of the metaphor of nature as a spacecraft with humans as its stewards, his way out of the problem is the following:

(3) “I would suggest that our real role as stewards of the earth is more like that of the proud trade union functionary, the shop steward. We are not managers or masters of the earth, we are just shop stewards, workers chosen, because of our intelligence, as representatives for the others, the rest of the life forms of our planet. Our union represents the bacteria, the fungi, and the slime moulds as well as the nouveau riche fish, birds, and animals and the landed establishment of noble trees and their lesser plants. Indeed all living things are members of our union, and they are angry at the diabolical liberties taken with their planet and their lives by people. People should be living in union with the other members, not exploiting them and their habitats. When I see the misery we inflict upon them and upon ourselves I have to speak out as a shop steward. I have to warn my fellow humans that they must learn to live with the earth in partnership, otherwise the rest of creation will, as part of Gaia, unconsciously move the earth itself to a new state, one where humans may no longer be welcome” (1992: 121-122).

One cannot but praise Lovelock’s attempt to search for a metaphor that should not portray nature as being managed and controlled by humans. Nevertheless, his “people as shop stewards” metaphor seems not to serve the purposes of a convinced environmentalist in full. This latter imagery is still an anthropocentric one, which together with the metaphor of forests as air-conditioners, which I am going to discuss next, legitimate Lovelock’s being criticized for not having provided a consistently biocentric view of nature.

To conclude, the spacecraft metaphor (humans being the stewards) cannot, unfortunately, be positively evaluated, either referentially (although it has the merit of being able to hint at causality in nature, as I mentioned) or emotionally.
3.2. Nature as an air-conditioner

Like the metaphor of nature as a spacecraft, that of the environment as an air-conditioner appears only once in my data, clearly stated, as shown in (4) below:

(4) “Amazonia may not be worth much as a source of oxygen, or by the same calculation, as a sink for carbon dioxide, but it is a magnificent air-conditioner, not only for itself but also for the world through its ability to offset, to some extent, the consequences of greenhouse-gas warming. Do the forests have an estimable value as natural, regional if not global, air-conditioners?” (Lovelock 1999: 116-117).

This particular metaphor, too, seems not to match the environmental reality around us and therefore not to be a very helpful tool for our understanding of nature. Criticism of it is of the kind that can be directed to any other such “machinistic” (Mills 1982) views that Western societies have lived by from the Enlightenment onward, as is the case of the above-discussed “nature as a spaceship” imagery.

A machine is an inert object, nature is dynamic and full of life. The former is a collection of spare parts, the latter should be thought of as an integrated whole. However, once again, the cause — effect matters that are specific to a technological item might be appropriate for the representation of the causal chain in the environment.

At an emotional level, the source of the metaphor’s shortcomings is the fact that, as Brockmeier et al (1999: 94) point out, “machines can be invented, refined and manipulated in order to transcend existing limitations.” Although people’s being able to create machines apparently reinforces the view of an almighty creator, it can also lead to a perspective that has become more and more frequent in modern cultures — God as a “retired engineer” whose divine role has been taken over by human beings. Consequently, if humans have the necessary powers to do what God does, it means that they can take nature as some raw material and easily change it into what their minds want it to become. Controlling the environment thus becomes a fully legitimate, and even more than that, a desirable thing to do.

The conclusion would then be the same as the one at the end of the previous section. The metaphor of nature as an air-conditioner cannot be positively evaluated, either referentially (with the minor exception indicated) or emotionally.

3.3. Nature as a house/home

Nature is metaphorically described as a home and, respectively, as a house (rather indirectly, by comparing pollution in the environment to a fire
set ablaze in a house) only once in my corpora, in a speech delivered by Prince Philip (1979). (5) and (6) illustrate these two occurrences:

(5) “...the earth is our home, it is what we all have to live in, and the quality of the natural environment, which we bequeath to the next generation, depends upon the attitude of every single one of us...” (Prince Phillip 1979: 36).

(6) “Concern for nature is an emotional issue and it is very important that people should feel strongly about it but, at the same time, the action which follows must be strictly rational. If you see a fire starting in your house, you hardly need a computer to tell you that if you do nothing about it your house will burn down. The point is to start putting the fire out before it spreads” (Prince Philip 1979: 32).

The metaphor of nature as a house/home has mixed values.

On the one hand, on a cognitive level, it expresses the partial truth that nature is where we live. On the other, at the same level, the metaphor is dualistic and reifying in that it constructs an idea of nature as a physical structure within which humans reside, and not something that humans themselves partially constitute.

Its emotional pitfalls follow from here. If humans reside in nature as if in a house, the implications are most of the time that they own the earth. Consequently, if nature is their home (there is a great difference between feeling at home — rooted, having a sense of place in one’s community or in nature — and feeling that nature is one’s home), then presumably they can do with it what they wish. Remodeling and redecorating seem to be neverending processes, and housekeeping is not always something to bother with.

Moreover, the image of nature as a home may be related to the problem of its being increasingly domesticated by humans. A home is a tame place and domestication itself means bringing into or around home. So if all of nature is humans’ home, the kind of attitude that is encouraged is attempting to manage and domesticate the environment.

The above-mentioned drawbacks are sufficient reasons for many to evaluate the metaphor of nature as a house/home as resourcist and anthropocentric. However, others, such as Brockmeier et al (1999: 106-107) have less critical views of it. A home, they say, “differs from a house because of the functional links between its human and non-human inhabitants, the relationships between occupants and neighbours, its having a history and such like. A 20th century urban apartment or suburban ‘semi’ may indeed not be the most suitable basis for this metaphor. A traditional Black Forest house with its self-sufficient economy of people and animals under one roof or the Australian Western desert concept of nguaia (camp, home, country, place
where people are staying or could stay) might be more suitable exemplars. The metaphor home... can be used to argue for more enlightened home management, as Myers (1979) argued in a chapter on the utilitarian benefits of species preservation. Myers and many writers after him hold that the world is still an incredibly rich storehouse (our only storehouse). It can, if we live with nature and not outside it, provide all of us with all we and future generations need. But we must learn to manage it intelligently.”

Thus, seeing nature as a house/home is partly appropriate referentially. Emotionally, its appropriateness seems to depend on the type of house that is chosen for implicit comparison purposes.

3.4. Nature as a factory

All the instances of metaphorically representing nature as a factory occur in one of the greenspeeches I analyzed. Kedgley (1999), the ecologist speaker, explains that:

(7) “There is a view of the world ... that the earth is a pool of resources that exists solely in order to be exploited by human beings; it is, essentially, a giant factory producing things for human consumption” (Kedgley 1999: 1).

If nature is a factory, then “animals are biological machines or economic units, not fellow creatures that we should respect.” (1999: 2) As such, if they are not sufficiently productive to meet human needs, “the solution is not to moderate human wants; it is to develop new technologies such as genetic engineering which can redesign animals or create entire new species of animals which can be owned by companies and used ... to produce whatever products we want. Inevitably, genetic engineering will escalate the exploitation and mechanization of animals by humans” (1999: 1).

Kedgley clearly explains the grounds on which the parallel between the environment and a factory has been arrived at — the idea that nature is a giant producer for human consumers. Such an anthropocentric and resourcist way of seeing nature cannot unfortunately prompt a concerned attitude on the part of our fellow beings. On the contrary, exploitation is encouraged.

As Kedgley presents things, it is quite obvious that the metaphorical vision of nature as a factory is intended to make sense primarily at an emotional level. This level aside, referentially, associating nature with a factory may be appropriate to the extent to which production in a plant presupposes a type of transformation of raw materials into final products comparable to that taking place in the surrounding world (the sun melts the ice and transforms it into water, trees turn their blossoms into fruit, bees make honey out of pollen, etc). However, this seems to be the only merit that the metaphor has in accurately representing the environment. Other than this, the imagery
is dualist (people are seen as apart from nature, not as part of it) and objectifying (a factory is not a living entity, even if people work in it).

With the single suitable aspect indicated, the metaphor of nature as a factory remains largely inappropriate both referentially and emotionally.

### 3.5. Nature as a casino

The representation of nature as a betting shop or a casino is probably the farthest apart from the group of what are considered highly conventionalized metaphors of the environment (such as the anthropomorphizing metaphors and the metaphor of nature as a house/home from among the ones I have already discussed). In my data, it is introduced by Phillipson (1992) in his lecture on managing natural resources. Fragment (8) below illustrates his point of view in a nutshell:

(8) “In matters of the environment we can never presume that the people and governments of nations will be like-minded. Attitudes differ dramatically; at one extreme there is concern only for the interest of people like oneself; at the other, idealistic dreaming of a world that is never to be. Attitude — either of individual, institution, or government — naturally varies according to the environmental problem under review and is largely determined by the adjudged relative importance of facts such as economics, scientific knowledge, social conscience, public opinion, international pressure. Subsequent action based on what is euphemistically termed ‘informed opinion’ does not invariably produce adequate safeguards; frequently, the reverse is the case. Man is demonstrably gambling with the planet’s natural resources and it is not unreasonable to think of the biosphere as a betting-shop or, perhaps more sophisticatedly, as a global casino” (1992: 197-198).

At the level of representation, it is quite difficult to imagine a connection between what is going on in a casino and what usually takes place in the environment around us. If there are some activities that can be transferred from the human world into the natural one, those specific to a casino are certainly not among them.

As such, this metaphor, like that of nature as a factory, seems not to have been meant primarily as a referential tool, but rather as an emotional one, as a way to express attitudes. Metaphorized as a casino, nature becomes the place where people entertain themselves, where they try their luck hoping to be winners, but never being able to predict unquestionable success. Even if “gambling with the planet’s natural resources” is for a good cause — ensuring their preservation — the results are quite often the opposite of what is intended, so that it is nature that suffers most during humans’ successive “good-will”
experiments. Playing risky games with the elements of the biosphere may thus reach the point where catastrophe is inevitable.

It is true, however, that, if nature is damaged to its last tiny component, the next to be negatively affected by this state of affairs are the causers of the natural disaster, people themselves. But the casino metaphor does not, to me, show this side of the coin — a still powerful nature that can turn against those who have harmed it is not hinted at by this kind of imagery.

To sum up, the metaphor of nature as a casino lacks the characteristics that can turn it into an appropriate referential instrument. Obviously anthropocentric as it is, it is not emotionally suitable either.

3.6. Nature as an economic system

There are instances in my data when specialized terms from economics are borrowed to refer to or to characterize the elements of the environment themselves or to describe phenomena occurring in the natural world. Thus natural resources become “assets” (9) which, under certain circumstances, can yield profit (10), the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is actually the “budget” of this particular gas that we can talk about (11), how hot the air is is referred to as the “heat budget” of the atmosphere (12), all the resources available in the environment form the “earth’s natural capital” (13), while the relationship between beetles eating holes in upper leaves and the rate of growth of the lower leaves of a tree is discussed in terms of loss, profit and benefit (14). “Production” in the natural world may also be compared to production in a traditional economic system (15):

(9) “The natural resources of the biosphere are, in effect, assets; as such they can be categorized as either fixed or current. The fixed assets are the non-living (abiotic) components, exemplified by gases (the atmosphere), water bodies (the hydrosphere), and solid inorganic matter (the lithosphere); together these constitute the physico-chemical environment. The current assets are the living (biotic) components — a potentially renewable stock of plants (flora) and animals (fauna). Transfers within and between the two major types of asset can, and do, take place” (Phillipson 1992: 194).

(10) “Stocks, being retained assets, do not represent profit, whereas turnover of stock with adequate return does. The turnover rates of marine and terrestrial plant stock differ markedly. Oceanic vegetation yields, on average, 14.1 times its own dry mass annually; terrestrial vegetation has a much slower turnover with a yearly yield of a mere sixteenth part or 6.2 per cent of the annual mean mass of stock. Put another way, some 70 per cent of the earth’s surface, the oceans, produces 30 per cent of the world’s annual plant profit. It
follows that 30 per cent of the earth’s surface, the land, generates 70 per cent of
the total planetary plant profit per year” (Phillipson 1992: 196).

(11) “Models of the ocean uptake suggest that it can accept about 1.8
GtC/year, so that there is an apparent imbalance of about 1.6 GtC/year. This
is a measure of the uncertainty in current understanding of the global budget
of atmospheric carbon dioxide” (Mason 1992: 57).

(12) “The heat budget of the atmosphere and earth is shown diagrammatically...” (Mason 1992: 59).

(13) “...in extent and intensity, human exploitation of natural resources
seriously threatens the earth’s natural capital” (DeLeo, Levin 1997: 12).

(14) “Because the beetles eat holes in the upper leaves, more light reach-
es those below, so that these can proceed with photosynthesis at a greater rate.
Here loss and profit are in balance. In fact, there is an added benefit. The
excrement of the beetles, which contains finely ground up leaves and ... is full
of minerals... fall to the ground and form nuclei of crystallization — centers
from which the decomposition of the leaf litter proceeds much more rapidly
and efficiently...” (Remmert 1980: 227).

(15) “Production falls into two main categories. One is primary produc-
tion, by green plants and photosynthetically active bacteria, which produce
organic matter from solar energy and inorganic matter. The other is second-
ary production, by organisms not capable of photosynthesis — bacteria, fungi,
and animals, which convert the organic matter of the plants into the substance
of their own bodies. Each of these categories can be subdivided into gross and
net production. Using light, a plant produces organic from inorganic matter.
This is gross production. But part of this matter is respired, used up by the
plant’s metabolism. Gross production minus respiratory losses is called net
production” (Remmert 1980: 199).

As far as the potential of the metaphor discussed to picture the environ-
mental reality is concerned, I think it is not inappropriate to refer to elements
of nature as if they were components of an economic system or to explain nat-
ural phenomena by comparison with those specific to economic markets. The
above examples contain direct explanations or at least suggest why this is pos-
sible.

However, anthropocentrism remains at the core of this metaphor and
creates a type of imagery that encourages a patronizing attitude towards the
natural biota. An economic system is a human creation and everything that
goes on in it is so controlled that at least the purpose, if not always the result,
is people’s well-being and prosperity. Does it follow, then, that nature can also
be controlled, its phenomena planned and its resources used for human ben-
economic value on biodiversity prevents us from coping with the root causes of loss of diversity and from recognizing the value of the environment, other than as a commodity to be exploited; it forces us to accept the old economic paradigm that assumes a perfect substitution between the natural capital and market capital, and it reinforces the technological premise that makes the biological impoverishment of the planet inevitable. Given the present interest rate on money, there is no hope that traditional economic approaches will preserve natural systems. Clark and his fellows (1973) elegantly proved the fallacy of this approach, demonstrating that it could be economically preferable to kill every blue whale left in the ocean and to reinvest the profits in the stock market, rather than waiting for the species to recover to the point at which it could sustain an annual catch.”

Talking about our management of the environment, as it happens quite frequently in the corpora I focused on, is a further proof that supports the criticism of nature as an economic system metaphor. Tokens (16) — (18) are illustrative in this sense:

(16) “Quantification of species diversity and the extent of disturbance by humans and livestock is important for future management of the vegetation” (Schindler 1998: 5).

(17) “Biodiversity questions are complex, but effective legislation and ecosystem management require objective statements rather than subjective considerations about the potential future utility of particular species” (DeLeo, Levin 1997: 12).

(18) “There are, of course, certain considerations which will have to be taken into account in the management of wildlife protected areas” (Prince Philip 1979: 33).

To summarize, the metaphor of nature as an economic system may be satisfactorily used to refer to elements of nature and to relationships between them. But, emotionally, it completely lacks the ability to support caring attitudes towards the environment.

4. Conclusions

The brief discussion of the five reifying metaphors of nature (the environment as a spacecraft, as an air-conditioner, as a house/home, as a factory and as a casino) and of the abstracting one (the environment as an economic system) legitimates the opinion that none of them entirely serves the purpose of correctly referring to the natural world around us. Some of them may have referential merits, but they all share at least one shortcoming — that of portraying nature as lifeless. Emotionally, only the house/home metaphor may be val-
ued positively, if a certain type of dwelling is chosen for the implicit comparison. The others generally encourage patronizing and careless attitudes towards nature.

Cited from the corpora


References


"The materiality of the body, insisted upon by Foucault, is not so much a fleshy, organic materiality, but an abstract object of power and semiotics. The natal materiality of the body is immediately, and already, discursively inscribed leaving no spaces for sensual experiences uncolonized, and unrepresented, by discourse. The body is knowable only as a discursive product, and linguistic representation." (Hassard 2000:60)

"We are part of the 'flesh' of the world, if we understand 'flesh' in the Husserlian or Merleau-Pontian sense, that is, underlining its non-spatiality, its openness to the invisible, and relating it to the category of inter-subjectivity." (Venn, 2000:223)

It is perhaps tempting to regard the body as something that is on the one hand, “natural”, a brute material and physical fact that is beyond “the social” and exempt from postmodern epistemological doubts. But, on the other hand, thinking it over, it is obvious that “the body” is a construct, differentiated from its other by a series of conventions that occasion a forgetfulness of how the zone of the body is arbitrarily demarcated and therefore vulnerable to deconstruction and reconstruction. What is more, it may be questioned whether bodies exist independently of the interactions with the world that are productive of a conventional sense of the body existing as an independent entity that comprises diverse organs. For instance, does the hand only become a hand when it holds a tool?

Phenomenology emphasized the importance of the lived body in how we experience and make meaning of the world. Phenomenologists talked about “being-in-the-world”, meaning that we are contingently rooted in the here and now of bodily experience, as embodied beings. What they meant was that this experience was not socially determined, but a direct, non-mediated encounter of people with the world around them. As Merleau-Ponty suggests, the body
“is made of the same flesh as the world... this flesh of my body is shared by
the world, the world reflects it, encroaches upon it and it encroaches upon
the world... they are in relation of transgression and overlapping” (qtd. in Venn
2000:218). In Edmund Husserl’s terms, the body is, in the first place, “the
medium of all perception; it is the organ of perception and is necessarily
involved in all perception... The Body is the bearer of the here and the now,
out of which the pure Ego intuits space and the whole world of the senses.”
(qtd. in Welton 1999:12). The body is the perceptual organ of the experienc-
ing subject; touching is very important and Husserl’s argument is that a sub-
ject that has only vision would never know the body as lived-body. Tactile sen-
sations have a “location” in the lived body. Husserl makes a distinction
between the visual appearances and the tactual, regarding, for instance, a
hand: “Touching my left hand, I have touch-appearances, that is to say, I do
not just sense, but I perceive and have appearances of a soft, smooth hand,
with such a form... The hand that is touching,... likewise has its touch-sensa-
tions at the place on its corporeal surface where it touches (or is touched by
the other)” (qtd. in Welton 1999:25).

Therefore, the activity of touching an object involves certain feelings that
are localized in the lived-body. Touching presupposes our capacity to be
touched, so it implies a feeling of reciprocity: “All the sensations thus pro-
duced have their localization, which means that they are distinguished by
means of their place on the appearing Corporeality, and they belong phenom-
enally to it” (qtd. in Welton 1999:25). Thus, on the one hand, the body is con-
stituted as a physical thing, matter, and in this way it has its extension and its
own properties, its colour, smoothness, hardness, warmth, etc. On the other
hand, “I” sense the warmth on the back of the hand, “coldness in the feet, sen-
sations of touch in the fingertips” (qtd. in Welton 1999:25). What Husserl
realizes is that the lived body is constitutive of the flesh of perceived things.
Things are related to other things because they are perceptually situated, and
they are perceptually situated because of the orientation they have to our per-
ceiving and moving bodies. We find the same relatedness in Heidegger, who
refers to the hand as securing the reciprocal relation between “beings” and
man. In his own terms, the hand discloses what is concealed, it acts in place
of words. Man himself acts through the hand, for the hand is, together with
the word (the ‘logos’), the essential distinction of man: “And only when man
speaks, does he think... every motion of the hand in every one of its works car-
rries itself through the element of thinking, every bearing of the hand bears
itself in that element. All the work of the hand is rooted in thinking... Thinking
guides and sustains every gesture of the hand” (qtd. in Welton, 1999:127).
Thinking is a craft, which is literally understood as the strength and skill in our hands. The hand is that part of our bodily organism which is totally different from all other grasping organs — paws, claws, or fangs. Only a being who can speak, therefore think, can have hands and can be handy in achieving works of handicraft. Heidegger defines thinking as the handicraft *par excellence*. Before him, in the 17th century, Pascal imagined the body as being full of thinking members. At that time the body was seen in parts constituted by a multiplicity of individuated organs, when the body was fragmented and the part became a subject, both in the sense that it was elaborated upon in a range of visual and textual spaces, and in the sense that it was imagined to take on attributes of subjectivity. The part was thus ontologically presented as oscillating between its status as both object and subject. Any given part is, paraphrasing Pascal, a thinking member of the body and a vehicle of culture and symbolization. This fragmentation, fracturing, dislocation, or whatever seemed at first to be lack of cohesion, was in fact the specificity that created, in the corporeal fragment, a remarkable density of implication. As Jean Starobinski writes in his *Short History of Bodily Sensation*: “I believe that the most fruitful generalizations are those arising from fairly precise studies of limited topics” (qtd. in Hillman 1997:xii).

Therefore, the fragment (and speculating on the 17th century view on the body seen in parts, we can see it as a view which *negotiated* between parts and wholes, although the *fragment* is thought to be one of the major characteristics of Postmodernism) comes to have a central significance in arriving at general cases starting from particular ones. So the method comprising two attributes of late modernity — fragmentation and negotiation — was used — even if not named — ever since the 17th century and the part was “taken for” the whole. The rhetorical trope in which these relations are configured is known as synecdoche, a term also mentioned by Hayden White in his *Figural Realism* (White 1999:11). The early modern period was even conceptualized as an age of synecdoche” (Hillman 1997:xiv), which is not only the taking of part for whole, but also, and inseparably, the substitution of the whole for the part (the word derives, in fact, from the Greek for “the act of taking together”). Michelangelo’s or Dürer’s portraits of individual organs of the body stand as finished works of art in their own right. Here is what Leonardo wrote in his anatomical drawings: “You will become acquainted with every part and every whole by means of a demonstration of each part.” (Hillman 1997:xiv) (emphasis mine). The Burckhardtian notion of the Renaissance as a period marked by the rise of the individual could, in this respect, be reformulated as a period marked by the rise of the individual part.
The fact that the early modern culture was aware that man consisted of more parts than the world increased their desire to recompose the “scattered body” and to return to their actual vision of wholeness and unity. They enjoyed the idea of parts only because these parts could be reunited in a whole. The part implies by definition a relation, thus the isolated part can never be fully autonomous, so the part is part of something, of a whole, it coheres with the whole. The body seen in bits and pieces leads to a loss of coherence, therefore to a state of chaos; it is only by a logic of connectedness that order is perceived. The part may displace the whole but it doesn’t replace it. Neither can do without the other. The same idea is stated in the Introduction to *Body and Organization*: “Parts are defined in relation to the overall purpose of the whole, emphasizing function and structure and obscuring difference and contradiction. The better the parts are specified and understood, the more complete the knowledge of the whole object, and therefore the more complete the power over it. The machine is the instrument of control over the world” (Hassard 2000:17).

The part may be considered the replica of the whole, just like the individual is treated as a replica of the universe. Jean-Claude Schmitt (1998:241) quotes Victor de Saint-Hugues, who imagined the human body as “a State in which each member was attributed a function”. And a further elaborated comparison between the organization of the kingdom and that of the human body is brought forward in the sense that eventually, the whole discussion focuses on the body as political body. Taking as a starting point medieval anthropology, man is not only body, but also soul, and this association constitutes the anthropomorphic principle which forms the basic belief according to which the world is socially organised on the dialectic of what is both inside and outside. The secret hidden movement of the soul is revealed outside by movements of the gestures.

Following Aristotle, John Bulwer considers that the highest perfection of a living creature is motion. Man would not be able to think and talk without possessing muscles, which are characterized as the link between the soul and the known world; without the muscles man “would be left destitute of the grace of elocution, and his mind would be enforced to dwell in perpetual silence, as in a wooden extasie or congelation...” (qtd. in Hillman 1997:232).

Human expression demands motion, and for Bulwer the main sites of significant motion are the head and the hands. In 1644 he published *Chirologia; or the Natural Language of the Hand*, in which he states that words are conventional and often misleading, but the signs made by the hands are “part of the unalterable laws and institutes of nature: “The natural language of the hand had the happiness to escape the curse at the confusion of Babel”
Thus, gestures of the hand were commonly used instead of words, as a non-verbal communication during the Middle Ages, a period when writing was almost exclusively a job performed by the clerics — in fact, writing is a gesture — there is no other way of putting down things but that of the hand writing the manuscript. During the Renaissance, Bulwer shows that the hand’s range of expressiveness is actually greater than that of words. He makes a list of what we can do with our hands: “sue, entreat, beseech, solicit, call allure, entice, dismiss, grant, deny, reprove, are suppliant, threaten, repent, pray, instruct, witness, accuse, declare our silence, condemn, absolve, show our astonishment, refuse, respect, give honor, adore, worship, despise, prohibit, command, confess, demand, plight our faith, praise, complains, give a pledge of aid, manifest our love...” (qtd. in Hillman 1997:241), and the list goes on and on, which reminds us that the Renaissance was the great age of lists. The author analyses different postures of the hand, from scratching the head with one finger, which is an “effeminate gesture betraying a close inclination to vice” to putting forth the middle finger, the rest drawn into a fist, “a natural expression of scorn and contempt” (qtd. in Hillman 1997:241).

The hands thus acquire a multitude of functions and this is considered to be the proof of man’s superiority over other creatures. The hand serves as the ideal type of part-whole relationship. The hand is the instrument of reason, and also the tool that uses tools, the tool of all tools — this is also stated in Helkiah Crooke’s *Microcosmographia*: “Reason is the hand of the Understanding, speech the hand of Reason, and the Hand it selfe, is the hand of Speech. The hand executeth those things which are commanded, our commandments are subject and obedient to Reason, and Reason it selfe is the power, force and efficacie of the understanding” (qtd. in Hillman 1997:285).

In its materiality, the hand can be defined by its functional properties: its ability to gesture, touch, grip, and demonstrate. The hand is necessarily linked to gestures and different gestures are specific for different cultural periods. In early modern Europe, handclasps, for instance, stood for consent in the marriage ceremony of the Church of England, feudal obedience to a lord, and formal reconciliation after conflict. The raised right hand signified political suffrage and affirmed obedience to civil or royal authority. In all of these gestures, the hand represents and effects a point of contact between collective notions of person and the world of interiority, intentions and will. There is an inescapable link between reason, the intellect and the hand. The hand writes, cuts, orders or paints only because the intellect dictates it to do so. The hand can both create and destroy — “By the helpe of the hand, Lawes are written, Temples built for the service of the Maker, ships, houses, instruments, and all
kind of weapons are formed” (Hillman 1997:292). After all, in the Roman Law, manus meant power. The hand separated from the rest of the body is represented in Michelangelo’s hand of God and in Albrecht Dürer’s praying hands. The apparent dismemberment of “ownerless arms” (Hillman 1997:304) must remain semantically invisible if they are to be read as icons of powerful agency. Usually, God is represented by His hand coming down from above. God’s hand emerges from the clouds, sometimes surrounded by a nimbus, often swathed in cloth. The clouds or classical sweep of fabric that circle the shoulder where the limb ends mark the point past which God’s actions must not and cannot be traced. We can see the evidence of God’s work on earth (denoted by the reaching hand), but God’s person and intentions remain inscrutable. The communication between God and the people is accomplished by the stretched hands toward God. And God’s hand gives his blessing either by His hand or by a divine instrument. His power and force are transmitted by a wave of the hand — God’s divine hand can bless, forgive or punish. The hand becomes the prominent vehicle for integrating sacred mystery with corporeal mechanism. God’s hand, usually in an open-handed posture, (“dextera domini”), stands for the invisible Father. In a similar way, Rodin’s hands in The Cathedral stand for the Church — we deal with a synecdoche here — religion is symbolically represented by two hands heightened as if making their way towards the sky. Bulwer interprets this kind of open-handed posture as the habit and sign of liberality: “To put forth the right hand spread is the habit of bounty, liberality and a free heart; thus we reward and friendly bestow our gifts. Hence, to open the hand in the Hebrew phrase implies to be free-hearted, munificent, and liberal. For the Hebrews when they would express a profuse munificence, they say jad pethucha, that is, [an open hand]” (qtd. in Hillman 1997:301).

This open-palmed gesture can also be glossed as one of invitation. The semiotic structuralist interpretation of the image emphasizes how different levels of signification (production-consumption-interpretation) are juxtaposed to one another, in order to produce “meaning” — that is significance, identity and intention. Meaning emerges from how the chain(s) of signifiers, unto themselves, inter-connect. According to Roland Barthes, perception of the “text”, let’s say, is divided into langue (the world of the ‘object’, the shared language known in principle to all), écriture (social ‘meanings’, significances shared in a group/society) and parole (personal, experienced response). Barthes was also the one who believed that fragmentary expression is preferable, because “innocence opposes that order which distorts” (Arta 2001:1). So, in order to grasp the fragment, we must detach ourselves from logic and
its causal relations. In fact, the world is an analogon of the fragment, and not the other way round.

We cannot assign precise meanings to fragments. They evoke the loss of a complete body, but are more resilient than the unity they have been forcefully separated from. This ambivalence explains the immense prestige of the fragments of ancient sculptures, such as the Belvedere Torso, seen as models of perfection by countless generations of artists. Descartes believed that the reason for the life of a body is that it possesses organs, which are made up of 'particles of matter.' In his study of Greek poetry, Schlegel views the fragment as totally detached from the rest of the world, and self-sufficient, as an entity closed upon itself, like a hedgehog, reluctantly disclosing a whole meaning. Also, Rodin's revolutionary assemblages were inspired by this metonymic understanding of the fragment, allowing the imagination to discover the new life each of them condenses. Metonymy is the linkage, the chain of associations, the joint. To be out of joint, to have the capacity to dislocate and be dislocated, is to recognise the fragility of the joint, the point of vulnerability that is the corollary of the gift of movement, and in the register of language, the ambivalent task of the interpreter.

Rodin was fascinated with the diverse forms of hands and their expressive capabilities, both as independent sculptures and as components of a larger whole, communicating their strength, movement and expression. Rodin's interest in hands as independent sculptural forms was further inspired by his access to photography. In 1887 Rodin received a copy of Eadweard Muybridge's groundbreaking photographic study *Animal Locomotion* which included a series of dramatically lit images of hands in various gestures and poses. A decade later Rodin worked with an amateur photographer, Eugène Druet, to produce his own photographs documenting the hands he had sculptured. Rodin instructed Druet to photograph the hands from a variety of angles, as if emerging from underneath a blanket or out of the end of a sleeve (Jarrassé 24-28).

These photographic experiments supported Rodin's own belief that the meaning and expressive potential of all sculptural forms were in a constant state of flux. Rodin felt very strongly that the impact and success of any given sculpture, big or small, depended upon its context as well as its manner of presentation. It was a belief that was central to Rodin's working method and also informed how the hands were used both on their own and as components of larger figurative work. Often when Rodin composed a new figure he experimented by attaching different hands at varying angles to explore the possibilities that each combination might reveal. This working method encouraged Rodin's interest in the fragment, and he believed in the idea that pure forms,
such as the hands, are not necessarily dependent upon a larger whole to convey meaning (cf. *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica*, vol.10, 1993:130-132).

Rodin proved that the hand could convey a profound amount of emotion through the careful modelling of their musculature, proportion, texture and balance. The hands’ expressive capability is huge — Rodin’s hands clench, beg, pray, show disease. Rodin infused them with a range of emotions — from anger and despair to compassion and tenderness. *The Hand of God*, borrowed directly from Michelangelo’s Sistine ceiling painting of the moment of creation, is a highly symbolic work that uses the hand to represent the creator of man and woman. It evokes parallels between the story of creation and the act of the artist modelling figures from clay. The two hands stand for the place from which this world was born.

The close observation of the human form, and especially the human form in movement, continued to inspire Rodin. On two separate occasions he also allowed casts of his own hands to be made, the effects of which were quite different. The position of Rodin’s hands seemed to reflect two conflicting sides of his personality and especially his profound interest in the question of damnation versus salvation. The posing of Rodin’s left hand resulted in the creation of a gesture somewhat akin to a satanic benediction. The later casting of his right hand was much more benevolent and reminiscent of his own rendering of the noble hand of Pierre de Wiessant from his masterpiece *The Burghers of Calais* (cf. *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica*, vol.10, 1993:130-132). Rodin’s late work, such as *The Hand of God*, evokes parallels between the story of creation and the act of the artist modelling figures from clay. God is represented by His hand (the whole represented by a part) and the internal movements of the soul are translated into the external movements of the body by means of gestures. The movement is specific to the entire body, while the gesture particularly refers to the hands and other members (“gestus in manibus est”) (Schmitt 1998:127).

A gesture is a sign of reason. It is seen as a movement, thus implying both an action, an activity (*modus agendi*) and an attitude (*modus habendi*). The interior movements of the soul are translated into the outside world by the exterior movements of the body. The gesture offers a configuration, a figure (*figuratio* meaning that the gesture is always perceived by someone; in fact the look of the other is what gives existence to the gesture) On the other hand, the gesture gives birth to a certain attitude or action. Thinking is rooted in our gestures and the gesture is both natural and cultural — the gestures of the hand become a text which can be read as “signs” and interpreted at different levels of meaning. The hand incorporates an ideal correspondence between parts and wholes, and guides us in understanding their mechanical interactions.
The hand is the second portrait of man. The hand is the gesture, the gesture is the word, the word is the soul, and the soul is the man.

References:


1. Introduction

Within the class of collective nouns, or, as some authors call them, group nouns, there is a subclass of particular interest: collective nouns describing groups of animals of the N1-of-N2 form.

The interest arises, on the one hand, from the apparent lack of system within the subclass as a whole and the lack of conceivable logical relations between N1 and N2 elements. In other words, very frequently there is apparently no conceivable explanation for the choice of the N1 element in relation to the N2 element — for example, knowing that owls are birds and that the most frequent collocation is “a flock of birds” and not “a parliament of birds”, why should one say “a parliament of owls”? However, as it can be predicted by the use of the adjective “apparent” and adverb “apparently” in the previous sentence, there is a system, and a logical explanation for the choice of the N1 element can be found.

On the other hand, these collocations are equally interesting from the point of view of their current status. Namely, a considerable number of N-of-N collocations belongs to 15th-century lists of ‘proper terms’, notably that in the Book of St Albans attributed to Dame Juliana Barnes (1486) and there is no doubt that many of these were fanciful or humorous terms which probably never had any real currency. Nevertheless, they were taken up by Joseph Strutt in Sports and Pastimes of England (1801) and by other 19th century writers. This “revival” ultimately led to the establishment of these structures as the only “proper” terms for naming groups of animals. However, no one has tried to determine their real-life frequency and distribution, which is particularly interesting considering that the literature on this topic is very scarce, is prominently prescriptive in its nature and is solely focused on the quantificational component of their meaning, which, on its own, is not sufficient to explain the
existence of several collocations for a single animal and of contextual restrictions on their usage.

2. Classification and Research

The starting point for the classification was the list of “Terms for Groups of Animals etc.” from the Concise Oxford Dictionary, to which a number of additional terms was added from different sources. In total, the list contains 255 collocations. The research consisted of two phases:

- the semantic analysis of N-of-N collocations
- the analysis of their current status by using the Internet as the most representative and up-to-date corpus of spoken and written English.

2.1. Semantic Classification

As the example above clearly shows, a good classification of N-of-N collocations describing groups of animals must be based on the presence or absence of the implied or additional meaning, and not on their quantificational meaning, which is just a characteristic they all have in common, and which makes them collective nouns. In other words, a good analysis of these collocations has to begin with a detailed semantic analysis that takes into consideration all semantic aspects of a particular collocation.

In order to make the semantic classification as insightful as possible, the corpus of N-of-N collocations describing groups of animals was subjected to a two-stage analysis.

The first stage consisted of the following three steps:

- looking up all possible meanings of the N1 components of particular N1-of-N2 structures,
- consulting reference books for further information on particular animals (N2 components),
- analyzing logical relations holding between possible meanings of the N1 component and the characteristics of the animal (N2 component).

The data acquired in this way were then, in the second stage, further analyzed in regard to their implicative or additional meaning, i.e. the meaning other than quantificational.

The semantic analysis clearly showed that it is not the quantificational component, but the implied semantic component that determines and restricts the usage of a particular collocation.
As a result, all collocations were classified in two large groups: N-of-N collocations which, more or less, have only quantificational meaning (QUANTIFICATIONAL), and N-of-N collocations which, besides quantificational meaning, have a distinct implicit or additional meaning (QUANTIFICATIONAL PLUS, from this point on, these will be referred to as QUANTIFICATIONAL+). Additionally, the semantic analysis clearly showed that it is not the quantificational component, but the implied semantic component that determines and restricts the usage of a particular collocation.

Graphically, this basic binary opposition is shown in figure 1.

Figure 1: Basic classification of N-of-N collocations describing groups of animals: within the set as a whole there are two large subsets — ‘quantificational’ collocations and ‘quantificational+’ collocations.

Each of these groups — both quantificational and quantificational+ collocations — can be subdivided into a number of subgroups.

2.1.1. Quantificational N-of-N Collocations
Within the set of quantificational collocations there are two subsets:

- quantificational collocations which describe groups of domestic animals and imply that the group is under a direct, or indirect, control of a human keeper;
- quantificational collocations which describe groups of wild animals — of course, in this case the existence of a human keeper is not implied.

2.1.1.1. Quantificational Collocations Describing Domestic Animals
A prototypical, and the most frequent, representative of quantificational collocations describing domestic animals is ‘a herd of X’, where X stands for cattle or bovine domestic animals. For example: *a herd of cattle*.

Considering the fact that these collocations imply that the group is under the control of one or more persons, one might argue that they should belong
to the class of quantificational+ collocations, because they also have an additional, implied meaning. However, that is not the case. In the first place, the notion of a keeper is now hardly present, and the quantificational meaning of these collocations is by far more dominant. In the second place, the notion of a keeper is in many respects the result of our associations related to the animals described by N2, and not the result of notional or logical relations between the N1 and N2 components of the N1-of-N2 structure. When one hears the expression ‘a herd of cows’ one’s general knowledge associates the expression with two pieces of information: that cows are domestic animals and that domestic animals are kept together under human control. As a result we imply the existence of a keeper. But, the same happens when we say ‘a cow’. A cow wandering freely, not tended by a cowherd is for a European a scarcely imaginable sight. In other words, people are inclined to associate a domestic animal, or domestic animals in general, with a keeper, and this has nothing to do with the N-of-N construction. This train of associations and the resulting implications cannot occur after hearing an expression like ‘a herd of whales’ (note that the noun ‘herd’ is used again) or ‘a whale’, because whales are wild animals and thus any possibility of a person taking charge of them is immediately eliminated.

2.1.1.2. Quantificational Collocations Describing Wild Animals

Quantificational collocations describing groups of wild animals are the least interesting group, in spite of being the largest. These are collocations that have only quantificational meaning, or collocations whose additional meaning is hardly present. The typical representatives are ‘a company of parrots’, ‘a flock of birds’, ‘a shoal of fish’, etc., which only denote a large number of animals, and nothing else.

However, it would be wrong to say that within this class there are not some more colourful examples, like ‘a draught of fish’ — a large quantity of fish taken in one drawing of the net, but in these cases the quantificational meaning is much more prominent and more relevant for the use of a collocation than any additional meaning that it may have.

There is also a number of constructions which were originally quantificational+ but have become purely quantificational. A good example is ‘an army of frogs’. The first recorded collocation is ‘an army of ants’, which is a quantificational+ collocation describing the distinctive quality of ants — the quality of being well-organized, like an army. Later that collocation was applied to frogs as well, but in doing so the quantificational+ component was lost. Hence, ‘an army of frogs’ means only ‘a great number, a multitude of frogs’, without any additional meaning.
2.1.2. Quantificational+ N-of-N Collocations

According to the additional meaning (other than quantificational), the subset of quantificational+ collocations can be subdivided into the following subclasses:

- quantificational+ collocations describing the manner of motion,
- quantificational+ collocations describing behaviour of animals or their distinctive quality,
- quantificational+ collocations describing animals’ habitat in general,
- onomatopoeic quantificational+ collocations,
- quantificational+ collocations related to parentage of animals, and
- quantificational+ collocations describing the impression which animals make on one’s mind or feelings.

2.1.2.1 Quantificational+ Collocations Describing The Manner of Motion

Quantificational+ collocations describing the manner of motion, as their name suggests, contain as their additional meaning an implicit description of the manner in which animals move. An excellent example is ‘a team of dogs’, which implies that dogs are harnessed to draw together (in a sleigh). Obviously, ‘a team of dogs’ cannot be applied to four pet retrievers playing in the park.

Sometimes, this additional meaning is not very prominent, but in most cases, as in the previous example, it does restrict the use of the collocation. For example, ‘a flight of birds’ cannot be used for birds that have landed, but only for those in the air. ‘A wedge of geese’ (in the air), ‘a drove of cows’ (explained earlier) and ‘a paddling of ducks’ (on the water) are other examples of collocations whose use is restricted by their additional meaning.

There are also collocations, like ‘a sleuth of bears’ or ‘a leap of hares’, which represent borderline cases, and are therefore difficult to classify. Knowing that sleuth means ‘laziness, slow movement’, one might rush and classify ‘a sleuth of bears’ within the class of quantificational+ collocations describing the manner of motion, but in fact ‘laziness, slow movement’ is a distinctive quality of bears, their characteristic behaviour. Hence, ‘a sleuth of bears’ is a quantificational+ collocation, describing the behaviour of the animals or their distinctive quality. The same explanation can be applied to ‘a leap of hares’ — the collocation does describe the manner of motion, but the leaping manner of motion is a distinctive quality of hares.
2.1.2.2. Quantificational+ Collocations Describing the Behaviour of Animals or Their Distinctive Quality

Quantificational+ collocations describing the behaviour of animals or their distinctive quality deal with the manner in which animals normally behave and with their general characteristics. ‘A barren of mules’ is a very conspicuous example. It, of course, points to the fact that mules are incapable of producing offspring. A bit less striking, but still a very good example is ‘a destruction of wild cats’ which refers to their savage behaviour, just as is ‘a labour of moles’ which vividly depicts one of the general characteristics of moles — their persistence in digging. ‘A hover of trout’ illustrates the distinctive quality of trout: their ability to jump over steep rapids in a river.

2.1.2.3. Quantificational+ Collocations Describing Animals’ Habitat

Collocations which describe the place, building or environment in which animals live belong to the subclass of quantificational+ collocations describing animals’ habitat. Many of these collocations are quite colourful, sometimes on the verge of being funny. ‘A bank of monitors’ is the most extreme representative of the group. A monitor, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, is “a large lizard of the family Varanidae, found in Africa, Asia, and Australia; so called from being supposed to give warning of the vicinity of crocodiles”. In addition, the Encyclopedia Britannica also states that monitors “mostly inhabit the bank of the river”. That, naturally, explains the collocation ‘a bank of monitors’.

Nevertheless, not all collocations within this subclass are so far-fetched. ‘A stud of horses’, ‘a volary of birds’ and ‘a bike of hornets’ are typical examples. Less typical, but not too far-fetched an example is ‘a stalk of foresters’. The following information is necessary for the correct interpretation of the collocation: a forester is ‘a popular name for any of various woodland moths of the family Agaristidae which ‘feed on leaves and stalks of small plants’.

2.1.2.4. Onomatopoeic Quantificational+ Collocations

The subclass of onomatopoeic quantificational+ collocations comprises N-of-N collocations which describe, or even imitate the sounds which animals produce. The best example, and the one closest to the absolute imitation, is ‘a peep of chickens’. Other typical collocations are ‘a chattering of choughs’, ‘a gaggle of geese’ and ‘a murmuration of starlings’.

However, the least typical example is ‘a parliament of owls’. Apparently it does not belong to this subclass, but this collocation is very old, and is based on the original meaning of the word parliament: ‘the action of speaking, a speech, a talk, conversation, debate’. In that respect ‘a parliament of owls’ is
a allusion to the multitude of speech-like long cries which owls produce when together.

It must be emphasized that the quantificational meaning of these collocations is, in fact, secondary, because it is almost completely overshadowed by their onomatopoeic function.

2.1.2.5. Quantificational+ Collocations Related to Parentage of Animals
Collocations such as ‘a brood of chickens’, ‘a litter of pups’ and ‘a covey of grouse’ imply that a whole number of young were born, or hatched, at once, which in turn implies that the young have the same parents, or at least one parent in common. These collocations belong to a rather small subclass of quantificational+ collocations related to parentage of animals.

In this case, the quantificational and additional meanings are in a state of equilibrium.

2.1.2.6. Quantificational+ Collocations Describing the Impression which Animals Make on One’s Mind or Feelings
This subclass comprises N-of-N collocations which describe the impression which animals make on one’s mind, senses or feelings by their behaviour or by some of their distinctive qualities. The best example is ‘a dole of doves’ which denotes that the mournful cooing of doves excites sorrow, grief, or pity in the mind of a person who hears it. Lions certainly look powerful and proud as they lie in the prairie, masters and rulers of the wilderness. Hence, the collocation ‘a pride of lions’ is quite understandable and easily explainable.

When someone interrupts a cat that is resting, it first looks at the intruder for a moment, as if in doubt what to do, and then decides either to escape or to continue resting. A collocation ‘a doubt of cats’ refers exactly to this manner of behaviour which is, no doubt, typical of cats.

Quantificational meaning of these collocations is slightly less prominent than their non-quantificational meaning, but it does not restrict their use in any respect.

2.1.3. Quantificational+ Collocations in General
A remark has to be made in relation to quantificational+ collocations.

It is worth noticing that all these collocations, when analyzed in a more general framework, denote a certain distinctive feature of a particular animal: paddling is a distinctive manner of motion for ducks on the water; it is a distinctive characteristic of mules that they are not fertile; horses are distinctive from other animals because they live in a stud; peeping is a distinctive sound of chickens; a litter of pups is distinctive from other pups by their parentage;
doves are distinctive from other birds by their ability to excite sorrow, grief, or pity in a mind of a person who hears their mournful cooing.

Of course, it does not mean that this classification is redundant, because it explains subtle differences in meaning. Nor does it mean that this classification is obsolete, because many of these collocations can be found in contemporary literature, and even heard on TV (Discovery Channel, National Geographic, Animal Planet etc.).

The summary of the semantic classification of N-of-N collocations describing groups of animals is given in table 1.

2.2. The Current Status of N-of-N Collocations

Considering the subtlety of differences in meaning and the fact that a valid semantic interpretation of many of the listed collocations requires a careful etymological analysis, the only natural next step was to determine their current status and frequency.

For this purpose, a custom data-mining program was developed using the Automate® macro programming language. The task of the program was to search the Internet (using the Google search engine) for all possible combinations of N1 and N2 elements. In order to do so, the program was supplied with two lists: a list of 154 N1 elements and a list of 151 N2 elements (animals). The total number of combinations for these two lists is 23254. The program was run on two computers simultaneously and finished the search in about 30 hours.

Figure 2 illustrates the internal workings of the program. The program takes the first noun from the list of animals (N2 component) and combines it with all the words from the list of N1 components. Once it gets to the end of

Figure 2: The internal workings of the program.
the N₁ list, it takes the next noun from the list of animals (N₂) and again combines this word with all the words from the N₁ list. The program ends when it gets to the end of the list of animals (N₂).

2.2.1. Results Of The Google Search And The Conclusion

In a sharp contrast to the list of 255 “proper” collocations, the program found a total of 6053 collocations. However, only about 80% of them really refer to groups of animals (e.g. “a systematic murder of whales” does not refer to a group of animals, but “a murder of crows” does). 3547 collocations have fewer than 10 hits (occurrences), 1739 collocations have 10 to 99 hits, 645 collocations have 100 to 999 hits, 99 have 1000 to 9999 hits and there are 23 collocations with more than 10,000 hits. Unfortunately, the actual results of the Google search with frequencies cannot be given here due to the sheer size of them: they are more than 20 pages long.

The results point to three conclusions:

• purely quantificational collocations, with only a couple of exceptions, are far more frequent than collocations which also have additional meaning.

• it seems that a new quantificational hyperonym for groups of animals is emerging in English – “a bunch of X”. Contrary to the list of proper terms, which indicates that “a bunch of” should only be used with ducks (on water), waterfowl and wildfowl, the results clearly show that “a bunch of” can be used quantificationally with virtually any animal (133 of 151 animals in the list can go with “a bunch of”). Moreover, 63 of these collocations have mid-to-high frequency (100 to 9999 hits) and 50 have low, but non-negligible frequency (10-99 hits).

• the additional semantic component is still relevant and influences the choice of collocation for a particular animal in a particular context. For example (and, again, contrary to the list of proper terms), the noun “cows” collocates with the following nouns (depending on the context): army, band, bank, barren, bevy, blessing, brace, building, bunch, business, cast, charm, cloud, cluster, clutch, colony, company, congregation, congress, descent, destruction, down, drift, drove, fall, field, fleet, flight, flink, flock, gaggle, game, gang, herd, hill, horde, host, labour, mob, murder, pace, pack, pair, parcel, party, plague, rookery, run, rush, school, spring, stand, string, swarm, team, tribe, trip, troop, walk, watch and yoke.
Table 1: The semantic classification of N-of-N collocations describing groups of animals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N-OF-N COLLOCATIONS DESCRIBING GROUPS OF ANIMALS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>QUANTIFICATIONAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUANTIFICATIONAL + ADDITIONAL MEANING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOMESTIC ANIMALS (A KEEPER IS IMPLIED)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILD ANIMALS (NO KEEPER)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANNER OF MOTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEHAVIOUR OR DISTINCTIVE QUALITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HABITAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONOMATOPOEIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARENTAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPRESSION</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- a flock of goats, sheep
- a herd of asses, cattle, cows, goats, pigs, sheep, swine
- a leash of hounds (a set of three)
- a mob of cattle, sheep
- a pack of hounds, dogs
- a pair of horses
- a tribe of goats
- a trip of goats, sheep

- an army of caterpillars, frogs
- a kale of turtles
- a band of gorillas, jays
- a bed of clams, oysters, snakes
- a bevy of larks, quail, roes, swans
- a brace of grouse
- a building of rooks
- a bunch of ducks, water fowl, wild fowl
- a cast of falcons, hawks
- a cote of badgers
- a clowder of cats
- a cluster of grasshoppers
- a company of parrots, pigeon
- a congregation of eagles
- a draft of fish

- an army of ants
- a baron of mules
- a blessing of unicorns
- a business of ferrets
- a colony of ants, beavers, gulls, penguins
- a conspiracy of ravens
- a covert of ducks
- a deceit of lapwings
- a flight of birds, coromants, doves, goshawks, insects, pochards, swallows
- a fall of woodcocks

- an aura of polar bears
- a bank of monitors
- a bire of hornets, wasps, wild bees
- a desert of lapwings
- a drey of squirrels
- a field of (race) horses
- a herd of horses
- a hive of bees
- a nest of mice, rabbits, vipers

- a charm of finches
- a clattering of choughs
- a chime of finches
- a clattering of choughs
- a crash of rhinos
- a gaggle of geese
- a kettle of hawks
- a murmuration of starlings
- a parliament of owls, rooks
- a peep of chickens
- a brood of chickens, ducklings, hens
- a clout or clutch of chickens
- a covey of grouse, partridges, pheasants, quail
- a kindle of kittens
- a litter of cubs, pigs, pups
- a rye of pheasants
- a spring of seals, seal(s)

- a congress of baboons
- a doe of doves
- a doubt of cats
- a down of hares
- a hark of hares
- a piteousness of doves
- a pliving of turridoves
- a pride of lions
- a rag of cots
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TRANSLATION AS/AND GLOBALISATION


References

Strangely enough, McLuhan (1964:27) considers that “highly literate people cannot cope with the non-verbal art of the pictorial... The unconscious depth-messages of ads are never attacked by the literate, because of their incapacity to notice or discuss non-verbal forms of arrangement and meaning. They have not the art to argue with pictures.” Advertisements have evolved a lot since then and they have developed both linguistically and visually. Moreover, there is a certain type of ads that does not use language, particularly the fashion and perfume ones, which are addressed, more often than not, to the connoisseurs. Therefore the above statement is rather arguable.

There are, however, other situations in which one need not be necessarily a highly elevated and cultivated person in order to identify a pattern. It is the case of the advertisement “The new supermodel, Vauxhal Corsa”. A lot of cultural knowledge is involved in deciphering the meaning of the ad. An important element is the frequent association between cars and women, which is fully taken advantage here. In the commercial, the car shows up every time a famous model has a shooting session and all the attention of the photographers or journalists turns suddenly to the car, a fact which arouses the women’s anger. Therefore the commercial makes use of the old rivalry between cars and women as well as of the fixed association between them.

This is also a cultural specific element: in Romanian the correlation is not so striking, as both are feminine nouns. The connotations are more challenging in English, where common nouns do not have the gender category. A car is commonly referred to as a “she”, maybe because in the beginning the satisfaction of driving cars was mostly men’s prerogative. Today it is still men who have an interest in cars: sometimes they are as attracted to cars as to women; at other times the car takes precedence over the woman. There are cases when there is a competition between cars and women, perhaps because they are as expensive from men’s point of view. Another motive for the association between women and cars may be the forms of the latter. A lot of jokes have been made starting from the conceptual metaphor CARS ARE WOMEN or, vice versa, WOMEN ARE CARS. It is not unusual for men to talk about women in terms of “headlights” or “trunk” pejoratively, obviously. However, both cars and women are important issues in a man’s life. It is said
that one never forgets one’s first love. Neither one’s first car. On the contrary, there are things that make a car more desirable (and faithful) than a woman. One of the them is that it is an object and even if many men treat women like objects, they are not and sooner or later they make it clear, to men’s annoyance. Anyway, if one gets tired of one’s car or she does not meet his requirements any more, it is very easy to get rid of it; it does not imply some troublesome divorce or some noisy break-up. It is simply sold without tears and remorse and nightmares that she will come asking for alimony. In short, cars seem to represent men’s dream of a silent, submissive wife, always ready to serve without asking questions. Anyway, it does not go exactly like this, it is just an idealised version of the real, Murphy-ruled world in which generally cars break down exactly when you need them more (which ironically seem to be another point of similarity with women, some would argue!).

Speaking of the conceptual metaphor CARS ARE WOMEN, this seems to be rather productive. The next advertisement that deserves one’s attention is for Toyota Celica. It exhibits a mauve car in motion (everything in the background is blurred in beige nuances). All the elements of the image evoke speed: the vague background, the lit headlights of the car, the front wheels turning left, the position of the car that seems to be passing by. On the other hand, the car is the only “character” of the picture: there is no other visible presence, animate or inanimate. The long copy is as follows:

“Forget about slipping by unnoticed

Vivacious curves, a shimmering body and flowing metallic lines. With such striking good looks the Toyota Celica has turned quite a lot of heads recently. Of course, you’d expect people to pay close attention to this car. But with a 2.2-liter, 130-hp, twin-cam, 16-valve engine, they had better look fast because they won’t have long to stare. Take the aggressive, aerodynamic shape of a liftback or coupe with an available rear spoiler and optional power moonroof. Or you can even get it in a sleek convertible model. Either way, this is one car that’s definitely going to get you noticed.

TOYOTA CELICA
I love what you do for me”

If it had not been for the technical details and a few other details, the ad might be understood as referring to a woman. In this case, the mapping CARS ARE WOMEN is materialised in a metaphorical style. The slogan may seem a little puzzling, as slipping unnoticed may seem a quality of the cars: an automobile which is so silent that passes unnoticed cannot but be appreciated. But the advertisement refers to something else: to a car that has such striking good looks that would make people turn their heads and watch it just as when a beautiful woman makes her appearance. The clues for such an interpretation
are numerous. NPs like curves, body, flowing lines, striking good looks and VPs like has turned quite a lot of heads recently, to stare and pay close attention point in that direction. Another hint is the mauve colour of the car, a colour rarely worn by men, but, on the contrary, preferred by women. Looking back at the picture after having read the text, one may imagine an appealing young woman wearing an elegant mauve dress, as the car itself consists of rather circular, smooth lines. Therefore the ad matches the product perfectly — as it clearly would not be as suitable for another type of car.

Even if it is constructed around the conceptual metaphor CARS ARE WOMEN, the advertisement, however, does not suggest feminine qualities other than beauty and fascination. It does not imply characteristics like weak, sensible or soft, which are associated with women, but which would not appeal to car buyers. The feminine connoting words and phrases combine with unmistakable automobile attributes: vivacious, shimmering, metallic, aggressive, aerodynamic. Virtually in every sentence the metaphor interweaves with some element which reminds one of the advertised product; this is either just referred to by the above mentioned attributes, or the common noun car is actually employed deictically determined by the demonstrative this, or the name of the car itself or its technical details are given.

The car is meant to perform the same purpose as a beautiful woman: for its/her owner/partner to show off and be envied by the others. The last words “I love what you do for me” are worth commenting upon. Again these words may be said to a woman as well as about the car in question (with the subsequent personification). There is, however, the same sexist attitude implied: the car/woman is there to do something for the customer, to get him out of anonymity, not allow him to slip unnoticed.

The advertisement to close the CARS ARE WOMEN series is that for Renault 19. The picture of the ad is simple, presenting two dark cars facing different directions at different levels on a dark background, like in an exhibition. The text is as follows:

“Grand temptation.

£1000 off the Renault 19 16 Valve? Can we mean the car that ensnared the hearts of the world-weary motoring press? (“Something magical happens when you extend the Renault,” said Fast Lane in awe.) The model whose molten lines and pump-iron attitude cause heads to turn and necks to crane? Whose whipcord responses, pin sharp steering and sheer eye-popping performance produce smile after mile after mile? (Translation for number-crunchers: 137 bhp, 0-62 mph in 8.5 secs, and a purely academic top speed of 133 mph.) Yes, it’s the very same Renault 19 16 Valve, now just £12,635 for either hatchback or saloon. Indeed, as that’s some £3,364 less than the VW Golf Gti
16V, perhaps temptation is the wrong word. “Grand folly” might be nearer the mark. And then there are all the other inducements. Electric front windows and mirrors, power steering, remote central locking, alloy wheels, a hip-hugging driver’s seat adjustable for height and lumbar, an alarm, an engine immobiliser, a... What, you still haven’t succumbed? Look, just visit your Renault dealer as soon as you can. And while we suffer from delusions, you can enjoy the grandeur.”

This ad exhibits a wealth of rhetorical devices, from Biblical allusion to antithesis and rhetorical question, from alliteration to pun, leaving apart the orality of the copy. What is of interest here is again the realisation of the conceptual metaphor CARS ARE WOMEN. This time women are seen as tempters, as the slogan undeniably shows it. The text provides a number of phrases which relate cars as tempters to women tempters: a car or a woman may ensnare the hearts, cause heads to turn and necks to crane, may have eye-popping performance and molten lines and may produce smiles or a grand folly. Another metaphor which can be interpreted along the same lines is that represented by the verb to succumb. A very appealing woman may cause a man to surrender, and apparently the same can be said by Renault 19. An interesting choice is the inclusion among the technical features of the determiner hip-hugging which seems not to fit the rest of the enumeration. Actually it does not appear like a car-attributed feature, but rather like a tender gesture in the act of love making.

What is obvious is the opposition between folly offered by the producers of the car and the rest of the weary world. It appears that with the purchase of the car the buyer will enter another dimension, the Promised Land of Car Owners. The distinction is clearer at the end: the common mortals, we, who suffer from delusions and the chosen one, you only, who can enjoy the grandeur.

Another metaphor worth mentioning is number-crunchers referring to those who are interested in technicalities. It may be included in the category THOUGHTS ARE FOOD, as it is meant for people who appear to devour this type of information; they are immune to the temptations presented by the ad, and are more captivated by the facts and figures.

However, not all the cars in the advertisements are compared to women. An extremely popular comparison is that between cars and animals, horses most of the time. This may be due to the famous horse-power: the unit for measuring the power of a vehicle’s engine. One of the ads belonging to this category is for the new Alfa Romeo Sportwagon:

   “Every cubic inch an Alfa Romeo
You would expect a car developed from over seventy years of experience and over 10,000 separate victories on the race track to be a thoroughbred machine.

Our new Sportswagon is no exception. It is the latest in the Alfa Romeo 33 range.

*Its heart and soul:* the latest 1.7 16V fuel injected incarnation of the famous flat four ‘Boxer’ engine. 137 bhp, 0-60 mph in 8.1 seconds. A top speed, where permitted, of 127 mph.

*Its body:* fold down the rear seats and you’ve got a load capacity of 48 cubic feet. More than enough room for when your driving pleasure has to sit comfortably with family commitments...

In this case, the car seems to be the embodiment of a horse, and not just any horse, but one with a record of victories on the race track. These stand for the achievements that the Alfa Romeo manufacturers have had along the time. The characteristics of the car are also divided into two categories: the heart and soul which represent the technical features of the car, and the body, the material ones. It also can be said that the heart of the car is its engine which gives rise to a number of characteristics that make it remarkable. Using the CARS ARE HORSES metaphor, advertisers try to convince us the Alfa Romeo Sportswagon combines the qualities and functionality of a race horse that will not disappoint those who bet on it.

The next advertisement talks about another type of bet. It represents an Alfa Romeo car again:

“Alfa Romeo — Dark horse

Let’s face it. If you’re in the market for an executive car, an Alfa Romeo probably wouldn’t be the first car that springs to mind. But perhaps you should consider the Alfa Romeo 164 range, the dark horse of sports saloons.

The perfect proportions. The light, spacious cabin. The flowing contours and bodylines. Finished to a level of luxury that puts our competitors to shame...

Quietly elegant. Discreetly powerful. The Alfa Romeo 164. Dark horse? Maybe. But we’d put our money on it every time.”

Clearly, the advertisement does not refer to a horse properly, but makes use of the idiom dark horse which means person with hidden qualities. The creators of the ad allow themselves the extravagance of being modest as they know they are talking about the executive car of the year 1991. Therefore they start the ad in a surprising way: not by praising the particularities of the car, but by admitting that it may not be the first to be noticed. This in spite of the physical description that would make all the heads turn! The perfect proportions, the flowing contours and bodylines make us think again of a woman’s
body, even if there are no other clues to confirm this hypothesis. The other personifying epithets combine the ideas of elegance and power with those of discreteness and reserve.

The whole ad is given balance and persuasive power due to the syntactical parallelism occurring twice. The first one displays the structure determiner + qualifier(s) + noun and has the purpose of physically describing the [+human] car. The second consists of adjectives modified by adverbs and serves as a means of delineating the more abstract attributes of the car. The elliptical constructions are also worth mentioning. It seems that the key words do not need any connection between them. Their presence ensures the harmony between what is concrete, rendered in the nominal structures and what is abstract, disclosed by the verbal structures.

If the ad presented before combined the physical and the spiritual characteristics of a human being, the following one focuses only on the latter. A particularity of this ad is that it does not present any technical details of the car. However, the copywriters have found a powerful element which connects all the qualities of the car: it relies entirely on the similarity between the Mitsubishi Colt and the consumer.

“A Compact with Your Spirit

Playful and stylish, yet sensible and capable...the all-new Mitsubishi Colt is a lot like you. It’s versatile. Responsive. Handles well in tough situations. Won’t compromise on safety. And certainly knows how to have fun. Drive the new Colt from Mitsubishi. We’ve built it for you.”

Had it not been for the few details that point out clearly that the discourse is about a car, the ad could have been mistaken for a person’s characterisation. And not any kind of person, but a very complex one. The qualities it displays belong to a wide range of traits of character. They prove both profundity and delicacy. They describe a person who can manage by himself, takes life seriously, accepts responsibilities, has style, displays a certain degree of flexibility, but at the same time is sensitive, agreeable and knows how to entertain himself. Translated into car qualities, this means that Mitsubishi Colt is represented as a car on which the consumer may rely, which can get out of difficult situations, adapts itself to various types of roads. In addition it provides the means to entertain the passengers and it has style.

Practically, each of us would be flattered by the above description. The consumer is flattered too, as the ad is supposed to describe exactly the type of person who would buy such a car. The enumeration of qualities attributed both to the car and the consumer is used to increase the latter’s self-esteem. Implying that the person who buys the product is a special person may be the
best method of selling that product. The connection that is made is between
the status of the consumer and the idea of buying the product.

The last two advertisements have exemplified the metaphor CARS ARE
HUMANS. Obviously, perfect humans, as the consumer is not allowed to
think of the flaws of human character. The association may be discouraging
for those who have been disappointed by their fellows, but it may be a good
point for those who are very confident in their qualities.

Not all the car ads are targeted at men. For example the next advertise-
ment seems to be finally addressed to women. The image is intriguing: besides
the normal car, placed above the long-copy, like in any ordinary advertise-
ment, there is another one on the opposite page, which resembles an ice-
cream. The pictorial metaphor is obvious: the shape and the position of the
car on the stick as well as its colour reminds us of a blueberry icecream. This
is supported by the text as well, which goes as follows:

“0% Fat
100% Fun

Plymouth Breeze $14,360 (Nicely equipped.) Here’s a cool treat you
won’t feel guilty about — Plymouth Breeze. No extra calories, just plenty of
room thanks to cab-forward design. And with its modified double-wishbone
suspension, Breeze has a healthy appetite for exciting roads. Plymouth Breeze
is even filled with all the things you crave: dual air bags, AM/FM stereo and
standard air — all for a fat-free price. To get a taste of Breeze, see your
Plymouth dealer, call us a 1-800-PLYMOUTH or visit Plymouth Place on the
web at www.plymouthcars.com.”

This is a clear instance of successful verbo-pictorial metaphor. The image
and the text go hand in hand. The image the of car/icecream is supported by
a number of phrases in the text, starting from the slogan 0% Fat. 100% Fun.
and ending with the name of the car — Breeze, a pleasant cool wind whose
effect on a summer day resembles that of an icecream. A lot of the vocabulary
in the long-copy belongs to the culinary semantic area: 0% Fat, a cool treat, no
extra calories, a healthy appetite, to crave, a fat free price and to get a taste.
Moreover, the phrase you won’t feel guilty about it makes it clear for whom the
advertisement is intended: women are usually very preoccupied with their
weight and calories. The ad is very appealing to those who already have an eye
for the fat-free products in the supermarkets and spot them immediately, most
of the modern women, actually. At the same time, comparing it to the other
car ads, the lack of technical details is obvious. They have been replaced by
general information, easier to digest, about the extra space, the suspension, the
air bags and the stereo. The only figure, beside the telephone number, is the
fat-free price.
In fact this complex metaphor works at different levels. It cannot be said that an entire conceptual metaphor can be developed around it, as it should be sustained by an entire system of conceptual references. Unlike the above mentioned metaphor CARS ARE WOMEN which has its representatives in our everyday thoughts, CARS ARE ICECREAMS, or, at least CARS ARE SWEETS have no conceptual support.

An entire system of associations can be constructed here as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plymouth Breeze</th>
<th>Icecream</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Driving the car</td>
<td>Tasting icecream</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100% fun</td>
<td>0% fat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>good quality</td>
<td>no calories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>driving safe</td>
<td>no sense of guilt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eagerness to drive</td>
<td>appetite for eating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plymouth dealer</td>
<td>icecream salesman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The price is comparable

To conclude, it seems that car ads are some of the most productive in point of metaphors, both pictorial and lexical. As the car industry is developing, growing into one of the most powerful industries world-wide, manufacturers have to find new ways of attracting customers. Unfortunately, cars are not so easy to test (like a perfume or a hand cream) and therefore what the copywriters try to sell is not the car itself but an image. However, even if the technical details are included in the ad, as it is the case of some of the above examples, for most of the customers they do not mean much. Of course, there are the expert few to whom the information makes sense, but for the majority of the possible customers it is the image promoted by the car which is more appealing. Cars are associated with various concepts, abstract or concrete, and it is these concepts that make the customer choose a car from the rich offer of the automobile market. It can be said that s/he, subconsciously, decodes the metaphor and selects that type of car whose metaphorical secondary subject, or vehicle in Richards’ (1965) conception, corresponds to his fantasies and goals in life. So far, the following conceptual associations have been identified:

1) CARS ARE WOMEN
2) CARS ARE HORSES/ANIMALS
3) CARS ARE HUMANS
4) CARS ARE SWEETS

Some of these metaphorical mappings can be identified in everyday thinking as well, therefore the ads based on them rely on this to create new representations of the products they promote. It is interesting how these ads succeed in reinvigorating the common conceptual metaphors and transform
them into new, fresh material, sometimes by means of images. Other cases of metaphorical mapping are less well represented in the common thinking; they are the outcome of creativity and originality that is valued most when it comes to the discourse of advertising.

References

Introduction

The essence of communication lies in the fact that messages passed from the speaker to the hearer contain new information in addition to old information, distributed in different ways. The ways it is distributed are influenced by and depend on many factors including contrastive stress, the style of the speaker, the choice of an appropriate climax and the highlighting of communicatively effective aspects of an utterance (Greenbaum & Quirk 1990). This paper, however, investigates only the prototypical structure, which is a simple, active, declarative sentence with a typical ordering of information — from given to new, following the information flow principle (Biber et al 2002:99).

Since one of the main principles in language, the principle of language economy, in most cases triggers such changes in language which result in shorter and more economical expression, in many cases speakers tend to use words in place of whole sentences (*X flies planes.* — *X is a pilot*). In the first sentence there are two semantic units (*flies planes*), while in the second there is only one (*pilot*). In some cases there are no morphological relations between the two sentences, only semantic. On the other hand, there are cases where, besides a semantic relation, there is a clear morphological relation (*He drives [unexpressed object].* — *He is a driver; He goes to the theatre. — He is a theatre-goer.*)

This domain of nominalization, defined as nominal expressions which are a result of a word-formation process, as well as of a transformational derivation from a sentence (Lipka 1992), is a clear example of the interrelation of word formation and syntax and another concept relevant for this paper.

The aim of this paper is to investigate this relationship by observing three types of word-formation processes: prefixation, suffixation and compounding. Special attention will be paid to the aspect of given vs. new information, i.e. the field of information flow (henceforth, IF). An attempt will be made to show how the IF of a sentence is reflected in the related lexeme, what regular-
ities can be found and, based on those regularities, what generalisations can be made.

Theoretical background

The relation between sentences and polymorphemic words has been noticed and pointed out by different authors (Marchand 1965a, 1965b; Lipka 1976, 1992). Lipka (1976, 1992) discusses examples found in Marchand (1965a, 1965b) and focuses his attention on a striking fact that different nominalizations can be derived from the same underlying sentence (*Someone eats some apple. — apple-eater, apple-eating, eating apple*). Different reduced syntagmas of this kind can be derived from the same full syntagma, i.e. the sentence, because in different speech situations different parts of the underlying sentence will need to be emphasised because those parts are the ones which are necessary in the given utterance and context. If someone is talking about a person, they will need the syntagma *apple-eater*, if they are talking about a specific kind of apples, they will need *eating apple*, and if they are talking about an activity, they will need *apple-eating*. In all three cases the same underlying sentence is used as the source, but in each case there is a different surface structure which complies with the needs of the speaker in the given utterance and context.

Lipka (1992:86-87) claims that full sentences can be transformed in a rule-governed way into nominalizations, i.e. polymorphemic words. This is an example, as Lipka says, of information condensation, which is another manifestation of the principle of language economy. The distinction between given and new information plays an important role here, because, depending on what is seen as given and as new information, one part of the underlying sentence will be chosen as a starting point in the process of nominalization and that starting point will be given information. What will be in the focus of attention is new information which makes the meaning of the syntagma more specific.

In order to better understand how this process functions and what its essence is, first the information flow in sentences needs to be elaborated and exemplified. This will be followed by explanations relating the IF of polymorphemic words.

The theory of Functional Sentence Perspective (henceforth FSP) was first developed by the linguists of the Prague School in an attempt to explain the choice of a certain word order in a sentence with the same semantic elements. Jan Firbas (quoted in Bibović 1971:1) says that “[t]he principle of FSP (...) causes the sentence to open with thematic and close with rhematic
elements. Very roughly speaking, thematic elements are such as convey facts that constitute the communicative basis of the sentence, such as contribute least towards the development of the discourse and consequently convey the lowest degree(s) of communicative dynamism (=CD) within a given sentence. Rhematic elements, on the other hand, are such as contribute most towards the development of the discourse and consequently convey the highest degree(s) of CD within a given sentence.

Communicative dynamism (henceforth CD) “refers to the variation in communicative value as between different parts of an utterance” (Greenbaum and Quirk 1990:394). CD is manifested in degrees and can vary from low (known information), through medium to high (new information). As Greenbaum and Quirk (1990:395) state, “it is common — though by no means necessary — for the range of such communicative dynamism to increase from low to high in accordance with the linear progression of the information unit”. This means that given information is prototypically found at the beginning of a sentence and new information at its end. Since new information is the focus of the process of communication, the phenomenon of high information value occurring at the end of a sentence is referred to as the Principle of End-Focus (Greenbaum and Quirk 1990:395). This difference in communicative value is expressed in sentences through the process of thematization.

A thematic element, or the theme of the sentence, is “the name given to the initial part of any structure when we consider it from an informational point of view. When it occurs in its expected or ‘unmarked’ form, its direct relation to given information can be seen informally as announcing that the starting point of the message is established and agreed.” (Greenbaum and Quirk 1990:397). This given information provides a context which is known to both the speaker and the hearer.

The new information unit, the rheme, is the most important part of the message and “it seemed natural to place the new information after providing a context of given information so we can regard focus as most naturally and normally occurring at the end of the information unit” (Greenbaum and Quirk 1990:397-8).

Greenbaum and Quirk (1990) and Prčić (1995) propose a three-fold division of sentences into theme, rheme and focus. Focus is defined as the last element of the rheme which bears the highest degree of CD. Since the distribution of CD in a sentence is not of binary nature, but a matter of degree, this three-fold distinction can be very useful in some analyses, as will be shown later in the paper.

Polymorphemic words have two different parts that can be distinguished: determinatum and determinant (Marchand 1965a, 1965b; Lipka
1976, 1992). The determinatum is the element containing given information of the underlying sentence, including the relation of reference and the existence of a referent. It also includes the denotation of the linguistic sign used for referring. The surface syntagma belongs to a subclass of its determinatum and is therefore its hyponym. The determinatum of a syntagma is both semantically and morphologically the dominant part. It is semantically dominant because, as Lipka (1976:130) says, “it can be substituted for the syntagma (…). Such substitution entails a loss of information, but not the basic change of meaning...”. It is morphologically dominant since it determines the word class of the whole syntagma and directly combines with inflectional suffixes.

The determinant, on the other hand, is more important from the IF point of view, because it is the bearer of new information. It syntagmatically modifies the given and known determinatum and makes the category denoted by the reduced surface syntagma more specific. Polymorphemic words usually have a higher degree of semantic specificity when compared with the simple words that constitute their determinatum.

The underlying sentence has the highest degree of CD at the end, and this is where the rheme/focus is, according to the end-focus and IF principles. On the other hand, polymorphemic words show an inverse tendency. Since the determinatum is the last element in the syntagma, and the determinant is the starting point in the lexeme, the distribution of CD is different. CD in polymorphemic words is the greatest at the beginning of the syntagma and diminishes towards its end. The rheme/focus, the point with the highest degree of CD is at the beginning (unlike in sentences where it is at the end) and it is for this reason that the term Front-Focus Principle will be proposed here, which would apply to polymorphemic words and their corresponding underlying sentences have a sort of a mirror-image relationship, its clearest evidence lying in the fact that the focus which is at the end of an underlying sentence is at the beginning of its corresponding polymorphemic word.

“I believe that topicalization, that is picking out a ‘topic’ or ‘theme’ of conversation, usually involves choice of a specific information ‘focus’, which may be expressed by intonation and stress” (Lipka 1976:136). This statement is valid for most cases of the process of thematization. Quite normally, speakers tend to employ less force in speech when talking about known information, regardless of whether it is a sentence or a lexeme, and they tend to speak more prominently when uttering the part containing new information. That is why low CD corresponds to weak stress, medium CD to nonnuclear stress, and high CD to intonation nucleus (Greenbaum and Quirk 1990:395). The very fact that old information is known and shared by both the speaker and the hearer means that there is no need to stress something that is already
known. On the other hand, new information in the sentence needs prominence so that the hearer could identify it as important, new and contributing to old knowledge.

In sentential analysis it has been noticed that, in its prototypical manifestation, the beginning of the sentence, i.e. the theme, bears low stress. The stress increases towards the end of the sentence and is the highest on the last element, i.e. the focus. In the analysis of polymorphic words the degree of CD in most cases coincides with prosodic prominence, but the distribution of the elements is different. The theme is the last element in polymorphic words, and the focus and rheme are at the beginning of polymorphic words. This is reflected in the way polymorphic words are pronounced.

The analysis presented here includes as many different types of compounds, prefixations and suffixations as possible in order to investigate how IF structure is manifested in them, what regularities there are and if there are any deviations from these regularities. For each chosen lexeme an underlying syntagma was provided, which is not a full or accurate meaning of the lexeme, but merely a paraphrase which serves to show the underlying content whose thematic structure is being examined and compared with that of the corresponding lexeme, i.e. some of the lexemes are more or less lexicalised, but these lexicalisations have not been considered since that goes beyond the scope of this paper.

Compounds

The prototypical IF structure of compounds should include the following: (1) the front-focus principle should apply; (2) primary stress should be on the first element of the compound, i.e. on the determinant; (3) the compound and its underlying syntagma should achieve the mirror-image of elements.

Pronunciation needs to be examined since it is a way of showing how the process of thematization works. In underlying sentences, primary stress is on the last element, while in compounds, the first element typically bears primary stress. This element is the focus of the compound and corresponds to the focus of the underlying sentence. The second element of the compound bears secondary stress since it is the first part of the rheme, and corresponds to the first part of the rheme of the underlying sentence. The last element of the compound is unstressed since it corresponds to the theme of both surface and underlying syntagmas (X goes to the THEATRE. — THEATRE-goer).

In most cases the analysis shows that the underlying sentence has the reverse word order when compared with its corresponding surface syntagma, i.e. it is the mirror-image of the surface syntagma (e.g. THEATRE-goer — X goes
to the THEATRE; HONEY-bee — the bee produces HONEY; OIL well — the well contains OIL).

There are, however, examples where the order of the elements in the underlying sentence is not reversed, i.e. it is not the mirror-image of its surface syntagma (e.g. SUNset — the sun SETS; DAYbreak — the day BREAKS;). Marchand (1965a:66-67) offers an explanation for this, saying that this type affects intransitive verbs. These verbs do not have an object which could be included in the activity expressed by the surface syntagma, so the subject of the underlying sentence is included in the activity. This type of compounds is a deviation from the prototype insofar as the mirror-image is not achieved. The other two characteristics, i.e. primary stress on the first element and the front-focus principle, are there.

Other deviations from the prototype, in which the surface syntagma is not the mirror image of the underlying syntagma, have also been found (e.g. PUNCHbag — X punches the BAG; BAKING powder — X bakes with POWDER; SWIMMING pool — X swims in the POOL; DANCE hall — X dances in the HALL). In all these cases word order is not reversed because the thematized part of the compound was not the first element of the underlying sentence. The same underlying sentence offers a possibility for several surface syntagmas, so X punches the BAG could give BAG-puncher as a surface syntagma, in which case the mirror-image would be achieved. Also, the underlying syntagma X dances in the HALL could yield HALL-dancing and HALL-dancer, besides DANCE hall.

One group of compounds deserves special attention here, namely the neoclassical compounds. Their analysis has shown that postulating one underlying level is not enough, and that there should be two levels of analysis (Prcić 2002, personal communication). The first level would consist of combining forms themselves, i.e. neoclassical roots, and the second level would contain the paraphrase of the compound using ordinary English words (e.g. BIOlogy — 1 -logy about BIO-, science about LIFE; GEOgraphy — 1 -graphy of GEO; 2 description of the EARTH). It can be concluded that neoclassical compounds exhibit the same features as other compounds — they are subject to the front-focus principle and have the reverse order of elements of their underlying syntagmas. Their pronunciation varies from one case to another, so it can be said that in this point they are sometimes deviations from the prototype.

The group of exocentric compounds also deserves special attention, because the results of their analysis shows that they are deviations from the prototypical IF structure of compounds. These compounds are not mirror-images of their respective underlying syntagmas (e.g. CUTpurse — X cuts PURSES; CUTthroat — X cuts THROATS; PICKpocket — X picks POCKETS).
These compounds do not have the reverse order of the elements of the underlying syntagmas because their surface syntagmas lack an overt nominal element in the form of a suffix which would be the surface realisation of the X from the underlying syntagma. In the case of X picks POCKETS, a possible surface syntagma could have been POCKETpicker, or for X cuts PURSES, a possible surface realisation could have been PURSEcutter. However, in these cases the surface realisations do not have an overt nominal suffix which would secure the nominal status of the lexeme. Thus, by keeping the final nominal element from the underlying syntagma in the last place in the surface syntagma, the lexeme surfaces as a noun.

**Suffixations**

The prototypical IF of suffixations should have the following characteristics: (1) they should achieve the front-focus principle; (2) they should have primary stress on the base of the suffixation; (3) even if the suffix changes the pattern of the suffixation, the suffixation can still belong to the prototypical members as long as the primary stress is on one of the syllables of the base; (4) the surface syntagma should be the mirror-image of its respective underlying syntagma.

The analysis of suffixations includes only theme and rheme since only two elements are involved: a base and a suffix. The analysis has shown that the mirror-image is achieved in most cases, and therefore the reverse order of the elements is in place. The underlying sentences comply with the end-focus principle, while their surface syntagmas, i.e. suffixations, comply with the front-focus principle (e.g. SIMPLify – X makes (Y) SIMPLE; COLLETable – X can COLLECT (Y); GLADDen – X makes (Y) GLAD; TYPist – X TYPES).

When pronunciation is analysed, the following can be concluded: the theme of the underlying sentence, surfacing as a suffix in the complex word, is pronounced with less prominence, either with secondary stress, as in simplify, or unstressed, as in gladden. The rheme, on the other hand, is more prominent, it carries primary stress which falls on the base of the suffixation. The rheme in the suffixation is in the first place, following the front-focus principle, as in simplify. The rheme of the underlying sentence is in the last place, pronounced more prominently, following the end-focus principle, as in X makes (Y) SIMPLE.

However, there are cases where the structure of the surface and underlying syntagmas do achieve the mirror-image and comply with the front-focus principle, but the analysis of their pronunciation shows a deviation from the prototype. In these cases the suffix carries primary stress, and the base carries
secondary stress. All suffixes listed here are stress-imposing, meaning that, when added to the base, they not only change the stress pattern of the lexeme, but also bear primary stress (e.g. ASSOCIation — X ASSOCIATES; CHAPLINesque — X is like CHAPLIN; ABSENTee — X is ABSENT; PROFITeer — X makes a PROFIT; MILLIONaire — X makes a MILLION; CHINese — X is from/of CHINA).

Prefixations

The prototypical IF of prefixations should have the following characteristics: (1) the front-focus principle should be applied; (2) the mirror-image of the elements of underlying and surface syntagmas should be established; (3) the prefix should carry secondary stress for the reasons explained below.

The analysis of prefixations also includes only theme and rheme since as with suffixations, only two elements are involved: a base and a prefix. The analysis shows that in the case of prefixations the mirror-image between the surface and underlying syntagmas is achieved, meaning that the rheme is at the end of the underlying sentence (end-focus principle), while the theme is at the beginning of the underlying sentence and at the end of the prefixation (e.g. REopen — X opens (Y) AGAIN; MISbehave — X behaves BADLY; MISmatch — X matches BADLY; PREheat — X heats (Y) BEFORE; OVERcook — X cooks (Y) TOO MUCH; COexist — X exists TOGETHER (with Y)).

The prefix carries secondary stress despite the fact that it is the rheme with the prefixation, while the base carries primary stress despite the fact that it is the theme of the prefixation. The main reason for such a stress pattern in most prefixations is that the base carries the main meaning of the polymorphic word which is modified by the prefix, and is also the only element of the lexeme which is not bound. Logically, the main stress is to be found on free morphemes. Prefixes, on the other hand, do carry stress in most instances, but it is a secondary stress. They are elements which alter and add to the meaning of the base, but they are bound morphemes and cannot, therefore, receive primary stress.

There are, however, prefixations which show some deviations from the prototype — the front-focus principle is applied, but there is no mirror-image. The reason for this is the fact that the modifications in the underlying syntagma precede the base instead of following it, and the reverse word order cannot be achieved (UNable — X is NOT able (*X is able NOT); DEbone — X REMOVES bones (*X bones REMOVES); PROabortion — X is IN FAVOUR OF abortion (*X is abortion IN FAVOUR OF); SUBzero — X is BELOW zero (*X is zero BELOW)).
One group of prefixations deserves special attention here. It is the group which is formed from the only three class-changing prefixes, be-, en- and a- (e.g. BEfriend — X BECOMES a friend; ENable — X MAKES (Y) able; Afire — X is ON fire). From the examples above it can be concluded that these prefixations are deviations from the prototype in two points. Although they follow the front-focus principle, i.e. the prefixes are the determinant in the surface syntagma (Kastovsky 1986), they do not achieve the mirror image when compared with their underlying syntagmas and the prefix in each of them is unstressed.

Conclusion

The issues addressed in this paper were the following: (1) a connection between polymorphemic words and sentences; (2) as each sentence is subject to the IF principle as a reflection of the CD of a language, so is a polymorphemic word, if there is a connection between them; (3) if sentences are subject to the end-focus principle, then there must be another principle applied for complex words; (4) if it is established that surface complex words are mirror-images of their underlying sentences, then the focus of complex words should be in their first element; (5) the term proposed for this is the front-focus principle.

The analyses of various types of compounds, suffixations and prefixations support the proposed theoretical explanations. Prototypically, the focus and the rheme, i.e. new information, were found at the beginning of polymorphemic words and at the end of their underlying sentences. This has proved that the mirror-image is achieved, and also that polymorphemic words are subject to the front-focus principle, and underlying sentences to the end-focus principle. There were, however, cases which did not fit into this framework, i.e. they were deviations from the prototype. For each of these groups an explanation was provided and it was pointed out in that way they are different from the prototype. What is interesting to note is that all examples complied with the front-focus principle. In each section pronunciation as a reflection of CD in speech was commented on and exemplified.

In the field of IF of polymorphemic words almost nothing has been either written or researched, so the few conclusions reached in this paper should be just a starting point of research into this very fruitful area of linguistics.
References


DISCOVERING SEMANTIC DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF ILLNESSES AND DISORDERS

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Introduction.

A multidisciplinary approach to the semantic study of terms for illnesses and disorders ought to be applied in order to provide a more complete answer to the question of what are linguistic and culturally relevant categories of illnesses and disorders in different languages.

The topic belongs to a wider area of contrastive lexical semantics. The pragmatic perspective is crucial to a project on language comparison which aims to analyse and describe the vocabulary-in-use in the medical area. Essential features of individual languages can be discovered only by looking beyond the limits of our mother languages and including a contrastive perspective. The project is characterized not only by the features 'pragmatic' and 'contrastive', but also by the feature 'corpus-based' which has been gaining ground in recent years.

How to discover semantic conventions is the question of how we can verify our semantic analysis. Semantics cannot be left to introspection and intuition, its results should be controllable, reliable, repeatable (Weigand 1998:27). Semantic conventions can no longer be justified by native competence alone; instead they have to be verified by 'hard, measurable evidence' (Sinclair 1987:XV) on the basis of representative text corpora of languages-in-use.

Background.

Throughout the whole of the 20th century, contrastive lexicology was the concern of scholars. The German linguists (1931) Trier and Weisgerber (1934) introduced the term ‘word fields’ in the 1930s. Chomsky in the late 1950s and early 1960s viewed the semantic component as interpretative in his concept of generative grammar. That the ‘word’ is no longer the basic unit of meaning was perceived by Firth (1968), who introduced the term ‘collocation’ (combinations of words that elucidate the meaning). A number of
American anthropologists investigated the vocabulary of kinship, plants, disease, and other culturally important and variable systems of classification and described their results in similar terms to the field-theorists. Bierwisch (1967) had already noted that there were some difficulties resulting from specific relations between the word and the context. Wunderlich (1970) also stressed the importance of the context for the analysis of lexical meaning very early on. This line of analysis reached its climax in the work of Pustejovsky (1991). The apparatus that is available within linguistic semantics is the ‘component’.

Componential analysis can be seen as an extension of field-theory and, more particularly, as an attempt to put field-theory on a sounder, methodological footing. A clear account of components and how they are identified was given by Lyons in 1968. Those components may be universals, structural features that are common to all languages according to Langacker (1968). Leech (1978) elaborated the concept of universals. The 1970s saw the major contrastive linguistic projects, especially between English and European languages: German, Polish, Finnish, Romanian and Serbo-Croat. Bancilã (1974:265-276) analysed terms for physical pain in English and Romanian on the basis of half-dozen components. In 1980 James placed contrastive analysis as an ‘interlinguistic’ enterprise which looks on language not merely as form but also as function in context. In 1988, Wierzbicka analysed semantic primitives and stressed that every semantic area was worth exploring by means of precise comparison in different languages.

By the end of the century, Sinclair and Weigand claimed that it was the complex multi-word lexical unit that a pragmatic approach had to deal with. ‘Semantic village’ as a metalinguistic notion is a logical continuation of more traditional notions of ‘word family’ and ‘semantic field.’ Thus, a lexical item (noun, verb, adjective) may be ‘rooted’ in one village, where its root(s) semantically belong(s), but dwell in another, being an emigrant, if its lexical meaning belongs to a different semantic village (Dem’jankov 1998:98-9). James suggests that the lexical entries identified as belonging to the particular fields selected should be studied and specified according to their strictly semantic properties: the only syntactic information pertinent will be in the form of statements of the co-occurrence restrictions imposed on particular lexical items. This view of lexis is polysystemic: the lexicon constitutes a highly complex system of subsystems, i.e. the lexical fields mentioned (James 1999:86).

Objectives.

One of the primary aims of this study is to discover the semantic distinctive features that determine how the terms for illnesses and disorders are used
in English and Serbian. We are coming to grips with the wealth of the lexis both theoretically and lexicographically, and derive from it conclusive insights for a new conception of dictionaries and for foreign language learning. Since current bilingual dictionaries are by no means adapted to use, the purpose could be to create new pragmatic contrastive dictionaries that will help students to communicate in both languages and acquire action competence. It is the task of comparative semantics to make competence transparent and explicit.

**Methodology.**

Our proposed model is pragmatic and consists of the semantic level, represented by meaning positions and the conceptual level, represented in the cognitive base. It is a contrastive-interlingual model. We introduce universal semantic units by referring to the human abilities of perceiving and acting in the world and by looking at the ways in which we express what we do in different languages. *Universal structure* can thus be considered as the cognitive heuristic base of our model of language use. At our pragmatic level, the units are not single words but words-in-use or ways-of-use, i.e. combinations of words that make up multi-word expressions. It becomes possible to start from universal semantics and construct utterances of individual languages out of ways-of-use. The model can be called a cognitively based theory of use which relates cognition to use. The problem of lexical rules has been repeatedly addressed under the term ‘collocation’.

Semantic distinctive features of terms for illnesses and disorders in English and Serbian were discovered by the process of listing collocations. The general principles governing the method outlined by Hlebec (1998:5-7) have been the following: language items are compatible when they share elements of meaning, i.e. only the words sharing the same semantic features (or the same categories as more general semantic features) can collocate; words have been grouped in lexical fields so that only the word meaning relevant to the respective field has been offered; according to the definitions given as well as their relevant features, it has been possible to combine them with the words not listed here. The application of this method requires comprehensive knowledge, since it has proven difficult, based on single words, to be able to infallibly predict acceptable collocations with other words. Also, the appropriate choice of words is delicate, since collocational errors are possible to find even with native speakers, for there is a question of the degree of appropriacy. Thus, the fact that the language factor of collocational acceptability has been closely related to the extralinguistic factor of knowing reality is of particular
significance in our study. This means that the language use is mostly (if not entirely) derived not from the language system itself, but from experience. Bloomfieldian and cognitive linguists claim that there is no strict demarcation line between the facts of a language and the encyclopedic facts of extralinguistic reality; and, yet, a comparison with the corresponding segments of another language will readily show that, as it is well known, each language maps the perception of the same world in a different way, which is a sufficient reason to give linguistics its share of work.

It would be wrong to think that concepts determine lexical structure, and consequently we should not try to derive every single reading from a conceptual relationship (Schwarze 1998:205). That our way of life determines our way of using language is equivalent with and not at all opposite to the reversed relation of having a language from which one might derive insights into a way of life (Weigand 1998:31). In other words, the goal belongs to psychology while the means are derived from linguistic science (James 1999:27). This is a sophisticated semantic analysis, since it starts from the meaning of the term and ends up with its form, which, in our study, required consultations with medical experts. Where it was possible, i.e. according to the material available, the reverse approach was taken — from form to meaning.

The nominal and verbal corpora in English and Serbian have been formed by making use of general English and Serbian dictionaries, textbooks, reference books, journals and magazines. Nouns have been collocated with adjectives and verbs, because the nominal feature itself is far too general without the corresponding adjective (e.g. ‘illness’ in comparison with ‘mental illness’). This also applies to verbs, since they enable completion of the semantic feature of the noun they collocate with (e.g. *die of* collocates with the feature ‘fatal illness’). By combining all three features, the resulting collocations have made it possible to discover fundamental semantic features in the given lexical field (e.g. *pass on* + *whooping* + *cough* = ‘contagious illness’). When an adjective semantically constitutes the meaning of a noun, it can be used solely as a predicate, not an attribute (e.g., the collocation *congenital albinism* is inappropriate in English; the only possibility is *Albinism is congenital*). The contrastive analysis of 428 English and 433 Serbian standard terms for illnesses and disorders was done and the terms were classified into 23 groups on the basis of common verbal-adjectival-nominal features concerning the nature of illness (Figure 1). Some transitional categories (*pain, fracture, malformation* etc.) were also included, since they are perceived as illnesses in laymen’s point of view. In 1980’s, Tanay (1987:34-37) approached the term ‘pain’ from a collocational perspective.
We have to analyse the use of words according to our model and check our results by the corpus. In the end, we have to check our assumptions about semantic conventions against representative text corpora. A pragmatic approach, which starts from considering the possibilities speakers have of acting verbally in a specified field, brings up a unified description of all uses of a word. The single-word lexical item should be replaced by a *multi-word lexical unit* and different parts of speech used to express the “same” meaning should be compared (Hauenherm 1998:139).

**Significance.**

The analysis proposed in this project will have much to offer to translation theory, the description of the languages in question, to language typology and the study of language universals. It is close to language learning and to the more general concept of bilingualism, which both may be regarded as major branches of applied linguistics.

The proposed study will provide new insights into the psychological operation involved in linguistic performance. In this sense, the contrastivist continually transcends his own competence, in that he is first and foremost a linguist, whose proper concern is with structure, and yet he presumes to draw conclusions about a mode of human behaviour, learning. Thus, on the basis of an analysis of two related linguistic systems, he predicts the learner’s behaviour, and we can talk about a ‘psychological reality’ of linguistic analysis.

By juxtaposing the structures of the mother tongue against those of the target language, course designers (and teachers and learners) can better plan their learning and teaching; better foresee difficulty and consequently better husband resources and direct learning and teaching effort.

The value of this project is also that it standardises the data in the sense of ensuring the homogeneity of the data. Since the task of linguistic description would be complicated by having to cope with data taken from speakers with a mixture of regional and social backgrounds, the idea is to draw on the Standard variety, and select a pedagogic norm of the language for foreign learners. This question of *standardization* of terms is especially prominent in Serbian, which lacks the adequate norm in the area of medicine (there is a mixture of Greek, Latin and foreign terms, coined and loan words for illnesses and bodily disorders with inconsistent translation equivalents). To illustrate this in Serbian, we can give an example where in the same scientific paper the first author uses the term *rilising hormon*, the second *oslobadjajuci hormon*, and the third *liberin* in the same context!
We may observe the changing picture of medical English from the 15th to the 20th century. In addition to the Greco-Latin heritage, there is a mixture of standard English from all scientific and technological sources, including new eponyms, acronyms, abbreviations and trade names (McMorrow 1998:24).

Stylistic features have also been noticed — both popular and technical terms are equally used in both languages (e.g. myopia/short sight in English, astma/zaduv/sipnja in Serbian). Synonymy is prominent in Serbian.

Evaluation and dissemination.

A new insight can be gained about the lexical field of medicine, which has not been much studied recently. Linguists can benefit from the research results in improving the theory of language structure as well as linguistic performance.

At least three types of bilingual dictionaries can be concrete products resulting from the project: 1. English-Serbian Serbian-English Dictionary of Medical Terms (for medical profession); 2. English-Serbian Serbian-English Dictionary of Popular Medical Terms; and 3. English-Serbian Dictionary of Collocations in Medicine.

The teaching process can be improved by introducing new methods. We are currently undergoing a reform in the educational process at all levels, so this experience will help shape the curricular structure.

Figure 1: COLLOCATIONS IN MEDICINE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>semantic feature</th>
<th>verb</th>
<th>adjective</th>
<th>noun</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. CONGENITAL</td>
<td>correct</td>
<td>bad</td>
<td>stammer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. CONTAGIOUS</td>
<td>catch</td>
<td>slight</td>
<td>cold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. INFECTIOUS</td>
<td>contract</td>
<td>severe</td>
<td>diarrhoea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. INFLAMMATION</td>
<td>go down with</td>
<td>viral</td>
<td>hepatitis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. TUMOUR</td>
<td>remove</td>
<td>nasal</td>
<td>polyp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. METABOLIC</td>
<td>predispose</td>
<td>to myocardial</td>
<td>infarction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEGENERATIVE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. DEFICIENCY</td>
<td>suffer from</td>
<td>severe</td>
<td>anaemia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. MENTAL</td>
<td>lapse into</td>
<td>deep</td>
<td>unconsciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. NERVOUS</td>
<td>suppress</td>
<td>painful</td>
<td>muscle spasm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. SEXUAL</td>
<td>suffer from</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>sadism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. OCCUPATIONAL</td>
<td>develop</td>
<td>occupational</td>
<td>asthma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. SKIN</td>
<td>have</td>
<td>severe</td>
<td>itching</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
13. ALLERGIC AUTO-IMMUNE strike down erythematous lupus
14. DEPENDENCE overcome heavy drinking
15. SICKNESS suffer from seasickness
16. TRAUMA receive dry burn
17. FRACTURE sustain multiple fracture
18. MALFORMATION have bad limp
19. SWELLING have nasty lump
20. OBSTRUCTION reduce deep vein thrombosis
21. BLEEDING stem heavy bleeding
22. FAILURE suffer from renal insufficiency
23. ACHE/PAIN soothe / toothache

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