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This issue of *B.A.S. / British and American Studies* is published in honour of Professor Hortensia Pârlog. She is the founder of this journal, a pioneer in lexicography, and one of the first linguists to have paid attention to Anglicisms in the Romanian language. Her rich didactic and research activity within the English Department at the University of Timișoara is well-known. Making teaching more effective has been a major and constant concern in her career. For more than forty years, with the commitment of a great linguist and phonetician, Professor Pârlog has explained to her students how sounds, words and grammatical rules make sentences more beautiful and texts worth reading and translating. As one of the best-known Anglicists in Romania, she has published books of reference, mainly in the field of phonetics. Among them, *The Sounds of English and Romanian* (1984), *The Sound of Sounds* (1995), and *English Phonetics and Phonology* (1997) testify to her passion for the way in which English words must be uttered and used. The legend goes that she reads dictionaries as if they were novels, that's how keen she is to find the best ways to use words. Her in-depth and clear-sighted contrastive analyses of English and Romanian sounds and grammar have been considered fundamental contributions to the field.
Needless to say, her presence in the academic life has not been limited to her work as a teacher and a researcher. A responsible Head of Department, a remarkable presence on the Senate and the Faculty Boards, Professor Pârlog has always had a progressive attitude, fighting with optimism for the development of English Studies in Romania and for the correct understanding of the variety of meanings "English" has in the context of higher education in Europe.

Professor Pârlog has contributed significantly to the development of the Romanian Society for English and American Studies (RSEAS), as its Chair (1996-2002) and as the editor of University English, a bi-annual newsletter giving important information about the activity of the Society to both Romanian and foreign readers. In 2002, she became a member of the ESSE Executive, being elected Secretary of the European Society for the Study of English (ESSE). She has been one of the main driving forces of the society and has contributed substantially to a growing understanding of Western and Eastern academic issues. Together with a tremendous esprit critique, her admirable qualities have won the hearts of the members of the ESSE Board, made up of representatives of all the European national associations.

The series of British and American Studies conferences organized by Professor Pârlog since 1990 have become known among academics as prestigious scientific events. The BAS journal, which she founded and has edited for years, has given Romanian and foreign scholars a permanent chance to publish the results of their research.

Last but not least, Professor Pârlog has been a great friend. She has made the younger generations understand that passion and dedication are prerequisites for a successful career, a good relationship with the students, and a fulfilled personal life.

Every good wish for perfect health, Professor Hortensia Pârlog, and may your future be as great as your past!

Pia Brînzeu

Mircea Mihăiesă
I. Books


II. Dictionaries


III. Courses of lectures


IV. Workbooks for students (co-authored).

The authors of the first five workbooks are: M. Popa, G. Salapina, H. Pârlog, C. Georgescu, G. Schmidt, M. Lungu, M. Vulpe, C. Românu, C. Chevereșan.


**V. Papers**


15. The perception of weak forms of words by Romanian students of English, (co-authored), Seminarul de lingvistică nr. 9, Timișoara, Tipografia Universității, 1979, 9 p.


42. On Political Slogans, in Caiet de Semiotică, 10, Timișoara, Tipografia Universității de Vest, 1994, pp.15 - 25 (co-author Pia Brinzeu)
55. (Pseudo)quantifiers in English and Romanian, in „B.A.S., British and American Studies“, Timișoara, Hestia, 2000, pp. 183 - 189 (co-author Maria Teleagă)


AUT = Analele Universității Timișoara
RECAP = Romanian-English Contrastive Analysis Project

VI. Reviews


VII. Editor/co-editor; advisory board member


3. **Studii de analiză contrastivă a limbilor engleză și română** (co-editor), Timișoara, Tipografia Universității, 1983.


10. **Bucharest Working Papers in Linguistics**. (advisory board member)


**VIII. Translations**


2. **Meridianul Timișoara**, nr. 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 1990; nr. 1, 2, 4, 6, 12, 1991; nr. 11-12, 1992.


LITERARY ENCOUNTERS
THE “MAKING OF THE SELF IN THE FACE OF THAT SELF’S HISTORIC DENIAL”: SELF-REPRESENTATION IN AFRICAN AMERICAN AND GYPSY AUTOBIOGRAPHIES

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Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to point out a particular feature common to many African American autobiographies as noted in the literature, and to examine whether and how this same feature can be found in the autobiographical novel of Menyhért Lakatos, a gypsy writer living in Hungary. The establishment of this similarity can perhaps be a first step towards using the large volume of scholarly work done on African American literature for a better understanding of the much less explored body of gypsy novels. The feature I will examine in Frederick Douglass’ Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave, Richard Wright’s Black Boy, and Menyhért Lakatos’ Foggy Pictures (Füstös Képek), is what Robert Lee (1988:160) calls the “more than usually heavy weight of” self-representation. This means that African American authors describing their own lives have had not simply to describe or reflect on their experiences, but to create and invent a self-consciousness or a definition of their selves. “The problem, shared with DuBois by Wright, Baldwin, Malcolm X and others is that of voicing black self-consciousness so as to create it, or to recreate it in the context of 20th century America” (Taylor 1983:42). Another way of saying it is that these autobiographies are “the ‘making’ of the self in the face of that self’s historic denial” (Lee 1988:154). In spite of the huge cultural differences among these three autobiographies, I believe that staying focussed on the ways in which they go beyond expressing the self to “making” or “creating” self-consciousness will further the literary understanding of Lakatos’ work.
I. Douglass: A Different Kind of Autobiography

The Narrative of Frederick Douglass is not only the most famous 19th century slave narrative, but also a literary masterpiece describing in vivid style how a slave’s road to freedom starts not at the moment of his escape, but much earlier. In an “intellectual” (Dubs 1992: 25) reflection of his own being as a slave, Douglass describes how he has managed to conquer not only the outer forces (the whites) that kept him enslaved, but also the inner forces, such as internalized inferiority-feelings, lack of education, lack of enthusiasm, easy acceptance of conditions, and so on. Through a series of enlightening experiences starting with his early childhood, Douglass arrives at a point in life when he can say, “I now resolved that, however long I might remain a slave in form, the day had passed forever when I could be a slave in fact” (Douglass 1986:113). The physical escape comes much later; after his “intellectual” and “emotional” escape, after he has internalized the fact that he does not need to be a slave, slavery becomes “simply” an injustice he can and should fight against.

The first step in Douglass’ course leading away from slavery is his desire for and attainment of literacy. It is well known that slaves were not allowed to be literate, as it is expressed by one of Douglass’ masters, “If you give a nigger an inch, he will take an ell. A nigger should know nothing but to obey his master—to do as he is told to do. Learning would spoil the best nigger in the world” (Douglass 1986:78). Overhearing this statement, the young Douglass became reinforced in his desire for knowledge. Later in his life, Douglass took the courage to fight back one of his masters who had whipped him unjustly. This is a very important turning point in the Narrative of his life, as the protagonist takes the inner courage to resist his oppressor in spite of the danger and hopelessness that such an act must have entailed. Nevertheless, these steps were necessary in order to create his inner freedom or, even more, to define himself as a man other than that in the role of a slave that was allotted to him from before his birth. The strength and courage to escape slavery came next, but the struggle for freedom continued the rest of his life. This brief discussion of Frederick Douglass’ autobiography is necessary for a better understanding of the literature and structure of Richard Wright’s autobiography, which, in turn, can further our understanding of Lakatos’ life-story.
II. Richard Wright’s *Black Boy*

Although Richard Wright’s *Black Boy* was written almost exactly a century after Frederick Douglass’ *Narrative*, the similarities between the two have been noted by several critics. “All the elements of slave narrative structure are present: self-taught literacy, education as a means to understand a brutal environment, resistance that preserves one’s integrity” (Butterfield 1974:156). Among the many important similarities, I would like to emphasize the “concerns about self — and self-representation — so unaffectedly set out by Douglass” (Lee 1988:155). “Through knowledge, resistance, and the restless movement [my emphasis] that, as in the slave narratives, takes the form of flight to the North, Wright builds an identity out of the atomized solitude of alienation and preserves his integrity and freedom of spirit” (Butterfield 1974:167). Wright, thus, builds his own identity not only in spite of, but actually by means of the circumstances that seem to be determined to put him into inferior positions and keep him there by making him believe that he has no choice but to accept his position, his categories, his stereotypes. Three such “circumstances” are hunger (actual material poverty), alienation (both from his own people and the majority culture), and violence (widespread, random violence that accompanied the history of his race in America). To hunger he responded by knowledge, to alienation by resistance, and to violence by restless movement. In the rest of this essay, I will examine these three circumstances and these three responses to them, first in *Black Boy* then in *Smokey Pictures*.

**Hunger :: knowledge.** Several times in his autobiographical novel, Wright mentions the constant feeling of hunger, a constant reminder of poverty and suffering which surely has very concrete and direct effects on one’s behavior. “Hunger had always been more or less at my elbow when I played, but now I began to wake up at night to find hunger standing at my bedside, staring at me gauntly. ... But this new hunger baffled me, scared me, made me angry and insistent” (Wright 1998:14). Wright goes beyond a simple description of this demeaning feeling accompanying his childhood. In fact, he connects hunger with his earliest conscious recognition of injustice and his desire to understand the world. “Watching the white people eat would make my empty stomach churn and I would grow vaguely angry. Why could I not eat when I was hungry? ... I could not understand why some people had enough food and others did not” (Wright 1998:18). In this quote, we can clearly see that his first reaction of anger has led him to a
questioning, a desire to “understand.” Putting these questions and these words into the mouth of the 10-year-old boy he was at the time, Wright emphasizes that the desire to “understand” here is not simply a rhetoric to express that this injustice cannot be understood, but the real “bafflement” (to use his own word) of a child who wants to get to know a world where such unpleasant things are allowed to happen.

One thing he always wanted was to go to school, become educated, and be a writer. When he finally got to school, he had to face several problems; one of them was that he could not bring lunch with himself. When his mates offered him some food, he, with the pride of a child, invented a story explaining that he never ate during the day. Thus, we can say that he satisfies his real physical hunger by inventing a story about his eating habits, a story that fools his schoolmates and pleases himself with the ability to credibly narrate a plausible but untrue story. So, here the physical hunger is associated or turned into the “artist’s hunger, the compulsion to ‘learn who I was’ as an act of self-enscription” (Lee 1988:161). “During his boyhood, Wright described his hunger as physical” (Wright 1998:xiii), but “even after Wright achieved success as a writer, he was subject to the idea and the effect of abstract hunger. It became pervasive” (Wright 1998:xiii). He turned his experiences of hunger and poverty into an ever increasing desire to learn, know, and write—and use these things to understand and get to the root of this problem, for himself and others. The physical hunger of his childhood represents all kinds of other deprivations resulting from his family’s poverty. It became important after his father had left them, and it was accompanied by other signs of poverty. Wright soon realized that appeasing his hunger was not enough to effectively reduce his poverty. What he needed was not an improved situation, but a new definition of himself as a person who is able to fight the roots of hunger—injustice—by understanding his own position in society and fighting it with his pen: “I burned at my studies” (Wright 1998:133).

Alienation :: resistance. “The identity crisis in Wright resembles the dual alienation of DuBois and Redding: his singularity, his genius, the height of his aspirations, cuts him off from the black masses at the same time that racism cuts him off from acceptance in the white world” (Butterfield 1974:160). It is heart-rendering to read Wright’s alienation from his father who deserted the family, his mother who almost whipped him to death in a fit of anger, his grandmother who was a religious fanatic, his uncle who was
wayward, and from his classmates who could not relate to his intellectual interests and writing. But Wright makes it clear in his subtle ways that even his own family's cruelty towards himself is primarily a result of the state of people who, for generations, had to fight hopelessly against poverty, injustice, and violence. His mother's extreme severity, his grandmother's fanatic religiousness, and his uncle's frightening lessons to the boy Richard are all inadequate and sickly responses to their alienation from the majority culture. As he explains during one of his many musings about race relations, “I had to feel and think out each tiny item of racial experience in the light of the whole race problem, and to each item I brought the whole of my life” (Wright 1998:159). Thus, he could never shrug his shoulder at small signs of discrimination. He could never turn the other way and “live normally” as other black people around him believed they did when they chose not to worry about the daily inconveniences, small insults, and other tiny signs of racial discrimination. Wright had to resist every kind and every sign of discrimination and injustice because even the smallest insult from a white person reminded him of “the whole of his life.” At his job, he notices that the “The boss, his son, and the clerk treated the Negroes with open contempt, pushing, kicking, or slapping them. No matter how often I witnessed it, I could not get used to it. How can they accept it? I asked myself” (Wright 1998:121). Every racial incident reminded him that the irreparable wounds in all of his family members, the abnormal behavior that made them so alienated from him was in fact the result of hundreds of years of smaller and larger racial “experiences.”

Random violence :: restless movement. Richard Wright and his family had very little contact with white people during the normal course of events. Nevertheless, they lived a life in which they always had to be prepared for random violence from the white community. In one incident, “his Uncle Hoskins, in a playful mood, drives their horse and cart into the Mississippi River and convinces the boy Richard that he is heading straight for the middle ‘so the horses can drink.’ Richard takes him seriously and jumps out of the cart in panic. ... The action of Uncle Hoskins is part of a process of acculturation that prepared black children for a world of random violence and danger” (Butterfield 1974:157–158). While Uncle Hoskins and most black people around him internalized and learned to live with this constant danger, “with Richard, the process does not ‘take’” (Butterfield 1974:158). Richard Wright could never imagine accepting these conditions
and living a life where danger constantly waits for him in his meetings with white people and white culture. The violence, for example being hit with a whisky bottle by white people in the middle of the night, being stopped and searched by police for no reason at all, (Wright 1998:180–182), and so on, could not be resisted or controlled. Understanding that he could never get accustomed to the traditional ways (seemingly happy-going, uncle-tomish behavior) of avoiding the random violence aimed at blacks, Wright decided to leave for the North in the hope of a more peaceful life. Since he could not “laugh and talk like the other” (Wright 1998:182) blacks, white people around him noticed his unusually serious behavior. One of his friends even reminded him, “Do you want to get killed? ... You are marked already” (1998:183). Wright’s response is “Then tell me how must I act? ... I just want to make enough money to leave” (1998:184). This desire to leave is carried throughout Black Boy, which ends with his departure for the North. Just like Frederick Douglass, whose freedom inside himself was so great that it almost compelled him to run away even at the price of risking his life, Wright’s inability to accept the rules of a racially discriminating violent Southern world compelled him to look for better places in the North. “This was the culture from which I sprang. This was the terror from which I fled” (Wright 1998:257).

III. Parallels between Wright and Lakatos

When I turn to Menyhért Lakatos’ autobiographical novel, Smokey Pictures, and compare it to Richard Wright’s novel, I do not attempt to draw any social or racial similarities between the two authors. (Even if such similarities might exist.) My purpose is to study how the writer of an autobiographical novel from a minority culture uses means and tools to show how a correct and truthful self-definition is first and foremost among all attempts to break from oppressive traditions and circumstances.

Smokey Pictures describes the author’s childhood in the rural “ghetto” they call “Gypsy Paris.” The book is a detailed description of the gypsies’ life and traditions, their poverty and hopeless attitude. The protagonist is the author himself, who—by a series of fortunate accidents—manages to go to school and become educated. Without going into many details, I will look at the same three problems as before, hunger, alienation, and random violence, and I will show how Lakatos also responds to these by knowledge,
resistance, and restless movement, respectively. All of these responses are unlike the conventional behavior of his people in that he, like Douglass and Wright, re-defines his own self, his own being, in a way that differs from the accepted notions internalized by generations of his people.

**Hunger :: knowledge.** The physical reality of hunger appears in *Smokey Pictures* just as in *Black Boy*. For example, in a passage of vivid description, Lakatos tells how the gypsies stole dead pigs that were thrown out because of a disease that swept through the nearby farm. This was in the middle of winter, a time of great hunger in the whole gypsy district.

In spite of the heavy guarding of pig carcasses, the gypsies managed to steal, carry home, prepare, and eat — all in the same night — some of the dead pigs. And it is interesting how suddenly Lakatos turns his account of this description of hopelessness, poverty, and hunger into an account of his own role—still a child—as a giver not of food for the body but of knowledge, literature, and intellectual entertainment.

On the same night, they finished the pig. Some of the best parts were given to neighbors and family members, to those who could not get hold of a dead animal at that time. This was the custom. ... On these occasions, our poor country turned into a fairy-land. One afternoon, old Khandi came to me with three large volumes of books. ... Soon after, the custom of black magic was stopped. ... My public readings became extremely popular from the very first night. (Lakatos, 2000:66)

Without any complicated transitional passages, he thus turns, in the book, from the description of hunger and its desperate appeasement to his own role of bringing knowledge, intellectual food, to a people that suffered not only from physical necessities but harmful beliefs and lack of education as well.

Although his desire to go to school and study is not as clearly stated as Richard Wright’s desire, one of the major themes in *Smokey Pictures* is the description of how he was sent to school as a result of some strange events. When he goes to school, he again describes hunger at home, “For days, there was no food at home. When my mother became ill, there was nobody to trade for us, and we ate up all of our resources. ... I was lucky because I got food at school. I always carried an extra bag and took home the remains of food to my little brothers and sisters” (Lakatos 2000:74). Here the connection between food and school is direct and seemingly refers only to actual food for the body. But the next sentence again refers to an inner hunger, an
“inner desire” he had, even though he “did not at the time know yet what it was” (Lakatos 2000:74). During the summer, at work and in the company of other gypsies, he differentiates himself from his friends by his intellectual cravings, “I spent hours on a single idea or thought at a time. Events that I myself weaved from my imagination came to life as wonderful reality... I became someone who desired to burn everything to ashes around him in order to create a new world” (Lakatos 2000:165).

Just as in Wright’s book, descriptions of real physical hunger are turned into a desire for learning and knowledge in Lakatos’ life. This is a desire not simply to lessen hunger in the every-day life of his people, but to change things at their roots by emerging as a new person through education, knowledge, and writing.

Alienation :: resistance. Alienation from the majority culture is an obvious fact for both Richard Wright and Lakatos Menyhért. But we have seen in Wright’s case, that he was also alienated from his own people because he refused to accept his position, and he chose to turn to resistance. A comparison of two very similar incidents in the books shows how Lakatos’ alienation from his own people was a result of a similar unwillingness to accept modes of behavior expected of him by representatives of the majority culture. In *Black Boy*, Wright describes the story of a friend who agreed to accept a quarter from a white person for letting himself be kicked in the buttocks.

“You can kick me for a quarter,” he sang, looking impishly at the white man out of the corner of his eyes.
The white man laughed softly, jingled some coins in his pocket, took out one and thumped it to the floor. Shorty stooped to pick it up and the white man bared his teeth and swung his foot into Shorty’s rump with all the strength of his body. Shorty let out a howling laugh that echoed up and down the elevator shaft. ...
I asked him:
“How in God’s name can you do that?”
“I needed a quarter and I got it,” he said soberly, proudly,...
I never discussed the subject with him after that. (Wright, 1998:228–229)

Wright’s disgust and refusal to discuss this subject with him (or others like him) shows that his rejection of the accepted modes of behavior as a minority person alienates him not only from whites but also from blacks.

In a similar incident in *Smokey Pictures*, gypsy boys entertain a crowd of people:
The gypsy children soon made the best of the situation. They realized that the crowd became too drunk to enjoy their dance after a while. Instead, they wanted the gypsies to fall to the ground and twitch their bodies around like so many wild animals after having been shot. (Lakatos, 2000:43)

While the children accept this belittling role, Lakatos himself stays out of the game and helps his one friend whose epileptic seizure occurs because of the wild entertainment. His unusually sober behavior in this animal-like entertainment draws the anger of one of the drunk lords present. In a fit of passion, he shoots at Lakatos and seriously wounds him. Significantly, however, this becomes the turning point in Lakatos’ life. As a compensation, his schooling is financed by this otherwise malignant and hateful person who wounded him. And it is his schooling that will raise him above his people, but at the same time allow him to resist the expected lifestyle and struggle in favour of a more enlightened life.

**Random violence :: restless movement.** We have also seen in the case of Richard Wright that they lived in a world of random violence—the whites’ violence—which could reach them at any given time and place. As a response, his own family members became violent. Wright refused to accept this kind of behavior in either camp. Seeing no hope to change it, he decided to move to the North, just as the heroes of slave narratives had done in the past.

Violence was an everyday experience of members of the “Gypsy-Paris” as well. And again, it came from all sides: violence came in random fashion from the authorities, such as the police and doctors, it came from angry and malevolent individuals from the majority community, such as the person who shot Lakatos, and it came from among the gypsies as well. The police often came to them because of some actual theft or other illegal behavior, but, of course, they did not care much for finding justice and right punishment. Rather, they beat and shot at the easiest and most available targets. Many doctors refused to care for their sick:

Doctor Bocz was feared in the entire community. ... He never went out to any sick patient.

“Is he alive?” he would ask. “Why didn’t he come himself to see me? Call me only after he is dead.”

Nobody wanted his cure. Everybody would rather suffer or die than be “cured” by Doctor Bocz.
Like a maniac, he was hunting for lice all the time. He knew of only one cure: a pair of scissors. He used it for all kinds of illnesses.

“Where is the corpse?” he would shout at the edge of our territory. “Did you eat it? Shall I burn down this entire community of bacteria?” (Lakatos, 2000:118–119)

Wright's response to the uncontrollable violence was a firm decision to go the only place he imagined to be better, the North. Moving away, the restless movement, appears in Lakatos' book as a response to violence, just like in Richard Wright's *Black Boy*. Movement itself, of course, has a very important tradition among gypsies, and a tradition that is very different from the African American one. A study of gypsy travel goes beyond the scope and thesis of this paper. Nevertheless, we can look at some examples in the book, and show how Lakatos’ moving around was a search for refuge from violence both from within the gypsy community and from outside it.

He is literally chased away from “Gypsy Paris” by the police—after having stolen something—and he has to hide and wander for months. He and his “friend,” Bada, have to leave their families and community because they are searched by the police. This is an example of how his restless movement is caused by a violence which is not in proportion with his sin of stealing. During his wandering, he arrives at another gypsy community, and “marries” a girl there. Soon, however, he has to leave his new family, new community, and new wife because of inner violence. It turns out that this community is split by family feuds. After a very serious fight with them, (Lakatos 2000:276–277) he has to leave them and continue wandering. His search for a better place can never end, but his life—just like Wright’s—is characterized by this restless movement. And what he does find in these wanderings is an ability to better define and express himself. His travel at the end of the book is no longer an escape from something, but a search for “higher imaginations” (2000:455), as he characterizes it during the train journey.

**IV. Conclusion**

The autobiographies of Frederick Douglass, Richard Wright, and Menyhért Lakatos are not simply descriptions of lives in minority status, but also inventions of new, hitherto unexplored definitions of selves. They use the dire circumstances of hunger, alienation, and violence in innovative
ways to define and invent their intellectual beings through knowledge, resistance, and restless movement. The similarities noted in the different autobiographies studied in this paper mean that the theoretical foundations of studying African American literature might be applied in the quest for a better understanding of other minority literature, in particular gypsy literature. The study of African American and gypsy literature and, in particular, the role of intellectuals, as they see themselves, can help in the recognition and understanding of hitherto unexplored cultural values.

References


I Introduction

Flaubert's Parrot is one of Julian Barnes's two most popular and, if it in any way constitutes an adequate criterion for judging a book, the best sold novels, the other one being A History of the World in 10 ½ Chapters. Flaubert's Parrot is the book whose significance for the literary career of Julian Barnes is manifold. According to the author himself, this is the novel that launched him (Smith 1989:74). This is the novel that marked the beginning of his career in the United States, followed by the subsequent publication of his previous two novels (Metroland, originally published in 1980 and Before She Met Me, published in Great Britain in 1982). As a confirmation of the interest that this work raised and the positive reception it received stands the fact that, upon its publication in 1984, the novel was nominated and, moreover, shortlisted for the prestigious Booker prize.

More telling of the reception of Barnes's works, however, is the fact that, aside from launching him, the novel launched the ongoing controversy regarding the genre of his books—the one centering on the question of whether Barnes's works can be accepted as novels at all—especially the two mentioned, most popular books of his.

II Deconstructing the Analysis

When approaching the issue of the genre analysis of this novel, it should be stressed that there are at least two possible levels of analyzing and discussing the problem of genre. On the first level, genre is defined in its 'wider' sense—thus, the first question which is being raised is whether the book presents fiction or non-fiction. In this way, one could distinguish between a novel, a collection of short stories, a collection of essays, etc. as between different genres. As a result, what follows is what Julian Barnes
deems the “but-does-he-write-proper-novels?” school of criticism (Smith 1989:73).

On the other hand, the genre in its other, ‘narrower’ sense, presuming that the book is fiction and that it is a novel, distinguishes between various kinds of a novel—a historical novel, a detective story, a thriller, etc. Both levels of analysis are applicable to the problem of genre in Flaubert’s Parrot.

III The Problem of Contents

A) Fiction vs. Non-fiction

“When I read non-fiction I am often aware that it is merely a masquerade of the truth.” Julian Barnes

The very subject-matter of the book presents the potential genre-analyst with the problem. Flaubert’s Parrot is the story narrated by Geoffrey Braithwaite, an entirely fictional character, a retired doctor, a widower, and, what is of the greatest importance for the plot but also for establishing the link between fiction and non-fiction, an amateur Flaubert scholar. During his visits to the museums dedicated to the memory of Gustave Flaubert, the 19th century French writer and a very non-fictional character, Braithwaite comes across two stuffed parrots, both of which are supposed to have served as the models for Loulou, the parrot from Flaubert’s short story “Un Coeur Simple” (a historical and a literary-historical fact). Thus, a search ensues—an obsessive search for everything related to Flaubert, his life, his works, his memories, his successes, his failures, his dreams and the remnants of the mentioned. The fictional character Geoffrey Braithwaite accumulates the facts about the non-fictional author and historical figure Gustave Flaubert, adding some fiction as a side-dish. Thus, for example, the reader is presented with the (fictional) story of (non-fictional) Louise Colet, Flaubert’s (non-fictional) lover, imagined and presented by the (fictional) narrator.

However, this obsessive and thoroughly-conducted fictional search for the data of the life of a non-fictional character is actually revealed to serve as a mask and escapist device for the fictional character, unable to face the tragic events from his own past. The non-fictional life becomes a surrogate, a cover and an escape for the fictional one—running away from his own
life, postponing the moment of facing the painful truths of his wife’s infidelity, their (un)happy marriage and her subsequent suicide. Braithwaite finds it easier to cope with someone else’s non-fiction, with someone else’s life, someone else’s past, someone else’s victories and defeats. And here is the moment of reversal—facts are no longer given and unquestionable, for their very inner nature, believed to be sound and solid, challenged and put to test; fiction, on the other hand, becomes (almost) unattainable and books, it seems, are no longer the places where everything is explained.

Flaubert’s Parrot, it might be argued, thus constitutes a merger of a reluctantly told fictional story by Geoffrey Braithwaite and a more readily presented story of Gustave Flaubert, which, when taken separately, puts the non-fictional part of the book under the label of (a sort of a) biography.

B) Biography—Traditional, Conventional, Postmodernist

“When you write the biography of a friend, you must do it as if you were taking revenge for him.” Gustave Flaubert

The epigraph Barnes gives at a forerunner to his novel, taken from Flaubert’s 1872 letter to his friend, Ernest Feydeau, not only introduces the first intertextual reference of the novel abounding in intertextual references but, in a thematically suitable way, sets the scene for the development of the plot of the book that points to some of its most prominent characteristics. What Flaubert stated in this quote is his view of the genre of biography, which makes it possible for Barnes to channel the reader’s expectations and direct them towards the very genre. However, this epigraph simultaneously summarizes the way in which Barnes is going to approach the genre of biography, suggesting the chosen venture point through the emphasized words: ‘a friend’ and ‘revenge’, and indicates if not Barnes’s agreement with Flaubert’s point of view, then surely his ironic approach to the chosen genre.

The label ‘biography’ in this case reflects the postmodernist questioning of the boundaries of the genre as much as Barnes’s powerful irony directed to the conventions of the given genre. When discussing the boundaries of the genre of biography, the postmodernist poetics emphasizes the fact that they have become porous and blurred to such an extent that, as a rule, it is very difficult to distinguish between a biography and a novel.
Braithwaite, and thus Barnes, undoubtedly deal with Flaubert’s biography through the obsessive and excessive process of collecting all available material and memorabilia that have anything to do with the chosen object of attention—Flaubert. However, the biography he is trying to compose differs from the conventional and traditional one, and precisely in this distinction lies Barnes’ challenge to the conventions of this specific genre, but also to conventions in general.

Through the genre of biography as fictionally composed by Braithwaite, many of the conventions have been brought into question, among them biographical material and its ordering. Although the typical material of a biography is present (biographical data, quotes from other biographies, Flaubert’s correspondence, written testimonies of his friends and contemporaries, even the quotes from his fiction), what constitutes the remainder of the corpus is the material that traditionally would not be included in a biography. Thus, the descriptions of Flaubert’s statues bear the same (or at least supposedly the same) biographical weight as the chronology of his life, which lists the most important years and events of his life.

On the other hand, the aforementioned merging of the fictional and non-fictional levels of the story shows the way this biography is organized. Verifiable and verified information on Flaubert’s actual life is not given according to the chronology of his life but according to the chronology of the fictional frame-story, thus seemingly but purposefully undermining the objectivity level of the facts.

The explanation for including the unorthodox material into a biography is suggested through the comparison of a biographer’s attempts with those of a fisherman, which Barnes gives in his so-called biography:

The trawling net fills, then a biographer hauls it in, sorts, throws back, stores, fillets, and sells. Yet consider what he doesn’t catch: there is always far more of that. The biography stands, fat and worthy-burgherish on the shelf, boastful and sedate: a shilling life will give you the facts, a ten pound one all the hypothesis as well. But think of everything that got away, that fled with the last deathbed exhalation of the biographee.

What got away, presumably, from all the nets of Flaubert’s biographers are those elements and facets of the story of his life that Braithwaite is trying to find a substitute for—all those accounts that have not been written down or that have not survived the passing of time, all those potentially crucial people in his life that got lost along the way, all those stories Flaubert
did not have a chance to write, and all that he did not have a chance to become. In this way, fiction serves as a surrogate for this lost or obscured part of Flaubert’s biography.

Through the attempt to create the fullest and the most complete portrait of Flaubert possible, Braithwaite makes another diversion from the canonical concept of biography. Namely, what he strives to achieve is not the biography of a long-dead French author who claimed that he wanted his books to be enough for his readers, some historical figure whose existence is so long extinguished that it becomes questionable. Instead, he struggles to reach Flaubert—the real man, Flaubert the friend from the aforementioned epigraph. And thus another one of the conventions of the biographical genre gets circumvented—that of objectivity.

Braithwaite is not an objective biographer, nor is he trying to pass himself off as being one. His approach to Flaubert is marked with personal tones—standing on the shore in France near the place that is significant for his own past, as well as for Flaubert’s past, Braithwaite finds his own past relinquished and devoid of all the feelings—even of the memories of the feelings. On the other hand, Flaubert’s is that past that is ripe with the juices of life, the past that he feels closely connected to. It is not the case of a biographer failing to perform his task of an objective reviewer of someone else’s life—this biographer does not even set to accomplish such a conventional task.

Instead, what surfaces from this collage of the fictional and non-fictional, the acceptable and not acceptable data and the plausible and implausible additions to a biography is a postmodernistically modified genre, the one in which a biographer is not a professional, but an amateur, who includes his own private, fictional story and in which the biographee is treated as a friend. What is tackled through such a biography is the commonplace of the postmodernist poetics—the issue of history. History, through biography, becomes just another literary genre, “autobiographical fiction pretending to be a parliamentary report” (Barnes 1984:90), while writing it becomes synonymous with taking revenge.

**IV The Problem of Narration**

The narrative technique and the idiosyncratic bond between the contents and the form reinforce and reflect this dual, fictional/non-fictional
nature of the book. In this respect, the book has frequently been called „a medley of prose genres (that) ... deconstructs the conventional distinctions between fiction and non-fiction“ (Scott 1990:64). This heterogeneous collection includes chapters as diverse as a bestiary, in which all animals that Flaubert had or wrote about or even mentioned in his correspondence are listed and discussed, an exam paper consisting of various points for analysis stemming from Flaubert’s life and works, a train-spotter’s guide to Flaubert, a dictionary of accepted ideas about Flaubert, or minutiae of an imaginary court case against Flaubert.

As a result, a very (comparatively) modest amount of the book is devoted to plain and straightforward narration. Even where there is narration, as in the case of Louise Colet’s story or Braithwaite’s true story, it rarely is plain and straightforward. Instead, it is endowed with narrative trickery characteristic of its author and it appears to evade the reader, as if slipping unnoticed through the net hauled by the reader himself in an attempt to catch some prose. On the other hand, there is a lot of searching, investigating, discussing, fabulating, arranging, constructing, imagining, speculating, a lot of lists and taxonomies, enumeration, explanations and interpretations.

In view of its structure and literary technique, and depending on whether a fictional or a non-fictional aspect of the book is emphasized, Flaubert’s Parrot has often been classified as a collection of short stories or a collection of essays on various themes related in some way to Flaubert or to the more general area of postmodernist topics. What remains to be determined, however, is whether there is a sufficient number of unifying elements that could justify the reception of the book as a novel.

The novel starts and ends with the same story—the story about Braithwaite’s search for the stuffed parrot—which provides the narrative and structural frame for various other stories and searches incorporated in this work. Also, there is the continuity in terms of the protagonists, which brings both the fictional and non-fictional characters to the same level of plausibility and (postmodernistic) truthfulness, subjecting them to the same principles of interpretation as far as this text is concerned. The continuity exists on the thematic level as well—thus, the novel examines and explores the postmodernist commonplaces such as history, attainability of truth, boundaries of genres, etc. In all these respects, it appears that the book does constitute a thematic and structural whole, which can be termed a novel.
V What Kind of a Novel?

When analyzed as a novel, *Flaubert's Parrot* exhibits the features of a detective story or a thriller, mainly when focusing on the frame story and modus operandi of the narrator Braithwaite. Namely, throughout the novel, Braithwaite is in the constant state of a search that is simultaneously conducted on several levels. In terms of the frame story, the object and the final goal of the search is the ‘real’ parrot, as indicated in the title itself. In terms of the story about Flaubert, the aim of the search is to reach some, apparently unattainable, definite image of Flaubert the man, as opposed to Flaubert the author. Hence all the enumerations and taxonomies, all facts and their kaleidoscopic merging into diverse segments of meaning and interpretation. However, there is yet another inquiry conducted and yet another mystery to be solved in the course of the novel, although on a perhaps less obvious level—the one of Braithwaite himself, the mystery of his personal life, his relationship and marriage to his wife Ellen, and the reasons for her suicide. In terms of postmodernist themes, the search can be interpreted as to lead towards the ‘final’ truth which, upon realizing that there is no such thing, becomes transformed into a plurality of truths the same way as the parrot is finally multiplied and transformed into the roomful of stuffed birds, all potential Loulous. In this light, Geoffrey Braithwaite resembles the character of a detective-amateur who conducts his inquiry following all the rules of the profession. Starting a quest that moves this novel closer to the genre of an adventure, Braithwaite starts with arriving to 'the scene of the crime', the museums in question, moving on to investigate all the suspects (or materials set before him, due to a time span of one century). He analyzes and draws conclusions, systematizes and doubts, mistrusts and questions, as a good detective should do.

However, the conventions of the genre dictate that the case should be solved and the truth unclosed. On the contrary, this goal is not achieved in the novel. The real parrot is not found, the real Flaubert remains hidden somewhere among his words and his works, which, according to Flaubert himself, should be the only thing that matters about the author. The real Braithwaite is revealed only to a certain extent and also extremely reluctantly. In this way, although the search, the set goals, suspense, mystery, gradual revealing of the clues, and the amateur detective Braithwaite all speak in favour of a detective story, there is one restriction. The failure to solve the
mystery and the postmodernist aspects of the story shift this novel to the territory of a postmodernistically modified detective story.

In this respect, given the fact that it deals with the problems of truth, history, past, reliability of historical and biographical data, reliability of narration, narrativity and textual nature of history, *Flaubert’s Parrot* is frequently interpreted as a novel of ideas, falling at that into the category of a postmodernist novel due to its formal and thematic features.

**VI Remaining Options**

If not analyzed as a biography, the book is often taken one step further and depicted as a biography of a biography—a sort of a manual for writing a successful biography of a historical character or a collection of all the tricks and pitfalls of assembling a biographical work. In this way, it is the showcase of all the difficulties involved in striving towards the complete image of a chosen character or a period, such as (un)reliability of the facts, impossibility of finding trustworthy sources and temporal issues, such as changing of the standards of comparison through time.

Focusing on the variety of discourses in the book, it is often labeled as a collage or a pastiche of different genres to be found in separate chapters that, respectively, in this way tend to be analyzed as separate wholes.

However, there is one genre that deserves greater attention. Due to the characteristic mixture of facts and fiction, as well as the inclusion of the elements of literary criticism and literary theory, the book is often interpreted and listed as an example of historiographic metafiction. The issues of dealing with the past, seizing the past, levels of the existence of the past, possibilities of obtaining historical knowledge and presenting it, as well as narrativity, textuality and discoursivity of history, all constitute the realm of postmodernism, but the problems of the autonomy of a text, the process of its coming to existence, its relationship with readers, as well as the relationship of reality and fiction, among others, fall into the domain of metafiction. Barnes, however, retains one specific feature when approaching these postmodernistically defined issues when, in addition to including the discussion of the problems of literary production, he introduces parody of these problems and issues as well.
VII The Author’s Definition

What contributes to the arguments of those who claim that *Flaubert’s Parrot* cannot be analyzed as a novel is the fact that this novel, extremely popular in France as well, was in 1986 given the *Prix Medicis* award, reserved for the best collections of essays.

On the other hand, the author himself was frequently asked to comment on this kind of a reception of his novels, especially *Flaubert’s Parrot*. Upon such occasions, Julian Barnes often came up with definitions of the genre of novel whose seriousness and thus the level of acceptability drastically varies, ranging from explanations such as the following:

“My line now is I’m a novelist and if I say it’s a novel, it is... And it’s not terribly interesting to me, casting people out of the realm of fiction. Okay, let’s throw out Rabelais, Diderot and Kundera...” (Lawson 1991:9)

to those along the lines of the more ‘serious’ one:

“It’s (novel’s) an extended piece of prose, largely fictional, which is planned and executed as a whole piece.” (Sexton 1989:42)

However, probably the most comprising and the most telling definition is the one focusing on the entire history of the novel, which on more than one occasion proved to be something Barnes takes into account when approaching every new task of his, every new novel he sets out to write and when setting the bar for his next enterprise:

“I feel closer to the continental idea—which used to be the English idea as well—that the novel is a very broad and generous enclosing form. I would argue for greater inclusivity, rather than any exclusivity.” (Smith 1989:73)

And that precisely is what he has been striving for and achieving in his works.

References

Shortly after *Brokeback Mountain*’s controversial 2006 Oscar race, this paper will take a look at the brilliantly-written, thought-provoking short story behind the movie. Annie Proulx challenges her readers’ expectations with a stereotype-crushing epic of few words, in which a ‘love that dares not speak its name’ gets the final say.

In a 21st century dominated by the all-too-fascinating power of moving pictures and special effects, the average entertainment consumer most often tends to forget the true magic of story-telling. The controversial *Brokeback Mountain*, icon-movie which undoubtedly stole the discussion panel and the limelight at the 2006 edition of the Academy Awards, is a cinematic performance which goes beyond mere glamor and technical artifice into the lost world of common living gone astray. The film fully benefits from its acknowledged excellent directing by Ang Lee, flawless acting by Heath Ledger and Jake Gyllenhaal, and breathtaking scenery. The acclaimed screenplay to match was fashioned by Larry McMurtry and Diana Ossana, very few people remembering, however, the true inspiration for their efforts: it is literally the somewhat neglected story behind the story that shall make the focus of our discussion in this paper.

Surprisingly enough, *Brokeback Mountain* is not just another case of attention grabber carefully constructed by the Hollywood industry to court the politically correct. The source that it quite faithfully translated onto the big screen happens to be an exquisite literary achievement by one of the most successful American writers of the last decades: Annie Proulx. In the contemporary vortex of images which overrule the more limited appeal of the written word, many of the movie-goers might need reminding of Proulx’s remarkable career: her debut novel, *Postcards* was given the P.E.N.-Faulkner Award for fiction in 1993, being closely followed by *The Shipping*
News, which won the Irish Times International Fiction Prize, The National Book Award for Fiction and no less than the Pulitzer Prize for Fiction in 1994.

Against this resonant background, Brokeback Mountain struck like lightning: “Annie Proulx figured no magazine would touch her short story, the tale of two Wyoming cowboys whose romance is so intense, it sometimes leaves them black and blue. But The New Yorker published it in 1997, and it went on to win an O. Henry prize and a National Magazine Award” (Cohen 2005: 1). Later on included in Close Range. Wyoming Stories, the piece contributed to the volume’s recognition by The New Yorker Book Award for Best Fiction 1999, the English-Speaking Union’s Ambassador Book Award (2000) and the Borders Original Voices Award in Fiction (2000). Unfortunately, enthralled by the 2005 movie-version of the story, many reviewers and even more viewers fail to pay tribute to the writing that set everything in motion. Peter Bradshaw’s review for The Guardian sets the record straight in a succinct presentation:

“Brokeback Mountain is an adaptation of a piece of writing from 1997 by Annie Proulx that already bears the reputation of being the best short story ever to be published in The New Yorker magazine” (Bradshaw 2006: 1). What is it, then, that has made this short story not only a groundbreaking literary achievement, but also the inspiration for a thought-provoking movie? The first thing that comes to mind is its daring topic: an FAQ posted by the writer on her website starts by calling the story “an examination of country homophobia in the land of the Great Pure Noble Cowboy” (Proulx 2005b: 1). Ennis del Mar and Jack Twist are barely 19 when they meet on a summer-herding job on Brokeback Mountain, which turns out to mark the beginning of a tragic, timeless and wordless emotional involvement between the two men or, as Anthony Lane assesses it, “a love story that starts in 1963 and never ends” (2005: 1).

The plot is uncomplicated and clear-cut, easy to summarize but not at all facile in terms of symbolism and implications:

There’s nothing romantic about herding huge numbers of four-legged beasts left to range far and wide, and cowboys pretty much have cornered whatever romance there is in rugged outdoor animal husbandry. Riding herd on sheep guaranteed a horseman a hard time in old Westerns, but Ennis and Jack make the most of it, even if their diet is mostly beans. They don’t talk much, but Ennis speaks of being raised by his brother and sister after their parents died in a car crash, and of a woman named Alma he plans to marry. Jack tells of his parents and working the Texas rodeo cir-
cuit. One night, Ennis decides to sleep by the fire rather than head off to his lonely post, but in the small wee hours, with the fire dead, he’s freezing. Jack yells at him to join him in his tent. A simple human gesture in sleep prompts a frantic coupling that in the cold light of morning each man is quick to dismiss. The summer ends, and as time goes by Ennis marries Alma and Jack weds Lureen, and they each have kids. The men’s shared passion keeps its fire, and their affection and need for each other grows. Over the years, they contrive to spend time together back on Brokeback Mountain. Always there is the threat of exposure and the fear it breeds (Bennett 2005: 1).

Eventually, Ennis belatedly finds out about his lifelong companion’s accidental death, much too late for any essential decisions to be made. After years of denial and repression, he stands both rebuked and painfully illuminated, in a final attempt to take upon himself the responsibility of the never-assumed promise: “Jack, I swear —” he said, though Jack had never asked him to swear anything and was himself not the swearing kind” (Proulx 2005a: 54). The inner struggle of two characters placed in adverse circumstances and surrounded by standardized prejudice stands at the highly sentimental core of the story. As Gail Caldwell of the Boston Sunday Globe puts it, “Brokeback Mountain does some of the best things a story can do. It abolishes the old West clichés, excavates and honors a certain kind of elusive life, then nearly levels you with the emotional weight at its center” (2005: 1).

How does Annie Proulx fight cliché? First and foremost, by means of distributing two male characters in an enduring love-story built according to the sinuous yet quite easily recognizable patterns of human relationships in general. It has been the “gay-story” label that has done the story and, subsequently, movie the most considerable share of injustice. Proulx’s aim is much wider, as Roger Ebert accurately points out in a review to the film-version: “Ennis and Jack love each other and can find no way to deal with that. Brokeback Mountain has been described as ‘a gay cowboy movie’, which is a cruel simplification. It is the story of a time and place where two men are forced to deny the only great passion either one will ever feel. Their tragedy is universal. It could be about two women, or lovers from different religious or ethnic groups—any ‘forbidden’ love” (2005: 2).

It is interesting to note how the all-encompassing dimension of the two men’s minute drama has managed to pervade most interpretations, regardless of their orientation or main focus. Thus, Paul Clinton follows the same
line in his CNN report, stating that “to label *Brokeback Mountain* as ‘the gay cowboy movie’ does a great disservice to its haunting love-story, stretching over decades, which survived in a time and place in which the two men’s feelings for each other were utterly taboo” (2005: 2). Romanian analysts of the phenomenon also emphasize the simple and touching story about the time that passes while feelings remain unchanged. Deconstructing stereotypical reception, Alex Leo Şeşban talks about two ‘cowgays’ who are, in fact, rather bisexual, get married and have children: apart from this ‘biological incident’, the topic itself is the love that knows no boundaries in time, space or gender (cf. 2006: 1).

Iulia Blaga goes even as far as offering a definitely non-queer perspective upon the narrated issues: he maintains that the focus lies neither with the gay couple, nor with the romance developing within it, but rather with Love itself (cf. 2006: 1). Projected upon the background of options such as marital compromise or divorce, it is this larger than life feeling that stays the absolute constant coordinate around which the action revolves. This is, indeed, the insight that Proulx herself offers into her work, while making her intentions clear to her audience:

“I hope that it is going to start conversations and discussions, that it’s going to awaken in people an empathy for diversity, for each other and the larger world. I’m really hoping that the idea of tolerance will come through […] It is a love story. It has been called both universal and specific, and I think that’s true. It’s an old, old story. We’ve heard this story a million times; we just haven’t heard it with this cast […] I think this country is hungry for this story, because it’s a love story and there’s hardly much love around these days. I think people are sick of divisiveness, hate-mongering, disasters, war, loss; and need and want a reminder that sometimes love comes along that is strong and permanent, and that it can happen to anyone” (qtd. in Cohen 2005: 2).

The major challenge of the story is that, in fact, it does not happen to just anyone: the ‘heroes’ of this romance of the American West go against the grain of all traditional representation. Not only do they transgress the common heterosexual standard, they do so while simultaneously embodying the male United States effigy: the free, untamed, ultimate image of masculinity—the cowboy: “Proulx didn’t think her story would ever be published because the material was too risky: it involved a love story between two men that made very explicit the physical attraction between them. And they were not just any men, they came from the wide expansive west that
gave us John Wayne and the Marlboro Man—and this world was described as chilly and oppressive against this novel kind of love” (Proulx 2005 c: 1).

Indeed, the choice of characters appears to act as subversive to the Hollywood brand-image of American identity as strong, fearless and incorruptible, just as the setting can be and has more than once been considered an effective tool of political criticism. The action takes place in the rural America of the 1960s, moving back and forth in between Wyoming and Texas, two of the most conservatively intolerant states. There is little wonder, consequently, as to the fear that projects itself bitterly onto the two protagonists’ common fate. Moreover, the American reader can relate to actual facts in recent history that have to do with a merciless vocation for cruelty rather than open-mindedness, as does Roger Ebert when talking about Ennis’s obsession with actual lynching:

When he was taught by his father to hate homosexuals, Ennis was taught to hate his own feelings […] Jack is able to accept a little more willingly that he is inescapably gay. In frustration and need, he goes to Mexico one night and finds a male prostitute. Prostitution is a calling with many hazards, sadness and tragedy, but it accepts human nature. It knows what some people need, and perhaps that is why every society has found a way to accommodate it. Jack thinks he and Ennis might someday buy themselves a ranch and settle down. Ennis who remembers what he saw as a boy; ‘This thing gets hold of us at the wrong time and wrong place and we’re dead’. Well, wasn’t Matthew Shepard murdered in Wyoming in 1998? And Teena Brandon in Nebraska in 1993? Haven’t brothers killed their sisters in the Muslim world to defend ‘family honor’? (2005: 2/3).

While the movie seems aimed in retrospect at a notorious American case, the short story proves to be quite visionary: written in 1995 and eventually published in 1997, it seems to have foreseen the murder of gay college student Matthew Shepherd in Laramie, Wyoming in 1998. In this respect, Proulx’s work proves to have indeed stemmed out of close observation of the studied areas as a deeply-enrooted writing skill: “I long ago fell into the habit of seeing the world in terms of shifting circumstances overlaid upon natural surroundings. I try to define periods when regional society and culture, rooted in location and natural resources, start to experience the erosion of traditional ways, and attempt to master contemporary, large-world values. The characters in my novels pick their way through the chaos of change. The present is always pasted on layers of the past”. (Proulx 1999: 6)
Brokeback Mountain does witness an explicit blow at traditional, patriarchal, standardized views, exposing the shallowness, hypocrisy and inflexibility of stereotypes in their violent confrontation with real life. While the writer acknowledges in various interviews that Wyoming, the “Equality State”, can hardly be seriously regarded as such, she chooses to depict it as complex rather than ruthlessly put it down. Ennis and Jack are victimized by the same society that has shaped them: the two cowboys (merely shepherds or herders, in fact), are themselves inclined towards a conservative mentality due to the immediate data of their rudimentary education (cf. Sturza 2006: 2). This is what ultimately triggers their tragedy: apart from social prejudice and convention, the ultimate barrier they can never break is that of their own mental boundaries. Denial begins on the first morning after, as Ennis says, “I’m not no queer” and Jack replies “Me neither. A one-shot thing. Nobody’s business but ours” (Proulx 2005a: 15).

The scene that haunts the memory of the more reluctant protagonist is the scene that explains the heartbreaking choice the two are never able to make, at least not simultaneously. To Jack’s dreams of shared future and sweet secluded life together, Ennis replies:

It ain’t goin a be that way. We can’t. I’m stuck with what I got, caught in my own loop. Can’t get out of it. Jack, I don’t want a be like them guys you see around sometimes. And I don’t want a be dead. There was these two old guys ranched together down home, Earl and Rich—Dad would pass a remark when he seen them. They was a joke even though they was pretty tough old birds. I was what, nine years old and they found Earl dead in an irrigation ditch. They’d took a tire iron into him, spurred him up, drug him around by his dick until it pulled off, just bloody pulp. What the tire iron done looked like pieces a burned tomatoes all over him, nose tore down from skiddin on gravel […] Two guys livin together? No. All I can see is we get together once in a while way the hell out in the back a nowhere—” (Proulx 2005a: 29/30).

This passage holds the key to the immense burden the two characters are meant to carry around and has given rise to various reactions and interpretations. In the context of ideological criticism, one can find articles such as Rick Moody’s film review for The Guardian. He considers that “it is hard, therefore, not to think of Brokeback Mountain as an incredibly salient political statement for troubled times. I’m sure that there are many public relations professionals right now trying to pretend that this is not the case, that [this film] is not an affront to certain senators from Wyoming and Texas and
Utah and Colorado and Montana and Idaho, and perhaps an affront to the president of the United States himself” (2005: 2).

On the other hand, the reputed Stanley Kaufmann of The New Republic emphasizes a feature that is characteristic of Proulx’s prose: “Brokeback Mountain does not contain the slightest suggestion that its purpose is to chronicle a case or a social problem” (2006: 20). Indeed, what makes the short story so utterly convincing and its message so powerful is precisely the appeal to the commonality of things and feelings, to the simplicity that paradoxically distinguishes and halos them: “It simply treasures two human beings who, unlikely as we may have thought it for these men, find themselves fixed in a discomfiting yet thorough passion. They inhabit a world that vaunts macho masculinity; nonetheless they seem secretly fortified by their fate” (Kaufmann 2006: 20).

Despite some inevitable outbursts, this secrecy which needs to be kept around the central affair is brilliantly paralleled by a scarcity of both dialogue and stylistic ornamentation. Proulx’s writing is an almost laconic third-person rendition of events as seen through Ennis’s problematic lens. As it usually happens in Oriental writings, there is very little actual talk, each line weighing a ton of emotion and cutting like a scalpel into the bleeding human heart. Meaning is rather constructed in the fashion of absurdist theater-plays, by means of a never-ending interplay between pause and silence. Implication and suggestion function perfectly, together with significant details, oblique looks and unuttered sentences. The half-said and the half-done meet in a perpetual and tormenting half-life, as illustrated by the open confrontation of the two and their realization of immutable fate. When Jack, after twenty years of relationship, tempestuously owns up to his frustration and bitterness, reproachful of Ennis’s public reticence, shouting, “I wish I knew how to quit you”, the latter almost falls into a frantic aggrieved trance.

Little vast clouds of steam from thermal springs in winter the years of things unsaid and now unsayable—admissions, declarations, shames, guilts, fears—rose around them. Ennis stood as if heartshot, face grey and deep-lined, grimacing, eyes screwed shut, fists clenched, legs caving, hit the ground on his knees. “Jesus,” said Jack. “Ennis?” But before he was out of the truck, trying to guess if it was heart attack or the overflow of an incendiary rage, Ennis was back on his feet and somehow, as a coat hanger is straightened to open a locked car and then bent again to its original shape, they torqued things almost to where they had been, for what they’d
said was no news. Nothing ended, nothing begun, nothing resolved (Proulx 2005a: 43).

One can easily notice the visual quality of Annie Proulx’s prose, which exposes people and situations as they are, in deep connection to the environment and background that shapes and breaks them altogether: “Nonjudgmental and sympathetic, Proulx’s story, romantic but never descending into the sentimental, showed the sad impact of irrational homophobia on the lives of two men who happen to be gay. That, as cowboys, they are iconic of all that is masculine America adds a decidedly deliberate level of irony” (Lazere 2005: 1). Moreover, refusing a manifest political dimension, the story creates the impression of a haiku fable, a quick-spirited elegy to slow-mindedness and its devastating effects upon the human soul. Between love and death, Ennis and Jack can find no middle ground but the wild majestic Brokeback Mountain. Delicate, insightful, subtle, the story ranges high in the typical frame of Proulx’s stories, true to a non-complimentary contemporary life:

“America is a violent, gun-handling country. Americans feed on a steady diet of bloody movies, televisions programs, murder mysteries. Road range, highway killings, beatings and murder of those who are different abound; school shootings—almost all of them in rural areas—make headline news over and over. Most of the ends suffered by characters in my books are drawn from true accounts of public record: newspapers, accident reports, local histories, labor statistics for the period and place under examination. The point of writing in layers of bitter deaths and misadventures that befall characters is to illustrate American violence, which is real, deep and vast” (Proulx 1999: 6)

Under such circumstances, there could hardly be any proper ending to an essentially ‘im-proper’ love that literally does not dare speak its name. “Not once do our heroes mention the word love, nor does any shame or harshness attach to their desire. Indeed, what will vex some is not the act of sodomy but the suggestion that Ennis and Jack are possessed of an innocence, a virginity of spirit, that the rest of society (which literally exists on a lower plane, below the mountain) will strive to violate and subdue. If the lovers hug their secret to themselves, that is because they fear for its survival” (Lane 2005: 2). Eventually, it is Jack Twist who pays the price, it is human life that bends against insurmountable laws; the secret and the love that had made its object remain untouched, untamed, unspoken, captured
in the miracle of evanescent memories which Proulx handles so unforget-
tably:

The shirt seemed heavy until he saw there was another shirt inside it, the sleeves carefully worked down inside Jack’s sleeves. It was his own plaid shirt, lost, he’d thought, long ago in some damn laundry, his dirty shirt, the pocket ripped, buttons missing, stolen by Jack and hidden here inside Jack’s own shirt, the pair like two skins, one inside the other, two in one. He pressed his face into the fabric and breathed in slowly through his mouth and nose, hoping for the faintest smoke and mountain sage and salty sweet stink of Jack but there was no real scent, only the memory of it, the imagined power of Brokeback Mountain of which nothing was left but what he held in his hands (Proulx 2005a: 52).

A story of love under siege, as labeled by The New Yorker, Brokeback Mountain reads like poetry and feels like real life. It stands to show that wearing hearts on the sleeve—regardless of the protagonists’ gender—can still make powerful literature nowadays. To quote impulsive Jack, “Old Brokeback got us good and it sure ain't over” (Proulx 2005a: 26).

References


THE APPLICATION OF BRECHT'S EPIC THEATRE IN CARYL
CHURCHILL'S MAD FOREST: A PLAY FROM ROMANIA

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Bertolt Brecht (1898–1956) is one of the most significant figures in 20th
century drama. Apart from being an influential playwright, Brecht is also a
theoretician who has developed his own theory of drama. Moreover, he
produced numerous essays in which he discussed his views on western
dramatic tradition in general and his idea of theatre in particular. Brecht's
ground-breaking theory has inspired many playwrights and directors after
him and Caryl Churchill is one of his followers. This paper will focus on the
application of Brecht's epic theatre theory in Churchill's Mad Forest: first, an
outline of Brecht's epic theatre will be given, and in the second part of the
paper, epic theatre elements in Churchill's Mad Forest will be examined.

Brecht believes that a new form of drama is essential for the 20th cen-
tury. He argues that:

The old form of drama does not make it possible to represent the world as
we see it today. What we nowadays regard as the typical course of a man’s
fate cannot be shown in the current dramatic form (qtd. in Spiers 1994: 26).

Accordingly, Brecht introduces his idea of drama which he named as
‘epic theatre’ (Gray 1974:73; Spiers 1994:29). Heavily influenced by the com-
munist manifesto of Marx and Engels and also being a fervent communist
himself, Brecht is against the idea of naturalist theatre, which he called
‘bourgeois theatre'. For him, the naturalistic representation of life in tradi-
tional drama causes a bewildering effect on the audience. In this kind of
dramatic experience, the spectators can easily identify him/herself with the
characters and, consequently, this kind of identification gives rise to an
unquestioned acceptance of life presented on the stage. Brecht names this
type of theatre as ‘Aristotelian theatre', since the identification with the
characters and the action result in catharsis, the purification of the soul that
is experienced as an outcome of the arousal of strong feelings in a tragedy,
as Aristotle writes about in his *Poetics* (1970:26). Opposing this cathartic effect, Brecht calls his theatre ‘non-Aristotelian’ in his theoretical writings (Brooker 1988:44, 1994:188; Gray 1976:80; Styan 1983:142; Wright 1989:25). Moreover, this century for Brecht is a collective one; the individual who had the central role in the bourgeois theatre has lost its importance (Spiers 1994:27). Instead of a cathartic theatre, Brecht aspires to a theatre in which the spectators are active and distant observers. Brecht asserts that:

The theatre, which is our time became political before our eyes, had nor been apolitical up to then. It had taught us to view the world in the way that the ruling classes wanted it to be viewed… Now the world could and had to be represented as caught up in development and continuous process, without any limits beings laid down by any one class regarding these as necessary to its interests. The passive attitude of the spectator which essentially corresponded to the passivity of the great majority of people in life, made way for an active one (qtd in Wright 1989:27).

Additionally, Brecht is against the lyrical and moving nature of drama. According to him, only rational thought can bring change to the contemporary state of humanity. The climax and the suspense of the traditional theatre make the audience carried away with the action. However, the theatre in Brecht’s mind gives time and space to the spectator to think and compare. This estrangement generates different and new insights on the spectators’ side. Discussing the spectator in the epic theatre, Brecht (1992:71) highlights the difference between the dramatic theatre’s spectator and the epic theatre’s spectator as follows:

The dramatic theatre’s spectator says: Yes, I have felt like that too—Just like me—it’s only natural—it’ll never change—the suffering of this man appalls me, because they are inescapable—that’s great art; it all seems the most obvious thing in the world—I weep when they weep, I laugh when they laugh.

The epic theatre’s spectator says: I’d never have thought it—that’s not the way—that’s extraordinary, hardly believable—it’s got to stop—the sufferings of this man appal me, because they are unnecessary—that’s great art: nothing obvious in it—I laugh when they weep, I weep when they laugh.

The main feature of the epic theatre is that it challenges the reality which is taken for granted and searches for different viewpoints. In order to
present alternative realities, Brecht’s plays are discursive. Generally, a problem is presented and different points of view are offered but the final decision is left to the spectator.

According to Brecht, a human being is not static, but an individual in process. He/she has the ability and capability to change his/her life. Therefore, as mentioned above, Brecht wants an audience who can think about the action on stage and reach his/her conclusions about it. This distant evaluation can also bring change into his/her life. In order to achieve this distanced look, Brecht introduces the ‘V-Effekt’ or the ‘alienation technique’. Brecht defines the ‘alienation effect’ as:

The alienation effect occurs when the thing to be understood, the thing to which attention is to be drawn, is changed from an ordinary, well-known, immediately present into a particular, striking, unexpected thing. In a certain sense the self evident is made incomprehensible, although this only happens in order to make it all the more comprehensible (qtd in Gray 1976:71).

This technique yearns for creating a de-familiarization impact on the audience. For Brecht, the de-familiarization of events on stage can bring the distance between the play and the audience that he aims for. The ‘V-Effekt’ is achieved by various dramatic elements: first of all, the style of acting is radically changed in Brecht’s model. In epic theatre, the subject matter is more important than the characters. Furthermore, Brecht criticizes the traditional acting methods, in which the actor is required to “live” his/her role. Brecht asks his actors to maintain some distance with the role they are playing. He states that:

In order to produce Alienation-effects the actor has to discard whatever means he has learned of getting to audience to identify with the characters which he plays. The verdict: ‘he didn’t act Lear, he was Lear’ would be a devastating blow to him (qtd in Gilman 1987:219).

For Brecht, the actors are readers only rather than reciters (Wright 1989: 27). He emphasizes that ‘He [the actor] never forgets, nor lets it be forgotten, that he is not the subject, but the demonstrator’ (Wright 1989:32). To achieve this kind of acting, during the rehearsals the actors are encouraged to act their roles in the third person, also to use past tense to describe their actions as they perform them to give the idea that they are only ‘role-playing’ not ‘living’ their part (Brooker 1994:196; Gray 1976:69; Williams
1987:280). For instance, the actress Helen Weigel in *The Mother Courage* speaks her role in third person singular (Brooker 1988: 46). It prevents her from identifying with the character she plays and also it gives the audience the impression that she is only an actress not the Mother. The actors in Brecht’s theatre are also asked to speak the stage directions of their roles (Gray 1976:69; Williams 1987:280). In the epic theatre, the actors are aware of the audience and they require their participation. They direct questions to them and they also address them. For example, in *The Mother Courage* (Brecht 1986), *The Threepenny Opera* (Brecht 1986) and *The Good Woman of Setzuan* (Brecht 1966), the characters introduce themselves to the audience and they inform them about their problems.

In the epic theatre, masks are also used for an alienation effect (Spiers 1994: 37). The actors wear masks, which prevent the reflection of facial mimics and gestures. Moreover, different roles can be played by the same actor. Brecht also uses narrators either to comment on the action or predict the coming events. For instance, in *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* (Brecht 1988), the necessary background information is provided by the narrator, who sits at one side of the stage throughout the whole play. The chorus is utilized in the epic theatre as another source of commentary. The chorus, as in the classical Greek tragedy, either comments on the action or presents alternative points of view. These kinds of interruptions to the action further reinforce the estrangement of the audience.

Besides, songs are an integral part of Brecht’s epic theatre. Instead of creating or reinforcing an atmosphere, in the epic theatre the songs are used to create an alienation effect. Generally, the songs are commentaries rather than manifestations of a state of mind. The lyrics of the songs always carry a message or a discursive aspect.

In addition, Brecht uses the technical devices to strengthen the alienation effect. For example, in one production, he used a low curtain which covered only the half-height of the stage. The whole actions of the actors and the stage-workers could be seen behind it. In *The Horatii*, the sun was represented by a naked spotlight which was carried by a technician around the stage (Gray 1976:67). In some plays, photographs, film-strips and newspapers headings are projected on the wall. Brecht uses them to present different versions of reality (Gray 1976:70). The titles and the summaries of the scenes are also projected (Styan 1983:140). In the history of drama, this is one of the earliest attempts to use multi-media on stage.
Brecht requires a very strong illumination of the stage (Gray 1976: 67). The lighting effects to create a realistic representation of the times of the day in the naturalistic theatre are abandoned. Bold lighting is used all through the play, regardless of whether it is a day or night scene. The spotlights are not hidden; they are openly placed. This strong illumination of the stage and the auditorium also prevents the spectator from isolating him/herself from the outer world and sink into the illusionary world of the stage (Styan 183:143).

In epic theatre productions, the stage is naked most of the times. Set changes are made in front of the audience. There is no curtain separating the stage and the audience. Brecht (1992: 136) argues that “it is… necessary to drop the assumption that there a fourth wall cutting the audience off from the stage and the consequent illusion that the stage action is taking in reality and without audience”. Also, the period costumes are not used to avoid the illusion of naturalistic life. Besides, there is no attempt to set up an atmosphere in the epic theatre. Atmosphere is another device to create an illusion of reality, whereas in the epic theatre, all the illusions are stripped down.

For subject matters, Brecht uses parables and historical incidents. The settings of his plays are distant places, such as Georgia in The Caucasian Chalk Circle (Brecht 1988), or China in The Good Woman of Setzuan (Brecht 1966). The distant settings, characters with different nationalities and retelling events from the past reinforce the alienation effect on a European spectator, as these differences make identification difficult.

In terms of structure, Brecht’s plays are episodic. There is not a strict cause and effect relationship among the scenes. Each scene is a complete entity in itself. The title of each scene is announced to the audience just before it. Moreover, in some productions, the story of the next scene is written on hanging boards (Gray 1976:71). In addition, sometimes a written title precedes each scene. To disrupt the cathartic effects in the epic theatre, there is no climax, and no resolution is imposed. To break the natural flow of actions on the stage, repetitions are used (Gray 1976:69). That is, the same events are acted out more than once, or the characters and/or events are duplicated.

To sum up, Brecht has introduced a very radical and innovative dramatic theory. His ‘epic drama’ is welcomed by the contemporary playwrights who are in search of different media of expression. With the emer-
gence of poststructural and postmodern movements in the area of literary theory, asserting the illusionary and relative nature of truth, Brecht’s epic theatre, which also aims to strip down the idea of naturalistic illusion, is considered as a revolutionary contribution. Many modern playwrights and directors have used Brecht’s theories in their works. Likewise, Caryl Churchill incorporates Brecht’s philosophy of epic theatre to her *Mad Forest* (1996).

*Mad Forest* is about the Romanian Revolution, a one-week-long series of riots and protests that took place in the late December of 1989. The violent riots ended in the overthrow and the execution of the communist president Nicolae Ceaușescu and his wife Elena. Only three months after, Churchill was invited to Bucharest to write a play about the Revolution. To give an objective account of this recent chaotic experience, Churchill used epic theatre elements in her play.

As in Brecht’s epic theory, in *Mad Forest*, the situation is more important than the characters. The Revolution is mainly told through the eyes of two families, the Vladu family, whose members belong to the working class, and the Antonescu family, which has a relatively better status in an otherwise classless society. Florina of the Vladus and Radu of the Antonescuses are engaged. However, as Florina’s sister Lucia is married to an American, Radu’s family does not want their son to marry Florina.

However in the play, the political questions and situations are in the foreground rather than the plot. The personal events related by the two families are not given precedence and place in the play. Besides, the characters are drawn very artificially, the audience not being provided with the necessary background information about them. In the play, the characters are not heroes, only names. Partly due to the fact that their names are Romanian and an actor plays several different roles, it is difficult to follow and identify with the characters. For example, in the cast, Iain Hake plays both Bogdan’s father and Bogdan’s aunt, as well as a Securitate officer, a Vampire and someone with a sore throat. The same actor plays not only different sexes, but also imaginary creatures, such as the Vampire. To see the same actor in different roles breaks the naturalistic illusion of characters in realistic drama. Thus, it creates the alienation effect.

The play takes place in a distant geography, like Brecht’s plays. This unfamiliar culture and language creates a barrier between the play and the audience. It is difficult for a western spectator to identify with a different cul-
ture and language. Moreover, as the characters are not fully developed, there is no possibility for the audience to identify with the characters either. The spectator is left misguided in the foreign world of the play. The only thing to do is to watch and observe, not to experience. This distance is the main goal of the epic theatre, where the audience is fully conscious that they are watching a play.

The structure of the play also creates estrangement. Unlike the naturalistic theatre, in which the scenes are closely linked together with cause and effect relationships, in *Mad Forest*, the scenes are loosely connected. The whole play is episodic; each scene is an entity in itself. Therefore, there is not a plot to talk about. To emphasize this episodic nature of the play, each scene is presented with a title that is probably announced by a player on the stage. The titles are in Romanian, followed by an English translation and then again in Romanian (Churchill 1996:13). For instance, the first scene is called *Lucia are patru ouă*, “Lucia has four eggs”, while the second one is entitled *Cine are un chibrit?*, “Who has a match?” (Churchill 1996:13–14). Similarly, at the end of the play, the characters deliver their last speeches in Romanian without any English translation. The use of Romanian reinforces the alienation effect on the western audience.

In epic theatre, different reports of the same event are given. The audience is left to decide which one to believe. In *Mad Forest*, this is used in Act II, where different characters give their account of the day of the Revolution. The initial purpose of the Revolution was solely that of overthrowing the communist regime, but the Revolutionists soon start to cause trouble and kill. Nobody knows who is at which side and who has been doing the killing. The confusion and fear of the people is presented. As if in a documentary, Romanian citizens, not actors, give an account of their experience in broken English. A wide range of people presents different points of view of the same event. For example, a painter talks about the events after the Revolution:

My girlfriend and I were at the TV station. I didn’t know who we were fighting with and how bad it was. I was just acting to save our lives. It is terrible to hate and not to be able to do something real (Churchill 1996:40)

A student retells the same day as:

A lot of people bring tea and food though they didn’t know if there will be better days and more to eat. They bring things they save for Christmas.
Some people say the food is poisoned so that people who bring it must eat and drink first (Churchill 1996:41).

And a doctor speaks about his own experience:

On the 23 I went to work. Two boys came in with a young man on a stretcher, which they put down, then one of them fell to the ground and began to scream- he sees the wounded man is his older brother. His friend takes him down the hall to get a tranquillizer, it is very dark and when they come back the friend trips over something, it is the body of the older brother, who is dead, waiting for surgery. The younger brother was only 14. He threw himself on the corpse and won’t move, he said he wants to die with his brother (Churchill 1996:41).

These different reports of the same event make a strong impact on the audience. Hearing the different versions of the Revolution by the citizens, the spectators focus on the social and historical aspect of the event, rather than the personal experiences of the fictional characters. The tragic events are in the foreground rather than the tragedy of certain individuals. Moreover, as there is no account that the audience can identify with, the diverse comments on the same event strengthen the alienation technique.

Churchill also uses songs and dance that are significant in epic theatre. The song which the Old Aunt sings to Florina at her wedding is noteworthy. At first, the song seems to be about the joys of married life, but then turns out to anticipate the problems waiting for her in her new life:

More fun running free and wild  
Than staying home to mind the child.  
Better be on the shelf  
Only to have please yourself (Churchill 1996:76).

The tune at the end of the wedding when the whole family, including the Angel and the Vampire, dance is lambada. The popular song of the era with English lyrics, is a symbol of the inescapable effects of American imperialism and globalism. The songs and the dance are not used to reinforce the mood of the play, quite the opposite, they deliver comments on the action.

Parable and allegory are the other epic theatre elements in *Mad Forest*. In Act III, scene I, a vampire and a dog meet. The hungry dog wants food from the Vampire, but the Vampire tells him that he does not eat food. He drinks blood and he came to Romania for the Revolution. In the frantic
atmosphere of the Revolution, he can find new victims to suck their blood. Vampire’s words sum up the Revolution: ‘Nobody knew who was doing the killing, I could come up behind the man in the crowd’ (Churchill 1996:45). This isolated scene illustrates the senseless killing in the Revolution.

Last but not least, no attempts are made to produce a naturalistic stage. To create the alienation effect, the epic theatre refrains from creating any naturalistic illusion. As there are no directions for décor, the play is most probably performed on a bare stage with no lighting effect. Likewise, the costumes are not important. The production notes mention that the Vampire is not dressed as a vampire.

As a conclusion, Caryl Churchill uses Brecht’s epic theatre elements in *Mad Forest*. In the play, depicting the chaotic atmosphere of the Romanian Revolution, the political and social issues, such as the reasons and the consequences of the Revolution, the questioning of the new order, the Black Market economy, the communist regime are placed in the foreground. The days of the Revolution are portrayed in the style of a chronicle. To make the audience watch and internalize this drastic and haunting historical experience, rather than be carried away by the plot, the playwright employs the alienation techniques of the epic theatre, such as the use of foreign language and setting, episodic structure, different and alternative accounts of the same event, parable and allegory, songs and dances, the bare stage and the casual clothes instead of the garments typical of the naturalistic period. These elements create an estrangement effect on the audience; therefore, without an emotional identification with the characters, the audience watches the harsh and naked realities of the Revolution and makes their own decision about the event. The successful application of Brecht’s dramatic theory makes *Mad Forest* a significant example of epic theatre.

**References**


THE ALCHEMY OF ROMANTICISM IN SCIENTIFIC CONTEXT

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The present paper suggests a new understanding of the romantic phenomenon as a type of alchemy and as a spiritual process. I undertake to discuss essential aspects related to an alchemical understanding of artistic labour, esp. in Blake’s and Novalis’s poetics, but also in that of other romantics, and to demonstrate that the two phenomena have strong affinities. One conclusion is that romanticism is different from alchemy proper only by the fact that romanticism never entirely reaches the final alchemical phase (rubedo), but it always approximates it to increasing degrees.

I justify the present description as having been largely inspired by the realization of the fundamental value of a statement by Gilbert Durand, according to which romantic or alchemical tradition and psychological analysis converge and point out an archetypal structure, by going back to the ancient religious tradition (Durand 1998: 221). I thus vindicate the present approach as based on Jung’s system of thought, and thereby underline Durand’s observation, according to which romantic poetics predicted “depth” or analytic psychology (Durand 1998: 241), which, through Jung’s work, in fact restored precisely alchemy to its true spiritual value. In accordance with the view opened by these studies, we easily understand that we are dealing here with an ouroboric phenomenon of cultural validation: the equation romanticism-depth psychology-alchemy forms a complete cycle, ending in a return to romanticism.

The formal structure of this cycle looks as in the figure below:

Fig. 1 The cyclic, spiral, eternal ‘equation’ of the development of romantic, depth-psychologic, and alchemical thought as an ever unfolding rota philosophica or mandalic unfolding in four major movements: the fourth movement ends the philosophical wheel and restarts the whole circular process, presumably on a superior level, as according to Ilya Prigogine’s and P. Glansdorff’s universal criterion of evolution (postulated by them in 1954).
The following scheme presents three full ouroboric, spiral cycles:

**THE FIRST NUCLEUS OF EVOLUTION:**
1.1. Romanticism is born $\rightarrow$ 2.1. Depth psychology is derived from romantic thought $\rightarrow$ 3.1. Alchemy (born before romanticism) is validated $\rightarrow$ [further developments derived from alchemy 3a. iatrochemistry, as an application of chemistry to medical theory, introduced by Franciscus Sylvius of Leyden (1614–1672) $\rightarrow$ 3b. modern Chemistry $\rightarrow$ 3c. modern Biochemistry] $\rightarrow$ ($\leftarrow$)

**THE SECOND NUCLEUS OF EVOLUTION:**
Return to romanticism because of the validation of a theory (alchemy) that emerged before romanticism, the latter providing the tools for this particular validation. The result is the birth of:
1.2. Romanticism (superior, deeper, more complex romanticism: ‘postmodernism’ as a new more complex form of romanticism) $\rightarrow$ 2.2. Depth psychology (superior, deeper, more complex depth psychology: ‘transpersonal psychology’ as a new more complex form of depth psychology, such as that initiated by Ken Wilber) $\rightarrow$ 3.2. Alchemy (superior, deeper, more complex alchemy: ‘quantum chemistry’ and ‘quantum physics’ as a new more complex form of alchemy, making possible the turning of metals/elements into any other metals/elements by processes of fusion or fission) $\rightarrow$ ($\leftarrow$)

**THE THIRD NUCLEUS OF EVOLUTION:**
1.3. Romanticism (superior, deeper, more complex romanticism: ‘postpostmodernism’ as a new more complex form of romanticism; in this sense, romanticism contains elements which are similar to Taoism; but, as Capra demonstrated in his famous *The Tao of Physics*, Taoism and quantum theory are deeply similar; the consequence of this isomorphism is that a deep similarity can be established between romanticism and quantum theory) $\rightarrow$ 2.3. Depth psychology (superior, deeper, more complex depth psychology: possibly ‘transdimensional psychology’ as a new more complex form of depth psychology, such as could be envisaged in the future) $\rightarrow$ 3.3. Alchemy (superior, deeper, more complex alchemy: ‘quantum science’ as a new more complex form of alchemy, making possible the integration of science and consciousness such as is the case of the project already initiat-
ed by Danah Zohar (1991) a project that has as predecessors works by David Bohm, Ken Wilber and Fritjof Capra; the latter’s *The Tao of Physics* proves, as already mentioned, the existence of deep similarities between Taoism and quantum physics)

The following scheme presents the generalized model:

![Diagram](Fig. 2 The general model of development of theories as a successive process of emergence, derivation, validation (as restoration/recuperation) and reemergence on a superior level, such as suggested by the cyclic ‘equation’ of the development of romantic, depth-psychologic and alchemical thought:

**THE GENERALIZED MODEL**

1. Emergence of initial theory (Theory A); 2. Preparation and derivation of the next theory (Theory B) from the first (Theory A); 3. Validation of a theory (Theory C) that had already been constituted when Theory A emerged (this is thus an act of restoration or recuperation); 4. Reemergence of initial theory (Theory A) as Theory A’, i.e. Theory A on a superior, deeper, more complex level. The process of reemergence is stimulated paradoxically by phase 3 (validation-restoration), which thus gives back impetus to phase 1 (birth) which made possible phase 2 (evolution) that led to phase 3 (restoration of lost or scientifically/culturally unvalidated knowledge; the previous lack of validation was a consequence of the insufficient development of knowledge). The result is thus phase 4 (rebirth or renaissance on a superior level).

This cyclic process seems to be possible because the birth of Theory A (in our case romanticism) already had in its background Theory C (alchemy) as unvalidated knowledge. In order for Theory A (romanticism) to cause Theory C (alchemy) to be validated, Theory A (romanticism) inserted/embedded into its foundational structures crucial elements from Theory C (alchemy) that seemed valid. As a consequence, Theory A (romanticism) is ‘genetically’ a descendant of Theory C (alchemy). In other words, Theory A (romanticism) contains ‘embedded’ ‘cultural genes’ of Theory C (alchemy) combined with others (derived from other fields such as philosophy, science, religion-morals and art-aesthetics). Theory A (romanticism) thus
then passes on ("dis-embeds") part of its 'cultural genes' to Theory B (depth psychology) and so part of these 'cultural genes' belong already to Theory C (alchemy), for which now Theory B (depth psychology) 'feels' deep affinities, because it already has in itself embedded structures of Theory C (alchemy). This is how Theory B (depth psychology) comes to validate/vindicate the right to 'lawful' existence of Theory C (alchemy).

The crucial fact here is that the entire process is grounded on a composite process of 'genetic' inheritance/ 'hereditary' embedment and self-referentiality (an inner self-referential cycle) (for the sake of simplification, we use A, B, C for the three theories): A (descendant of C) is born, A gives birth to B, B (descendant of A; A descendant of C) validates C. C validated by B (descendant of A) now validates A, who becomes thus A', (a more complex A).

In formal terms, the general 'genetic' self-referentially cyclic equation is, in accordance with the principles of systems theory regarding complexification of embedded structures:

\[
A(C) \rightarrow B(A(C)) \rightarrow C \rightarrow \\
A'(A(C)) \rightarrow B'(B(A(C))) \rightarrow C' \rightarrow \\
A''(A'(A(C))) \rightarrow B''(B'(B(A(C)))) \rightarrow C'' \rightarrow \\
A'''(A''(A'(A(C)))) \rightarrow B'''(B''(B'(B(A(C)))))) \rightarrow C''' \rightarrow \\
\ldots \text{ad infinitum}
\]

We can therefore speak indeed of an alchemy of romanticism, since romanticism is a descendant of alchemy: romanticism has elements of alchemy deeply embedded in its foundational structures.

Moreover the basic process of systemic embedment identified as \([A(C) \rightarrow B(A(C)) \rightarrow C \rightarrow]\) can be viewed in genetic terms of recessiveness and Mendelism, namely in terms of the genetic process according to which an ancestral character (in our case, alchemy), apparently suppressed in cross-bred offspring (in our case, romanticism) in favour of the alternative character in the other parent (in our case, philosophy-art, religion, science), can be transmitted to later generations (in our case, depth psychology) in which it can reappear/resurface (in our case, the act of validation of alchemy by depth psychology). This is a genetic process of resurfacing in a subsequent generation of embedded elements/of hereditary factors (here, 'cul-
tural’ or ‘cognitive’ ‘genes’) that in the initial generation remained non-manifest (recessiveness, cf. Lat. recessus = non-manifest, withdrawn).

More than that, Jung (1998) also established for the case of archetypes a similar process of resurfacing after periods in which they lie dormant.

These hypotheses may well serve as models for a general theory of the evolution and metaevolution of cultural and scientific paradigms.

We have thus strong reasons to believe that, because romanticism predicted the birth of “depth” or analytic psychology, it also prepared the way precisely for the restoration of alchemy to its true spiritual value. That is why, as a preparatory stage, romanticism is also a kind of pre-alchemical phase asserting an alchemical type of system of its own, which already contains the germs of the validation of alchemy. The fact that Jung fulfilled the restoration of alchemy indicates that Jung’s thought should be the foundation, the starting point of a theory about an ‘alchemy of romanticism’ or a ‘pre-alchemy of romanticism’, since Jung's system has so strong connections with alchemical thought, and implicitly with romantic theory, which prepared and anticipated in the first place the birth of depth psychology, which was to become a strong tool for the deep understanding and vindication of alchemy.

Thus, the “guiding line” of the romantic spirit is the archetype of the fall-redemption cycle (Durand 1998:389), the fundament of any type of alchemy. One of the mythological axes of romanticism is therefore the initiatory or Promethean quest, the so called “religion of the woman”. Julia Rennert spoke in this sense about a “Promethean woman” in Blake, who signifies America’s soul (Rennert 1995:137), the personification of aspiring after the freedom of spirit, similar to Jerusalem of Blake’s major prophecies. Regarding this “religion” of the woman, Novalis asserted that it represented the purpose of man, being the other essential dimension of the romantic soul (Durand 1997: 223). The woman is the symbol of symbols, like the angel, because femaleness is the only mediator, being both “passive” and “active”, and this fact was expressed by Plato, by the Hebrew Shekinah, the Moslem Fatima, the Hindoo Shakti, etc (Durand 1999: 39).

The male-female differentiation is in this respect the fundament of alchemy, but also of romanticism. The feminine in balance with the masculine is the essence in the alchemical great work or magnum opus which Jung equated with the process of individuation, whose equivalent in
alchemical terms is the quest for the Philosopher’s Stone or lapis (Bonardel 2000:161).

Jung underlined the fact that the central axiom of alchemy is approximated by Maria Prophetissa’s statement: “One becomes two, two becomes three and from three appears one as the fourth” (Jung 1998:28). This “equation” becomes intelligible if we add that the odd numbers are male (spiritual) (since ancient times, both in the West as well as in China), and the even numbers are female (earth, the subterranean). The Christian Trinity is thus essentially male. Jung showed in this sense that alchemy formed precisely as a submovement against the background of the Christianity which dominated on the surface, it trying to fill in the gaps caused by the tension between the contraries extant in the Christian doctrine (Jung 1998:28). Jung pointed out also that evil formed together with matter the Dyad, which is female in nature, an “anima mundi”, feminine physis, who pines after the embrace of the Unique (the good and perfect). Justinian gnosis described in this respect the dyad as Eden, its upper part being a virgin, and its lower part being a snake (Jung 1998:272). This image can be met in Blake in a few drawings for Vala, and Jung stated that in this type of image alchemy used the motif of Eden for Mercurius, represented in the upper part as having the body of a virgin and in the lower part as being a snake (Jung 1998: 272, n.33).

The personification of even numbers is, according to Jung, “serpens mercurii”, the dragon which creates and destroys itself, represented as Ouroboros, the snake which devours itself by biting its tail, symbolizing rota philosophica, the supreme level of the wisdom of Old Testament’s God, identified with alchemy (Hoheisel 1986:74). It is represented also as the alchemical mandala (Jung 1998:116), representing “prima materia”, the primordial matter, equivalent to “matter per se” of the Aristotelian philosophy of nature (Hoheisel 1986:65). Betty Dobbs explained with good reason that this primordial non-differentiated matter, the “philosophical chaos”, is the essential analogy which connects alchemy with the cosmogony of the Judeo-Christian tradition, according to which God created the world from empty, chaotic, formless matter (Dobbs 1986:142). Materia prima as a primordial matrix contains in nuce all future developments (Hoheisel 1986:66), and this theory was later to be found as a crucial doctrine in Novalis (the idea that reality is the evolution, the unfolding, of an inner germinal reality into the outer reality; this theory reminds us of David Bohm’s statement
according to which reality is evolving by the unfolding from an inner “implicate order” to an exterior “explicate order”). The alchemical *materia prima* is also similar to the aquatic element Tiamat that points to the idea of a matriarchal primordial world, which in the Babylonian theomachy was defeated by the patriarchal world led by the god Marduk (Jung 1998:28–29). Christine Gallant believes in this sense that Blake’s *Vala* is an image of the ouroboric Great Mother, *materia prima* of Nature, in the drawings representing it having an unmistakable serpentine character (Gallant 1978:59). (See, for instance, *Vala*, I, 153–182).

Maria Prophetissa’s axiom, although rather vague, as Jung, too, acknowledged, seems to indicate the circle’s quadrature, which is a symbol of “opus alchymicum”: dissolving the chaotic unity of the beginning (*materia prima*) into four elements (represented as a square) and their reunion into a superior unity (represented as a circle): this is called quintessence, the unity always hoped for, but never reached (Jung 1998:116). This fundamental conception of alchemy is similar to the perpetual romantic aspiration: between the romantic artifex and his infinite goal, there is always a distance, which becomes smaller and smaller, but never void. In other words, both in alchemy and in romanticism “the impure, gross one becomes the subtle one, whose purity is superior” (Khunrath, apud Jung 1998:116). It is significant to notice that this phenomenon is similar to the discovery made by Prigogine and chaos theory: systems which move further and further away from equilibrium tend, at a certain moment, paradoxically, to reorganize into a higher, integrated order, therefore a higher unity (in other words, reality advances from lower/grosser unities towards higher/more subtle unities, through perpetual complexification).

In nature the contraries search for each other. This leads to the birth of what is called *descensus ad inferos* (the descent into hell, often present in the works of the romantics), which, for Jung, is an “opus alchymicum”, having as a purpose the union of the ultimate contraries (i.e. male-female) in what is called *hieros gamos* (the holy wedding) or the “chemical wedding”. Its result is the incorruptible unity of the contraries (Jung 1998:37–38).

We notice that a theory of conscience, perhaps similar to Danah Zohar’s (1994), is necessary to understand the alchemical phenomenon, which basically means projecting the archetypes into the chemical substance which *artifex* (the master) transmutes, without him identifying with
them (Jung 1998:38). This theory of conscience is offered, at least partially, by Jung’s researches and by those of archetypology in general.

The synthesis of contraries has often been presented as the brother-sister incest, a conception based on *Visio Arislei* (Arisleus’s Vision) (*Artis auriferae*, apud Jung 140). Blake used this image (for example in *America*, where Orc—the telluric energy rapes his sister) in order to visualize the violent operations taking place at an alchemical level. We speak in this respect about a “torture” of metals in alchemy. The main idea is that both matter and spirit suffer, and spirit is the one working on matter by agency of the fundamental dynamics of *solve-coagula*, unification-differentiation. Insemination is differentiation, and this process can be violent, reflecting the typically male harshness necessary in this act, as well as the “wild” nature of the matter on which the spirit works. This is so because by any change, from a holistic perspective, one operates not only on the respective entity, but also on the holarchical “unitoriality”, in Hölderlinian terms. In other words, from the viewpoint of chaos theory, the beginning of the “bifurcation epoch” is a painful process leading to the ontological leap.

In modern criticism, however, there are disputes regarding the image of incest, which is supposed to symbolize Oedipus’s drama: Brenda S. Webster’s example is Blake’s poem *Visions of the Daughters of Albion*, in which Oothoon is raped by an older man, Bromion, while her young lover, Theotormon, laments (Webster 1996:198–199). This is supposed to stand for an Oedipal triangle. Moreover, this triangle is supposed to exist also in the Enitharmon-Los-Orc triad of the major prophecies: Los enchains Orc (see Raine 1965:17–18), because Los is jealous of the closeness between Orc and his mother. From an alchemical perspective, however, we are dealing not with Oedipus’s drama, but with the cooperation between time (Los) and space (Enitharmon) with regard to the “fixing” into matter of the transforming, revolutionary energy (“red Orc”). Without this energy (approx. the Jungian *libido*) (see Bloom 1962: 255, 275), time, i.e. Los, would not even exist, because then there would be no motion: Los and Enitharmon are the fixing agents: they fix inside the feminine (i.e. inside space) the male element, the germ of immortality (the philosopher’s steel), the part of the alchemical work which never disappears.

Blake’s Orc is thus the famous “Philosopher’s Steel”, the divine germ. The same can be said about Shelley’s Demogorgon, as a principle of, simultaneously, revolution and necessity.
The unconscious, feminine in nature, on the other hand, is the unknown, unlimited, indeterminate psyche. Thus, paradoxically, the romantic phenomenon involves a tendency towards femininity (see also Cooke 1985: 413), because limitlessness and indeterminacy are contained in the feminine, and the infinitely deep meaning and the infinite per se (as freedom) constitute the purpose of the romantic quest.

Paracelsus described, in this respect, a reality that is given birth to by a feminine principle directly inside the uncreated, whence the alchemical separation between the carnal (perishable) and the insensible is made. It is possible to understand this vision as a prefiguration of a dogmatic nomology/noology, in which everything is given from the very beginning. This is the static, classical, deterministic aspect. Still, Paracelsus lays stress on the irreversibility of events, on the impossibility to return to the materia prima, the origin. This fact is the equivalent of one of the fundamentals of romanticism: the impossibility to return to innocence after going through experience. This aspect is evolutionary, romantic in nature, and it manifests in Blake in the almost obsessive going always onwards, which denotes the progressiveness created by the contraries. In this respect, it is significant that this temporal irreversibility forms the fundament precisely of the modern doctrine about the arrow of time propounded by Ilya Prigogine which shows that time has a unique favourite direction: always onwards.

We can say it is precisely from the adamant character of Paracelsus’ statement that the romantic spirit was born. In this respect it is a well established fact that Novalis, for instance, had read Paracelsus (Mähl 1986: 367), as well as Blake, who considered the latter and Böhme as spiritual masters, both of them having appeared to him in vision (Blake 1979:799: “To John Flaxman, 12 September 1800”). That is why the romantic spirit is the one searching for the world of innocence after the fall into experience, it searches for the inaccessible, unlimited, unique, original, new, the Other’s identity, the origin, the feminine, “the religion of woman”, the ultimate philosophy, the principles, God, creation’s infinite meaning.

Barzun offered in this respect a definition of the romantic period according to which “the problem was to create a new world on the ruins of the old one” (Barzun 1961:14, apud Weisstein 1968:48, n. 3). This definition may contain an alchemical allusion, in the sense that the ashes (i.e. the ruins of past worlds) are the crude material of the work. In the terms of the theory I propound, Barzun’s definition can be reformulated as follows: the
romantics begin again the *anagenetic* cycle, building on the ruins, on the decadent phase of the baroque, while also interfering with manneristic elements. The latter have a medial position between the regression/decadence of the baroque and the romantic “evolutionism”, which, in its turn, is curbed by classical elements of stationary equilibrium.

Artifex, or the archetype of the hero in romanticism, goes, however, through a continuous alternation between two Durandian schemes: the ascensional and the descensional (i.e. the ups and downs of the hero’s path) which make evolution possible. In this respect, Weisinger showed that the archetypal scheme in myth and ritual regarding the god who dies and rises again becomes the “symbolical representation of the creative process”, approximated by the idea of “leaps, falls and higher leaps” (Weisinger 1964:250, apud Quasha 1996:32). We are obviously dealing here with Ervin Laszlo’s idea regarding evolution by sudden leaps and deep transformations. The descensional scheme becomes manifest in images like those of caves and caverns, so frequent in Blake’s and Shelley’s works, of the mine—being connected with ritual regenerative death—so frequent in Novalis’s works, but present also in Shelley’s metaphysical landscapes: see at least the suggestive image in *Queen Mab*: “every shape and mode of matter lends / Its force to the omnipotence of mind, / Which from its dark mine drags the gem of truth / To decorate its paradise of peace.” (Shelley 1994:32, *Queen Mab*, VIII).

As Beverly Moon showed, the cave is the cosmic womb out of which the sun and the moon appear. The cave is symbolized by the Holy Grail, or the alchemical vessel; it is the womb of the earth out of which life is born, and into which life returns (a belief having roots in the paleolithic cultures, cf. Moon 1991: 468). William Butler Yeats observed in this respect that in Shelley’s philosophy two symbols are prevalent: the tower and the cave. The tower signifies the ‘mind looking outward upon men and things’, while the cave signifies the ‘mind looking inward upon itself’ (Yeats 2001:351). The main value of the cave is thus to be a place of transmutation. The feminine aspect of the divine is thus experienced as a transformative and embracing reality (Moon 1991: 468–469).

Between artifex and the lunar-feminine principle, there is a close connection, the alchemical work being initiated precisely in the “sublunar” space. Artifex is inserted into a vast context governed by fixed laws, in a huge network of microcosmic-macrocosmic correspondences. In this net-
work the Sun (Sol) is the alchemical sulphur, and the Moon is Mercurius (“the sun and its shadow”; Maier 1618 apud Roob 1997:79). Alchemy and romanticism have thus deep isomorphic structures. H. J. Sheppard and Henry H. H. Remak offered extremely relevant definitions of the two phenomena: Remak’s definition: “Romanticism is the attempt to heal the break in the universe, it is the painful awareness of dualism coupled with the urge to resolve it in organic monism, it is the confrontation with chaos followed by the will to reintegrate it into the order of the cosmos, it is the desire to reconcile a pair of opposites, to have synthesis follow antithesis” (Remak 1968: 44). Sheppard’s definition: “Alchemy is the art of liberating parts of the Cosmos from temporal existence and achieving perfection which, for metals is gold, and for man, longevity, then immortality and, finally, redemption. Material perfection was sought through the action of a preparation (Philosopher’s Stone for metals; Elixir of Life for humans), while spiritual ennoblement resulted from some form of inner revelation or other enlightenment” (Sheppard 1986:16–17).

As a consequence, on the one hand, romanticism works on chaos, transforming it into order, it transforms dualism into monism, it unites contraries into synthesis; on the other hand, alchemy operates on matter and on the fallen soul of man in order to obtain perfection and redemption by shortening the period of natural gestation and by spiritual ennoblement, illumination, revelation.

We can therefore speak at least of a pre-alchemy of romanticism. The purpose of the great work is the conjunction of the sun and the moon, the marriage between macrocosm and microcosm (Roob 1997: 264 and 380). The Great Art in European alchemy is defined as the secret of combining the Masculine with the Feminine (Eliade 1991:128), Conjunctio. Four phases of Conjunctio have structurally survived during the whole history of alchemy: nigredo-blackening, albedo-whitening, citrinitas-yellowing, rubedo-reddening (as in Physika kai Mystika, the earliest Greek text with an alchemical content having a programmatic nature—cf. Roob 1997:30—attributed to Democritus, which appeared sometime between the 2nd and the 1st century BC, the first alchemical writing proper—cf. Eliade 1999:407–408). In Khunrath’s view there are also four phases symbolized by birds: putrefactio-raven, albedo-swan, cauda pavonis-peacock (the phase of the bright colours) and rubedo-Phoenix (Khunrath 1602 apud Roob 1997:115). In this respect, Blake used the image of the swan as symbol of albedo in
Jerusalem, plate 11. On the other hand, Novalis used the image of the Phoenix at the end of Klingsohr's tale. The wedding bed-throne is nothing else but what alchemists call the “alchemical wedding”, the Phoenix, connected with the image of fire, being an old alchemical symbol for Christ's resurrection. Likewise, the Phoenix symbolizes the stone-lapis, the level at which initiation is completed (Hiebel 1951:139). The stone-Christ isomorphism is in this sense well known, having been first demonstrated by Jung.

*Solve* and *coagula* (or “undo in order to be able to redo”, equivalent to “the yes and no in all things” postulated by Jakob Böhme—cf. Roob 1997:252; equivalent to the expansion and contraction postulated by Blake, and to mercury and sulphur postulated by alchemy) represent the password of the spiritual alchemist which set into motion the work (Underhill 1995: 239). It is significant that, for Coleridge, precisely artistic imagination (more exactly, the ‘secondary imagination’) is the one enabling the artist to dissolve, to scatter in order to recreate (see also Gilbert and Kuhn 1972: 352). Thereby Coleridge defines the alchemical nature of the work of art: imagination works through *solve* and *coagula*, dissolving and recreation.

Simplifying like Julius Evola (1999), Evelyn Underhill spoke, too, of only three phases of transformation: black, white and red, analogous to the three traditional stages of the mystical path: purification, illumination, union (Underhill 1995:239). According to this equivalence, *albedo* represents illumination, the highest peak achieved in absence of the union with the absolute (*albedo* is the “state of the moon” or “of silver”, the “chaste and immaculate queen”, the illuminating path). Man’s spiritual perfection is announced, however, only by the emergence of red, the alchemical gold, the “Wedding of the Moon and Sun”, the fusion of the human spirit and of the divine spirit, *Magnum Opus*, the deified/spiritual man (Underhill 1995: 239–240), the *Red Dragon*, similar to Blake’s red Orc (who does acquire a dragon-form at a certain point). In this sense, for the Chinese, the dragon is an emblem of yang, or male energy, and free spiritual life, whereas the phoenix is a symbol of yin; the dragon was also the emblem of the Chinese Emperor, while the phoenix—of the empress: together, the two mythical creatures symbolized marital harmony (of the kind later invoked by alchemists), and the use of this composite symbol is attested, for instance, in jade ritual discs with dragon and phoenix dating from ca. 481–221 B.C. (Cotterell and Storm 2001: 435). The European alchemists probably borrowed the symbol of the dragon from the Chinese and, possibly, also that of
the phoenix (see also Underhill 1995: 242). Rubedo is thus a lunar-solar union-illumination. In Blake's works the name of the hero called Albion contains an alchemical allusion regarding albedo-illumination. In Hölderlin, on the other hand, Urania-Diotima is a solar-lunar Sophia, who attracts Hyperion back into the eternal sphere, he being a solar principle who fell into materiality.

The consequence of the afore-said is the realization of the great novelty of alchemists: namely, as Eliade pointed out, “they projected on Matter the initiatory function of suffering” (Eliade 1999: 409), i.e. exactly what Blake and Novalis, and other romantics, do. Realizing this, the alchemists enabled Matter to assume at the same time the destiny of Spirit. Thus, in the plane of Spirit, initiation leads to freedom, illumination and immortality, and, in the plane of Matter, initiation leads to transmutation, to the Philosopher's stone.

This is the revaluing of a mythical-ritual immemorial scenario: the growth of ores in the bosom of Mother Earth. The oven is a new tellurian matrix in which the ore achieves its gestation; the miner and metallurgist thus accelerate the growth of ores (see also Ziolkowski 1985:29).

Opus magnum is thus the effort to “spiritualize” Matter (Eliade 1999: 409), and to spiritualize artifex together with the matter of his work. This function of opus magnum can be met both in Novalis and in Blake, for them the text being initiatory labour, mental toil, a projection of the self into the pains described in the text. The matter of the romantic artifex is thus the hypercontemplated word. That is why Blake stated at the end of the poem Milton: “Father & Mother, I return from flames of fire tried & pure & white” (Blake 1979:535 Milton II, 43). Artifex passed beyond nigredo (he is “pure”), he reached albedo (he is “white”). The union with God is, however, rubedo. This is the eternally postponed purpose of the romantic.

As a consequence, romanticism is a type of alchemy which is different from alchemy proper only by the fact that romanticism never entirely reaches the final alchemical phase (rubedo), although it ceaselessly approximates it to an ever increasing degree: the romantics always tended towards an ever greater unification: between man and woman, between man and cosmos, between cosmic man and God.
References


THE MAGIC OF THE EYE. MARGARET ATWOOD’S

CAT’S EYE

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Representing the central focus of the face, the eyes are known to have a variety of meanings. They are the main conveyors of human emotions, a gateway to one’s soul and they can establish contact with others or suggest the perception of the transcendental—in other words, a connection with divinity. At the same time, the eyes can stand for creativity and inspiration, thus suggesting a third or inner eye (Emick 2005). This divine third eye (“the eye of Buddha” in Hindu culture or Buddhism, Emick 2005) equates in the psychologists’ opinion to the feeling of guilt, the sensation of being watched, i.e. one’s own judgment (De Souzenelle 1999:380). The divine third eye is also present in religious paintings surrounded by rays of light and connoting God’s omniscience and judgment.

The eye, however, may also imply rather negative things such as envy (“the evil eye”), fragmentation or objectification of people’s bodies. While there is a ‘cure’ for envy—“the eye in the hand” of Middle Eastern culture, which is meant to protect its bearer against envious looks and to bring him/her wealth and happiness (Yronwode 2003)—a body can be fragmented by oneself (for example, looking in the mirror) or by others, and objectified, that is turned into an object of desire (Davis in Leitch 2002:41).

Margaret Atwood makes extensive use of the eye symbol and its various connotations in her novels (for example, The Handmaid’s Tale (1993), which I have discussed in a previous study (Șerban 2005), but most particularly in Cat’s Eye (1989). As the title suggests, the book is centered on the eye, first of all as a sensory organ, with its primary function of perception and looking, but also as a protective amulet and suggestive of artistic vision. The novel is a first person narration and, therefore, the reader sees everything through the mediating eyes of the main character, Elaine Risley, who returns to her home-town Toronto partly to re-see her past and (re)discov-
er her true identity. In so doing, she begins her search for Cordelia, her childhood friend and tormentor.

Liza Potvin (2003) identifies two closely connected key leitmotifs in *Cat's Eye*: on the one hand, witchcraft (black magic in close relation to voodoo or zombification) and the division of body and soul. Coming from an idyllic wilderness, as the family accompanied the father who was a biologist, Elaine has trouble adapting to urban life and feels like a social outcast. She cannot get rid of the “heathen” label given to her by Mrs. Smeath, Grace’s mother, and this will torture her throughout her adolescence and adult life. In her desperation to become accepted, she must follow the rituals of the society to which she wishes to belong (Culpeper 1989), that is she must learn to play the games girls her age play. Elaine is thus put under a “magnifying glass” and constantly criticized by her three ‘friends’: Grace, Carol and Cordelia, who seem to remind us of the three “weird sisters” of Shakespeare’s (1999:859) *Macbeth*, or of the Greek Moirae/Fates (Wikipedia 2006) who “controlled the metaphorical thread of life” from one’s birth until his/her death.

One of Elaine’s most significant memories in this respect goes back to the age of nine—also centered on the eye (nine/‘n eyen’) and connoting (symbolic) death, the underworld, witchcraft and insanity and finally, re-integration (Staels 1995:180; Benoist 1995:87). The four girls play a game where Elaine must appear to be dead; she is buried alive and left alone in the darkness of the symbolic grave. Waiting to be rescued, Elaine imagines seeing nightshades (another name for Belladonna) associated with medieval witchcraft because “witches were said to rub it on their bodies, and its poison was absorbed through the membrane of the skin, inducing hallucinogenic ‘orgies’” (Potvin 2003).

Thus begins Elaine’s zombification process: she becomes subservient to Cordelia—“the main witch”—who transforms Elaine into her slave. Potvin (2003) argues that this metaphor of zombification is a model for “the internalizing of oppression for women, for the creation of a pathological ‘slave-mind’ within the ideological framework of patriarchy”. This idea is shared by Sharon-Rose Wilson (1993:308) who claims that the hole in the ground becomes symbolic for “the void of identity and women’s powerlessness in patriarchy”. But Elaine is not the only ‘slave’ in the novel. Although she appears tough and demanding, Cordelia too is in fact enslaved by patriarchal demands; she is always careful to behave and dress properly, and
she is afraid of her father who punishes her with beating. Fathers—as authoritative figures—are away for the day, but return home at night: “Darkness brings home the fathers, with their real, unspeakable power” (Atwood 1989: 164). In fact, the girls only apply the rules of patriarchy and of Mrs. Smeath, who has developed a patriarchal mentality and enforces its rules and norms.

Deeply hurt because she is seen as “wrong” and “sinful”, Elaine attributes Medusa-like eyes to Mrs. Smeath who thus becomes a powerful ‘witch’ that can petrify people (Staels 1995:185) and that would haunt Elaine throughout her adult life.

In her need to be accepted and loved, Elaine is numbed and unconscious and undergoes self-mutilation by developing cannibalistic instincts; she begins to bite her lips and tear the skin around her nails and off her heels. In de Souzenelle’s (1999: 99) opinion, it is through the feet that humans connect to the Earth-Mother, and having swollen or wounded feet suggests the identification with the dark, instinctual or animal side. We can therefore argue that in her trying to get the others’ approval, Elaine denies her connection with the Great Goddess and rejects precisely her inner feminity, trying to become stronger by dominating her weaker side. The time when she experiences the first splits between her body and soul is suggestive of her split identity:

“At these times I feel blurred, as if there are two of me, one superimposed on the other, but imperfectly. There’s an edge of transparency, and beside it a rim of solid flesh that’s without feeling, like a scar. I can see what’s happening, I can hear what’s being said to me, but I don’t have to pay any attention. My eyes are open but I’m not there. I’m off to the side” (Atwood 1989:185).

Involved in the manipulative games of girls, Elaine finds protection in a cat’s eye marble, part of a boys’ game at which her brother Stephen proved to be very skillful. If the nightshade (or belladonna) is the poison which may induce blind submission, the cat’s eye marble may serve as an antidote. This blue protective amulet reminds the reader of the ‘eye in the hand’ of Middle Eastern customs, which is hung near the window or the door in order to protect the household of evil spirits and bring them happiness and welfare (Yronwode 2003). Blue is usually associated not only with spirituality, emotion, that is the need of love and affection, but also with
introversion and self-protection. It suggests once more Elaine’s longing for her friends’ approval and affection.

In Egyptian mythology, the cat-goddess Bastet used to symbolize wholeness or the merging of the physical and the spiritual and, at the same time, it stood for healing (Cass 1999; “Cat Symbolism” 2005). It is this very important trait that is retained by Elaine’s cat’s eye marble, which will help her gain power over her tormentors and find an identity of her own. This piece of marble gives her the power to see what it sees when she holds it in her hand. It could therefore be considered as an inner, third eye enabling her to gain deeper insight and, at the same time, offering protection.

“I keep my cat’s eye in my pocket, where I can hold on to it. It rests in my hand, valuable like a jewel, looking out through bone and cloth with its impartial gaze. With the help of its power I retreat back into my eyes” (Atwood 1989:166).

The second symbolic burial, or rather a descent to the Underworld, comes as an important stage in Elaine’s development because her protective amulet enters her body making her assume “cat’s eye vision” (Wilson 1993: 304). Just as the core of the marble is surrounded by glass, Elaine no longer allows herself to be affected by the others’ opinion and view of her. It is the moment when her inner self begins to grow stronger, but also to lose emotions, as the cat’s eye marble enters her own body and symbolically freezes her. Trying to get the hat which Cordelia threw into the ravine, Elaine falls into the frozen water of the creek and has a vision of the Virgin Mary dressed in black, which she will later identify with the Mexican Virgin of Lost Things. Black comes to symbolize and emphasize the spiritual death of the protagonist, but at the same time rebirth and transformation (Benoist 1995:89). Culpeper (1989) argues that the Virgin stands for Elaine’s own will, and that it is this will to live—the survival instinct—which gives Elaine the necessary strength to get out of the icy water. The arrival of her own mother overlaps with the image of the Virgin in Elaine’s mind and the vision disappears so suddenly that she cannot believe it actually happened.

According to Mexican beliefs, the Virgin of Lost things can restore what has been lost, but Elaine does not seem to realize that what she has lost is really her “self”. Her soul is now frozen, as the cat’s eye entered her body just like the little piece of the magic mirror that got into Kay’s eye in Anderson’s story Snow Queen (2006), causing the blurring of his vision and the freezing of his emotions. Since Elaine denies her vision, she cannot be
reborn. She chooses to survive as a dead living creature or a zombie, as she will later depict herself in her self-portraits. Similarly to a vampire, Elaine has absorbed all the energies of her tormentors and, having now power, she grows indifferent to them. She begins to wear vampiric black and relishes in scaring Cordelia with a story of her vampiric other. In psychology, black is commonly linked to feelings of guilt and fear. That is why Elaine’s wearing black clothes may suggest her (unconscious) fear of not being accepted by others and her guilt of not doing her best to make herself accepted. Elaine has now taken the place of her tormentor and has turned into a vampire, sucking Cordelia’s vital energies and making her grow weaker and weaker. Trying to remember her past, Elaine tries to remember and find Cordelia, always referring to her as her alter-ego, her mirror image, which can make her whole again. Staels (1995:183) argues that “Elaine and Cordelia relate to each other like Siamese twins”, one self being “weak and helpless while the other self is fierce”, and further points out that Elaine’s “attempt to silence a dimension of herself, to detach herself from the memory of Cordelia, leads to her static condition of living death”.

It is this story of the twins (metaphor of the actual body and its reflection) that definitely establishes Cordelia as Elaine’s double or alter-ego, her reflection in the mirror. The protagonist describes herself and Cordelia as two halves of the same face, as “twins in old fables, each of whom has been given half a key” (Atwood 1989:434). This idea is developed by Melchior-Bonnet (2000:206) who writes that mirrors stand for the division between the body and the soul, and since Elaine considers Cordelia as her Other, we may infer that they relate like the spirit to the body, making up a whole. In Lacanian terms (Felluga 2003), the mirror image is extremely important in establishing the person’s identity (the identification of the ‘I’ and its mirror reflection); therefore, Elaine has to return Cordelia’s (her double) reflection in order to achieve re-integration. As Elaine cannot find Cordelia during her visit in Toronto, we may assume that her alter-ego has remained trapped in the mirror—which offers protection but it simultaneously is a symbolic equivalent of the labyrinth (Melchior-Bonnet 2000:331)—and, hence, lost forever. Our ‘vision’ of Elaine Risley remains therefore only partial because, although we have learnt to see through her eyes, her image is not reflected, it is not complete, and we are left with half a face only (Howells 2005:121), as she fails in finding her ‘twin’ Cordelia. Elaine thus becomes a female Narcissus who cannot get hold of the reflected image.
Atwood is very fond of the mirror symbol and she has used it before in *Lady Oracle* (1977), again with reference to the division between body and soul. Bearing in mind that the eyes are gateways to one’s soul (Nanu 2001: 94), staring in the mirror induces a hallucinatory state in which the soul seems to exit the body and get in touch with the other world. During such trances in-between dream and reality, the protagonist Joan (Atwood 1977) practices automatic writing; in other words, travelling through the mirror establishes the connection with inspiration or the creative subconscious.

I would like now to return to the eye as an organ of perception. As I have mentioned previously, its main function is to establish direct contact with the others and looking can determine power relations between humans. In *Cat’s Eye* (Atwood 1989) men seem to fragment the protagonist’s body; both her first lover and her husband want to change Elaine by turning her into a “body of desire” (Davis in Leitch 2002:41). Or, to put it in Mulvey’s (1975) terms, it is not what women are that matters, but what they inspire in men. Josef the art teacher sees women as “helpless flowers, or shapes to be arranged and contemplated” (Atwood 1989:338). His touch freezes Elaine—as if in a painting—and then erases her. “He tells me I am untouched. This is the way he wants me, he says. When he says these things he runs his hands over my skin as if he’s erasing me, rubbing me smooth” (Atwood 1989:317). He first puts her into a perfume advert and then tries to change her into a doll-like, pre-Raphaelite woman.

“Josef is rearranging me. […] Josef takes me to the Park Plaza Hotel Roof Garden, in my new purple dress. It has a tight bodice, a low neck, a full skirt; it brushes against my bare legs as I walk. My hair is loose, and damp. I think it looks like a mop. But I catch a glimpse of myself, without expecting it, in the smoked-mirror wall of the elevator as we go up, and I see for an instant what Josef sees: a slim woman with cloudy hair, pensive eyes in a thin white face. I recognize the style: late nineteenth century. Pre-Raphaelite. I should be holding a poppy” (Atwood 1989:323–324).

The hotel mirror offers Elaine an insight into men’s perception of her, but this image is not a clear one as the mirror is smoked, symbolically suggesting an image imposed on the protagonist by others. The poppy as a pre-Raphaelite symbol, would then stand for her resurrection as a new woman totally complying with the norms of patriarchy.

Even in her adult life, Elaine preserves her cannibalistic instincts—chewing her hair and tearing the skin off her feet no longer as a means of
self-punishment or self-control, but as a means of reintegrating, of ‘re-mem-
bering’ herself. In Potvin’s (2003) words, such instincts are meant to suggest
“a gradual self-integration, similar to Marian’s consumption of her
body/cake in The Edible Woman—both women literally take themselves
back”.

When she becomes an artist, the cat’s eye becomes Elaine’s signature
and represents her skill, in other words, artistic vision. It even replaces her
head in a painting, suggesting the freezing of emotions, but, at the same
time, Elaine’s attempt at asserting her identity through art.

When, after her father’s death, Elaine descends into the basement of
her parents’ house—as if into the Underworld to ask for the wisdom of the
dead—and finds her lost cat’s eye marble in an old purse, she sees “my life
entire” (Atwood 1989:398) in it. Having re-found her roots (symbolized by
the basement of the paternal house), Elaine has re-membered herself and
won back her lost self by removing the glass (i.e. the cat’s eye marble) out
of her eye. The moment hints at the opening of the third eye, or the passage
from “the blindness of consciousness to the insight of imaginative seeing”
(Howells 2005: 120). The protagonist can now look at her own paintings
from a different perspective: wiser and more objective, as she learns to for-
give.

The vision of the Virgin plays an important part in Elaine’s re-seeing the
past. Although she denied the vision of the Virgin when younger, Elaine is
frequently haunted by it and often portrays her in her paintings of which one
shows her holding a large-size ‘eye’ (i.e. the cat’s eye marble). Potvin (2003)
argues that the Virgin embodies the typical female attributes of women
under patriarchal domination and “as someone holding the cat’s eye in
Elaine’s painting, the Virgin represents not just captured womankind, but
the ways in which one can use transformations to one’s own advantage; we
can transform ourselves as well as use others’ view of us in ways that suit
us”.

Culpeper (1989) discusses Elaine’s vision of the Virgin in the ravine,
when she was only a child, as symbolic of her attempt to survive the emo-
tional terrorism of her so-called friends. Later, the vision comes to stand for
the power to create. It is art and artistic vision which help Elaine undergo a
healing process of reuniting her split identity and reasserting her ‘I’ as a
woman and artist.
“The last painting is _Unified Field Theory_. It’s a vertical oblong, larger than
the other paintings. Cutting across it little over a third up is a wooden
bridge. To either side of the bridge are the tops of trees, bare of leaves,
with a covering of snow on them, as after a heavy moist snowfall. This
snow is also on the railing and struts of the bridge.
Positioned above the top railing of the bridge, but so her feet are not quite
touching it, is a woman dressed in black, with a black hood or veil cover-
ing her hair. Here and there on the black of her dress or cloak are pinpoints
of light. The sky behind her is the sky after sunset; at the top of it is the
lower half of the moon. Her face is partly in shadow.
She is the Virgin of Lost Things. Between her hands, at the level of her
heart, she holds a glass object: an oversized cat’s eye marble, with a blue
center.
Underneath the bridge is the night sky, as seen through a telescope. Star
upon star, red, blue, yellow, and white, swirling nebulae, galaxy upon
galaxy: the universe, in its incandescence and darkness. Or so you think.
But there are also stones down there, beetles and small roots, because this
is the underside of the ground.
At the lower edge of the painting the darkness pales and merges to a
lighter tone, the clear blue of water, because the creek flows there, under-
neath the earth, underneath the bridge, down from the cemetery. The land
of the dead people”. (Atwood 1989:430)

Just as the beam of light from a lighthouse guides sailors in the night,
the light showing from the Virgin’s cloak suggests once again the inner
strength and the guiding inspiration (artistic vision), which help the protag-
onist complete her healing process. The bridge in the painting is symbolic
of two banks, two parts of a whole; in other words, Elaine’s two selves that
need to be (re)merged into one by forgiving her childhood tormentors. The
dark sky and the presence of the moon also hint at a Hecate figure, a wise
woman, who is at the same time the goddess of witchcraft—thus enabling
vision or insight. However, the painting is also an overlapping of past and
present, art and science (Elaine’s own world and her brother’s), the
humans’ world, the underworld—one of her childhood terrors, with the
creek flowing from the cemetery through the ravine and reminding of the
river Styx surrounding hell—and the universe—“galaxy upon galaxy”
(Atwood 1989:430)—all gathered in one painting representing Elaine’s
attempt at painting her “life entire” (Atwood 1989:398).

The exhibition night when Elaine reviews her paintings is equal to an
awakening or a passage from blindness to insight, as she realizes that the
‘witches’ of her childhood are mere humans and she can therefore forgive
them, regain feeling and become whole again by redefining her identity as a woman through art and its healing, therapeutic role.

Elaine’s final descent into the ravine may be paralleled to a return to the womb of the Great Goddess or Earth-Mother, which enables Elaine to be reborn, to recover emotion and thus heal her split identity. The bridge is again present, reminding of a connection between present and past, body and spirit, the relationship between shape and the shapeless, what is present and what is lacking—in other words, Elaine and Cordelia.

By using metaphors of eyes, witchcraft and zombification, Atwood has managed to demonstrate the character’s development (from being seen through the eyes of others, through having a split/double image of herself in ‘mirror’ reflections, to finally reintegrating) and her search for vision and, simultaneously, women’s internalized oppression in the patriarchal society.

References


In the realm of American literature and culture Tennessee Williams appears as the pioneer of a specific cultural discursivity on gender issues, a typology of discourse that regulates several fictive divergences from his literary work. The author's name marks the general frames of his/her texts by revealing a unique, personalized “mode of being” (Foucault in Lodge 1991: 202). “The name of the author” is one the most relevant tools for mapping specific discursive patterns in a list of various texts; it indicates the status of the writer's textual discourse within a given society and culture (ibid.). Most literary texts are endowed with a figural assignment, called author-function, which shapes our understanding of given cultural works. Contemporary theories and especially those relying on gender, postcolonialism and film (Nánay 2003: 15) are recently more than keen to look back at the figure of the one who has produced the work of literature/art. The concept of the author stands in close relation with that of the implied author, as described by Wayne C. Booth in The Rhetoric of Fiction (1983). The idea of the implied author denotes an intermediate position based on the theoretical compromise established between the figure of the author as envisaged in traditional biography criticism and the actual narrative voice of the text.

Tennessee Williams’s literary texts contain frequent and powerful signs directly or indirectly alluding to the figure of the one who authored them. These signs are labeled “shifters” (Foucault in Lodge 1991: 205). A surprising cultural phenomenon takes place when the author-function, with the help of its shifters, transgresses the boundaries of the literary discipline and appears into another art form. In the following, I will examine the process in which the ideological figure of Tennessee Williams challenges the notions of the American auteur in the films diverging from his novel The Roman Spring of Mrs. Stone (1950) and see if and how the name of the
author influences the figure of the *auteur* in two filmic adaptations with the same title as the novel, one directed by José Quintero (1961) and the other by Robert Allan Ackerman (2003).

In film theory, and especially in the American context of the Hollywood film industry, the notion of the author is correlated with that of the *auteur*. According to Susan Hayward, the *auteur*—similar to Foucault's name of the author—is an ideological figure that emerges from the construction out of his or her own film (Hayward 2003: 26). The Americanization of the *auteur* theory, following the idea of Alexandre Astruc’s *camera stylo* in 1948 and then of the *politiques des auteurs* of the 1950s French *Cahiers du Cinéma* (Hayward 2003), defined the *auteur* primarily as the film’s director, who has a discernible style, a visible personal signature prevailing over the imposed rules of Hollywood’s studio system and is capable of making a movie into an *auteur* film. This monolithic and quite romantic definition of *auteurship* was brought into the American cinematic discourse by Andrew Sarris at the beginning of the sixties, who envisaged three criteria of value through which an *auteur* could be best described: “the outer circle”, which implies the technical knowledge and the director's professional quality as a *metteur en scène*; the “middle circle,” which contains the explicit personal style and “stylistic consistency” of the film director; and last, but not least “the inner circle” (Sarris in Braudy and Cohen 1999: 516–517), of the interior meaning, which results from “the tension between a director’s personality and his material” (516).

The Americanization of *auteur* theory was later challenged by poststructuralist theories that questioned the subject(s) producing the meaning(s) of the filmic text. The director as the main source of auteurship was displaced from its quasi-totalitarian position; the concept of the *auteur* has become subject to a plurality of approaches and today presents itself as a “pattern in constant flux” (Sarris in Braudy and Cohen 1999: 517) but not in the sense Sarris thought about. The flux is not about the rise and falls of the names and directors, and is not about any canonization process among names of directors. The *auteur* theory has shifted to plural. Contemporary theories of filmic auteurship de-center the *auteur* as a single entity that produces the filmic art and posit, instead, the more practical concept of the *auteur-function*, which enables one to consider a conglomerate approach (Hayward 2003: 26–27 and Nánay 2003: 18–19). The traditional figure of the *auteur* is currently seen as one of the possible ones—among many other involved including stars, screenplay writers, musicians, etc.—in the creation
of a film. If a text has an author and an implied author, then the filmic text should also have, besides the auteur (and auteur-function), an implied auteur. The implied auteur’s function in the film is analogous to that of the implied author of a written text. She or he is a fictional construct that is positioned between the ideological figure of the traditional filmic auteur and the actual ‘voice’ of the filmic narrative and helps the identification of the persons that have auteur-function(s) in the film.


*A Streetcar Named Desire*, written by Tennessee Williams and directed by Elia Kazan (1951), is one of the most important antecedents to these Williams adaptations. This was the first film to successfully fight the strict ideological censorship of the Production Code Administration (PCA) of the McCarthy era and, as a result, presented the film world with a new genre: it became the first American adult film. This movie also signaled the beginning of the so-called commercial American art cinema due to its “startling differences from the standard Hollywood movie in the representation of
sexual themes” (Palmer in Roudané 1997: 216). Similar to the Kazan’s version of Williams’s drama, the adaptations of the *The Roman Spring of Mrs. Stone* seem to follow the general features of the American adult film, not only in their MPAA rating—they have been *Rated R* for sexuality/nudity—but also in the ideology of gender issues they convey.

*The Roman Spring of Mrs. Stone* (1950) is Tennessee Williams’s only novel; it is actually a short novel—a novella—that tells the story of a middle-aged famous actress, Karen Stone, whose wealthy producer husband dies on their way to Italy. After the death of her husband, Karen decides to live in the city of Rome, where she falls prey to her drift of unfulfilled carnal desire that will soon be embodied by a young and handsome Italian *marchetta*, her paid male companion. This novella contains the trope of the aging woman in search of love, pervasive in Williams’s dramatic oeuvre; some considerable siblings are Alexandra del Lago (Princess Kosmonopolis) in *Sweet Bird of Youth* (1961) who is in love with the young, opportunist Chance Wayne and Sissy Flora Goforth in *The Milktrain Doesn’t Stop Here Anymore* (1964)—and in its short story version of *Man Bring This Up Road* (1959)—that copes with death and with the memory of her lovers through the mediation of handsome Chris Flanders nicknamed the Angel of Death.

Williams’s novel is divided into three parts: “A Cold Sun,” “Island, Island!,” and “The Drift.” The first part introduces the reader into the flawed world of Karen Stone, where her best friend, Meg Bishop, the reporter warns the actress about the scandal and the imminent dangers of the liaisons with local “pretty young boys of the pimp or gigolo class” (Williams 1969: 19), especially that with Paolo di Leo, Karen’s favorite companion. Meg Bishop is an enigmatic character with a “rather shockingly transvestite appearance, almost as though the burly commander of a gunboat had presented himself in the disguise of a wealthy clubwoman” (Williams 1969: 14). She is an omniscient, omnipotent figure, a woman journalist, who writes columns entitled *Meg Sees.* In terms of her narrative function, she is the implied author of the novel; she is also the author’s “shifter” on the premises of her sexually subversive character as the hallmark of Williams, who frequently associated himself with the distinctively unusual female characters he was portraying.

The second part of the novel is a flashback into the Stones’ marriage, a union of two people “that was haunted by a mysterious loneliness” (Williams 1969: 70). The name of the husband in the novella is Tom, which, by the allu-
sion to the name of the author, Thomas (Tom) Lanier Williams, and to the character of the poet-narrator in Williams’s memory play *The Glass Menagerie* (1944), is another shifter of the name of the author. This part of the novella tackles Karen’s career, and focuses on her role as Rosalind in William Shakespeare’s *As You Like It* in the context of her “incident in the dressing room” (Williams 1969: 70) with a young actor who played Orlando. The brief sexual encounter has an allegorical value in the novel; the Shakespearian pastoral comedy that took place outside the American stage but on American grounds turns into an Italian urban irony in the novel; it also foretells the Roman episode of love that will be experienced by Karen and painfully end in her last amorous drift. The character of Karen Stone in the narrative appears ambiguous and complex as a result of the roles she plays on the stage and outside it. She encodes multiple facets of sexuality in the limelight, ranging from that of Rosalind, a young woman, who is also cross-dressing into Ganymede (a powerful gay icon) to that of Julia, the teenager *enamorata*.

In the last part, the book focuses on the issue of Karen’s “drift,” the principal metaphor in the protagonist’s life and a repetitive pattern in the novel. Mrs. Stone lived through her roles in “various parts” being “never ever” (Williams 1969: 20) herself; she lived as if in a drift of roles; measured the world as a stage, and came to a point when this drift had to be stopped. The place couldn’t be better: ROMA, which, in mirror reading, means AMOR, “love”. It is in Rome where Karen Stone faces the eternal spring in a May-December relationship with the mysterious young man, “the figure of the solitary watcher” who “did not appear to be drifting at all” (Williams 1969: 114) and who followed her all the time. The young actor, who played Orlando, and Paolo di Leo, the paid companion, were only *intermezzo* erotic figures that lead her to the Thanatos-like character of the mysterious street urchin, symbolizing an angel of death.

The first, 1961 film version of *The Roman Spring of Mrs. Stone* (screenplay by Gavin Lambert and additional writing by Jan Read) came out almost simultaneously with the emergence of the American auteur theory. Karen Stone is played by Vivien Leigh. The choice of this actress was no accident because Vivien Leigh, who had previously portrayed the famous Southern belle in *Gone With the Wind* (1939) and Blanche DuBois in Elia Kazan’s *A Streetcar Named Desire* “was picked to portray and aging and mentally unstable actress who forms a liaison with a handsome young gigolo” (Barton Palmer in Roudané 1997: 219). Vivien Leigh’s person was the key code that
“linked the spectator’s knowledge about the sexual transgression of film stars” (ibid.) with the illusionary world of the movie. Vivian Leigh was the transgressor that confronted the mainstream Hollywood heteronormativity with issue of visible or implied sexuality and sexual otherness. As Barton Palmer claims, Williams’s vision about the traditional male roles in American theatre and film had little to do with them being “bearers of sexual desire […] and more its object” (Barton Palmer in Roudané 1997: 220), thereby assuming a role that was “conventionally a female position” (ibid.). In the novel and in the first film adaptation, Tom Stone, the husband, is indeed a rather passive character but one not devoid of power (he is rich); Paolo (portrayed by Warren Beatty) is nothing more than a domestic companion and a sexual device for the financially powerful widow Karen Stone, who seems to be in a subordinate position while her marriage lasts, but relocates herself in a power position afterwards. Vivien Leigh’s body is not explicitly eroticized in this movie. Despite one almost anemic attempt to show her half naked body she does not appear as a sexual object. It is rather the male characters that reflect sexual appeal in this movie; they shape a “new cultural trend” (Barton Palmer in Roudané 1997: 221) due to the alternative approaches Williams’s drama (and script) opened for the representation of the male body in *A Streetcar Named Desire* with Marlon Brando as Stanley Kowalski.

Sexual transgression is already encoded in the first minutes of the film: Karen is cross-dressed as Ganymede when she first appears, then we see her as Rosalind, the monumental bride. Even the semantic implications of the title of *As You Like It*—on the contextual foreground of “The Washington Theatre”—ignite an alternative discourse on issues of sexuality and cultural norms. The beginning of the film depicts Meg Bishop as the coded shifter of Tennessee Williams. As in the text of the novel, Meg is the only figure that seems to transgress the boundaries of gender and, subsequently different ideological discourses. Besides this gendered task, she is the one who professionally performs the writing business in the world of the film. The masculine Meg kisses the ex-cross-dressed Karen, in an act of coded discourse that sets in motion the filmic shifter of the gay author. The next image, intended to erase the kiss scene and to ere-establish the mainstream codes of social behavior, is that of compulsory heterosexuality, played by the couple of friends visiting Karen in her dressing-room (Quintero 1961).

The film’s possible ending is presented in the narrated story of a murdered wealthy woman from the French Riviera told by the jealous Paolo:
A middle aged-woman was found in bed with her throat cut from ear to ear, almost decapitated. She was lying on the right side of the bed and there were stains of hair oil on the other pillow. No broken lock, no forced entrance. Obviously the murderer had been brought in by the lady and gone to bed with voluntarily! (Williams 1969: 96)

This passage is transposed almost verbatim from the original novel, which shows, among other episodes passim, that this adaptation was made primarily through what Andrew Dudley labeled as “intersecting,” where “the uniqueness of the original text is preserved to such an extent that it is intentionally left unassimilated in adaptation” (Dudley in Braudy and Cohen 1999: 454). However, the 1961 film is a faithful adaptation of the novel, only a little more above the level of the traditional cinéma du papa, which was characterized by a set of canonical works of literature script-led adapted with the most powerful fidelity and accuracy. If we take into consideration the Americanization of the auteur theory updated in the context of the post-structuralist auteurship, one can see that the auteur of this film is not Quintero, the director; he leaves many unassimilated parts of the novel in his film. Due to its fidelity of adaptation, the film lacks the signature or the pervading style of the director that is here a metteur-en-scène. The person that carries these characteristics in the 1961 adaptation of Williams’s novel turns is Vivien Leigh. She—as a Hollywood star from a previously adapted drama by the same playwright?has brought with herself the artistic signature of Williams. He posits himself in the space that articulates the ideological voice of the filmic narrative and—in the absence of a distinctive director, screenwriter, etc.—becomes the implied auteur of this film.

Robert Allan Ackerman’s adaptation of the novel (with the writing credits of Martin Sherman) opens with the image of The Broadway Theatre’s performance of Romeo and Juliet in New York. It is perhaps the more liberal ideology of the third millennium Hollywood?and also The City’s metropolitan aura?that, opposed to the central place of the Capital’s topography in the 1961 film version, does not need discursive veils to suggest alternative forms of desire and love. Interestingly, this film deals in detail with the previously neglected figure of Tom Stone, and puts a special emphasis on almost all male characters. Tom (Brian Dennehey) appears during the first minutes of the film and, by the similarity of their names here, he emerges as the shifter of Williams, the playwright. Ackerman’s version contains a cunning trick that the early version could not ‘afford’ to show,
due to the underlying ideologies of the production industry still prevailing during the production of the first adaptation. Karen Stone (modestly played by Helen Mirren) is visited, after ill-performing Juliet, by her devoted husband and producer, Tom. Meg Bishop does not appear in the opening episode; instead, Ackerman implants the character of Christopher/Chris (Roger Allam), a playwright of strikingly similar facial and bodily features with those of Tennessee Williams. This enigmatic character—who is a playwright that writes roles for Karen and is her best friend—manifests his sexual preference to young men, and talks in typical Southern drawl, curiously resembling the tone and voice of the playwright Tennessee Williams. Chris comes to congratulate Karen together with Guido, a young companion reminding of Williams’s long-term Italian companion, Frank Merlo.

Ackerman’s version transforms Williams’s novel to a greater degree than the previous version by adapting it through the most frequent mode of “borrowing” (Dudley in Braudy and Cohen 1999: 454). Here the director “employs, more or less extensively, the material, idea, or form of an earlier, generally successful text” (ibid.). However, Ackerman, like Quintero, falls under the spell of the novel and visibly ignoring the second and third criterion of value from the American definition of the auteur?metaphorically hands over the auteur function to the author of the novel in the absence of a star actor/actress, screenwriter or anyone with special personal touch from the creative team of the film-making to perform this ‘job.’ The implied auteur of this version is Chris, the filmic alter ego of Williams, who functions as a dramatic ‘author’ within the filmic text. What this version achieves is the interestingly conscious and visible acknowledgement of Tennessee Williams directly as the auteur and, indirectly, as the implied auteur of this film.

The chart below enlists the names of the auteurs and implied auteurs of the two adaptations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author/director</th>
<th>The novel</th>
<th>The 1961 Adaptation</th>
<th>The 2003 Adaptation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T. Williams</td>
<td>José Quintero</td>
<td>Robert.A. Ackerman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied author</td>
<td>Meg Bishop</td>
<td>——</td>
<td>——</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shifter</td>
<td>M. Bishop &amp; T. Stone</td>
<td>Vivien Leigh</td>
<td>Tom Stone &amp; Chris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auteur</td>
<td>——</td>
<td>Vivien Leigh</td>
<td>T. Williams</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implied auteur</td>
<td>——</td>
<td>T. Williams</td>
<td>Chris(topher)</td>
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<td>Auteur function</td>
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In the José Quintero film from 1961 the auteur is Vivien Leigh. She represents the transtextual cultural code that refers back to the figure of T. Williams. The implied auteur of this film is the American playwright, and accordingly, the auteur-function is also occupied by him. The early adaptation has opened the—mainly men inhabited—auteur’s world to the figure of a woman star and displayed the openly gay author of the adapted novel as both the implied auteur of the film and one that has the auteur-function of the movie. In Ackerman’s 2003 version the auteur is the author of *The Roman Spring of Mrs. Stone*; the implied auteur is Chris(topher). It is an interesting combination of the implied and actual autership which reflects the exclusive style of the one that authored the basic text. It seems that this version’s auteur-function goes also back to Tennessee Williams. Ackerman’s adaptation played on what Gerard Genette described as critical metatextuality between one text (here the novel) and the other (the film); it is the ironic twist of this metatextual approach that brings back the (name of the novel’s) author long after his ‘death.’

Both films rely heavily on the novel, which is the hypotext of both filmic interpretations. The name of the author pervades both filmic discourses and generates—though gender shifts and variable character correlations—an ideological continuity that materializes in the complex form of the *auteur*-function. Seymour Chatman observed that the “[C]lose study of film and novel versions of the same narrative reveals with great clarity the peculiar powers of the two media” (Chatman in Braudy and Cohen 1999: 436). To paraphrase and adapt Chatman’s words to the world of Mrs. Stone, it seems that the two film versions of Williams’s literary text could not fully do what the novel did. As a result, the name of Tennessee Williams interdisciplinary secured itself a place in the context of the American *auteur* system.

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IN SEARCH OF PARADISE LOST:
METAMORPHOSES OF HEAVEN IN CONTEMPORARY INDIAN
LITERATURE OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE

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The true paradises are paradises we have lost.
(Marcel Proust)
Who has not found the heaven below
Will fail of it above. (Emily Dickinson)

People have always looked for glimpses of a lost paradise both around and above them, within their minds and inside their soul in the attempt to partly recreate the endemic bliss, which was once bestowed upon them. Giving it physical or spiritual coordinates, abstract or concrete dimensions, people have always related to its aching loss and to the constant need to regain it thus re-establishing a lost harmony. The loss of Heaven and the nostalgia it provoked, the desire for the recreation of this particular topos, was inscribed in the eagerness with which paradise was searched for in the most unusual spaces, in places and people, memories and feelings in the clash between reality and pseudo reality.

Early colonial literature, through embellished travel accounts and presumably authentic geographic descriptions, imposed a long standing tradition of depicting far off lands as exotic, endemic territories presented in sharp contrast to the exhausted European space, only to be later on vilified and demonized for their otherness. Colonial literature seems to have laid a particular stress upon exoticism and remoteness emphasising the gap between the metropolitan and colonial worlds, finally upon the adventure and excitement implied by the attempt of civilising the wild. The colonial imagination appropriates the metaphorical movement between places, which translates a space in terms of belonging to another, and installs a special vocabulary of coding and decoding. Caren Kaplan speaks about a “culture of nostalgic melancholia” (Kaplan 1996:34), associated to the perma-
nent tension between location and dislocation; the “nostalgia” of a lost paradise is tightly related to colonial literature and the arguments brought in favour of this connection start from an etymological approach of the term deriving from the Greek *nostos*, meaning “return home” and *algos*, describing a painful condition, hence the analysis given to the modernist “imperial nostalgia”, directed toward something which has been lost.

The start of Orientalism corresponds to the beginning of biased representations and the identification operated between Easternness and Otherness, a product of an ethnic typology, later evolving towards racism. Conquering the Orient was seen as a return to the Garden of Eden, whereas the attempt to “civilise” and westernise it managed nothing else but to corrupt and ultimately spoil this space. In these colonial literary productions, Heaven seems to be placed at the intersection of text and reality, of exoticism and eccentricity, since colonial representations offered pictures of places and spaces secondary to reality. The endemic and hellish representations of the native land led to a peculiar use of power and knowledge going towards fetishising views; representation was synonymous with apprehension, definition and subordination through the stereotypical knowledge Edward Said (1978) spoke about when recording the evolution in the representation of the East.

Colonialism and its literature becomes from this perspective a “form of writing geography” (Young 1995:170), for which the desire to come back to a paradisiacal space is “a social rather than an individual product” (1995:168) originating in what Deleuze and Guattari theorise as a form of “group fantasy” (in Young 1995:167–168). This collective fantasy seems to have engendered a particular way of envisaging India as an exotic place of difference and strangeness, as a space characterised by mixtures of disparate elements and influences, of sharp contrasts and conflicting drives. Colonising India was in the first place considered to be a “conquest of knowledge” enriching the West with the profound wisdom of the ancient East. India was the best place to offer a disturbing image of strange coordinates, where Heaven and Hell seemed to overlap within an ambivalent space of spiritual, sensual, historical, mythical and political dimensions.

Oscillating between endemic representations of an exotically exquisite beauty and a nightmarish depiction of heat, dirtiness and disease, colonial texts provided India with an ambiguous reputation of epitomising Otherness. This perspective suited in a strange manner the Indian mistrust
for clear-cut dichotomies and embrace of conjoint opposites; reluctant to perceive anything from a unique perspective, the Indian culture asserts its preference for inclusiveness, eclecticism and pluralism. Ambiguous representations of both Heaven and Hell, though acquiring different meanings and dimensions as compared to their counterparts in Christian tradition, seem not to perceive one without the other in a perpetual intermingling of contraries that appears to define Indian tradition.

The huge difference in envisaging Heaven in Eastern and Western cultures mainly lies in the spiritual coordinates attached to its attainment and representation. Christians imagine it as the final space a virtuous person hopes to reach after death, the place where all good deeds and virtues during life are rewarded with eternal bliss. With all the stress placed upon sin and means of defeating evil, Heaven plays a much more important part in Western religion than in Eastern tradition. Easternness in its various religious systems and traditions represents heaven as a transitory place, an intermediary stage between earthly life and the Absolute.

Heaven in Hinduism is a temporary place where one can enjoy the results of one’s virtuous deeds on earth; the Hindu heaven, called Swanga, can be attained through constant renunciation and detachment from all possible earthly attachments triggered by desire. The Christian heaven is a place of retribution only attained through good deeds, self-annihilation and prayer. Swanga is supposed to be ruled by Indra, the God of thunder and light, and to be inhabited by a plethora of deities, including devas, Varuna (the god of the oceans), Agni (the god of fire), Sunya (the Sun), Ganga (the deity of the Ganges), Kamadeva (the god of love). Since it is only an intermediate place, Swanga is sometimes described as having real coordinates, presumably on Mount Meru, but it is mainly defined as a spiritual place situated beyond sin and good deeds, a temporary stop before the next incarnation (Zimmer 1997: 372–385). Unlike the Christian tradition that largely stresses the frightening way of castigating sins, Hinduism does not make Hell (Narake) the antithesis of Heaven. Narake is just a space where the Chitragupta, the karmic law, operates recording human actions according to which souls suffer punishments or are rewarded for their virtues. The consequence of ignorance and the extreme embrace of the illusory material world activate samsara or the cycle of reincarnations. (Smart 1969:60—86; Snelling 1997:23—35)
Islam describes heaven as *Fanaa*, a place of extinction of the self, in the sense of a total annihilation of everything deemed not divine, through meditation and contemplation, taking the believer along the triple path of ignorance, devotion and wisdom. The orthodox part of Islam represents Heaven as a state of being for, with and in God, attainable in three stages that follow the *Baqaa* of good deeds, that of human virtues and finally that of reaching the essence. The Buddhist *Nirvana* bears much resemblance to the Hindu *Moksha*, the final point in the heavenly ascent and the end of the cycle of incarnations; both are treated not as actual places but rather as states of mind requiring a total severance from desires, sufferings and bliss. Religious writings are reluctant to describe it as any type of description would imply material existence and they sometimes attempt a negative description. The Udana records Buddha's description: “*Where there is Nothing; where naught is grasped; there is the isle of No-Beyond. Nirvana do I call it—the utter extinction of aging and dying.*” (Gautama, *Udana* VIII, 3 in Smart 1969:81)

The Hindu *Moksha* situated beyond death and reincarnation, represents the transcendence of anything pertaining to causal, temporal and spatial dimensions. It does not try to fulfill a soteriological goal as Christianity does since salvation is achieved here through different means and the final result is quite opposite in essence; it does not imply liberation from suffering, as in the case of Christians, but total detachment from it and it cannot be equated to the Christian paradise as this is rather an attempt of transcending any idea of heaven, punishment or retribution. (Achimescu 2001:111) Hindu salvation is beyond sin and virtue, happiness, or suffering, existence and non-existence, it hints at a reality transcending history, a metaphysical reality defying Christian historic temporality. Whereas the Christian believer is striving to redeem his self and take eternal delight in God’s heaven, the Hindu believer struggles to achieve release from the self through the identification of the individual self—*atman*—with the universal spirit—the *Brahman*. The usual paths followed by the believer, aside tantric and yogic practices, comprise intense meditation, moral observance, self-dissolution in love, and, not less important, the unraveling of the *maya*. Reaching *moksha* finally means annihilating the karmic effects, revealing the true reality from under the veil of illusion and pushing the spirit into acquiring a superior form of awareness of its own consciousness.
More interested maybe in “conjoint opposites” and means of breaking free from earthly attachments, the Eastern systems of belief are translated in Indian literature by the illustrations given to the concept of Heaven, seen both as an ideal space permanently searched for and as a state of mind that would recreate a primordial state of harmony and interior coherence. The Indian Moksha—translated into Sanskrit as liberation—finds its correspondence in the continuous attempt to escape, sometimes by going into exile or migrating, some other times by giving free vent to imagination and reconstructing an ideal past that seems to be entirely engulfed by “the polluted waters of the real” (Rushdie 2000:309). Oscillating between the temptation to equate Heaven to spaces and territories, and the impulse to treat it as a space of the mind, Indian literature indulges in recreating metaphorical paradises by means of the symbolic images of home, native land and human mind and soul.

Heaven/Hell of Intimacy

“Hell is other people”, Sartre once claimed (1976:45), imagining hell as a place of no privacy and intimacy, as a space of perpetual exposure and absolute disclosure; but since one’s Hell can be another’s Heaven, Indians, yet blighted by the lack of space and over crowdedness, do not turn these drawbacks into hellish features, on the contrary making heaven a place of domestic cosiness and familiar intimacy. “Private and public, past and present, the psyche and the social, develop an interstitial intimacy. It is an intimacy that questions binary divisions through which such spheres of social experience are often spatially opposed. These spheres of life are linked through an ‘inbetween’ temporality that takes the measure of dwelling at home, while producing an image of the world of history.” (Bhabha 1994:13) The others will never be taken to represent hell in Indian culture; they will form what, in many Indian novels written in English, could be seen as the paradise of family ties and the feeling of belonging to a community. Hell erupts in the Garden of endemic love and affection only when family connections are broken, when parentages are confused and unreliable, when rebinding with tradition is impossible, equated on a larger scale by greater historic disruptions in communal feelings.

Heaven is recreated through the feeling of belonging to a space of natural beauty, which excludes dissensions and conflicts, to a familiar space of
comfort and protection and to a community reinforcing the awareness of being part of a tradition. The heaven of natural beauty is discussed by Bhabha in *Nation and Narration* where it becomes a symbol of national identity: “The recurrent metaphor of landscape as the inscape of national identity emphasizes the quality of light, the question of social visibility, the power of the eye to naturalize the rhetoric of national affiliation and its forms of collective expression.” (Bhabha 1990:295) Exquisite beauty unspoilt by the benefices of the civilizing West are brought forth by Rushdie’s last novel *Shalimar the Clown*, a story of love and revenge, a chronicle of a foretold crime. This novel revolves around “worlds in collision”, “two alternative realities competing for the same time and space” (Rushdi 2005:1–4) the corruption and final annihilation of traditional values and, with them, of an entire familiar universe, around the same old dichotomy Easternness/Westernness in whose mechanisms personal and collective histories, lives and identities get caught.

The novel focuses upon the history of Kashmir, presented here as an endemic garden sheltering local festivals and impressive wazas, picturesque characters, and dramatic destinies intertwined, as in many of Rushdie’s previous works, with the history of their community. The beauty of the place richly evoked by means of exquisite settings, marvellous revivals of everything Kashmir once meant for India, and colourful gatherings of its inhabitants, is suddenly spoilt and forever lost, plunging into a nightmarish limbo where anger, extremism and terrorism succeed in transforming this paradisiacal land into a hellish territory governed by violence and fear.

If thoughts of paradise do occur to us, we think of Adam’s fall, of the exclusion from Eden of the parents of humanity. However I have not come to speak of the fall of man, but the collapse of paradise itself. In Kashmir it is paradise itself that is falling; heaven on earth is being transformed into a living hell. (Rushdie 2005: 28)

The Indian paradise of conciliation and tolerance where all stories, both Hindu and Muslim, “sit happily side by side on the same double bill” (Rushdie 2005:71), where the hatchet of grudges and disputes have long been buried and forgotten so that “the frontiers between the words, their hard edges, had grown smudged and blurred” (75) is constantly threatened by the hell of political operations. The Partition is viewed in many Indian literary productions as another fall from grace, triggering a multiple loss on
the level of familial, communal and national identity. With Rushdie, this becomes an irreparable blow in the heart of a nation in *Midnight’s Children*, an occasion to contrast the paradise of the Kashmiri Mughal Garden in *Shalimar the Clown*, breaks between families and communities, provoking suffering and pain with Desai and Kunzru, and unleashing the demons of anger and intolerance in Roy, Shamsie, and many others.

With Desai as with most Indian writers for whom history is intricately linked to personal lives and at the same time reflected in them, the Partition is envisaged as the demon lying at the core of a blissful paradisiacal land operating a dreadful split not only inside the Indian nation dividing it between rival religious and political parties but also inside communities and families condemned to bear for successive generations the burden of dark secrets, hidden wounds and tragic losses.

Isn’t it strange how life won’t flow, like a river, but moves in jumps, as if were held back by locks that are opened now and then to let it jump forwards in a kind of flood? There are these long stretches—nothing happens—each day is exactly like the other—plodding, uneventful—and then suddenly there is a crash—mighty deeds take place—momentous events—even if one doesn’t know it at the time—and then life subsides again into the backwaters till the next push, the next flood? That summer was certainly one of them—the summer of ’47. (Desai 2001: 42—43)

The political hell disrupting a certain traditional order of things and disturbing the cozy, domestic paradise of small things and trivial gestures and turning familial bliss into “a great cemetery, every house a tomb” and every city into “nothing but sleeping graves” (Desai 2001:5) can be restored to its formal imperfect yet satisfactory endemic dimensions through a healing coming to terms with the past, traditions and ancestral roots and sometimes, by counterbalancing exterior hell with a paradise created within one’s mind.

**Heaven as a State of Mind**

One of the most frequent images of heaven is the one recreated in the mind by memories and evocations sending back to childhood; evoking childhood gives writers the opportunity to come back to images of a distant past of a rising nation contrasted to an un-heroic present of a decadent society. The childhood of a nation corresponds most of the time with the
description of happy times full of hopes and expectations, of serene dreams and idyllic scenes. That is how Narayan presents his world of knowledge and learning, creating a world where myths of the past and events of the present blend in a coherent version of a secular India. That is also how Desai imagines the world of childhood in *Clear Light of Day*, where the innocent world of childhood, corresponding to a young Indian nation, is shattered at the moment of Partition.

The metaphorical treatment of events is a recurrent element in Indian literature, sending back perhaps to a particular way of envisaging history and relating it to individual lives. The Hindu idea of a cyclic temporal dimension envisages history as playing only a marginal part due to the insignificant lapses of time it covers when projected against the universal time of mythological coordinates. Relativising time and history is not only a postmodern element but also a means of introducing philosophical and religious dimensions in assessing historical events and their impact upon humanity. Historical events find their equivalent in personal stories of everyday life, metaphors find their realization in real world and on the whole, nothing seems to be as it appears to be. Confusing historical events, giving more credit to gossip and stories than to record and files, sending lives and memories to the foreground and pushing history to the background often becomes a means of securing the paradise of the community against the turmoil of the outer world.

With Arundhati Roy, understanding history means entering the House of History and listening to what the ancestors have to say. History is imagined as an ancient house at night time, with all the lights turned off and ancestors whispering in the dark. People are unable to understand its meaning since they appear to be caught in an absurd war both won and lost, the worst kind of war, the one that “catches dreams and dreams them again” (Roy 2001:58). Understanding history means learning its smell and discovering it in all insignificant things around which the paradise of familiar dreams and memories can ultimately be reconstructed.

Most of the time, Heaven in the mind is created out of sweet memories and reminiscences of an undisturbed past, out of a sense of security and protection provided by family and kin, not rarely by imagination, music and art.
— I agree with you, the sources of pleasure are many. Our minds contain worlds enough to amuse us for an eternity. Plus you have your books and record player and radio. Why leave the flat at all? It’s like heaven in here. This building isn’t called Chateau Felicity for nothing. I will lock out hell of the outside world and spend all my days indoors.
— You couldn’t. Hell has ways of permeating heaven’s membrane. (Mistry 2003: 4)

These were the arguments brought in Mistry’s *Family Matters* by a “loving” family to a 79 year-old former University Professor afflicted by the Parkinson disease to convince him that heaven can be willfully constructed by surrounding oneself with delightful objects and familiar items, which might convey the same feelings of comfort and protection offered by a supporting family. Instead, the old man is taught a tough lesson of how a broken ankle might be the devil’s tool in insinuating hell at the core of an apparently happy family. The heaven the whole family is trying to restore is made up of dreams and memories, books and music, humour and irony, and, ultimately, love and consideration for the others. Memories can play their part in reconstructing the paradise of the past, but they can also reveal their ambiguous nature, as almost anything else in Indian culture that excludes monologism and exclusivist binaries, by creating a hell through their merciless accumulation of excessive remembering.

**Heaven of Home/Away**

One of the most frequently encountered images of paradise in Indian literature is that originating in the desire to escape towards a promised land that keeps luring people away of the home they grew accustomed with into the paradise of an ideal “away”. In *Racism, the City and the State*, Cross and Keith (1993:124) speak about the creation of a *meta-utopian space*, an environment where different utopian visions intersect and different representations overlap, creating what the migrant literature imagines as the endemic space of exile. Ranging from political exile, with acid notes of critical observation, to spatial exile—reinforcing exotic places meant to enlarge the gap between the too familiar by now, native land and an ideally depicted and imagined distant space—and finally to spiritual exile, postcolonial Indian literature is particularly found of the topic of exile, of its reformulations of space and retranslations of identity.
When speaking about migration, it is usually referred to in terms of metamorphosis intimately linked to translation. In Ania Loomba’s interpretation, “to translate” is etymologically related to “to conquer” both suggesting a re-mapping of the text/world (Loomba 1998:101)—in terms of space and roots, of language and of the social and political implications it entails. Elleke Boehmer dealing with migrant metaphors in colonial and postcolonial literature enumerates some of the most important tropes of the colonial discourse and acknowledges metaphor as “the carrier of dominant conceptual characteristics” (Boehmer 1995:54). Its features related to transferability, translation and metamorphoses make it best suited for a discourse based upon transactions between cultures and identities and placed in a space where miscegenation and hybridity are signs of an active syncretism.

Viewed from this perspective paradise acquires once again ambiguous dimensions as it seems to oscillate between the nostalgic remembrance of the heavenly place called home once it is lost and the paradise of metropolitan spaces where every dream seems possible. The conflicting feelings defining home and away are translated through the permanent commuting between the bliss of getting away from the familiar and embracing novelty with its trail of wild dreams and expectations and the hell of what Bhabha (1994:18) called unhomeliness, of what was treated as the migrant’s triple loss with Rushdie—the loss of place, language and identity or the “unhealable rift between a human being and a native place, between the self and its true home”, “terminal loss” and the “sorrow of estrangement” Said (2000:173) was speaking about when discussing the experience of exile. Prafulla Mohanti, Rozina Visram, Salman Rushdie, Hanif Kureishi, Hari Kunzru to name only a few, envisage the attraction operated by the “foreign” paradise of the enticing metropolis upon the native. Metropolis and colonial polis might interchange their features so that, most of the time, what was mistakenly perceived as an alluring heavenly place could turn into a hellish space of uprooted, self-erasing identities. Paradise and Hell can easily interchange their coordinates and metamorphose one into the other. Belonging or not to a minority, feeling the stigmata of isolation, alienation and frustration can effortlessly be turned either into a hellish space of conflicting emotions and suppressed anger or into the blissful coming to terms with one’s roots, past and identity.

To be born into a minority is a blessing and a curse. [...] When you are born into a minority that is a minority within a minority, you learn to belong
in different ways. The blessing is that one belongs in different ways, one learns to see different perspectives, one speaks many languages, one is aware of many histories, one is both this and that. If you only stop to listen, you are blessed with so many stories. If you only shut out the screaming of those who will not listen, you recognise the blessing of a coherent identity: for the identity of a person from a minority does not depend on a piece of cloth or a ritual; it is part of his own lived being. It is not external; it is internal. And with it comes the blessing of having cause to write. (Excerpt from a talk given in 2005 at the Florence Poetry Festival by Tabish Khair, later also published in The Hindu, Chennai, on 1st January 2006.)

The conclusion of most Indian texts is the same: paradise is everywhere around us and inside us as long as we take the time to discover it wherever it might be—in the space we inhabit, in the one we wish we inhabited, in the mind or in the others. Hell would be as easy to locate and to replace it. Ambiguous treatments of heaven and hell range in Indian literature from the heavenly bliss of familial love with Anita Desai (Clear Light of Day), Raj Karnal Jha (The Blue Bedspread) or Rohinton Mistry (Family Matters) to the hell of failure in familial relationships with Arundhati Roy (The God of Small Things), from the duplicitous imagined paradises of home and exile with Rushdie (The Satanic Verses) and Mukherjee (Wife), to the intriguing intricacies of Western/Eastern dichotomies with Hari Kunzru (The Real or just another trick of the deceiving maya, paradise as well as space or time becomes another relativised concept susceptible of participating in our search for identities, for homes, for happiness and if it is true that heaven can sometimes lay at our feet it is equally true that some other times we can relinquish it into the realm of the myth, of the past or worst than everything, into the realm of… “it never happened”.

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THE ROLE OF MASCULINE URBAN LANDSCAPE IN DON DELILLO’S NOVEL COSMOPOLIS

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Introduction

Don DeLillo (b.1936), a contemporary American writer, presents different perspectives on American culture and urban environment. Often the writer focuses on the “paradoxes and contradictions of postmodern culture” (Schlager and Lauer 2001: 247). His main characters, according to Duncan Cambell, represent “a victim of circumstances” who is always “an isolated loner disgusted and alienated by his own culture” (Cambell 2005: 2). As Brockes states, Don DeLillo “writes about men for men” who are not able to function within the society (Brockes 2005: 2). From this masculine perspective the author portrays the contemporary landscape, which, in most cases, is an urban one.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the role of the masculine urban landscape, New York, in Don DeLillo’s novel Cosmopolis (2003), focusing on the role of the setting in the narrative, and to consider types and functions of the setting alongside with the main principles of reading a postmodern urban novel. The understanding of the role and functions of the setting may open diverse interpretations of a literary text and demonstrate close relationship between the main character and the environment.

The Role and Functions of the Setting in the Narrative

The well-developed setting often expands the narrative in many different aspects: it helps the readers to better understand the places and events within the narrative and often expands their knowledge of different types of the setting. According to Cassil, “nothing is more fundamental to creating a story than establishing a spatial, temporal environment” (Cassil 1990: 19). Michael J. Toolan observes that “the establishment of an identifiable setting is a strong psychological preference in most readers” (Toolan 1988: 103).
Toolan explains this attitude by stating that the readers are fond of being aware where they are and “look for clear spatiotemporal indications of where and when a thing happened” (Toolan 1988: 103). In this aspect, the setting concerns the details of the narrative that are related to time and place.

Thus, two major types of the setting in the narrative can be observed—spatial and temporal (Ricoeur 2004: 328). Different definitions of the setting in the narrative emphasize its role in a piece of fiction. For example, Gerald Prince defines the setting as “the spatiotemporal circumstances in which the events of the narrative occur” (Prince 1989: 86). Walter Nash analyses the setting from a different perspective. The critic observes that most settings include the descriptions of houses with elaborate portrayal of “rooms, furnishings, stairways, terraces, gardens” (Nash 1990: 35). Thus, the place can be described considering different things and including a multitude of useful details. Gerald Prince rightly observes that the time and place of the narrative may also be “symbolic of a conflict to come or of a character’s feelings” (Prince 1989: 87).

Moreover, as Rimmon-Kenan states, there are two types of environment in the narrative—the “physical” and the “social” (Rimmon-Kenan 1996: 69) and relates them with the traits of the character that they can represent. Similarly, Mieke Bal defines the function of the setting in the narrative explaining that a well-chosen setting can describe “a character, which is situated in a space, observes it, and reacts to it” (Bal 1985: 93). Toolan observes that in many modern novels a setting may be “instrumental—like another character—in leading a character to act in a certain way” (Toolan 1988: 104). Toolan focuses on the relations between the setting and the character, stating that these relations can be of “causal” or “analogical” nature: “features of the setting may be either cause or effect of how characters are and behave” or “a setting may be like a character or characters in some respects” (Toolan 1988: 104; italic in original). Such a prominence given to the setting proves its significance to the story and invites the reader to pay more attention to its presence in the narrative.

Emphasizing the role of the setting, Rimmon-Kenan states that often the setting highlights some particular features of the character in the narrative. The critic observes that “the physical and social environment of a character does not only present a trait or traits indirectly but, being man-made, may also cause it or be caused by it” (Rimmon-Kenan 1996: 69). Rimmon-
Kenan explains that “the analogy established by the text between a certain landscape and a character-trait may be either ‘straight’ (based on similarity) or ‘inverse’ (emphasizing contrast)” (Rimmon-Kenan 1996: 69). Thus, the setting may provide some additional information about the situation and may serve as an indirect or direct characterization in the narrative.

Walter Nash explains the role of a particular geographical place described in the narrative, stating that “when a particular location is central to a narrative”, “authors will sometimes provide a factual orientation, with dimensions, compass bearings, relative positions, details of fabric and structure, and general notes, in guidebook fashion, on the history, provenance, and architectural peculiarities of buildings” (Nash 1990: 126). In this aspect, the setting that has a reference in the real world allows the reader to visualize the particular place and to draw parallels between the fictional place and the real one.

Defining the Masculine Urban Space

The urban novel emphasizes the place making the setting as an important element of the narrative. The word “urban” refers to a specific setting, normally, a city (The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, 1971: U-453), which in turn creates a special relationship with people dwelling in it. While the term “masculine” includes the representation of this urban space both from the virile point of view and describing the “virile values” and reasoning (Irigaray 1993: 224).

Murray Baumgarten observes that often “the city is a metaphor, metonymy, and symbol, a literary trope, as well as physical entity (Baumgarten 2005: 2). Thus, following Baumgarten, urban novels become “encoded landscapes of self and place” (Baumgarten, 2005: 2). Baumgarten enumerates “four aspects of the cityscape in the representation of the city in the narrative: the natural, the built, the human, and the verbal” (Baumgarten 2005: 3). The critic states that “in each case a different aspect of city discourse may be highlighted” (Baumgarten 2005:3). Baumgarten observes that in the modern urban novel the concept of “home” becomes different from the one in the traditional English novel because it becomes a place infiltrated by the outside and becomes inseparable from the character dwelling in it (Baumgarten 4). Thus, the influence of the outside urban
The reader of the urban novel expects to find names of streets, buildings and public spaces that are often included in the description of the city. Discussing the aspects of contemporary architecture, Simon Parker observes that nowadays traditional urban spaces are often used in a “non-programmed way” (Parker 2004: 153). Parker explains this by a postmodern method of “topological displacement” (ibid.) which has become the feature of the urban landscape and a distinctive feature of postmodern culture.

Considering the above, it is possible to state that masculine urban space contains the representation of the masculine/virile values and actions within a specific urban environment, which often includes the description of a big city. The concept of “home” includes both the details from the inside and the outside, the main emphasis being put on the influence of the outside world. The issue of topological displacement that includes the use of different locations and spaces in a non-programmed way becomes a characteristic feature of postmodern urban culture.

**New York as the Masculine Urban Landscape in Don DeLillo’s Novel *Cosmopolis* (2003)**

The description of the setting in Don DeLillo’s novel *Cosmopolis* is presented on two levels: from a small space (“home”—the apartment of the main character) the action moves to a wider space (streets and certain parts of the city). Most places mentioned in the novel are not fictional and the central setting is Manhattan, New York. However, as a postmodern novel, *Cosmopolis*, contains a setting that does not serve just as a background for the story, but it also functions as guidelines of the map of New York City and as a personified character that affects the reasoning and actions of the main character, Eric Packer. Finally, the setting becomes a device helping to reveal the protagonist, demonstrating a particular relationship between the latter and the concrete urban landscape.

The time in the novel—“in the year 2000, a day in April”—is not indicated directly and the reader is only informed that the action begins in the morning and ends in the evening of that day (Varsava 2005: 83). The action starts in the main character’s apartment of “forty-eight rooms” (DeLillo 2003: 7). The inside location is contrasted to the outside, so that the city out-
side is depicted as much louder than the inside of the apartment: “the atrium had the tension and suspense of a towering space that requires pious silence” (DeLillo 2003: 8). Moreover, the apartment is a static space, while the city is a dynamic space, inviting the protagonist for actions.

Alongside to the above-mentioned spaces (the inside one, the apartment, and the outside world, the streets), there is another type of space included in the novel—the limousine that takes the main character around the city—turning the character into an observer of the events happening outside. The inside events are often compared and contrasted to the ones happening outside.

All the outside places mentioned in the novel include specified spatial indications and details, which, interestingly, becomes a rule through the novel. On the one hand, it appears that sometimes the detailed description of the place has the function of a guidebook; on the other hand, it is a way to reveal its qualities and contrast it to other spaces (for example, the apartment or the limousine), thus indicating the change of the events. Often, these descriptions include “typologically displaced” locations that, according to the aspects of postmodern architecture, have become the usual ones within the urban landscape (Parker 2004: 153). For example, Eric Packer and his companions moved “down the street between the rows of garbage cans set out for collection and past the gaunt hotel and the synagogue for actors” (DeLillo 2003: 130). Here, the fact that a synagogue is turned into a theatre is referred to.

As it has been already mentioned, the setting of *Cosmopolis* is located in the frames of the real place. The journey that Eric Packer takes on that particular day in April begins in the East Side of New York and ends in the West Side. During that day he crosses ten avenues, although traveling along one street. Generally, this fictional journey across New York gives the reader clues to the real places, so that the whole text can serve as the guidelines or a map for doing a sightseeing tour of the city. There are thirty-two places in the novel that refer to the places in Manhattan. For example, the first reference to a real place is “First Avenue” (DeLillo 2003: 9), later Eric Packer’s limousine turns “into stalled traffic before it reached Second Avenue” (DeLillo 2003: 13). In addition to avenue and street names, there are other references to really existing objects: the car was stuck in the traffic “halfway between the avenues, where Kinski had boarded, emerging from the Church of Saint Mary the Virgin” (DeLillo 2003: 78). According to John
Updike, going in his limousine, the main character begins “the crosstown epic” (Updike 2005: 1). As Updike claims, *Cosmopolis* “meets Manhattan geography under sci-fi moonlight” (Updike 2005: 2). Thus it is possible to confirm the statement that urban landscapes often contain detailed information presented in the fashion of a guidebook.

When the limousine takes Eric Packer to Eighth Avenue, which marks the end of the East Side, the setting serves as the borderline between the East Side and the West Side: “Eighth Avenue, out of the theater district, out of the row of supper clubs and lounges […] into the local, the mixed, the mostly unnoticed blocks of dry cleaner and schoolyard […] and old brick buildings” (DeLillo 2003: 129). The description of the place becomes a reminder of what is left behind and turns into an introduction to a new place and new experiences. Moreover, the sense of violence and premonition of a disaster or death becomes the leading motive during that trip across New York City. All references are not just mere spatial landmarks, but they also play the role of the character’s manifestation and represent different features of the city.

The urban landscape in *Cosmopolis* also serves the function of a personified character. The sense that there are two major characters in the novel (Eric Packer and New York) is present throughout the novel. Thus, Eric Packer is in the function of the protagonist, while New York becomes the antagonist, destroying Eric Packer at the end of the novel. It seems that both characters are engaged in some kind of communication, being either contrasted or compared to each other.

The city that has characteristics of technological advance corresponds to Eric Packer’s preference for technological progress. His huge apartment and limousine are packed with various modern appliances that seem to respond not only to his needs but also to his feelings. Eric Packer finds “beauty and precision […] and hidden rhythms” in technology (DeLillo 2003: 76). He enjoys watching different technological devices in the same way people enjoy watching beautiful things of art. Eric Packer prefers shrewdness, toughness and precision both in technology, in people and in his urban environment.

During his journey across New York, Eric Packer meets many different people and witnesses many events. However, it seems that it is not separate situations and people that he encounters, but the city as a whole. For example, when Eric makes an eye contact with the man on the street, he feels
that “a quarter second of a shared glance was violation of agreements that made the city operational” (DeLillo 2003: 66). The city has its own rules that have to be obeyed. The way people behave with one another within the limits of the city forms a part of these rules. So Eric’s meeting with a stranger in the city becomes the encounter with the city and its rules.

Moreover, whenever Eric Packer describes what he sees around him, he refers to the city as if it was a human being. It seems that Eric thinks of the city as of a man that has his occupation, as well as his past and future. Finally, it is the city that destroys Eric Packer and, thus, becomes the winner.

The urban landscape in the novel fulfills another function: it mirrors the main character’s emotions and actions, and the environment emphasizes distinct features of the character. For instance, the description of the protagonist’s home reveals much information about Eric Packer: the place where he lives has “the lap pool, the card parlor, the gymnasium, […] the shark tank and screening room” (DeLillo 2003: 7). His limousine with “a microwave and a heart monitor”, a video and “the surveillance camera” (DeLillo 2003: 13; 15) suggests his wealth and position in the society and demonstrates his dependence on the environment.

Although the setting of Cosmopolis contains several sub-settings that represent different spaces, they have one thing in common—all of them are masculine spaces, traditionally used by men. Notwithstanding the fact that the action of the novel begins in the domestic sphere (the apartment), the whole novel develops outside the space called “home”. Moreover, the domestic space represented in the novel is exclusively masculine. Traveling in his spacious limousine, Eric Packer experiences different encounters with strangers, finds and explores unknown and dangerous spaces. The limousine with various technological devices and the office inside embody a definite masculine space, representing the ego of the main character.

Different functions of the urban landscape in Cosmopolis may suggest a variety of interpretations. The setting can be used as the background for the narration, as a means of describing a character and as a character itself. Thus, the urban landscape in the novel contains many different features that emphasize the importance of the setting in a narrative.
Conclusions

Don DeLillo’s novel *Cosmopolis* has a multifunctional setting. First of all, it functions as a representative of time and place in the novel, which is the most frequent role of the setting in the narrative. It naturally provides the reader with the information on the location and time. However, the urban landscape in *Cosmopolis* also functions as guidelines of the map and as a personified character. This particular setting becomes the essential factor in the narrative.

Moreover, the reader witnesses the developing relationship between the main character and the setting. In this aspect, the setting serves as a device that highlights the main character’s features and emotions. The reaction of the main character towards the environment serves as an additional means of characterization.

In Don DeLillo’s *Cosmopolis*, the setting (New York) becomes central to the narrative, taking up the role of the antagonist, destroying the main character and remaining the winner at the end of the novel. Thus, the city is portrayed as an organism, having much in common but, at the same time, being very different from a human being. The city, as the antagonist, becomes a representative of the masculine urban space.

References


PARALLEL WORLDS IN *THE GROUND BENEATH HER FEET*

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In his exploration of the East and the West, the fusion and collision of these two worlds, so different, and yet, in some aspects, so similar, in his preoccupation with home, roots, rootlessness and one’s sense of belonging, his study of national, family, personal, parallel and imaginary histories, his search for political, geographical, national, or personal identity, through migration, metamorphosis and rebirth, in his commentary on the increasingly protean and chaotic modern world and his depiction of the many aspects and forms of love, Salman Rushdie makes fantasy go beyond what realism can express. In his view, although it may seem paradoxical, employing fantasy is the only way to represent the hectic reality of the modern world of speed, fragmentation and loss of orientation (Childs 2005).

His novels tell stories set in a hybrid world where the real and the imaginary, the natural and the supernatural, the traditional and the contemporary are combined to create a rich and exotic magic reality reminiscent of Borges and García Márquez, but one with a different historical and cultural background. His is a reality where on the streets of London ghosts of dead women fly on magic rugs chasing men transformed into angels, where sights of great beauty can literally make you blind, where immortals travel through parallel dimensions and telepathy is the least unusual phenomenon. In a plethora of such magic occurrences in an otherwise regular everyday reality of his novels, parallel worlds and dimensions are found more than once.

Creating parallel worlds, other worlds, secondary worlds, alternate realities and dimensions, or whatever else we call them, is only natural and often expected in fantasy. In science fiction and fairy tales it is sometimes even obligatory (Hume, 1984). Talking about parallel realities in contemporary India, England and America, however, might be slightly unusual. Generally speaking, this fantastic element can be used for various purposes, sometimes as a means of escaping the consensus reality or of trying to
envisage a world different from the one we know out of pure curiosity. Sometimes these worlds are used merely as a trick or for fun, at other times the purpose is more serious and the parallel world serves as a reflection of and a comment on our reality. Presenting the world from a different perspective, creating other dimensions of reality or even other realities, the author might be trying to reveal something about our own. Whatever the purpose, one way or another, parallel worlds inevitably remind us of the world we live in, as they are based on its elements. (Jackson 1981:65) In the case of *The Ground Beneath Her Feet* they are practically the same. By presenting the reader with these worlds, Rushdie talks about the relationship between fiction and reality, the nature of both, and, most of all, the shaky ground beneath our feet.

*The Ground Beneath Her Feet* has often been described as a rock’n’roll novel, dealing with the lives of two world-famous musicians and a photographer during the second half of the twentieth century. Following them from Bombay to London and then New York, Rushdie unfolds their family histories, shares with the reader their public and private lives, gives us an insight into their ambitions and pursuits, their sense of belonging and their love. The story is, at the same time, a remake of the myth of Orpheus and Eurydice, with celebrities featuring as modern-day deities, and a brief history of pop and rock’n’roll, with music as the central and binding motif. It is also a story of a love triangle with earthly and divine love standing side by side. Most importantly, however, it is a story of migration and change, of the modern world, its fragmentation, instability and disorientation. Finding pure realism inadequate for an authentic representation of these qualities, Rushdie introduces three parallel worlds, the fictional world of the book, the real world outside the book, that is, our own reality, and the visionary dream world of Ormus Kama, one of the three main protagonists.

The fictional world of the book is, naturally, the first one the reader encounters. It is the one in which Vina Apsara and Ormus Kama, icons of the world of music, comparable to and each one a combination of many real celebrities, take the world by storm and become not only symbols of song but also of love. Rai, a photographer, their lifelong friend and Vina’s lover, a mortal among gods, is the one who tells the story of their Holy Trinity, music, love and life-death, determined to spare nothing in order to set himself free. They all move through a series of extreme successes and failures, moments of great happiness and fulfilment and terrible tragedies of
the kind typically found in myths, in a world of fictional history parallel to the one we know. In this version of history, events are modified, famous people change and exchange places, professions and names and, generally, most facts are distorted. JFK is not killed in Dallas, The Watergate Affair is only a novel with Nixon merely one of its characters, the British fight the war in Vietnam and the history of music is turned upside down, with Madonna as a music critic, Vox Pop a famous band and Jesse Garron Parker “stealing” famous songs from the mind of an Indian teenager Ormus. Playing with facts and creating imaginary histories based on the real one is typical of Rushdie. Some critics regard it as pointless and immature play. Even though it definitely is, to a certain extent, playful fun and the author seems to be enjoying it a lot, there is a much more serious side to it. History is what we witness every day, what we learn about from books and the media, but we live in a world of facts distorted through the prism of man’s subjectivity, changed by time and memory and manipulated by the State and the media. So, how do we know fact from fiction? Is not that what Rushdie points to? By changing significant historical facts and personages perhaps he is also trying to emphasize the random nature of life. If JFK is not assassinated in Dallas, he will be somewhere else, or another important politician in another country will face a similar destiny. In view of such interpretations, Rushdie’s play with history is far from immature and even further from pointless.

While unfolding the story of the family and childhood of the prodigious Ormus Kama, modern god of music and love, Rushdie introduces the second of the three parallel worlds, a dream world known to Ormus alone. In it, Ormus communicates with his dead twin brother Gayomart, “his shadow self” (1999: 99) and receives from him the tunes and then lyrics of what will later become the greatest hits of world music. The only visible outward sign of the visionary world, one of the types of parallel worlds mentioned by Ann Swinfen (1984), and his brother’s existence in it is a purple stain on Ormus’s left eyelid. In moments of seclusion, when Ormus is deep in reverie, Gayomart leads him through what seems like an underworld (Falconer 2001:1) and sings the songs of the future, unintelligibly at first, but, in time, more and more clearly. Solitary and reserved as he is, Ormus shares the secret of this world with no one until he meets Vina. She believes him and even Rai, “the least supernaturally inclined of men,” as he considers himself, has no option but to believe. The reason for this might be their com-
mon background. In *Imaginary Homelands* Rushdie expresses the idea that all emigrants share a tendency to see the world from a double perspective, (1992:19) which is why Vina and Rai, who, like Ormus, live in the parallel worlds of the rational West and the less rational East, understand that Ormus has not simply slipped over the edge.

What does this world represent? As Rushdie puts it, “In Gayo, Ormus found the Other into which he dreamed of metamorphosing, the dark self that first fuelled his art.” (1999:99) The dream-like underworld is his first source of inspiration, the power of which will burst out only when he is free from Gayo’s grasp. In search of music and Vina, he moves from Bombay to England where, in a car accident, perhaps the most important turning point in his life, he loses Gayo, but gains his own music and the love of his life. Before the moment of simultaneous loss and gain, Gayo comments on a certain change in Ormus, the effect of his migration to the west. It is a sign that, from then on, everything in Ormus’s life will be different. Seconds before the accident Ormus

    closes his eyes for an instant because alternative universes have begun to spiral out from his eyeballs in rainbow-coloured corkscrews of otherness that fill him with terror.” (1999:307)

The hallucination may be a result of his having taken tea with drugs in it, but maybe also of something far more serious. Just before losing consciousness he experiences another hallucination. The top of his head opens, Gayo climbs out and runs away. Free from the labyrinths of Ormus’s visionary mind, he never returns. Then something hard punches Ormus in the left eye, leaving him in a coma for almost four years. Gayomart’s escape closes the door of the dream world, but it sets Ormus’s imagination free and, strangely enough, opens the door to another parallel world, the glimpse of which Ormus first caught on the plane to England.

On his way to the New World, several years before the accident and the disappearance of the dream world, Ormus senses a change.

    ...every bone in his body is being irradiated by something pouring through the sky-rip, a mutation is occurring at the level of the cell, of the gene, of the particle. The person who arrives won’t be the one who left, or not quite. (1999:253)

    Even his mother sees “a light emanating from within him.” (1999:253) Ormus feels that the plane literally passes through a membrane in the sky,
dividing the East and the West, as well as his past and future, his former and future self. The moment his new life begins, a beautiful young Indian woman materialises, says Rushdie, and the reader is not aware that he means it literally. She reminds Ormus of their time spent together in a hotel room, of their passionate lovemaking, of the music of their intimacy, and his alleged promises. Ormus remembers none of it and the name of the hotel, the Cosmic Dancer, does not catch his attention. Another, older, woman appears and apologizes for the girl’s behaviour, explaining that the girl, her former student, tends to fantasize and imagine things. She talks of Bombay and Ormus notices that her Bombay and her India are somehow different from his. However, he lets it pass. He also fails to understand what she means by saying “we are not a part of your world.” (1999:257) In time, he will find out.

While he is in a coma, Maria, the deranged girl, visits him in his bed, her “only desired resting place.” (1999:315) No one knows how she manages to get in or understands what she means by “I come from his secret world.” (1999: 317) When she literally disappears through a crack in the air, those who see it, succumbing to the power of rationalization, decide not to believe their own eyes, since what they have seen is impossible. Every attempt at keeping the woman away from Ormus fails and she continues to satisfy the needs of his sleeping body as well as her own insatiable desires.

Upon waking up, Ormus realizes that his almost colourless left eye will see very little of the world around him, but, at the same time, it will see “too deeply, too far, too much.” (GBF, 324) Ormus learns that the accident has left him with double vision. Maria helps him understand that his two eyes see different worlds, that is, two variations of the same world, two dimensions of the same reality, infinitely similar and yet different. This double vision is, in a way, parallel to the one shared by all expatriates. It also reflects Rushdie’s double vision as an emigrant writer who, belonging to two worlds and neither of them at the same time, sees everything from a double perspective, which, given his role as an insider and outsider, provides him with deeper insight into both worlds. The two realities in *The Ground Beneath Her Feet* are in conflict and the collision manifests itself in earthquakes. Only one world can survive and, towards the end of the novel, the reader discovers which one.

Earthquakes are present throughout the story. They appear as literal earthquakes which devour cities and people, family earthquakes in the
form of murder, suicide, separation and migration, or emotional earthquakes which leave deep cracks in the soul. More than anything else, these earthquakes are metaphorical. They reflect a world in a process of fragmentation—a literal, political, historical, and personal one. Earthquakes “are the means by which the earth punishes itself and its population for its wrongness” (1999:327) as they are caused not only by faults in the Earth, but by Human Faults as well. Instability seems to be the main feature of every single aspect of modern life. Not even the family can provide solid ground beneath one’s feet any longer. The world is, apparently, coming apart at seams, especially in the lives of displaced individuals, Ormus, Vina and Rai, with their uprooted sense of belonging and unstable ideas of home, family and identity.

Maria, the promiscuous nymph capable of travelling between worlds, a kind of cosmic dancer, informs Ormus of the existence of

certain individuals in whom the irreconcilability of being is made apparent, in whom the contradictoryness of the real rages like thermonuclear war; and such is the gravitational force of these individuals that time and space are dragged towards them and deformed [...] They are the instruments through whose agency that growing deformity is clearly and terrifyingly unveiled. (1999:327)

Apparently, Ormus is one such individual, whose prophetic mind senses the oncoming destruction more and more clearly.

Trying to explain what he sees to Vina, Ormus speculates that there might be other dimensions, or worlds, too. The only way to shut them out is to close his left eye, although even that eventually becomes ineffective as their manifestations get more powerful. He does not, for obvious reasons, mention people who have found a way of moving between the worlds. While describing the different variations of reality, “the shadows behind the stories we know” that “could be just physics beyond our present capacity to comprehend” (1999:350), Ormus reveals to the readers that Maria’s world is, actually, their own. In it, John Kennedy was assassinated in 1963, Nixon is President and the British are not in Indochina. Ormus’s visions of these universes and their more frequent and ever more destructive collisions prove correct. The contradictions in the real, as Rushdie calls them (1992), become violently visible and frighteningly inescapable.

In time, the arrivals and departures of travellers between worlds are increasingly difficult and, finally, completely impossible. They leave the trav-
ellers exhausted, which makes it easier for Ormus to control Maria by means of an eye patch. When he is alone, he removes the eye patch and witnesses the edges of dimensions blurring. The frontiers are being erased, the barriers between the real and the imagined are breaking down, and Ormus is afraid of the possible consequences on life in his world. Whose reality will survive? On the morning of the first day of his marriage to Vina, Ormus wakes up to find the parallel world gone. Another dream world, a new aspect of the real has shut its door to him. Being in two minds about whether to doubt its existence or to believe in it, he keeps wearing eye patches. Reluctant to admit that the other world was not real, he goes on searching for it and the search remains his obsession until the other world’s final destruction.

For a prophetic genius, visions of alternative universes may be a thing of every day, but for Rai, a down-to-earth man, seeing a silhouette of what looks like a ghost-woman on a roll of film is more than a surprise. The woman visits him in his dreams, reminding him that they were lovers and he wakes up with the name Maria on his lips. For days, he keeps photographing empty rooms and she continues to haunt his pictures. She is there to tell him to help Ormus and the effort drains all her energy. In an attempt to record Maria with a video camera, Rai manages to capture her teacher who resolves his doubts about reality. She tells him about its numerous versions, about the people who are able to perceive them; she also tells him that the world is heading for collision, which is why earthquakes are getting more frequent and more destructive. Rai learns that the other world, the reader’s dimension, is severely damaged and people can no longer slip through. Metaphorically, in a reality which is too harsh and completely off balance, one can no longer count on fancy, fantasy or fiction as an escape. The fictional world of Ormus, Rai and Vina, however, is much stronger and, at the end of the woman’s speech, Rai witnesses the collapse of the parallel world.

I imagine that I am watching the end of a world [...] I seem to see towers and oceans rise [...] In the hiss and roar of the white noise it is easy to hear the dying screams of an entire species, the death rattle of another Earth. (1999:509)

By letting the world of fiction survive, is Rushdie trying to say that fiction is stronger than reality? Is it more endurable or more permanent? It may be that, in today’s world, we often do not know the difference between the
two, as fancy and reality are not so easily separated. We only know about hoaxed, fictional facts transmitted, like a disease, by the media. The world of facts might not even exist and everything could be seen as fiction. These worlds, reflections of one another, could be interpreted as variations of one world, modified and distorted by the subjectivity of individual minds. What they reveal about the state of the modern world remains the same, regardless of how we may choose to understand it (Bradbury 1994). It is a world in conflict with itself, a world marked by earthquakes of all kinds, all of them signs of its profound instability. The result is a general state of fragmentation. Edges of identity are increasingly blurry, particularly for emigrants whose identities, in Rushdie’s terms (1992), are at the same time plural and partial, love and family do not provide safety or comfort, one’s sense of belonging is elusive and very difficult to define. It is a world of solitary individuals who, as a result of their sense of displacement, sometimes forget what it is that they are looking for. Disorientation leads them to migration in search of the solid ground beneath their feet. Even when they manage to find it, it proves to be only temporary.

Bearing all these in mind, it is easy to understand why the author finds fantasy a more appropriate way to express provisional truths about reality, as he experiences it. Such visions of the modern world are present in all Rushdie’s works and parallel worlds are a common fantastic element in his attempt to represent them. The destruction that Ormus foresees reaches beyond this novel, not only to *Shalimar the Clown* (2005), where collisions are, once again, present, but to the world around us. As Rushdie once said, our lives are touched by history every day, and history often means conflict and destruction. The two take different forms, but they never cease to occur. Such views of the modern world, shared by many of Rushdie’s contemporaries, are, beyond doubt, rather pessimistic and, at the same time, realistic, but, there is something that should not be overlooked. The only character in *The Ground Beneath Her Feet* who manages to survive all the collisions, to find relatively solid ground beneath his feet and restore balance is Rai, whose real name, Umeed, means “hope.”

**References**


There is no doubt John Donne was an excellent poet, however, his religiousness raises a great deal of controversy. In the latter part of his life he was an eminent Anglican preacher and this is actually what earned him popularity in his lifetime. Still, looking at Donne as an Anglican must be troublesome as he was born into a fiercely Catholic family—one of his close predecessors had been Sir Thomas More, the martyr. No wonder, as biographers have proved, that Donne’s parents took all pains to install Catholic faith in their son (Bald 1970: 19–52). How does, then, this image of a young defender of the Roman Catholic Church relate to his ministry in the Anglican Church? Answering this question has proved to be challenging for numerous early modern historians and literature critics as their conclusions are full of contradictions. Some believe that Donne never lost his Catholic inclinations, and so his conversion into Anglicanism resulted from sheer conformism. John Carey for instance holds that “though Donne came to accept Anglicanism, he could never believe that he had found in the Church of England the one true church outside which salvation was impossible” (Carey 1981: 29). Similarly, R.C. Bald suggests that Donne took the holy orders to end the long spell of financial misfortune resulting from the controversial circumstances of his marriage with Anne More (1601). It was only “the death of his wife [that] marked a turning-point in Donne’s life; it deepened his sense of religious vocation, and produced something much closer to a conversion than the feelings which had prompted him to enter the Church (Bald 1970: 328).

Isaac Walton, Donne’s first biographer, claims that „about the nineteenth year of age, he, being then unresolv’d what religion to adhere to, and, considering how much it concern’d his soul to choose the most Orthodox […] begun seriously to survey, and consider the Body of Divinity, as it was then controverted betwixt the Reformed and the Roman Church” (Walton
Throughout the rest of the biography Walton virtually neglects Donne's Catholic background seeing him always as a loyal and devoted son of the Anglican Church.

There is no doubt that Donne's Catholic legacy is of primary importance to the understanding of his Church ministry and particularly the sermons. I believe that Donne's decision to convert to Anglicanism, though not as instant as Walton or as late as Bald suggest, was ultimately sincere. In order to understand that process we need to look into some aspects of Donne's life as well as his works, particularly those with religious inclinations and, even more particularly, the sermons.

We can presume that by the age of 19 Donne was still Catholic. This is indicated by the details of his portrait made by William Marchall in 1591. Donne is wearing clothes and other attributes that could be identified as Catholic, e.g. a traditional Spanish jacket, an earring in the shape of a cross, and a sword. As Dennis Flynn suggests,

“[o]f Course only a Catholic who fancied himself a swordsman would wear a cross hanging from his ear. This was an impudence evoking the cavalier style of Spanish and French liqueur captains, those hard riding, loose tongued, yet devoted adherents to the religion of the swordsmen of Europe. This was an impudence evoking the cavalier style of Spanish and French liqueur captains, those "hard riding, loose tongued, yet devoted" adherents to "the religion of the swordsmen of Europe." [...] By all accounts Donne was still a Catholic in 1591” (1995: 4).

At that time Donne still wanted to be identified with the tradition of Catholic swordsmen—men of honour and devotion. The sword suggests a noted nobility background, linking his Catholicism with dignity and tradition. The Spanish Cavalier style also indicates connection with Rome. Donne's connections with Catholic nobility and the court are also made evident by the statement of Constantine Huygens, a Dutch friend of Donne's: [he was] „educated at Court in the service of the Great,” (Smith [1630] 1975: 80–1).

The future perspectives were not, however. According to the Pope's decision, English Catholics were no allowed to treat Elisabeth I as the rightful head of the state and church. The Queen was excommunicated and thus exposed to potential dethronement or even assassination. Subsequently, she took all necessary measures to control English Catholics and force them to pledge allegiance to the Crown. Whoever opposed had to face per-
secution. Some Catholics became martyrs. Among them there were also members of Donne’s family: his brother Henry, who died in prison for sheltering a Catholic priest, Henry Percy, the Eighth Lord of Northumberland closely related to Donne’s family, and his uncle Jasper Heywood, the leader of a Jesuit mission in England, who just escaped death by leaving the country. Donne likewise had to make a choice: emigrate in order to gain religious freedom, stay in England in readiness for martyrdom, or conform in hope of a normal life and, at the same time, secret inclination to Rome. He did consider emigration at least on two occasions. There is a document which testifies to his trip to Rome in 1593 where he met Father Claude Aquaviva, a Jesuit who reported about the meeting to Jasper Heywood (Bald 1970: 56–57). The thought of emigration came again after his unfortunate marriage. In a letter to Anne’s father Donne writes “I should wrong you as much as I did, if I should think you sought to destroy me, but though I be not hell-longly destroyed, I languish and rust dangerously. From seeking preferments abroade, my love and conscience strains me; from hoping for them here my Lord’s disgracings cut me off” ([1602] in Flynn 1995: 173). Finally, however, it seems clear that Donne took the last option.

The first sign of Donne’s changing attitude towards the Roman Catholic Church was his early employment for Sir Thomas Egerton, Lord’s of the Great Seal Secretary. That vocation required at least a formal acceptance of the Anglican Church and the Queen as its head—otherwise Donne could not have performed the job in the country so wary of religious and political adversaries. Yet, we do not know to what extent that decision was supported by his religious considerations. Was it just a conformist decision like some critics would like to believe, or was it a conscious move made on the basis of sincere search for the right church?

As I have already mentioned, Walton suggests that Donne converted to Anglicanism after some study at the age of 19. The study involved the works of Cardinal Ballarmine, which, marked with his handwritten critical notes, Donne was to return to the then Dean of Gloucester for inspection ([1670] 1947: 25–6). This would have been a typical procedure towards a potential dissident, whose brother had already committed treason. This act, according to Walton, ended Donne’s inclination to the Vatican. Yet it is known that Walton had an ambivalent attitude towards the Catholic Church and generally tended to disregard its role in his biographical work (Flynn 1995: 2–9). It is thus hard to treat his statement as conclusive. Moreover, in later years,
Donne consciously avoided service in the Church for several years. On the other hand, it is hard to accept Donne’s view as an ‘apostate’ broken until the end of his life (Carey 1982: 15-59). The truth is probably somewhere in the middle: perhaps he did not take the decision to adhere to the Anglican Church immediately—it was a process—but he did search for the truth and once he found it he kept firm to it. This longing for the truth was expressed in one of his early poems, Sonnet XVIII: “Show me dear Christ, thy spouse, so bright and clear / What, is it she, which on the other shore / Goes richly painted? Or which robbed and tore / Laments and mourns in Germany and here? [. . .] / Betray kind husband thy spouse to our sights, / And let mine amorous soul court thy mild dove”. (1–4, 11–12: 363).

We know that his ordination of 1615 was preceded by a long study of theological works of the Fathers and reformers—all biographers admit such studies took place after the unfortunate marriage which deprived Donne of any chance of a secular career. Walton believes that the studies after his initial decision to convert to Anglicanism were mainly designed to deepen the poet’s knowledge of biblical tongues and Christian doctrines as “he applied himself to an incessant study to Textual Divinity, and to the attainment of a greater perfection in the learned Languages, Greek and Hebrew,” ([1670] 1947: 46). However, we can also presume that Donne was simply dissatisfied with what looked like a conformist decision to adhere to the new religion, and wanted to understand whether or not the Anglican Church was heretical, as Roman Catholics claimed. He analysed all controversial writings of the time, as well as the texts of the Fathers and doctors of the Church. It was unlikely for a man who repeatedly refused offers to take the orders and was presumably only interested in a secular career to make such thorough studies of divine writings. The only plausible explanation seems to be the personal zeal for spiritual truth.

With time, Donne seems to have become an expert in the controversy between the Anglican and Roman Catholic Churches. It is exactly why Thomas Morton, the Chaplain of Lord Rutland, asked him in 1605 for help having been given the task of dealing with the problem of Catholic disobedience regarding the Oath of Allegiance. William Mueller, a modern critic, claims that “his [Morton’s] choice of Donne as his assistant showed good judgment, for there was probably no Englishman with so detailed knowledge of the issues between Rome and Canterbury, with so impressive a legal background, and with so thorough a command of language” (Mueller
The writings were addressed to the small but still active group of Catholics who refused allegiance to the Crown. Morton and Donne tried to prove that accepting the leadership of the king in no way impaired their Christian constitution. The claim of Rome to appoint secular rulers was described as unlawful. Donne’s participation in the project was not fully official as the works were only signed by Morton, yet the cooperation may have occasioned further confirmation of the previously made choices. At the end of the cooperation, however, Donne was still unready to face openly his former fellow believers. When Morton offered him a safe and stable job, provided that he took the holy orders, he declined.

Official statements came in 1610 and 1611 as Donne wrote *Pseudo-Martyr* and *Ignatius-his Conclave*, where he openly criticised the Roman Catholic Church. In the introduction of *Pseudo-Martyr* he wrote words of key importance to the understanding of his way to fulfilment in religion:

> I had a longer worke to doe than many other men; for I was first to blot out, certaine impressions of the Romane religion, and to wrastle both against the examples and the reasons, by which some hold was taken, and some anticipations early layde upon my conscience, both by Persons who by nature had a power and superiority over my will, and others who by their learning and good life, seem’d to me justly to claime an interest for the guiding, and rectyfying of mine understanding in these matters. And although I apprehended well enough, that this irresolution not onely retart-ed my fortune, but also bred some scandall, and endangered my spiritual reputation, by laying me open to many mis-interpretations; yet all these respects did not transport me to any violent and sudden determination, till I had, to the measure of my poore wit and judgement, survayed and digested the whole body of Divinity, controuereted between ours and Romane Church (*Pseudo-Martyr*: 4–5).

Donne’s religious maturation was certainly a lengthy and complex process, not a swift decision made at a young age. In the work he also criticises the concept of total obedience—obedience accepting only full commitment and not based on logical arguments. He argues that Catholics restraining from taking the Oath of Allegiance were in reality mislead, as loyalty to the earthly authority was in fact God’s own will for people. Also, he claims that the Oath was not imposed to cause apostasy or suffering, but to differentiate between loyal citizens and potential rebels and criminals, “for this Oath is not offered as a Symbole or token of our Religion, nor to distinguisch papists from Protestants, but onely for a Declaration and Preservation
of such as are well affected in Civil Obedience, from others which either have a rebellious and treacherous disposition already, or may decline and sink in to it" (Pseudo-Martyr: 244).

*Ignatius-his Conclave* is a powerful satire on the order of Jesuits. He criticises the order for spreading the concept of total obedience demanded regardless of logic. He even mentions some very controversial stories questioning the moral conduct of the order (*Ignatius*: 41–2). What a change if one takes into consideration the fact that Donne spent a few years of his teenage life with his Jesuit uncle Jasper Heywood.

Looking into the sermons we will find that Donne continued to express similar concerns and objectives as in the case of *Pseudo-Martyr* and *Ignatius*. Words of criticism directed against Jesuits can be found there, too:

A Carthusian is but a man of fish, for one Element, to dwell still in a Pond, in his Cell alone, but a Jesuit is a useful *ubiquitary*, and his Scene is the Court, as well as the Cloister. And howsoever they pretend to bee gone out of this world, they are never the farther from the Exchange for all their Cloister (volume: III: 169).

It is clear that he disapproved of the way in which the orderfunctioned.

He also criticised the Roman Church for claiming the right to appoint rulers and kings:

> how does the Roman Church give any man infallible satisfaction, whether these or these things, grounded upon the temporall Laws of secular Princes, be sins or no, when as that Church hath not, not will not come to a determination in that point? They pretend to give satisfaction and peace in all cases, and pretend to be the onely true Church for that, and yet leave the conscience in ignorance, and distemper, and distresse, and distraction in many particulars (VIII: 116).

However, the sermons give us more insights into the theological inclinations of Donne. Importantly, they depict that Donne seemed to differentiate between the Roman Catholic and the universal Catholic Church. This is again vital in our pursuit of the truth about Donne’s conversion. His statements in the sermons imply that he believed the universal Catholic Church to be the embodiment of the *via media*—universal Christianity based only on the teaching of Christ: "because as in our baptismse, we take no other name necessarily, but the name of Christ: So in our Christian life, we accept
no other distinctions of Jesuits, or Franciskans; but onely Christians: for we are baptized into his name, and the whole life of a regenerate man is a Baptisme" (V: 164–5). He claims that all churches can be called apostolic "as long as they agree in the unity of that doctrine which the Apostles taught, and adhere to the supreme head of the whole church, Jesus Christ" (III: 138). Thus, the universal Catholic Church, according to Donne, seems to be interdenominational, based primarily on the adherence to Jesus' teaching.

As for the Roman Catholic Church, Donne hints that, at some point, the Vatican focused on doctrines introduced by men and, subsequently, lost sight of those created by Christ. He goes on to criticise doctrines which, he believes, are human creation. He points, for example, to the adoration of the Holy Sacrament when he writes “Wee charge them with Idolatry, in the people’s practice (and that practice is never controlled by them) in the greatest mystery of all their Religion, in the Adoration of the Sacrament“ (III: 132); or the concept of the purgatory, which has no eschatological connotations according to the Fathers: “if you enquire whether any of them [The Fathers] speak of Purgatory, you shall easilly finde that they do; but not so easily, in what sense; when they call the callamities of this life, or when they call the general Conflagration of the world, Purgatory” (IV: 143).

Donne was particularly critical about the Council of Trent, which, in his words, raised some controversial points of faith, treated before only as optional rules and not always defined in detail by Church documents, to the level of obligatory doctrines. In one of the sermons he writes “This has been the bondage induced by the Council of Trent to make Problematical things, Dogmatical; and matter of Disputation, matter of faith” (IV:144). He gives various examples. He holds, for instance, that not all the seven sacraments were created and recommended by Christ himself, yet in the course of the Council they were all accepted as equal, and so necessary for salvation. This caused, as he claims, a considerable controversy among the protestant denominations which accepted only a limited number of sacraments.

Donne seems to imply that the action on the part of the Roman Catholic Church worsened the relationships with Protestants and affected adversely the prospect of cooperation. His criticism of the Roman Catholic Church is easier to understand when we realise that he, in general, criticised any dissenters. He believed in the uniting power of the universal Catholic Church, yet all groups emphasising their own doctrines in opposition to ‘the others’ did not express the real spirit of Christ—the tendency to
one true universal church. In this group Donne includes many other separatist movements throughout the history of Christianity. He does not hesitate to say that “sects are not bodies, they are but rotten boughs, gangrened limes, fragmentary chips, blowne off by their own spirit of turbulency, fallen of by the weight of their own pride [...] for there is nothing common amongst them, nothing that goes through them all; all is singular, all is [...] my spirit, and thy spirit, my opinion and thy opinion, my God and thy God” (III: 88). From this perspective the Council of Trent or earlier decisions of Rome could be seen as promoting singularities—sanctifying rules not common to the entire Christianity—controversial as it seems to us today, this is how Donne appears to have understood the actions of the Vatican.

No wonder that he goes on to say that the departure of some Christians from the Roman Catholic Church was sooner or later inevitable, and that is how he, indeed, justifies the secession of protestant churches:

We departed not from them, then, till it was come to a hot plague, in a necessity of professing old opinions to be new articles of Faith; not till we were driven by them, and drawn by the voice of God, in the learnedest men of all nations; when they could not discharge themselves by the distinction of the Court of Rome, and the Church of Rome, because if the abuses had been but in the Court, it was the greatest abuses of all, for that Church, which is so much above that Court, not to mend it (X:174)

According to Donne, after the “awakening of Christians” and especially the Council of Trent, it was the Anglican Church that stood rightfully in the middle of the religious scene, being the optimal expression of the universal Catholic Church values, the continuation of the church that had existed since the beginning of Christianity:

trouble not thyself to know the formes and fashions of forraine particular Churches; neither of the Church in the Lake, nor a Church upon seven hills; but since God hath planted thee in a Church, where all things necessary for salvation are administered to thee, and where no erronious doctrine (even in the confession of our Adversaries) is affirmed and held, that is the Hill, and that is the Catholique Church” (LXXX Sermons, 1649: 76).

All this seems to imply that Donne believed that he was, substantially, a member of the same church—the universal Catholic Church to which all his great forbears belonged. Thus he never departed from the true Catholic Church and never defied his family tradition. His conversion to Anglicanism
was, in fact, continuity rather than apostasy. This also confirms the sincere motivation lying behind his actions.

Of course, it is possible that, initially, his decision to leave the Roman Catholic Church had been affected by practical issues. He definitely wanted to avoid severe penalties assigned to English Catholics. He probably had the ambition to find a suitable job based on his connections with nobility. All this seems natural for a young man who does not necessarily feel ready to sacrifice his life. We could ask whether anyone should be ready to become a martyr as martyrdom does not appear to be a common gift. Some have it, others simply do not. Donne must have belonged to the latter. He was certainly also helped in his decision by the example of the Egertones, who had no problems accepting the leadership of the queen, and with whom he stayed. However, taking into account all these, we cannot simply discredit him as insincere or pragmatic. Throughout his mature life, he made an effort to see the truth and keep his conscience clear. The conclusions that he reached seem convincing. Moreover, there is sufficient evidence in the sermons and in his life that he treated his ministry in the Church with utmost respect and was always committed to the task of serving the believers. It was not for no reason that he attained great fame as a preacher who did not hesitate to cry in the pulpit in his effort to save the souls of the listeners. Two months prior to his death, Donne wrote in a private letter to his friend that he preferred to preach the Word of God even if it were to shorten his life, rather than wait in peace and quiet for death to come (Bald 1970: 522).

As regards his position within the Anglican Church, Donne, he seems to have clung to the same values as in the case of his attitude towards Catholicism. However, critics and historians have found convincing evidence of extremely different or even contradictory religious opinions in his works, e.g. Armenian or Catholic (Carey 1982: 29) and puritan (Doerksen 1995: 351).

In the eyes of some scholars, this discrepancy again confirms Donne’s lack of firm convictions and, subsequently, proves there was no real vocation behind his decision to take the holy orders (Carey 1982: 15–36). However, support for various factions within the Church need not mean that Donne identified with any of them. As a matter of fact, the contradictions among existing critical explanations are mainly caused by uncontextualised quotations of little pieces of the sermons. This point is strongly emphasised...
by one of the most important recent Donne scholars—Jeanne Shami (1995: 380–412). It seems that Donne purposefully endorsed to a certain extent different, even opposed religious sides like the arminians—lovers of ceremonies and sacraments—and puritans—Calvin’s die-hard followers and great supporters of sermons. Yet the main reason for such behaviour was to promote unity, tolerance and peace in the Church of England. The understanding of the concept of *via media* seems to offer a good solution to that problem.

*Via media*, as explained by Peter White (1993: 187–210), is based upon the concept that the Anglican Church is located theologically in the middle between Roman Catholicism along with arminianism and the more radical reformatory factions like the puritans. Its substance consists in putting emphasis only on those articles of religion which are common among all religious groups. Those articles constitute the Christian doctrine created by Christ himself, and so they ought to be obligatory for all Christians in order for them to receive salvation. Inclusion of additional unorthodox principles of faith, mainly those of human origin, or exclusion of the orthodox doctrines, could be perceived as promotion of singularities, which is an action contrary to the spirit of *via media*. The additional articles of faith can be accepted only as facultative options. Their application must never be imposed as they are not necessary in the process of salvation. It could be, however, justified if they occurred to be useful for the sake of individual effort to become more sanctified. Based on this definition, *via media*, at least as it appears to be understood by Donne, allows for a support of certain singularities as long as they are not imposed on everyone. Thus, as Peter White proves, even though the preachers who were in favour of the *via media* in the Anglican Church did not identify with arminians or puritans, they supported the unity and tolerance within the Church and did sometimes endorse some minor singularities if that could be helpful for a particular congregation.

It seems that Donne, in fact, applied the concept of *via media* to all aspects of Christianity. We can certainly see an application of that concept in his already discussed attitude towards the Roman Catholic Church. John Donne’s sermons clearly testify to this kind of approach. The preacher emphasises total loyalty to the fundamental doctrines of the Church and defines them as the holy doctrines devised by the very Jesus Christ. He recommends compromise and tolerance as the basic conditions in order for
the Church to function. He also approves of singularities as long as the factions which apply them to their liturgy show signs of good will and accept the official line of the Anglican Church, though he stresses that all additional points of faith, e.g. ornaments and pictures in the temple, are facultative.

The conflict between arminians and puritans is very informative. Arminians stressed the sanctification of the holy service and the importance of participation in the sacraments, especially the sacrament of communion. These were the visible signs of God's grace and through them believers could reaffirm their salvation. With this came along the idea of pictures and ornaments in the Church—they were to deepen the spiritual experience of the believers by reminding them of holy biblical stories. Puritans, on the other hand, affected by the doctrine of predestination, sought constant confirmation of their part in the Elect. The process was made possible by listening to the word. The answer whether one was saved was not in the sacraments or sheer partaking in the holy service—it was only in the conscience. Sermons were supposed to speak to the conscience and prompt the process of self analysis. All other features, including the pictures, only distracted the listeners’ attention.

It is interesting to see how Donne featured against this context. In the sermon preached on Christmas 1628, Donne emphasises that the true Church of God must both have the sacraments and preach the Word of God in homilies:

Now, as in our former part we were bound to know God’s hand, and then bound to read it, to acknowledge a judgement to be a judgement, and then to consider what God intended in that judgement, so here we are bound to know the true Church, and then to know what the true Church proposes to us. The true Church is that, where the Word is trully preached, and the Sacraments duly administered (VIII: 309).

The true church embraces both the Sacraments and the Word. Neither should be disregarded. It is thus clear that he emphasises the importance of unity around reaffirmed doctrines. In the same sermon, Donne goes on to explain:

it is the Word, the Word inspired by the holy Ghost; not Apocryphall, not Decretall, not Traditionall, not Additionall supplements; and it is the Sacraments, Sacraments instituted by Christ himself, and not those supernumerary sacraments, those posthume, post-nati sacraments, that have been multiplyed after: and then, that which the true Church proposes, is,
all that is truly necessary. So that Problematical points, of which, either side may be true, and in which, neither side is fundamentally necessary to salvation, those marginal and interlineary notes, that are not of the body of the text, opinions raised out of singularity, in some one man, and then maintained out of partiality, and affection to the man, these problematicall things should not be called the Doctrine of the Church, nor lay obligations upon mens consciences; They should not disturb the general peace, they should not extinguish particular charity towards one another (VIII: 309).

It is not any Word and any Sacraments. He clearly states that both aspects of Christianity are necessary in the Church, yet they must be based on Christ’s teaching. The additional points of faith, or, as he calls them, the marginal singularities, ought not to cause conflict or dispute as they are of marginal importance to our salvation. Only Christ-originated ceremonies should be accepted as vital for all Christians’ salvation. There is no doubt, therefore, that John Donne was a follower of the *via media* and a supporter of the Calvinist consensus.

In his *via media* approach Donne can sometimes embrace certain singularities of those who seek their interpretation of the Church. He sometimes sounds quite arminian in the way he defends the holiness of church building:

You meet below there make your bargains, for biting, for devouring Usury, ‘and then you come up hither to prayers, and so make God your Broker. You rob, and spoile, and eat his people as bread, by Extortion, and bribery, and deceitfull waights and measures, and deluding oaths in bying and selling,and then come hither, and so make God your Receiver, and his house a den of Thievies. His house is *Sanctum Sanctorum*, The Holiest of holies, and you make it onely *Sanctuarium* (VII: 317–18).

He can also pay attention to the decorum of the holy service taking again the stance normally associated with arminians:

there come some persons to this Church, and persons of example […] I never saw Master nor servant kneele, at his comming into this Church, or at any part of the divine service... kneeling is the sinners posture; if thou come hither in the quality of a sinner, (and, if thou do not so, what doest thou here, the whole need not the Physitian) put thy selfe into the posture of a sinner, kneele (VI: 72–3).

On the other hand, he can also appear to be more puritan in the way he adores the importance of the spoken word in Church:
Christ is *verbum*, The word; not A word, but The word: the Minister is *Vox*, voice; not A voyce, but The Voyce, the voyce of that word and no other; and so, he is a pleasing voyce, because he pleases him that sent him, in a faithfull executing of his Commission, and speaking according to his dictate; and pleasing to them whom heis sent, by bringing the Gospel of Peace and Reparation to all wounded, and scattered, and contrite Spirits (Ii: 172).

A pastor is the voice of Christ and Christ is *Verbum*. There seems to be no Church without the properly given Word. And it is not only the task of the preacher to make the oration as perfect as possible, but also the listeners’ duty to pay attention, remember, check with the Bible and the canon laws, and implement the word in their lives:

[Preaching] is a debt, not onely to God, but...to you: and indeed there is more due to you, than you can claime, or can take knowledge of. For the people can claime but according to the *laws* of the State, and the *Canons* of the Church, in which God hath placed them; such preaching, as those Laws, and those Canons enjoyn, is a debt which they can call for (Vi: 93).

However, such contradictory support is absolutely in line with the *via media* approach, since singularities can be accepted as long as they enrich particular Church communities and do not raise too much controversy in fellow believers.

John Donne’s sermons show us a preacher in his earnest, a man at the peak of his intellectual and spiritual powers, committed to Christianity and peace—an image so different from the young poet ‘Jack’ Donne. There is no doubt that his way to the ordination in the Church was long and tough, yet, once in the office, Donne was fully committed to the service of his congregation. In the light of the presented evidence, Donne should not be seen as a conformist apostate, pitted by his choices to the end of his life. He took all possible measures to find the Godly truth until he came to peace with his conscience and learned to serve God and people rightfully. He finally came to know God and the Church that he was ministering. He found a way to God through the centre, which harmonised the existing extremes. This was the path on which he felt safe as a Christian and this was what he was determined to share with his congregation. The commitment and sincerity that accompanied his holy service made him a preaching legend in his own lifetime. There is no reason why today we should question that legend.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING AN ARTIST: TOM STOPPARD'S VISION OF ART

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When in, 1967, Tom Stoppard swept the stage of the Royal National Theatre with his debut *Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead*, it was celebrated as both a daring artistic act and a radical political statement. In the play, the quintessential Shakespearean hero is banished to the margins of the stage, occupied instead by two nondescript and allegedly corrupt courtiers, whose death is of little consequence to their royal friend. Since then, Stoppard has consistently explored the nature, meaning and function of art. It is a quest fraught with contradictions, but paradoxes appeal to Tom Stoppard (Delaney 1994: 223; Nadel 2002), who describes his artistic compulsion as a realization of an internal intellectual ping pong: “I write plays because writing dialogue is the only respectable way of contradicting yourself” (Stoppard, in Delaney 1994:31). This paper will attempt to examine the differing concepts of art and the role of the artist as contested in Stoppard’s works, and trace their shifting perspectives throughout his dramatic career.

The early Stoppard, much to the disappointment of the politically charged sixties and seventies, believes little in the social and political relevance of art: “I’ve never felt art is important. That’s my secret guilt” (Ibid: 46). *Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead* questions the reputation of art by probing the very heart of the literary canon. To Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, both Hamlet the character and *Hamlet* the play remain an enigma, and the Player, who serves as a mediator between their existential vacuum and the plot of *Hamlet*, intimidates and confuses them. Theatre is an artifice, abiding by rules different from life: here, a coin may fall heads eighty-five times in a row (Stoppard 1968: 11), here, “events must play themselves out to aesthetic, moral and logical conclusion” (Ibid: 58) and everyone marked for death must indeed die (Ibid.). Guil, who would “prefer art to mirror life” (Ibid: 59), criticizes the showy nature of death on stage: “No, no, no … you’ve got it all wrong. You can’t act death. The fact of it is noth-
ing to do with seeing it happen—it's not gasps and blood and falling about—that isn't what makes it death. It's just a man failing to reappear, that's all." (Ibid: 62) Ironically though, he falls prey to precisely such an illusion. According to the Player, the conventional rendering of death is the only kind of death on stage the audience is prepared to believe in (Ibid: 91):

I had an actor once who was condemned to hang for stealing a sheep—or a lamb, I forget which—so I got permission to have him hanged in the middle of the play—I had to change the plot a bit but I thought it would be effective, you know—and you wouldn’t believe it, he just wasn’t convincing! [...]—he did nothing but cry all the time—right out of character (Ibid: 62).

Death constitutes a crucial structural and stylistic element of tragedy and, as such, must abide by its laws. The actors can die “heroically, comically, ironically, slowly, suddenly, disgustingly, charmingly, or from a great height” (Ibid: 61), depending on the nature of the play and the disposition of its characters.

Written consecutively, *Artist Descending the Staircase* (1972) and *Travesties* (1974) propose a number of similar arguments. The former, a radio play inspired by paintings by Magritte and Duchamp, portrays a lifelong friendship of three artists “who argue incessantly about theories of art and about their own practice” (Hayman, 1979: 110). *Travesties* stages a meeting among Tristan Tzara, Vladimir Ylyich Lenin, and James Joyce in Zurich of 1917, reconstructed through the fallible memories of Henry Carr, a former employee of the British Consulate in Switzerland.

In *Artist Descending the Staircase*, Beauchamp argues that art is what people are taught to understand and accept as art (Stoppard 1990: 121). Donner, on the other hand, insists that both talent and craft are essential: “To speak of art which requires no gift is a contradiction employed by people like yourself who have an artistic bent but no particular skill” (Ibid: 122). This debate is echoed in *Travesties*:

Tzara: Doing the things by which is meant Art is no longer considered the proper concern of the artist. Nowadays, an artist is someone who makes Art mean the things he does […]

Carr: An artist is someone who is gifted in some way that enables him to do something more or less well which can only be done badly or not at all by someone who is not thus gifted. […] Don't you see my dear Tristan you
are simply asking me to accept that the word Art means whatever you wish it to mean; but I do not accept it.

Tzara: Why not? You do exactly the same thing with words like patriotism, duty, love, freedom [...] (Stoppard, 1975: 21)

In Artist Descending the Staircase, Beauchamp advocates nonconformity of art: “Art consists of constant surprise. Art should never conform. Art should break its promises. Art is nothing to do with expertise: doing something well is no excuse for doing the expected.” (Stoppard 1990: 143) Similarly in Travesties, Tzara, who is renowned for his method of composing texts by drawing words out of a hat, asserts that traditional concepts of art are dead: “Music is corrupted, language conscripted. Words are taken to stand for their opposites. That is why anti-art is the art of our time.” (Stoppard 1975: 22)

Worried about justification of art and the artist to the poor, Donner experiments with edible art in his younger days and describes the artist as “a lucky dog”(Stoppard 1990: 144). Carr, too, considers artists as “members of a privileged class”(Stoppard 1975: 28) and the significance of art as overrated (Ibid.):

When I was at school, on certain afternoons we all had to do what was called Labour—weeding, sweeping, sawing logs for the boiler room, that kind of thing; but if you had a chit from Matron you were let off to spend the afternoon messing about in the Art Room. Labour or Art. And you've got a chit for life? (Passionately) What is an artist? For every thousand people there's nine hundred doing the work, ninety doing well, nine doing good, and one lucky bastard who's the artist (Ibid.).

Tzara seeks to justify art through a radical purge: “It's too late for geniuses! Now we need vandals and desecrators, simple-minded demolition men to smash centuries of baroque subtlety, to bring down the temple, and thus finally, to reconcile the shame and the necessity of being an artist!” (Ibid: 41) Carr’s protest is that the artist, too, must be answerable to society and that “it is the duty of the artist to beautify existence”(Ibid: 20).

Although by no means impervious to its effect, Lenin has little time for art in general. In his view, it reaffirms the status quo and placates people into subservience (Dean 1990):

[…] I can’t listen to music often. It affects my nerves, makes me want to say nice stupid things and pat the heads of those people who while living in this hell can create such beauty. Nowadays we can’t pat heads or we’ll
get our hands bitten off. We've got to hit heads, hit them without mercy, though ideally we're against doing violence to people… (Stoppard 1975: 62)

Art must become a wheel in the revolutionary process and, as such, must belong to the party: “There can be no real and effective freedom in a society based on the power of money. Socialist literature and art will be free because the idea of socialism and sympathy with the working people, instead of greed and careerism, will bring ever new forces to its ranks!” (Ibid: 59)

It is, finally, the ridiculous figure of Joyce, in a mismatched jacket and trousers, reciting limericks and singing Irish songs, who voices an innate human impulse for the indispensability of art: “An artist is the magician put among men to gratify—capriciously—their urge for immortality. […] What now of the Trojan War if it had been passed over by the artist’s touch? Dust. A forgotten expedition prompted by Greek merchants looking for new markets” (Ibid: 42).

Despite his persistent reservations about committed theatre, in the double bill Dogg’s Hamlet, Cahoot’s Macbeth (1979), Stoppard does credit art with a political impact. In Dogg’s Hamlet, a group of schoolboys stumble over their lines from Hamlet, which they unenthusiastically rehearse for their school performance. As their mother tongue is a language called Dogg, Shakespeare’s speech constitutes a literally foreign language for them. The school principal then presents two “butchered” versions of the play, in which Shakespeare is served cut and dried in extremis, resulting in shambles and “signifying nothing”. Contrastingly, the performance of Macbeth in Cahoot’s Macbeth, which is put on in a private Prague flat by actors banished from the official stage, serves as a vehicle for an indirect but powerful political statement and a symbol of free artistic expression in a repressive society (Diamond 1986). Although his works are formally endorsed by the Communist authorities, a Shakespeare which is performed by dissident artists turns into a potential culprit. As the Inspector says, the classic’s very universality leaves one in doubt about what exactly he is saying:

Shakespeare—or the Old Bill, as we call him in the force—is not a popular choice with my chief, owing to his popularity with the public, or, as we call it in the force, the filth. The fact is, when you get a universal and timeless writer like Shakespeare, there’s a strong feeling that he could be spitting in the eyes of the beholder when he should be keeping his mind on
Verona—hanging around the ‘gents’. You know what I mean? Unwittingly, of course. He didn’t know he was doing it, at least you couldn’t prove he did, which is what makes the chief so prejudiced against him. The chief says he’d rather you stood up and said, ‘There is no freedom in this country’, then there’s nothing underhand and we all know where we stand. You get your lads together and we get our lads together and when it’s all over, one of us in power and you’re in gaol. That’s freedom in action. But what we don’t like is a lot of people being cheeky and saying they are only Julius Caesar or Coriolanus or Macbeth. (Stoppard 1980: 60)

In *The Real Thing* (1982), Stoppard raises the issue of art’s social usability in yet a more intricate manner. Here, Annie asks her husband Henry, a playwright, to polish a play written by a soldier imprisoned on allegedly political grounds:

Annie: I know it’s raw, but he’s got something to say.
Henry: He’s got something to say. It happens to be something extremely silly and bigoted. But leaving that aside, there is still the problem he can’t write. (Stoppard 1999: 200)

When Annie proposes that Henry’s dismissal stems from the fact that Brodie’s script challenges Henry’s idea of what good writing should be, Henry embarks on the famous cricket bat speech, demonstrating what he sees as an inherent difference between good and bad art:

This thing here, which looks like a wooden club, is actually several pieces of particular wood cunningly put together in a certain way so that the whole thing is sprung, like a dance floor. It’s for hitting cricket balls with. If you get it right, the cricket ball will travel two hundred yards in four seconds, and all you’ve done is give it a knock like knocking the top off a bottle of stout, and it makes a noise like a trout taking a fly … *(He clucks his tongue to make the noise.)* What we’re trying to do is to write cricket balls, so that when we throw up an idea and give it a little knock, it might … travel … *(He clucks his tongue again and picks up the script.)* Now, what we’ve got here is a lump of wood of roughly the same shape trying to be cricket bat, and if you hit a ball with it, the ball will travel about ten feet and you will drop the bat and dance about shouting ‘Ouch!’ with your hands stuck into your armpits. *(indicating the cricket bat)* This isn’t better because someone says it’s better, or because there’s a conspiracy by the MCC to keep cudgels out of Lords. It’s better because it’s better. You don’t believe me, so I suggest you go out to bat with this and see how you get on (Ibid: 204–5).
The Real Thing examines the relationship between life and art, particularly in matters of love. The play opens with a scene in which a husband discovers his wife's infidelity, a scene which turns out to be a play within a play. Henry's first wife Charlotte mocks its artificiality: “You don’t really think that if Henry caught me out with a lover, he’d sit around being witty about place mats? Like hell he would. He’d come apart like a pick-a-sticks. His sentence structure would go to pot, closely followed by his sphincter” (Ibid: 163). Scene three, however, in which Annie tells her first husband Max that she is in love with Henry, and scene nine, where Henry learns about Annie's attachment to her fellow actor Billy, are “real”, even though they bear an uncanny resemblance to scene one. Having written an adultery play, Henry finds that his art bounces back on him.

Henry sees himself as a guardian of language. He, like Stoppard, declares affection for words. His tendency to finish people's sentences and correct their grammar may be an irritating habit indeed but his objections to maltreating words imply that such deliberate distortions can lead to a flawed morality and wronged perception of reality. As Carr says in Travesties: “If there is any point in using language at all it is that a word is taken to stand for a particular idea and not for other facts or ideas” (Stoppard 1975: 21).

Shakespeare in Love (1998), Stoppard's rewrite of an original script by Marc Norman, proves no less revealing in issues of art and the artist. Imagining the circumstances in which Romeo and Juliet was written, the film captures various stages of the creative process, from the writer's block to an inspired exaltation, and the curious twists through which life shapes art and art foretells life. The stage love between the Verona lovers is paralleled by an off-stage relationship between Will Shakespeare and Viola de Lesseps. The link is enhanced further by the fact that Viola is at the same time an actor in Will's play. Their love feeds the play but through Romeo and Juliet their relationship, too, is relived, rectified and immortalized. At times, fiction and fact blend so easily that we can hardly tell one from the other (Lukeš 1999). The film opens with a close-up on a playbill advertising The Lamentable Tragedie of the Moneylender Reveng’d, accompanied by screams of torture from the voice-over. The next scene reveals the theatre manager Philip Henslowe on the stage of his Rose, being assaulted by his creditor. It takes us a little while before we realize this is in fact not the advertised play but “reality”. Similarly, lines from Romeo and Juliet take
turns as dramatic speeches to be recited on the stage and as intimate conversations between Will and Viola. In the final performance, chance casts Will as Romeo against Viola as Juliet. At this point, art and life merge.

Throughout his dramatic career, Stoppard hesitantly, yet perceptibly arrives at a reaffirmation of faith in the power and importance of art. In *Travesties*, Carr asserts that: “art does not change society, is merely changed by it” (Stoppard 1975: 50), complemented by Joyce’s: “by God there’s a corpse that will dance for some time yet and leave the world precisely as it finds it” (Ibid: 42). However, in *The Real Thing*, Henry suggests that art can “nudge the world a little” (Stoppard 1999: 207).

In *Travesties*, Carr remarks that what he learned in Zurich during the war was that: “Firstly, you’re either a revolutionary or you’re not, and if you’re not you might as well be an artist as anything else. Secondly, if you can’t be an artist, you might as well be a revolutionary …” (Stoppard 1975: 71). Stoppard allegedly set out to write the play in order to find out “whether an artist has to justify himself in political terms at all” (Stoppard, in Delaney 1994: 69). However, in *Cahoot’s Macbeth*, as well as in *The Coast of Utopia* (2002), artists do attain the status of revolutionaries. In 1973 Stoppard might have argued that: “when Auden said his poetry didn’t save one Jew from the gas chamber, he’d said it all” (Ibid: 50), but he would not deny the significance of art on another plane: “Art is important because it provides the moral matrix, the moral sensibility from which we make our judgements about the world” (Stoppard, in Dean 1981:8). In Henry’s words, “you may perhaps alter people’s perceptions so that they behave a little differently at that axis of behaviour where we locate politics or justice” (Stoppard 1999: 206). Art should not be expected to play a role of an immediate political commentary: “If you looked out of the window and saw something that you really felt must be changed, something you felt was a cancer on society and you wanted to change in now, you could hardly do worse than write a play about it” (Stoppard, in Delaney 1994:75), but should attempt to make a more general statement: “Well, that’s what art is best at. The objective is the universal perception, isn’t it?” (Ibid: 67)

Tom Stoppard employs a number of postmodern techniques in his works but to call him a postmodern playwright, as has often been the case, is something of a misnomer (Heuvel 2001). Despite their postmodern garb, Stoppard’s theatre and film pieces bespeak a vision of art which is essentially modernist (Sammels 1988).
References


CULTURE BORDERLINES
THE TAMING OF AMERICAN MULTICULTURALISM: FROM
BALKANIZATION TO EMPIRE

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The concept of multiculturalism has undergone important changes under the combined effects of such domestic and international developments as the new world order, globalization, the war against terror and the rise of neo-conservatism. In its attempt to answer the question “What happened to multiculturalism?” the paper addresses the shift from the radicalism of critical multiculturalism blamed for the “balkanization” of America to the neo-liberalism’s absorption of multiculturalism and its repackaging as an US model of identity for the 21st century world, and still further, to the taming of multiculturalism and its assimilation by cultural pluralism pointing to what Hardt and Negri describe as the “empire” of the globalization age (2000).

In the spring of 1988, a large crowd of students demonstrated at Stanford University shouting “Hey, hey, ho, ho, Western culture’s got to go” in protest against the mandatory undergraduate courses in Western Civilization which were focused mainly on DWEM (dead, white, European, male) authors and excluded or ignored such categories as non-Europeans and women. From Stanford the protests spread to other campuses across the country and had as a result a curricular and canon revision that restructured courses and reading lists from a multicultural perspective that sustained political and cultural representation of race-gender-class differences. The student demonstrations brought to public attention multiculturalism’s culture wars over notions of pedagogy, common culture, identity politics, political correctness, affirmative action and crisis in representation. The rise of multiculturalism had actually started in the late 60s, with roots in continental poststructuralism and in the social upheavals and the feminist and civil rights movements of the explosive decade, but, as in the case of “post-modernism”, its conceptualization was a slow process. The term itself
emerged in public culture only in the early 90s. As Nathaniel Glazer pointed out,

> the Nexus data base of major newspapers shows no references to multi-culturalism as late as 1988, a mere 33 items in 1989, and only after that a rapid rise—more than 100 items in 1990, more than 600 in 1991, almost 900 in 1992, 1200 in 1993, and 1500 in 1994...The drop in the number of newspaper references since 1994 may reflect the fact that in many respects multiculturalism in education is no longer news, but quotidian reality (1997:7–8).

All through the first half of the 90s, the number of books on Multiculturalism and culture wars was on the rise. So were the attacks of religious and political conservatism, which blamed multiculturalism for the ethnic “balkanization” of America, “an across-the-board assault on our Anglo-American heritage, or the disuniting of America” (Schlesinger 1992). Their target is a tendency of oppositional multiculturalism described as “radical, critical, or strong” that addresses the “unequal distribution of power in society” and analyzes “how cultural divisions are constructed historically through racist policies or other institutionalizations of oppression.” (Jay 1997:104) Such multiculturalism is very different from the “cultural pluralism” inscribed in the “E Pluribus Unum” motto of American democracy. Could this type of multiculturalism be an adequate model for the 21st century world? Most unlikely.

Multiculturalism’s oppositional critique of democracy was a national project, confined to the parochialism of the “national”: national identity, national borders, and common culture. It was “trapped in the epistemology of nationhood with its either/or categories...and its tendencies to essentialist definitions of identity” as Ulrich Beck, an advocate of cosmopolitanism, argues in his inquiry into “the ways in which societies handle otherness,” (universalism, ethnicism, relativism, nationalism, cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism etc.) (2004:446). Indirectly, he too associates multiculturalism with the idea of “balkanization” for Multiculturalism conceives of individuals as members of separate groups, “members of territorial, ethnic, and political units, which then engage in ‘dialogue’ with one another ‘across frontiers.’” (Beck 2004:447) But what if the dialogue collapses?

Apart from the effects of its limitation within the confines of the nation, multiculturalism’s oppositional critique of exceptionalism has been weakened by the absence of class as a category of cultural, political and eco-
nomics analysis, despite the centrality of class on the race-class-gender scale of alterity, and also despite the fact that class would and should cut across all other differences. The failure to address class reconfirms the exceptionalist assumption that the US is a classless society, or rather a middle-class society. (See Russo and Linkon 2005 and Zandy 2004). In fact, the very notion of “American exceptionalism,” as Seymour Martin Lipset documents in his book *American Exceptionalism. A Double-Edged Sword*,

became widely applied in the context of efforts to account for the weakness of working-class radicalism in the United States. The major question subsumed in the concept became why the United States is the only industrialized country which does not have a significant socialist movement or Labor party. (1997:156)

American studies has produced very few books on class, (with two notable exceptions, Russo and Linkon and Janet Zandy, published recently). Most Americanists have treated the problem of class indirectly, by replacing class with social movements or by considering, like Denning, that ethnicity and race are expressions of working class—consciousness, “the modality through which working-class peoples experienced their lives and mapped their communities.” (Denning 1997: 239)

America’s new being in the globalized world and the threat of international terrorism called for the placing of the U.S. study within an international context and the challenging of the conventional narratives of U.S. isolationism and exceptionalism. Under the mounting evidence of the gradual disappearance of the white majority by 2050, the attempts to reconceptualize America and to renegotiate national identity have been done within the framework of a critique of multiculturalism that followed three major directions in the debates on multiculturalism.

First, attempts to re-articulate an ethno-racial multicultural paradigm for a globalized world in response to the charges of balkanization brought against radical multiculturalism and to the limitations imposed by the center-margin model. Attacking the “cooptive liberal pluralism” of a multiculturalism expressed in such culinary metaphors as: melting pot, ethnic stew, tossed salad, bouillabaisse (Shohat and Stam 1996:46, 48) Shohat and Stam, for instance, posit the relational model of a *polycentric multiculturalism*, in which the role of polycentrism is to globalize multiculturalism. As they explain,
[Polycentrism] envisions a restructuring of intercommunal relations within and beyond the nation-state according to the internal imperatives of diverse communities. Within a polycentric vision, the world has many dynamic cultural locations, many possible vantage points. The emphasis in “polycentrism,”..., is not on spatial or primary points of origin but on fields of power, energy and struggle. (1996:48)

Such a revisionist version of radical multiculturalism aimed at deconstructing the dichotomy center-periphery, at destabilizing the colonial and neo-colonial frames of reference, or rather, at “unthinking Eurocentrism,” as stated in the title of Shohat and Stam’s book (1994), approaches, after all, the question of American identity in a recognizable melting pot spirit, with the essential difference, that now the melting pot makes of the third-world, non-white individual the representative American.

The second direction in the multiculturalism debate is marked by attempts to re-locate American identity in the context of globalization and the “browning of America” (Mukharjee 1997:475), beyond ethnicity (Sollors 1996), in a post-white (Fox, 1997), post-race (Darder and Torres 2004), post-ethnic America, “a site for transnational affiliations” (Hollinger 1995: 15) and cosmopolitan identities (Hollinger 2006; Glazer 1997).

The third one is represented by the neo-liberal attempts to assimilate and tame multiculturalism, to mainstream multiculturalism by transforming it into the TNCs’ official ideology, a kind of “corporate liberal multiculturalism” (Rouse 1995:380) an “attempt to refigure American identity advantageously for the global economy” (Buell 1998:561) The July 1997 issue of Wired magazine predicted that “at the turn of the century, the U.S. [will be] the closest thing the world has to a workable multicultural society.” As Buell argues in his definition of America’s “national post-nationalism,”

Metamorphosed from a nationalist narrative—a narrative of the internal development of national character and values—to an act of global positioning, American multiculturalism appears world-influential, soothing anxieties about and familiarizing Americans with the idea of a new, supposedly interdependent, interactive global economy, (Buell 1998: 561)

—a model for the rest of the world.

From a radical critique of exceptionalism, a radical model of cultural analysis deeply rooted in social movements documenting ethno-racial identities, the politics of race, class, gender and America’s history of exclusion, through neo-liberal cooptation, multiculturalism was tamed into one more
expression of pluralism, a renewed affirmation of the enduring American
eXceptionalism. The fluctuation in the relation between liberal pluralism
and radical multiculturalism provides the best illustration.

At the time of its conceptualization radical multiculturalism like cultural
pluralism was grounded in the idea of plurality and the ethno-racial defin-
tion of the US cultures. But cultural pluralism was Eurocentric, universal-
ist and limited to culture, while multiculturalism was ethnocentric and quite
often anti-Western, if not plainly Afrocentric (Asante 1998), postmodern,
anti-essentialist and reveling in difference. It addressed the political and the
social, dealing in identity politics, political correctness and crisis in repre-
sentation.

Now, more than a decade later, an updated on-line encyclopedia defines multiculturalism as “a public policy approach for managing cultural
diversity in a multiethnic society, officially stressing mutual respect and tol-
erance for cultural differences within a country's borders.” (Wikipedia)
Multiculturalism is no longer an ethno-racial critique of democracy, but a
synonym of cultural pluralism in a multiethnic society, which is likely to
obliterate rather than disclose power structures in culture and society and
thus reaffirm exceptionalism. Jay calls it a “pluralistic multiculturalism,” that
“emphasizes the characteristics of individual cultures rather than stressing
the social or political relationships between them” (Jay 1997: 104).

The taming of multiculturalism, its cleansing of social and political
connotations has been done through its appropriation, reconstruction and
mainstreaming by the official neo-liberal discourse in the closing years of
the 1990s. Borrowing Appadurai’s (1993, 1996) metaphor of America as the
“cultural laboratory” of the world, I would say that pluralistic multicultural-
ism is presented as the tested version of identity that the US offers to the
globalized world of the next American century. (In many countries, includ-
ing our own, multiculturalism has become a convenient remedy for social
and political tensions). The revival of American exceptionalism and the idea
of “good empire” in the neo-conservative discourse of recent years supports
this assumption. Classic empires have always been multicultural, but can we
speak of empires or an American empire in the globalization age and if so,
what would Empire look like?

The gradual erosion of national borders, the expansion of the TNCs
networks in the process of globalization and the acceleration of communi-
cations revolution call for a redefinition of empire as a new global form of
sovereignty. Hardt and Negri define Empire in the Internet age as “a network power,” which “is now emerging, and … includes as its primary elements, or nodes, the dominant nation-states along with supranational institutions, major capitalist corporations, and other powers.” (2004:xi) Describing this network as “imperial not imperialist” they define empire as different from imperialism:

In contrast to imperialism, Empire establishes no territorial center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers. Empire manages hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of command. (2000:xii)

Without equating the US with Empire, Hardt and Negri assign the US a privileged position in Empire. On the one hand, they admit that “not all the powers in Empire’s network…are equal…but despite inequalities they must cooperate to create and maintain the current global order, with all of its internal divisions and hierarchies” (2000:xv) and they suggest numerous parallels between the present influence of the US in the world and the role of the dominant power in Empire. On the other, their transnational Empire takes as avowed model American constitutionalism “today’s global Empire draws on elements of US constitutionalism, with its tradition of hybrid identities and expanding frontiers.” (2000:xv)

In Multitude (2004), the sequel to Empire (2000), Hardt and Negri argue that Empire is sustained by “the multitude”, which in its turn is also presented as a network, “an open and expansive network in which all differences can be expressed freely and equally, a network that provides the means of encounter so that we can work and live in common.” (2004 xiv) The “multitude” differs from “people”, which implies fixed borders and identity, from “masses” in which “all differences are submerged and drowned” (2004:xiv) and from “the working class”, which refers only to “industrial workers.” If the existence of the multitude as a network allows for hybrid identities, the existing differences within the network indicate pluralist multiculturalism as a condition of the new democracy.

The taming of Multiculturalism has taken America full circle back to its founding principles reconfirming its enduring exceptionalism.
References:

On April 6, 1917, the United States of America began assembling a fighting force to engage in WWI. This American Expeditionary Force would eventually total almost 5 million men under arms, of whom 116,000 would die and 230,000 would be wounded when combat came to an end the following year. As if this was not enough mayhem for any generation, an influenza pandemic swept the world during this conflict and it killed more people in weeks than the sum total that died in combat during The Great War.

For Americans and their families, who had been afflicted by these ravages of war and disease, it is a fairly safe guess to suggest that the last thing on their minds was a legal war to terminate some of their rights as citizens, which they believed were protected by the United States Constitution. Some would later claim that what then followed amounted to a form of coup d'état. No sooner had the hot war of combat been entered into than religiously motivated agitators decided that this was the ideal moment to wage a Constitutional War.

Seen from the distance of time, the issues chosen for this war seem to have little in common with human rights, because the goal of America's Anti-Saloon League was to halt the transportation, trade and consumption of alcoholic beverages by means of a Constitutional Amendment. This legal battle for prohibition began on December 17, 1917, when the U.S. Senate introduced a proposal in the form of the 18th Amendment. The House discussed and passed a Joint Resolution that same day. This proposal was then submitted to the State Legislatures for ratification in accordance; it was
claimed, with a provision of the Fifth Article of the Constitution. Thirty-six
State legislatures ratified this Amendment on January 16, 1919 and it took
effect to the day, one year later.

If lawyers for the Anti-Saloon League were busy, so were attorneys rep-
resenting Anti-Prohibition (as the combatants were known to the press at
the time.) A series of legal challenges were brought before the U.S.
Supreme Court during March, 1920, under the general heading of the
and oral arguments lasted for several days.

At one point Justice Louis Brandeis asked complainants’ attorney
Herbert A. Rice of Rhode Island, how perceived problems with the 18th
Amendment could be resolved: “The Court is now fully acquainted with the
nature of the arguments of the various counsel as to why the new Article
has not been validly made. The Court would like to know, in what way do
counsel (sic) think that the new Article could be constitutionally made?”
Rice replied: “In no way” (in Hennessy 1923: 342). Hennessy complained in
his book (1923:316) that not one of the litigants seemed to understand the
meaning of Article V or the 10th Amendment. If the Amendment had been
ratified by “The People” in conventions instead of by State Legislatures,
claimed Hennessy, there would not have been a problem with the
Amendment itself. Enforcement would have remained a different problem.
However, Justice Van Devanter for the Court finally handed down a negative
Opinion to the complainants on June 7, 1920.

New York attorney Francis X. Hennessy had been following the saga of
the 18th Amendment with keen interest, and, in 1923, E. P. Dutton published
his findings in the first edition of *Citizen or Subject*. Central to Hennessy’s
thesis is an interpretation of the Declaration of Independence of 1776;
Article V of the original Constitution of 1787, and the first ten amendments
(The “Bill of Rights”) of 1789, with special emphasis on the meaning of the
10th Amendment reserving rights to “The People.” Hennessy contended that
the 10th Amendment, coupled with provisions of Article V, reserved all pow-
ers not originally granted in the Constitution, to future ratifications by “The
People” in conventions.

Throughout his book Hennessy laboriously and repeatedly explained
that the reason why the Constitution opens with the line “We the People” is
because the Constitution is made in their name in conjunction with the
State governments in which “The People” reside. According to the 10th
Amendment, the Constitution only contains powers delegated to it by “The People” and the legislatures of states in which “The People” reside. Because powers delegated to the Constitution by “The People” are powers specifically enumerated within the existing Constitution, Hennessy claimed that, according to Article V and the 10th Amendment, only “The People” in conventions can grant additional powers by further amendment. All of this would be the subject of intellectual conjecture and interpretation during debate, if the 21st Amendment did not exist. That Amendment gives weight and credence to Hennessy’s thesis, and the history of Hennessy’s thesis is the foundation for this present work.

“THE PEOPLE” OF NATURE’S GOD

Hennessy contended that the wording of the Preamble to the Constitution identified its authors as “The People”, the very same “People” who had been liberated from Great Britain by the Declaration of Independence. He analyzed the wording of the Declaration and noted that the King of Great Britain claimed a divine right to rule his subjects. In the draft edition of the Declaration, Thomas Jefferson had specifically identified the King’s religious authority by describing him as the “Christian King of Great Britain” (cf. Wills 1979).

However, many of the U.S. Founding Fathers were Deists, following the lead of Thomas Paine (author of Common Sense, published January 10, 1776, which both inspired and predated the Declaration.) Once the Christian Crown had been removed as the ultimate source of legal authority, the authors of the Declaration named “Nature’s God” (further identified as “Creator” and author of the “Laws of Nature”), as their replacement source for ultimate authority. They concluded their Declaration by appealing to Nature’s God as Supreme Judge of the World, for “divine Providence” and protection from the British Crown.

It was this same Nature’s God that led the authors of the Declaration to state that they held “these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed, by their Creator, with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.” Hennessy’s book is a tedious recital of this phase of American history, but it allowed him to build a step-by-step approach for his thesis. His premise is stated in the opening lines of his “Introduction” (1929:vii): “Many Americans are interested in the Eighteenth Amendment. Millions are interested in the
American citizen. It seems not to be known that the existence of one flatly denies the existence of the other."

In 1924 (the year following the first publication of Hennessy’s book), The People’s Rights Publishers of Cincinnati, Ohio published The Constitutional Rights of the People of America. A Short Review of the History of the American Constitution and A Negation of the Eighteenth Amendment, credited to a “Plain American Citizen.” Its own preamble proclaimed: “Citizens of America! Awake! It is Time to Re-light the Lamp of Paul Revere.” Although this anonymous author included original material in the publication, the author also relied heavily upon the work of Hennessy who had taken the approach that the various attorneys who had been heard before the United States Supreme Court in 1920 (State of Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 350), all failed miserably because their challenges had not been focused upon the meaning of Article V and the 10th Amendment.

Hennessy claimed that, because the makers of the Constitution were “The People,” and because “The People” had been set free from the British Crown, the People of the United States of America were not subject peoples and they did not owe allegiance to a king. “The People” had set themselves free as individuals by means of the Declaration. “The People” only acknowledged Nature’s God as being superior to them. These former subjects had become independent human beings and that is how their status remained until they agreed to join themselves together as citizens of a new nation called the United States of America. As the supreme law of the USA, the Constitution flowed from the spirit of the Declaration as inspired by the Laws of Nature and Nature’s God. It did not flow from the Magna Carta’s privileges or anything else that belonged to the history of the sovereign British Crown.

In the ordinary run of things, Hennessy’s work (now seen from the obfuscation of time), might appear to be a speculative text similar to one lifted from present-day supermarket tabloids. Belying a conclusion that his work was mere historical revisionism is the tangible existence of the 21st Amendment.

Hennessy’s Second Edition

On Sunday, March 17, 1929, (thirteen days after President Herbert Hoover had been sworn into office), Hennessy wrote a new Introduction to the second edition of his book. It reads like a self-vindication of his original
manuscript: He began by reciting the opening words of his original Preamble (see quotation above), from “six years ago” and then he launched into a new recital which began with the year 1919 and the birth of the 18th Amendment:

It was easy for the writer to see what was entirely wrong with the supposed Eighteenth Amendment. Thirteen State Legislatures had intruded upon the protective silence of our Constitution. Misguided men had rendered to Cæser (sic) a matter that belongs to God. In a matter of morals, a new Parliament of thirty-six Legislatures had attempted to usurp dominion over all of us. (1929: xxvii)

Hennessy continued: “The misguided men did not know their America. Their minds were not the minds of Americans. In their hearts they paid homage to the foreign concept that it is for Cæser (sic) to determine in what matters Cæser may govern men.” (ibid.) Then Hennessy began to quote James Madison: “We have heard of the impious doctrine in the Old World that the people were made for kings, not kings for the people. Is this same doctrine to be revived in the New, in another shape – that the solid happiness of the people is to be sacrificed to the views of political institutions of a different form?” (ibid.) Following that recital Hennessy began to quote from Benjamin Franklin: “I have lived, Sir, a long time, and, the longer I live, the more convincing proofs I see of this truth – that God governs in the affairs of men.” (1929: xxviii) (Franklin was the person who had brought Thomas Paine to North America. It was Paine and his fellow Founding Deists who had identified the Creator as Nature’s God in the Declaration.)

Then Hennessy explained the source of his new found satisfaction that his words of 1923 had not been in vain:

I wrote my book that the Americans, who constituted a Republic that can endure, might teach us all that we alone, in our conventions again assembled, have the authority to intrude upon great protective silence of our Constitution in all matters of faith or morals or daily personal conduct. I was confident that the citizens of America, instructed by those earlier citizens who knew so well the value of that protective silence, would make the challenge of those earlier Americans to this new usurpation by Cæser (sic).” (1929: xxxviii)

In his very next paragraph it is possible to imagine Hennessy bursting into the refrain of “I told you so!” He was writing his new Introduction on Sunday, March 17, 1929, and commenting upon events that had taken place
two days earlier: “My confidence has been justified. The challenge of my book came last Friday, on March 15, 1929, from the great State of Rhode Island, where, three hundred years ago, Roger Williams voiced the same political contempt which is embodied in the protective silence of our later Constitution. The challenge came from Providence to Cæser on the Ides of March.” (ibid.) On that day, wrote Hennessy, the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations had introduced into its General Assembly a Resolution which embodied all of the main points put forward by Hennessy in his book.

It was at this point in a rediscovery of these events that Hagger began to follow the advice of Ralph Waldo Emerson who wrote: “We are always coming up with the emphatic facts of history in our private experience and verifying them here. All history becomes subjective; in other words, there is properly no history; only biography” (1992:431). If Hennessy did not make this up, there had to be a newspaper record of these events. On the day after Hennessy wrote the new Introduction to the second edition of his book citing portions of the Resolution of Rhode Island’s General Assembly, The New York Times (Monday, March 18, 1929) repeated some of Hennessy’s same excerpted quotations concerning this new challenge to the validity of the 18th Amendment. The Resolution of Rhode Island’s General Assembly demanded to know whether the

> citizens of this nation have ceased to be free citizens and again have become subjects, owing an allegiance to a new and hitherto unknown Parliament, which consists of any thirty-six Legislatures, after a proposal by Congress, and which is vested with unrestrained power to legislate against us and our human rights in all cases whatsoever. (Hennessy 1929, Introduction; xxix and NYT. “Back Move by State to Void Prohibition”)

These questions, reported the Times, were part of the text to a new challenge by the State questioning the validity of the 18th Amendment. The State had instructed its Attorney General to bring the matter before the U.S. Supreme Court, although the State of Rhode Island was not willing to finance this legal action. In other words the Attorney General was authorized by the Resolution to put together an ad hoc and pro bono challenge.
“MUCH ADO ABOUT LIBERTY”
Following these developments of 1929, Hennessy wrote a play called “Much Ado About Liberty” and published the following year. On its inside title page, Hennessy described it as:

Depicting a last hour debate in the people’s convention at Concord, New Hampshire, where our Constitution received its final adopting vote and our Nation was born on June 21, 1788.

It was Hennessy’s intention that his play would be performed on the same day and month each year following the year 1930.

RHODE ISLAND TAKES THE QUESTION TO HER OWN PEOPLE
Between March 15, 1929 and November 4, 1930, Rhode Island’s Attorney General probably concluded that an ad hoc and pro bono approach was not going to succeed in mounting an efficient campaign leading to the repeal of the 18th Amendment. Because Hennessy had repeatedly claimed that Article V and the 10th Amendment did not permit the creation of an amendment such as the 18th Amendment (because it had been ratified by thirty-six State Legislatures), and because Rhode Island had previously agreed with Hennessy’s proposition in their Resolution of March 15, 1929, the State decided to put the entire matter to a vote by citizens within its borders.

On November 4, 1930, the “qualified electors” of Rhode Island voted 171,960 to 47,652 against further retention of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. The success of this vote led to the creation of a second Resolution by the Rhode Island General Assembly.

ANOTHER RHODE ISLAND RESOLUTION
While the context of the first Resolution was pure Hennessy, this second Resolution added some new twists. It was certified by the Secretary of State as H-805 that had been approved by the General Assembly on March 21, 1931. Unlike the previous Resolution, it did not call for a challenge in the U.S. Supreme Court. This new Resolution was for the purpose of “Recommending to the Congress of the United States the passage of legislation providing for the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.” The General Assembly directed the
Secretary of State to forward copies of the Resolution to the President (Herbert Hoover); Vice-President (Charles Curtis) and members of both the Senate and House of Representatives, ten days before convening of the Seventy-second Congress, which began its first session on December 7, 1931. In the Senate the Minority Whip was Morris Sheppard of Texas who had originally proposed the 18th Amendment. The Speaker of the House was John Nance Garner, also from Texas.

This new Resolution began with its own preamble regarding the defense of liberty in Rhode Island, followed by a general recital of State history, which noted that Rhode Island declared her own independence from Great Britain on May 4, 1776 (two months before the Declaration of Independence was signed), and dared to "stand against tyranny alone." (Resolution 1931: 1) The Resolution added a "been there, tried that" touch: "Whereas, In the course of her history, the State of Rhode Island ... attempted to enforce prohibition by law upon her people, and in the year 1886 the Legislature of this State voted to submit to the people the following amendment to the Constitution of the State" and there followed the details of the prohibition amendment approved in April 1887 "by a vote of 15,113 to 9,230." (Resolution 1931:2) The Resolution continued on to explain that the end result of that Amendment to the State Constitution had proved to be a disaster in that it became unenforceable because "so general was the defiance of the law by the citizens of this State, - so great were the evils which accompanied this prohibitory method, - that in January 1889, the Assembly voted that the previous prohibitory method should be annulled." (ibid.) That State Amendment was annulled in June of that year by a vote of 28,315 to 9,956.

This second Rhode Island Resolution went on to explain that based upon this prior experience, the State refused to go along with what it believed to be a wider version of their own misguided experiment that had previously failed with disastrous consequences. It mentioned the instruction in the earlier Resolution that had been given to its Attorney General to test the legality of the 18th Amendment because it had been ratified by three-fourths of the State Legislatures. The State maintained that it had always refused to ratify the 18th Amendment. The Resolution noted that it was:

contrary to the spirit of the Constitution, debasing our fundamental code of political rights and duties by the addition of a legislative fiat of a purely
sumptuary nature; because said amendment which has so grossly abridged and affected the rights and habits of the people of the United States, was not approved by the people of the United States, or by conventions called by the people of the various states, or by the legislatures of the various states elected to vote upon such an amendment; because said amendment seeks to enforce prohibition by law rather than to promote temperance by education and self-discipline and attempts an experiment never successful in any country at any time.

(Resolution: 3)

Just prior to this instruction it told its own members of the United States Congress to follow the path advocated by Hennessy (although Hennessy was not named):

Resolved; That the Representatives and Senators in Congress from Rhode Island be instructed to initiate, work and vote for legislation requiring Congress to call a convention under Article V of the Constitution of the United States for the purpose of proposing an amendment or amendments to the Constitution amending, modifying, revising, or repealing Article XVIII. (Resolution: 4)

CONGRESS WAVES THE FLAG OF ISLAM OVER AMERICA

Even though debate swirls around the place of alcohol in the lives of believers belonging to the Jewish and Christian faiths, consensus usually leans towards temperance and moderation rather than prohibition. However, exponents of The Qur’an have stated that this work contains three references, which, when combined, are understood to prohibit Muslims from imbibing intoxicants of any type because they interfere with their prayers. It was for these reasons that the champions of the 18th Amendment cynically wrapped their arms around the Islamic faith rather than Judeo-Christianity in order to sell the 18th Amendment to the State Legislatures who ratified it. What one of these politicians did and said, when viewed from the perspective of 2006, is quite amazing.

The 18th Amendment was not the product of Christian theology, but of Islamic texts in the hands of a Christian Congressman. When Senator Morris Sheppard of Texas proposed the 18th Amendment, it was discussed on December 17, 1917 in both the Senate and House, which is the same day...
that it was passed. House Democratic Party Representative Edwin Yates Webb of Shelby, North Carolina introduced the 18th Amendment as Joint Resolution 17, and Hennessy reported (1923: 273–274) that Webb made the following declaration:

During one of the great battles fought by Mohammed, the flag was shot from the ramparts. A daring and devoted soldier immediately seized it with his right hand and held it back on the rampart. Immediately his right arm was shot off, but never faltering, he seized the flag with his left hand and then too, was instantly shot away whereupon with his bleeding stubs he held the emblem in its place until victory came. With a zeal and a determination akin to that which animated this devotee of the great Mahomet, let us wage a ceaseless battle and never sheathe our swords until our constitutional amendment is firmly adopted and the white banner of real effective prohibition proudly floats over every courthouse and city hall throughout this, the greatest nation upon earth.” (See also U.S. Congressional Record, Vol. 56, p.469.)

Hennessy commented (1923:405) that “It was their thought that the doctrine of Christ could be made better Christianity by a substitution of the prohibition of Mohammed for the temperance of Christ.” Hennessy had previously stated (1929:280) that the proposed Constitution had been sent to the One People of America for ratification, not by the States. He quoted Justice Story in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee (14 U.S. 304, 1816). “The Constitution of the United States was ordained and established, not by the states in their sovereign capacities, but emphatically, as the Preamble of the Constitution declares, by the ‘people of the United States’” (1923:324). What alarmed Hennessy most was the lack of understanding of the Constitution by “The People” of the United States. They had lost their bearings and others were trying to rob them of their freedom. But they had become free because of the Declaration of Independence. He was angry that some compared the Declaration to Magna Carta, which he said was nothing but a grant of privileges by a king to his subjects, while the Declaration was a statement by “The People” concerning the status of their total freedom as individuals. Hennessy took issue with those who tried to wave a white flag over the courthouses and city halls of America in manner similar to surrender but in the name of Islam. He also complained that, because of the 18th Amendment, the dog in the RCA logo had become symbolic of “The People" listening to “His Master’s Voice” speaking on behalf of a hitherto
unknown Parliament that was attempting to rule them once again. (1923:404)

Although Hennessy cited the *U.S. Congressional Record* in his 1923 book (which was reprinted without change in 1929, but with a new Introduction added) as the source of his references to Islam and Prohibition, in the Foreword to his 1930 play, Hennessy appears to have concluded that the manner in which Islam had been introduced into this subject only confused the core issue.

**REPEATING PAST MISTAKES**

Although the method used to ratify the 21st Amendment was the method specifically prescribed by Hennessy, popular opinion seems to hold that the 21st Amendment repealed Prohibition, when in reality it introduced a Constitutional method of prohibiting alcoholic beverages within local communities. This confusion is possible because of a lack of understanding of why the 18th Amendment was repealed.

Mistakes of the past are often repeated when lessons of the past are totally forgotten. However, there seems to be a scarcity of public, academic and legal knowledge about the historical background to the 18th and 21st amendments.

It is due to constitutional ignorance that encroachments upon individual rights are continually attempted by means of proposed amendments that seek ratification by state legislatures instead of “The People” sitting in conventions. Yet the record of the 18th and 21st Amendments is plain. Any proposed constitutional amendments that have an impact upon the personal lives of American citizens will have to pass the same test that eventually brought down the 18th Amendment. Article V and the 10th Amendment require that articles of that type are to be referred for ratification by “The People” sitting in conventions.

Modern examples of religiously motivated conflicts with the penumbra of the 10th Amendment can be seen today in the various attempts to prevent the right of female citizens to obtain abortions and in a new Constitutional definition of marriage to mean a heterosexual union. However, as the historical record of the 18th and 21st Amendments plainly show, both of these attempts to interfere with personal liberty will require ratification by “The People” sitting in conventions before they can succeed.
Citizens of the United States owe a lasting debt of gratitude to the memory of attorney Francis X. Hennessy of New York his literary legacy that seeks to preserve our individual freedom under law.

References


The paper takes as its point of departure my studies on the image of Romanian immigrants in the British press, but, unlike my previous research, it focuses on the perspective adopted by the Romanian immigrants themselves, who have their own London-based weekly newspaper, written in Romanian – Diaspora Românească. The first issue was published in London on November 8, 2002, and, eight months later, the newspaper came out in Ireland, as well. Diaspora Românească then extended to the Italian, Spanish and Portuguese markets, thus creating a network in those European countries where many Romanian immigrants are to be found nowadays. Moreover, it is also planning to cover the markets in Germany, France, Austria and Switzerland. It is not the only publication of the Romanian communities living abroad, but it seems to be considered an important voice at least for the Romanian immigrants in the UK, since it is cited in the BBC News Online on the occasion of the visa scandal in the spring of 2004 (Casciani 2004).

Diaspora Românească belongs to the category of ethnic press and any discussion about its articles is bound to bring up issues such as diaspora, ethnic/diasporic identity, the contribution of the media to the shaping of the migrants’ identity, and, considering the latest tendencies in immigration studies, globalisation, third space, hybridisation and transnational communities.

While I cannot avoid mentioning these concepts, it is not my objective, as a discourse analyst, to cast light on the array of definitions and interpretations related to them. I will briefly present the meaning I attribute to the concepts I use in my argumentation and then focus on the text analysis itself.
According to Cohen, the concept of *diaspora* has evolved from the meaning it was given by the ancient Greeks, *i.e.* 'migration and colonization' (*sperio* = 'to sow' and *dia* = 'over'), to its perception in communities such as those represented by Jews, Africans or Palestinians, *i.e.* 'a collective trauma, a banishment, where one dreamed of home, but lived in exile' to, finally, a more flexible notion, used to describe communities living abroad who 'were neither active agents of colonization nor passive agents of persecution' (Cohen 1987:ix). While studies of diasporic communities may deal with various aspects, such as the strong cultural ties that bind the members of the community together, the nostalgia for and the relationship with the homeland, the racism encountered in the host country, or the process of assimilation of the ethnic group (Sreberny 2000:179), the latest research in the area has focused on a reconsideration of diasporic identity from the perspective of globalisation (Cohen 1987, Kennedy and Roudometof 2002, Lull 2000, Sreberny 2000, Wong 2002).

Any diaspora is the result of a process of deterritorialisation, defined as 'the partial tearing apart of cultural structures, relationships, settings, and representations' (Lull 2002:239), basically a dislocation from a given geographic, social and cultural space, which is often associated with the flow of population in a globalised economy, and with the crisis of the nation-state. Deterritorialisation is first of all connected to place; however, it is not a matter of 'excluding or negating local “place” or territory, but of relativizing or decentering it’ (Wong 2002:170). The effect of deterritorialisation would be that the community starts a new existence, which is often divided between at least two places, the homeland and the host country, therefore being 'neither fully at home in nor totally detached from either and often creating a third space of globalised diasporic connection' (Sreberny 2000:180). The cultural identity shaped in the course of deterritorialisation or during attempts at reterritorialisation is often a hybrid one, carrying the mark of traditions from the country of origin on the one hand and from the host country on the other (Lull 2000:253). The consequence of cultural dislocation is a complex process of negotiation of identity and culture ‘wherever migrant populations congregate’ (Lull 2000:240). For example, the newly arrived immigrants interact simultaneously with the other members of the same ethnic community, with their homeland and with the host country.
Robin Cohen has analysed diasporas in relation to five main aspects of globalisation – a world economy, forms of international migration, the development of ‘global cities’, the creation of cosmopolitan and local cultures, and a deterritorialisation of social identity – and has concluded that, while it is difficult to talk about causality between the two phenomena (globalisation and diasporisation), they ‘go together’ extremely well (1987:157–176). Globalisation has worked to the advantage of diasporas, which are most often located in global cities, hubs of international networks of transport and communication, and are able ‘to take advantage of the economic and cultural opportunities on offer’, due to their capacity to bridge ‘the gap between global and local tendencies’ (Cohen 1987:176). The cultural identity of such communities is both subnational and transnational, the result of ‘an overlapping, permeable, multiple system of interaction’ (1987:74).

When referring to the movements of diasporic communities ‘across space and time’, Annabelle Sreberny in her turn emphasises the necessity of reanalysing diasporic identity as a global, hybrid, third-space reality:

A focus on ethnicity has tended to imply a group looking inward to its new national host context. A focus on exile has meant an often nostalgic gaze ‘back’ to the old, political, home. A focus on diaspora seems to invite a looking around, not only in and back but also a scoping all-around gaze, multi-directional. (2000:182)

Much in the same line of argumentation, the notion of transnationalism has been coined to describe those “people who create collective ‘homes’ around themselves” (Wong 2002:170), homes which become thus ‘trans- or multilocal.’ Transmigrants ‘conduct transactions and influence local and national events in their countries of emigration’ (2002:169) and have ‘multiple identities,’ which, due to the fact that they are rooted in several societies, may be in fact described as ‘a hybridized transnational identity’ (2002:172).

The roles of the ethnic media within this framework are multiple: to help the migrants maintain ties with the homeland, to ensure a network between spatially separate communities of the same diaspora, to contribute to the reterritorialisation of the ethnic community, or to keep the migrants informed on issues such as the host country’s legislation, rights, job opportunities and other similar problems (Lull 2000: 252–253, Wood and King 2001:1–22). The ethnic media are considered a proof of transnational-
ism by Lloyd L. Wong, in his analysis of the phenomenon in Canada (2002: 172). They are also viewed as a means of diaspora empowerment, as well as of counteraction to the often discriminatory or racist representations of immigrants in the host-country media (Kennedy and Roudometof 2002:1–26, Lull 2000:256, Riccio 2001:110–126). In conclusion to a study on the impact of the ethnic media on the Iranians in the UK, Annabelle Sreberny states that the diasporic media ultimately contribute to the creation of a new, ‘detrerritorialised’ identity, instead of encouraging the immigrants to simply adopt the value system of the host country:

Again, diasporic media may play to all poles of affect: they can help Iranians relocate within the British cultural space, the inward turn; or they can exacerbate feelings of dislocation, the temporariness of the Iranian existence in England and intense involvement with affairs inside the Islamic Republic, the backward look; or they can bind Iranians to the emerging transnational Iranian community, the truly diasporic vision. Indeed, avid consumption of Persian diasporic media can lead to looking in all directions at once, maintaining a deterritorialized Iranian cultural identity as well as engagement with the fatherland, although by far the weakest invitation is toward realistic engagement with the new ‘home’. (2000: 193)

The objective of my paper is to examine whether any of the above mentioned functions of the ethnic media, especially participation in the development of a hybrid, transnational identity, but also the use of strategies such as immigrant empowerment and counteraction of immigrant representations in the foreign media, is traceable in the discourse of the London-based Diaspora Românească. The analysis is qualitative and is based on seven editorials chosen because they show a central preoccupation with the issue of identity. I have decided to focus on editorials because they are an opinion genre and represent the voice of the newspaper.

The newspaper addresses mainly the latest wave of Romanian immigrants, the post-1989 wave, which can be considered part of the Romanian diaspora only if one accepts a very broad definition of the term. Aware of this problem, in its 17–23 June 2005 issue the newspaper published an editorial about the Romanian diaspora, its development over the years and all the ethnic groups it may consist of (ranging from the Romanians in the Republic of Moldova to the Romanian citizens of other nationalities who
have immigrated). The newspaper ambitiously attempts to address all these groups:

To simplify matters, we will keep using the term ‘Romanian diaspora’ to refer to all the previously mentioned categories. We are part of the Romanian diaspora. We read the Romanian Diaspora. It all makes sense. (Tasente, 2005d, my translation)

My analysis uses the categories identified by Theo van Leeuwen in his detailed study on representations of social actors (1996), within the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis. I shall briefly present these categories, with a focus on those which will be employed in my article.

Van Leeuwen discusses the following types of representation of social actors: exclusion (total exclusion or forms such as suppression or backgrounding); role allocation, with its categories of activation and passivation; genericisation and specification; individualisation and assimilation (which could take the forms of aggregation or collectivisation); association and dissociation; indetermination and differentiation; nomination (use of proper nouns) and categorisation; functionanalisation and identification – types of categorisation; personalisation and impersonalisation (abstraction and objectivation); finally, overdetermination (1996:38–65). There could be an overlap between some of the categories – for instance, ‘personalisation’ refers to human actors in general, be they nominated or categorised.

One of van Leeuwen’s categories that I shall use in my study is role allocation – who is the Actor and who is the Goal (a distinction based on transitivity and verbal processes, as presented by Halliday with reference to the ideational function of language, 1994). It is important to establish who the active participant in a text is and who the ‘receiver’ of the action. The latter may be ‘subjected’, or, in other words, made to ‘suffer’ the action, or ‘beneficialised’, i.e. made to benefit from it (van Leeuwen 1996:44).

Secondly, generic reference to a social group, as opposed to specific reference, may be relevant if a pattern is established, because it removes the group from the readers’ immediate experience or, I would like to add, it endows the group with certain features that seem permanent. Thirdly, association and dissociation with other social actors, especially of the type ‘us’ versus ‘them’, are an important aspect in my analysis. Such elements may often be realised at the level of assumptions – indirect evaluation – or even of direct evaluation, by emphasising the desirable or undesirable characteristics of certain social actors. Fourthly, categorisation, with the sub-types of
functionalisation and identification, is also useful for the purposes of my analysis. Functionalisation presupposes reference to social actors in terms of the activity they carry out, the occupation or role (van Leeuwen 1996:54), while identification may, in its turn, be of three types: classification (on the basis of age, gender, provenance, class, wealth, ethnicity, race, religion etc. of the group), relational identification (which has to do with personal or work relationships) and physical identification. Van Leeuwen adds the factor of 'appraisement' to all this, which is about positive or negative evaluation of social actors (1996:58). Finally, another of van Leeuwen’s categories that appears in the texts I have analysed is impersonalisation, with its forms: abstraction (for example, referring to immigrants as ‘a problem’ – van Leeuwen 1996: 59) and objectivation or representing social actors by referring to a place, thing, instrument, part of their body or anything else that may be associated with them and is not human (1996:59–60).

The following editorials have been analysed: Românii și lipsa identității ['Romanians and the Absence of Identity'] (No. 57, 17–23 April 2004); A fi sau a nu fi român ['To Be or Not to Be a Romanian'] (No. 60, 09–15 May 2004); Relația diaspora-țară ['The Relationship Diaspora-Homeland'] (No. 91, 10–16 December 2004); Poza noastră de pe prima pagină ['Our Picture on the Front Page'] (No. 104, 25–31 March 2005); Imigrantul rău sau bun ['The Bad or Good Immigrant'] (No. 133, 14–20 October 2005); Am întâlnit și români muncitori și cîștigă ['I Have Also Met Honest and Hard-working Romanians'] (No. 138, 18–24 November 2005); Și tu ești român? ['Are You a Romanian, Too?'] (No. 150, 24 February-02 March 2006). The excerpts included in the linguistic analysis, originally written in Romanian, have been translated into English in order to offer any reader of this journal access to them. I have tried to preserve the characteristics of the Romanian structures, so as not to change their intended meaning.

The social category that represents the object of my research is the community of Romanian immigrants, which apparently has four components: the editorialist, his intended audience, the ‘good’ Romanians and the ‘bad’ Romanians. However, the relationship between these sub-categories seems to be more complex, since the intended audience – the newcomers – overlaps, many a time, with the category of ‘good’ Romanians. Moreover, both the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ Romanians form together the community of immigrants on the whole, of which the editorialist and his readers are an integral part. This difficulty in establishing the social actors within the com-
munity indicates, from the very beginning, that the group’s identity is not fully developed.

The editorialist represents himself as part of the community of Romanian immigrants who are his intended audience. This is obvious from his use of the inclusive *we* or *us*. He only becomes *I* when he gives advice or issues exhortations. As *I*, he is a mediator between the community of Romanians he associates with and the ‘other Romanians’, the ‘bad’ Romanians. By taking on this role – as member of a group who suffers because of an unfair negative image, but, at the same time, as someone who knows better – he wishes to persuade Romanians to accept one another and to build a positive image for their community; this is the most important message of the editorials. In this process he uses certain discursive strategies meant to justify the behaviour of the Romanian immigrants, both good and bad, and to respond to accusations in the rest of the English media.

The main problems raised in the editorials are, on the one hand, the shame Romanian immigrants experience when faced with the negative image of their homeland, which makes most of them hide their origins, and, on the other, the distance that ‘good’ Romanians want to take from their co-nationals, who are also to blame for this image and who become ‘the others’ or ‘them’.

In *To be or not to Be a Romanian* (Tasente, 2004b), Romanian immigrants as social actors are impersonalised by means of abstraction: they are thus identified with Romania’s image, which is ‘badly stained nowadays’ by the ‘appalling state of our economy’, ‘the third world living standards’, ‘our failures to convince the EU, with solid evidence, that Romania is worth integrating’, ‘our criminals abroad’, ‘the plight of the orphans back home’, and the visa scandals in the UK. All this contributes to the immigrant’s feeling like ‘a former jailbird who is trying to regain his position in society’ (Tasente, 2004b). The generic reference to the Romanian immigrant as ‘jailbird’ and the impersonalisation Romanian immigrants = Romania = negative image = the image of ‘a Romanian cripple, gypsy, robber and beggar’ (Tasente, 2004b) indicate a permanence about their negative perception, as well as self-perception. At the same time, the genericisation of Romanian immigrants into ‘the bad Romanian immigrant’ (a class in itself) explains the series of behavioural processes (see Halliday 1994) in which they are
involved: ‘we lower our heads even more, in shame’, ‘we hide as much as we can’, ‘we turn our back on one another’ (Tasente, 2004b).

The ‘bad’ Romanian immigrants in the community, the other factor responsible for its negative image, are represented as social actors with the help of functionalisation (what they do – the material processes in which they are Actors) and also appraisement – here negative evaluation. The negative evaluation may be explicit, but also implicit, for example in the ‘good’ Romanians’ attempts to dissociate from them. However, the editorialist does not always come up with these categorisations himself; he simply takes them over from other discourses in the English media or even in the Romanian community, the main source of negative self-perception.

Thus, the ‘other’ Romanians speak bad words, have telephone conversations about illegal activities, pester young Romanian women, and they do it when they think that there is no one else around who can understand Romanian (Tasente, 2006); they turn therefore into a savage group – ‘the horde of Romanians who have spread the disease in the West’ (Tasente, 2006), a negative categorisation which explains why honest Romanians run away from them ‘in shame and sometimes terror’ (Tasente, 2006). In other editorials (Tasente, 2005b, 2005c), the bad Romanian immigrants are represented not only as Actors in negative material processes – ‘Romanians who have strayed’, but also as abstractions, as ‘theft’, ‘robbery’, ‘prostitution’, ‘exploitation of other Romanians’; the purpose of the latter is that of emphasising, yet again, the seriousness of the negative identity they have created for their community, but also that of deleting agency, an aspect to which I shall return later. The ‘bad’ Romanians are also pejoratively categorised as ‘these fellows’, ‘criminals’, and ‘scoundrels’, even if such labels are not given by the editorialist, but by ‘others’ – the English press and citizens (Tasente, 2005c).

As a result, good Romanians tend to avoid them and hide from them, which is discursively represented by means of dissociation, especially in the use of ‘other’ and of ‘Roma’ to refer to them:

‘We are Romanians, but it seems that we cannot live with the other Romanians.’ (Tasente, 2004a, my emphasis)
‘So, you feel that it is not advisable to socialise with Romanians.’ (Tasente, 2004a, my emphasis)
‘That is why each of us feels that the other is dangerous, unpredictable.’ (Tasente, 2004a, my emphasis)
‘And when I say we do certain things, I do not mean thefts, robberies and other similar practices. Such activities must be condemned and we have an obligation to see to it that they do not become an integral part of our immigrant way of life. Otherwise, we will have rightly earned an image similar to that of the Roma.’ (Tasente, 2005b, my emphases)

Due to this overall negative image of their community, Romanian immigrants find themselves in a crisis of identity, not uncommon for transnational groups. At this stage, they appear to have three options: turn towards the homeland and the Romanians back home, turn towards the citizens of the states to which they have emigrated or turn towards their own community, in spite of all the disadvantages I have mentioned. I shall next discuss each of these options.

Firstly, their relationship with the homeland and the Romanians is represented in a manner that leaves little place for reconciliation. There is one editorial that deals exclusively with this aspect: The relationship diaspora-homeland (Tasente, 2004c). In it, role allocation is relevant: Romanian immigrants are Actors in material processes in which Romania is the main Beneficiary: ‘we have provided her with money earned by honest means, we have taught her the practices in the West’ (Tasente, 2004c; see also Tasente, 2005d). At the same time, Romania is not grateful and, paradoxically, rejects her benefactors: ‘We can help the country, but the country does not want our help’; ‘The Romanian people counts over 35 million souls, but, due to a narrow political strategy, the enormous human, political, diplomatic, economic and financial potential of the diaspora is wasted’ (Tasente, 2004c, my emphases).

The relationship with the homeland is represented with the help of what van Leeuwen calls ‘overdetermination’, or the simultaneous participation of a social actor in more than one social practice (1996:61–62). Romania is thus not only the homeland, but also the step-mother of her migrant sons. So, in their relationship with the state, Romanian immigrants are ‘exiles’, while in their relationship with the homeland, Romania’s sons are now ‘orphans’, a new class with which they must identify (Tasente, 2004c). The only conclusion to be drawn is that Romanians in the diaspora see themselves as victims of the homeland, not once (the negative image of the country), but twice (Romania’s attitude towards them).

All these features indicate both a cleavage between the new community and Romania and a position of moral and economic superiority of the
immigrants’ over their homeland, which is a strategy of diaspora empowerment used by the newspaper: ‘Well, we cannot be easily fooled’; ‘Any of Romania’s attempts to get closer to the diaspora will be looked upon with suspicion, she will have to earn our trust.’ (Tasente, 2004c)

Secondly, the citizens of the host countries are represented in two main ways, which cannot be considered solutions to an identity in crisis: genericisation and impersonalisation. Genericisation is obvious when referring to the citizens of the host country as the ‘foreigners’ or simply the ‘inhabitants’ or even as the ‘average citizens’ who believe anything the press writes about Romanians (Tasente, 2005a). More specific representations (the English, the Irish, and the Italians) do not indicate any warmth in the relationship either, since they are identified as ‘having their own flaws’ (Tasente, 2004a) and, therefore, not being the role-models immigrants might expect to find in them.

Impersonalisation takes the form of objectivation – the host country (and implicitly its citizens) is represented as a place ‘we admire and respect’, but which cannot do anything for ‘our tormented hearts’, and, on most occasions, the form of instrumentalisation – foreign citizens = the host-country media, in which the editorialist sees the ‘enemy of the immigrants’ (Tasente, 2005b). The English media are indeed made responsible for crucially contributing to the negative image of Romanian immigrants and for drawing attention to a minority (Tasente, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c), while the good deeds of Romanian immigrants must circulate through ‘private channels’ (Tasente, 2005c). It is the local media that generate racism and hatred against ‘the immigrant’ or, more precisely, ‘the Romanian immigrant’ (Tasente, 2004b), but only on the part of average citizens, not discerning citizens (Tasente, 2005a): ‘Thus, he [the average foreign citizen] thinks that he is your superior and treats you with indifference or like dirt’. Therefore Romanian immigrants are represented as victims in their relationship with the host country’s media – again an instance of overdetermination, but in a different context: ‘This type of press is our enemy that we cannot defeat. Actually, we can only be victims in such a war. And the wounds inflicted upon the Romanian communities abroad by the regular attacks of the foreign press can only be healed by time.’ (Tasente, 2005a).

Under these circumstances, Romanian immigrants have no choice but to remain within their community and find their new identity at this level, which confirms the general tendency of transnational groups to focus upon them-
selves. For this purpose, the editorialist uses what I shall call defence strategies, meant to empower Romanian immigrants in their relationship with the ‘bad’ members of the community, the homeland and the host country.

In one example of such a strategy, the editorialist explains some of the immigrants’ dishonest actions as being the result of the negative image they already have: ‘we can no longer handle the pressure and do foolish things since it does not matter, anyway…’ (Tasente, 2004b). This strategy – ‘we live up to our reputation’, used by the editorialist to absolve the ‘bad’ Romanians from responsibility in the crimes they commit, appears in other articles as well where it is completed by a new element, the fight for survival: ‘the problem we are faced with right now is contextual – the fact that most of us are engaged in a struggle for survival, in which case we act rather instinctively’ (Tasente, 2004a). Moreover, the editorialist introduces the general category of the immigrant, who is sometimes forced to act in a questionable manner, but only in order to survive. Romanian immigrants thus lose their specific feature of ‘bad immigrants’ and become part of this larger class of immigrants whose actions are justified (Tasente, 2004b, 2005b): ‘we do things that any other immigrant would do’; ‘our actions are the same as the actions of the vast majority in the immigrant communities’ (Tasente, 2005b, my emphases).

Another important aspect in the representation of ‘bad’ Romanians is that in most of the cases they are not portrayed as Actors in negative actions, but as people who simply find themselves involved in them, often after they have arrived in the host countries, as if that were a consequence of their migration to these states. Even when they are Actors, their agency is backgrounded (for example, ‘you hear bad words’, and not ‘they say bad words’, Tasente, 2006). Furthermore, they are instant victims of the media in the host countries, which exaggerate the occurrence and gravity of their crimes in order to attract readers. The negative actions of such Romanians are represented in more than one editorial as a disease, therefore implying lack of responsibility. The assumption is that these people need help, not verdicts; consequently, the community should not feel so ashamed as to constantly avoid them.

The editorialist also uses positive defence strategies in order to empower Romanian immigrants, such as the claim that their majority is represented by trustworthy, skilled people, who are known in private circles. The role allocation works in favour of Romanian immigrants this time – they are Actors in positive material processes, and categorisation rests upon positive appraisement. Association with them is also desirable:
It is with these people that we must identify ourselves. They are the ones who send millions of Euros back home every year, they are the ones who adopt the western mentality with which they will return to Romania, they are the ones whose experiences abroad will prove extremely valuable; they are the ones with whom we can sometimes feel free to party in a Romanian style, in good taste and a congenial atmosphere. (Tasente, 2005c, my emphases)

I have also met honest and hard-working Romanians. (Tasente, 2005c, my emphasis)

Impersonalisation is also used, but with a positive connotation: we are *an absolute and vital necessity* for the economy of the states where we have settled' (Tasente, 2005b, my emphasis).

The solution found by the editorialist for the identity crisis of the diasporic community is mutual understanding and acceptance: Romanian immigrants must learn to live with one another, must proudly declare their country of origin and set good examples. Otherwise, they too will be held responsible for the status of victims which the homeland and the media in the host country attach to them.

What the process of deterritorialisation means for Romanian immigrants, at the discursive level at least, is rather an identity in crisis, not really (or not yet) a hybrid or global identity, even if there is a little evidence of that as well. Before creating a new identity for themselves, they must ‘cleanse’ their image of all the negative elements attributed to it in the West. Without claims to generalisation, my qualitative analysis of social actor representations has shown that Diaspora Românească, as a representative of the ethnic media in the UK (and other European countries), participates in establishing the diaspora’s identity, and thus fulfils the typical functions of such media: empowering the immigrant community and responding to criticisms in the host country’s press.

**References**


Articles


The works of William Shakespeare contain a remarkable quantity of law terms, whose significances are naturally unknown to the generality of readers and a pretext for a research paper such as this one.

There are some who appreciate the fact that Shakespeare must have had a sound legal training. And yet the correct use of nautical terms he has displayed in the *Tempest* does not make him a seaman. However, for those who doubt Shakespeare’s legal knowledge and argue that the principles and practice of the law of real property were more generally understood by unprofessional people in Shakespeare’s time than at the present day, that circumstance will not satisfactorily account for all Shakespeare’s legal knowledge, because his works contain passages displaying an insight not merely into the principles and practice of the law of real property, but also into the common law, and of the criminal law, and a thorough intimacy with the exact letter of the Statute Law.

From his concern for juridical issues, as it relates to tragedy, we have stopped at Shakespeare’s exploration of retribution and restitution, for, as the French sociologist Durkheim (1933:387) says: “The task of the most advanced societies is, then, a work of justice”.

**Punishment**

There have been no limits to man’s imagination at devising techniques of punishment. More ways to hurt people and inflict pain exist than ways to reward or encourage people. In other words, society believes in punishment. All we tend to disagree about is how extreme the form of punishment should be.
In the earliest societies, punishment was always a collective responsibility. Everyone in the social group was required to take part in at least the public condemnation of the offender because the intent was to prevent whatever caused the crime to happen from spreading throughout the social group. As law and legal systems developed, societies became accustomed to letting formal authorities perform this function. Punishment then became a formal responsibility to be carried out by professional specialists in the employ of governments.

Retribution

Retributive justice is a theory of criminal justice wherein punishments are justified on the grounds that the criminal has created an imbalance in the social order that must be addressed by action against the criminal.

Perfect equivalence between the crime and its punishment is impossible, and the best that can be achieved is proportionality. The notion of proportionality is the idea that we can rank order the seriousness of the crime as well as a standard progression in the penalties to administer.

The matching of these rank orders is not perfect, but it’s good enough to produce consistency among judges. If we consider the culpability (degree of intent or willfulness) of each offender in addition to the ranked seriousness of their offense, this is called just deserts. If we take consistency to the extreme and see to it that all offenders who commit the same crime with the same degree of culpability get exactly the same punishment, this is called equity. If we look at the punishment as a natural part of the social order and feel satisfied that the offender has been appropriately punished, this is called reciprocity. If the offender happens to agree with the appropriateness of the punishment, or at least accepts some blame or shows remorse, this is called retributivism, or the upholding of human dignity through the mutual acceptance of a fair and just punishment. All these are principles in the philosophy of retribution (equivalence, proportionality, consistency, just deserts, equity, reciprocity, and retributivism).

The *lex talionis* or the law of repayment in kind finds its classic expression in the biblical injunction:

life for life, Eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, Burning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe (Exodus 21:23–5)
Scripture supports private or family vengeance. In the Old Testament, God Himself is a God of wrath, who promises to wreak destruction upon His enemies and the enemies of His people: “The revenger shall slay the murderer”. The word “revenge” occurs 25 times in the Scriptures, “revenger” – 8 times and “vengeance” 72 times. “God is a revenger” says the Geneva Bible and yet, the Christian position on vengeance is complex, even contradictory. Jesus Himself explicitly condemns the lex talionis of the Old Testament in the Sermon on the Mount:

Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. But I say unto you, Resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also.

(Matthew 5:38,9)

However, we are not going to enter such a debate, since we are not attending a theological seminar. My point was that lex talionis dates back to the Scriptures and is somehow blurred with the idea of vengeance, a thing which is totally rejected by and unbearable for criminology. Any criminal justice professor would get upset when someone mistakes retribution with vengeance. Vengeance is something completely different. As Francis Bacon (2004:15) defines it, “Revenge is a kind of wild justice; which the more mans’ nature runs to, the more ought law to weed it out.” Vengeance is not even a philosophy of punishment, or if so, it is a very crude form of retribution.

Leaving aside the criminological thesis, in iron-age societies that lacked written laws, courts and police, justice was synonymous with vengeance: families avenged offences against their members, and the cycles of offense and reprisal morphed into the great feuds that are the subject of saga and legend. Theories of just retribution and the practice of private revenge went together in Christian Europe, at odds but hand in hand, until the eighteenth century. A code of aristocratic family honor demanding vengeance lasted well into the modern period. In Elizabethan England a man was expected to retaliate swiftly for slights to himself or the abuse of his kin or dependents (Rowse 1971; Blackstone 1979). As Laertes says to Claudius:
That drop of blood that’s calm proclaims me bastard, Cries cuckold to my father, brands the harlot Even here between the chaste unsmirched brows Of my true mother. (4.5.119-22)

Case-study

“Here’s much to do with hate, but more with love” (Hamlet, 1.1.166)

The quote is from Hamlet and, yet, that is not the play of our focus. We have chosen a play in which the term “law” is used 11 times, “punishment” and “civil” appear twice and “judgement” occurs in three different places and yet, bloody (20 times) “vengeance” prevails, despite its use by Shakespeare in only two lines and the issues of restitution are dominant and point to a flaw in the juridical system.

This play is Romeo and Juliet, a tragedy in which two patterns of social solidarity, Escalus’s and the lovers’, come into conflict without being contradictory. Blame is assigned in no uncertain terms to the „parents' rage“ (1.0.10), the families having been reproved by Escalus on two or more prior occasions. (As a parenthesis, it is not always the parents’ blame. For instance, in the ball scene, the one thirsty for revenge is young Tybalt “Now, by the stock and honour of my kin,/ To strike him dead, I hold it not a sin.” (1.5.60–61) whilst Juliet’s father tries to smooth him down: “I would not for the wealth of all the town/ Here in my house do him disparagement” (1.5.67–70) and “He [Romeo] shall be endured” (1.5.80). This hostility of unknown origin is evident from the very start in the comic banter between the Capulets’ underlings. The fault festers in a social arena „where civil blood makes civil hands unclean“ (1.0.4). Expiation comes with the young lovers’ deaths along with that of Lady Montague, who is unable to bear the strain of Romeo’s banishment. The act the lovers commit by seeking to unite is neither criminal nor hypocritical, but something the audience takes for granted in human affairs. The lovers could no more have avoided seeking a union than voluntarily cease breathing, nor would the common law require it of them: „The Law compels no man to impossible things“ (Sir Edward Coke 2000:92). This play is unique in being circumscribed by obedience to aesthetic laws which can neither enforce equitable restitution nor compel a tragic playwright to bring back the dead.
Part of the play’s special dramatic power lies in its choric framing device, the only tragedy to use one explicitly. Employing the strict measures of the sonnet, the Chorus seems a true and objective observer. Moreover, its poetry prepares us for the sonnet the lovers create during their initial encounter. This artistic link has further implications, for, if the reconciliatory gestures the families institute seem insufficient to outweigh the loss, the restitution of art nevertheless points us toward unity as opposed to fragmentation. Restitution is held to be a valid means of rehabilitation in limited circumstances. We are certainly given to believe that the Veronese society has been emancipated from hatred to an extent. Such restitutions or pardons undertaken by the king were deemed by Coke (2002:240) a “work of grace and mercy”, particularly in restoring the blood rights of families of felons or traitors.

Legal issues in the play begin to develop as quickly as the young couple’s mutual admiration. Romeo’s banishment seems fair and reasonable given Tybalt’s death and the standing proclamations against public dueling (“the prince expressly hath/Forbidden bandying in Verona streets” (3.1.87–89) and it is precisely Romeo the one who utters this line, when he tries to convince Mercutio to stop at “word”s and not at “blow”s). In other circumstances, Romeo would have been executed on the spot, and Benvolio knows it: “the prince will doom thee death,/ If thou art taken” (3.1.135). But Escalus, even if he think in lex talionis terms “Romeo slew him, he slew Mercutio;/Who now the price of his dear blood doth owe?”(3.1.144–145) still, he wisely refuses the retributivist settlement proposed by Lady Capulet. Even Montague thinks in such terms, though he circumscribes the time frame strictly so that his son might be acquitted outright: “Not Romeo, Prince, he was Mercutio’s friend; / His fault concludes but what the law should end, / The life of Tybalt” (3.1.184–86). Escalus rejects these backward-looking proffers; instead, he regards his juridical role as being forward-looking. He sees some justification for Romeo’s act, but, for good public policy reasons, he cannot allow riotous behavior to go unpunished. The explicit motif for his ruling centers on the deterrent effect of banishment, though his decision to negate his prior ruling imposing the death penalty for public sword-play is fundamentally charitable.

Harsh retribution remains uppermost in the minds of the warring families, who are deeply wounded by the losses they suffer. The young lovers regard Romeo’s banishment as a breach of the sanctity of their relationship...
given the imagery marking their initial encounter. In a moment of lucidity, Friar Lawrence sees the marriage as a curative: “For this alliance may so happy prove / To turn your households’ rancor to pure love” (2.3.91–92). Though his verdict is destined to achieve the opposite effect, Escalus places restitution and social cohesion at the fore. The families’ rancor turns to despair over the deaths of their loved ones, but they are nevertheless reminded of the primacy of such love.

Because of its interest in reaching a judgment expeditiously, the legal system can never deliver the truly balanced restitution that an offended party might legitimately expect. The dead cannot be brought back to life, nor can the survivors ever be fully repaid even if the death penalty is imposed against the offender. As far as the state is concerned, punishment is nearly always aimed at deterring delicts rather than making the aggrieved party whole.

This is not to imply that restitution is defective as a punishment theory because even perfectly symmetrical retribution has its failings. Coke reminds us of the place of lex talionis punishment in common law history: “By the ancient Law of England, he that maimed any man, whereby he lost any part of his body, the delinquent should lose the like part, as he that took away another roans life, should lose his own” (Coke 2002:118). Coke and other theorists understand the deficiencies of this approach (for instance, if a victim had his only remaining good eye removed by a two-eyed aggressor). Punishing a beggar with capital punishment for the murder of a nobleman could never be considered equitable given the class prejudice in Renaissance England. What we infer from here is that equity under law is influenced by cultural and historical dynamics, too. Determining the severity of retaliation remains a difficult problem with shifting solutions, but the fundamental common law assumption holds that a victim ought to have restitution: “But the Law will, that in every case where a man is wrong and endamaged, that he shall have a remedy” (Coke 2000:197).

Full restitution is impossible in most circumstances given the inability of the offender to repay the victim for his acts. Restitution is almost always linked in complicated ways to issues surrounding retribution. Escalus’s nuanced decision to banish Romeo balances his desire to maintain the peace; his decree is inadvertent as to the harm it does the marriage, but it is not reckless or careless, unlike, say, Hamlet’s killing of Polonius.
Civil courts offer a victim the opportunity for restitution by righting a criminal wrong through the imposition of damages. Black’s Law Dictionary (1999:1313) defines restitution as an equitable remedy by which a person is restored to his or her original position prior to loss or injury. But there can be no real restitution for a permanently disfiguring injury or death, so Romeo’s banishment occupies a curious niche in the distribution of justice. There is wisdom in Friar Lawrence’s perspective on banishment as „dear mercy“ because the lovers are at the very least afforded the opportunity to reunite (3.3.28). Still, banishment has always been an extraordinary punishment in the English legal tradition: “For exile or transportation is a punishment unknown to the common law; and whenever inflicted, it is by the express direction of an act of parliament” (Hawley 1998: 91). Prohibitions against banishment are nearly absolute in English common law because that form of punishment has been reserved by the state for special circumstances.

Escalus is unaware of the marriage in part because the young lovers fear their families more than their ruler, but their status as a married couple gives them a special claim in English law. Ecclesiastical law requires restitution of conjugal rights, one indication of the state’s overriding concern to defend the matrimonial bond.

The intent of canon law was to keep the family intact for better or worse, sometimes to the great disadvantage of women. Canonical edicts on the restitution of conjugal rights suggest the supra-legal authority behind Friar Lawrence’s intercessions. Common law courts had habeus corpus and other temporal powers, but Coke defended the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts in tithing, marriage, heresy, adultery, and other moral matters. Civil and ecclesiastical laws were designed to bring lovers together. An ecclesiastical court would encourage their marriage bond and sanctify their love based on a putatively higher law than that which Escalus invokes. We are left to imagine what Escalus’s position on banishment might be had he been made aware of their relationship.

The means by which Shakespeare sets off his hero from society will be the overt criminal act, the contemplation of which, ironically, a tragic metaphysical journey is issued. This subjectivity flourishes in the tale of a melancholic young prince, written roughly a decade after what is by comparison an idyllic story of unfortunate young lovers who lived together far too brief a time in Verona.
Even if some of the critics, due to the weight which Shakespeare accords to social correctness, do not grant the play their highest praise, *Romeo and Juliet* remains, as Coleridge (in Hawley 1998:103) put it: “A beautiful close-poetic” example of “justice: All are punished! The spring and winter meet, and winter assumes the character of spring, spring the sadness of winter”.

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THE QUESTION OF REGISTER IN POETIC TRANSLATION: THE EMINESCU TRANSLATIONS OF LEON LEVIȚCHI AND ANDREI BANTAȘ

With an extract from a work in progress on a new Eminescu translation

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Poetry translation, especially that which attempts to conserve rhyme and metre, is notoriously difficult, and it is a truth universally acknowledged that the greater the poet, the more difficult it is to do justice to their work in translation. Hence arises the myth that certain poets are simply 'impossible to translate'. Romania’s national poet, Mihai Eminescu, is generally considered to belong to this category, despite a number of valiant attempts to translate him. The result is that his work is not as well known to speakers of English as, let us say, Goethe, Akhmatova or Cavafy, names with whom he deserves comparison.

The 2003 Teora Press bilingual edition Eminescu Poezii Poems, using the translations of Levițchi and Bantaș, is therefore to be welcomed as a step in the direction of familiarising the anglophone world with a poet it has neglected, despite the fact that he is a part of a European Romanticism in no way alien to the tradition of British poetry.

However, although these translations give us a hint of the fascination of Eminescu's work, they are not, I believe, completely successful as attempts to create poetry in the target language. Although the translations are ingenious, and show an infinite verbal resourcefulness, they tend to adhere to rhyme and metre at the expense of natural syntax, overusing archaisms and in the process sometimes creating jarring shifts of register. Therefore, though I am very far from wishing to show any disrespect to these eminent scholars, through whom I first discovered Eminescu, I feel that their work leaves 'space' for a new translation.
In this paper I would like to explain, with some examples, the reasons why I find their translation to be inadequate, not in terms of its accuracy, but in terms of the register of the target language. I also present in comparison some extracts from a work in progress: my own attempt to put Eminescu into contemporary English verse. This consists of a translation of *Sonnet 1*, which uses rhyme, but does not strictly follow the rhyme patterns of the original, thirty-four stanzas from *Luceafărul* (*Hyperion*), in which I do adhere to the original rhyme scheme, and an (almost) unrhymed translation of *Mai am un singur dor* (*The Last Wish*). In these translations I attempt to provide a contemporary non-archaic version of Eminescu without forgetting that the poems in question are works of High Romanticism and need to remain so in translation. In doing so, I am also attempting to prove that, despite the long English love affair with understatement and irony, despite the two-volts-down-the-green-fuse aesthetics of our present Poet Laureate, there is not a natural antipathy between High Romantic sensibility and contemporary English verse, in an approximation to the language of living men and women.

I have placed the versions side by side, along with the Romanian original text, in the appendix and, in what follows, I will present my case regarding what I felt needed changing in the Teora version and why.

The first texts in the appendix are from Eminescu’s sonnets. In Bantaş’s translation, archaic poetised diction such as ‘tis’, ‘amain’ and ‘evermore’ may repel the modern reader, and also clashes with more modern-sounding contractions such as ‘You’d’. Also, a more serious problem arises when this is combined with the type of internal rhyme which should generally be avoided in English, as in ‘I also lounge and toy with lore of yore’ (l. 9), or when we get the impression that sense is strained in order to find a suitable rhyme, as in the opening line where the archaic-sounding and extremely unusual word ‘aheap’ also creates a somewhat confusing picture: can leaves be simultaneously driven by the wind and piled up? Likewise, *exorcise* (l. 10) is not a literal rendering of the Romanian, and the reader is left rather confused as to why the tale needs to be exorcised. Lastly, I felt that the final line needed to be changed because of the rather awkward phrase ‘fine-shaped’ and the fact that a reference to fingers blinding eyes could suggest a poking of nails into eyeballs as much as a playful covering of a lover’s eyes.
The second text in the appendix includes extracts from *Hyperion*. Here, similar questions arise, and the problem is of greater urgency in so far as a great deal more is at stake. Whereas in *Sonnet 1* the translator must attempt to follow the poet in capturing the mood of an autumn day and a moment of tenderness between undeclared lovers, in *Hyperion* we are plunged into a mythical world of breathless passion and piercing Romantic irony, and the opportunities for bathos are immense. Like the myth of Hyperion itself, the language of the poem should both be rooted in the earth and reach for the stars: it is not an easy balance to achieve. The register shifts which I make from Leviţchi’s translation operate in two directions: sometimes towards a more simple and gritty language, but sometimes to a more elevated and Latinate register.

In making the translation, I have tried to avoid some of the strained rhymes, register clashes and archaisms which mar Leviţchi’s translation, sometimes, though not always, by taking a few liberties with meaning. To give an example: Leviţchi translates *Cobori în jos, luceafar blând, Alunecând pe-o raza, / Patrunde-n casa şi în gând / Şi viaţa-mi lumineaza!* as

\[
\text{Descend, o mild Hyperion,} \\
\text{Glide down upon a ray,} \\
\text{Into my home and thoughts anon} \\
\text{And brighten up my way!}
\]

The trouble with this is that *Hyperion* does not really rhyme with *anon*, and this, combined with the archaism, gives the effect of a failed, rather than a half-rhyme. Then, ‘glide down upon a ray’ is, I feel, too concrete, giving the impression of Hyperion swooshing to earth in cartoon-character style on top of a slide-like ray. And, finally, *brighten up* is not the English for *illuminate* or *irradiate*, but rather for the process of making a room more cheerful by the addition of a few brightly coloured flowers or rugs, or for making someone’s day go by more pleasantly by some small acts of kindness. The mystical and erotic qualities of the princess’ invocation to Hyperion are thus completely destroyed by a single inappropriate phrasal verb. To avoid these defects while still maintaining rhyme and metre, I found myself forced to add a detail that is not in the original. Hyperion thus gains some *courts*: after all, Keats’s Hyperion has them, and I like to think that Eminescu might have appreciated the intertextual allusion:
Descend, Hyperion, from your courts,
Glide down within a ray,
Into my house, into my thoughts,
Illuminate my way.

Elsewhere, freedoms that I have taken have generally been in favour of making the verse more concrete, as in stanzas (2) and (3). The technique that I used here was not one of verbal juggling, but an attempt to re-imagine what I believed Eminescu was trying to convey, or perhaps more simply, to re-imagine Hyperion. The extent to which I have succeeded is ultimately for others to judge.

In my version of Mai am un singur dor (‘The Last Wish’), the third text in the appendix, I make fewer imaginative changes, but again my main aim has been to remedy problems with register in the target language. Here I am attempting to move towards the simplicity which is the keynote of the poem in the original. Again, I try to avoid archaic diction, substituting ‘I have a last desire’ for ‘The boon which last I crave’, and ‘From the shadow of the firs’ for ‘Through shady firs of yore’, and smoothing out the inversion of ‘I want no coffin rich’ to ‘No costly funeral please’, and that of ‘Chant autumn dirges deep’ to ‘Chant dirges of autumn’. Archaic diction per se is not the only problem with Leviţchi’s translations: it is sometimes combined with inaccurate syntax, as in ‘The Moon will glide atop/Of firs’ which becomes in my version ‘The moon will rise above/The fir trees straight and tall’. Elsewhere there is an internal clash of register within a line, as in ‘Just weave for me a bed’, where the colloquial flavour of just does not suit the far from colloquial ‘weave for me’ (as opposed to ‘weave me’); I prefer to shift towards a middle register with ‘Weave me a plain bed’. Sometimes a certain redundancy of meaning also creeps in, as in ‘Lament my death and weep’, which I replace with the simpler ‘With lamentation’.

The use of feminine rhyme, as in huddle/muddle, which with rare exceptions, is not associated with serious thought in English poetic diction, also, I felt, needed to be replaced: especially as muddle is also a quasi-comic word in English and therefore jars in the context. When I first presented this translation at Timişoara in 2005, my substitution ‘this world’s confusion’, was thought to be too abstract by some of those present: I would, however, defend it, as the word confusion, though of Latinate root, does not
merely refer to a lack of intellectual clarity, but can also be applied in more concrete cases, as in ‘To be lost in the confusion of the street’.

Another phrase in Levitchi’s translation which constitutes an error of register is ‘Not far from the seaside’, which is unfortunate because of the excessive colloquialness of ‘Not far from’ and because the word seaside in English has a tendency to conjure up connotations of traditional seaside holidays, with brass bands and candyfloss. (We might say that a seaside holiday is not simply a beach holiday, but a beach holiday with certain unsophisticated trimmings!) I have preferred to bring in a cognate of the original Romanian which evokes echoes of Timon of Athens with ‘On the margins of the sea.’ Likewise, I have substituted ‘With ceaseless moaning’ for ‘And moan and never stop’, which causes a register clash because of the common English collocation ‘Stop moaning’ which thus casts the springs falling from the rocks in the role of a peevish child, a nagging wife or a belly-aching acquaintance.

The use of occasional rhyme and half-rhymes in my translation seemed to me the most effective way of capturing the atmosphere of melancholy stillness in this poem in an English version, though after some hesitation I rejected the stillness of ‘And over me the holy linden/ Will wave its branches’ for the swinging effect of the rhymed ‘And the holy linden-tree/Will wave its branches over me’.

I would like to conclude with a poem of my own, which is also a kind of compressed version of translations which I hope to make in the future:

To Eminescu
Fiona Tomkinson

You’ve taught us that deceit can come
In exotic guise
A hindu god
A poisoned shaft
Of parrotfeathers
And then the pain that doesn’t stop.

Death calling in so many ways:
The elfland prince
With pollen in his hair
The white-handed maiden
That lured down a star
But needed a bastard
To open her legs
The edge of the abyss
Where with Hyperion
We feel the dead weight
Of eternity, just another name for time.
And the marshy fringe of a lake
Where presence and absence
Of the desired
Were equal dangers.
Then the small blue flower
Which promised so little
Yet somehow managed
The perfect betrayal.

The hunting horn, your voice in metaphor
Consoles us when
Its sounding shreds all consolation.

But all this we knew before.

You taught us something else.
That deceit can have the tang
Of the lime-drifts in May
Promising something, we don’t know what
More than summer and the heavy heat
On a day of wet pavements
And pleasant dullness, blunt and sharp
A surge of caffeine in the blood
No drunkenness, but the thrill
Of a glass of wine in an outside café
To a girl of eighteen not used to such things.
Secondhand bookshops in the sidestreets
Pages that we’ll never read but smell
And a ladder leading to an attic somewhere..
Or expectation of an evening
The shot of *tuica*, the slice of cold meat
And something still unplanned....

This time it’s not
Lotus blossom covering up
The old stench of the Nile
But a promise like
The smell of peeled potatoes
Something not yet edible.
It’s feeling so much at home
In a place where you’ll never
Be invited again.

And something that you yourself
Learned imperfectly
That a final delusion is waiting
In the honest indignation
Of a wild cat’s spit and claws
And the thought this might change
By the weight of a feather
A country’s fate.

28/2/2005

**Note:** Thanks to my Romanian friend, Adriana Răducanu, for reading and commenting on my translation and for making literal English translations of some of the Eminescu texts.

**References**

APPENDIX

From Sonnets

1.

My translation

*Afara-i toamnã, frunza-mprãºtiatã*
It's autumn: leaves from far are blown in heaps,
*Iar vântul zvârle-n geamuri grele picuri;*
The windows groan, rattle in the wind and rain;
*Și tu citeºti scrisori din roase plicuri*
You're reading through old letters once again
*Și într-un ceas gândeºti la viaþa toata.*
Your thought sweeps through your life in just one hour.

*Pierzându-þi timpul tau cu dulci nimicuri,*
Dwelling on trash, sweet nothings from the past,
*N-ai vrea ca nime-n uºa ta sa bata;*
You'd hate the man who tapped your window-pane;
*Dar ºi mai bine-i, când afara-i zloata,*
You want the sleet to drown the world outside,
*Sa stai visând la foc, de somn sa picuri.*
So you can watch the fire, and doze and dream.

*Și eu astfel ma uit din jeþ pe gânduri,*
I also play with legends of the past,
*Visez la basmul vechi al zânei Dochii;*
Dream the tale of the fairy Dochia;
*In juru-ni ceaþa creºte rânduri-rânduri*
And round me – the mists are creeping nearer.

*Deodat-aud foºnirea unei rochii,*
Sound of swishing skirts: I stand in surprise
*Un moale pas abia atins de scânduri...*
Soft steps that scarcely touch the floor ... and then
*Iar mânã subþiri ºi reci mi-acopar ochii.*
A blindfold: slim fingers cold on my eyes.
Andrei Bantaș’s Translation

’Tis autumn: leaves are driv’n far, aheap
The windows groan with gales and rattling rain
While you peruse old letters once again
And in one hour your thoughts a lifetime sweep.

While idling with sweet nothings – vain and cheap –
You’d hate the man who’d tap your window-pane!
Though, better still, when sleet blows up amain,
You’d dream by ember glow – doze off to sleep.

I also lounge and toy with lore of yore:
Old Dochia’s tale I try to exorcise;
Around me, mists are growing evermore;

The sudden swish of skirts now makes me rise –
Soft steps which scarcely skim the floor…
Then cold and fine-shaped fingers blind my eyes.

Stanzas* from Hyperion

*Stanza numbers given are not of the original, but simply a consecutive numbering for ease of reference to the extracts here translated. Lines of stars mark a break in the text.

My translation

Long, long ago, we have been told
By those who weave the tale,
A maiden lived, of royal mould
And charm that could not fail.

.Descend, Hyperion, from your courts,
Glide down within a ray,
Into my house, into my thoughts,
Illuminate my way.”

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“I have left my sphere on high—
In answer to your plea,
My father is the towering sky,
My mother is the sea.

Oh, come and on your golden hair
I’ll lay a starry crown,
See! Brighter than the stars from there
Your radiance shines down!

But if you really want my love,
If your love is no sham,
Come down to earth
Be mortal as I am.

I shall be born again from sin,
Escape from the old law;
Eternity is bound within:
I shall be bound no more.”

Floundering in stars as in a sea
He swam and struggled there...
He flew that pain might set him free,
Till with a final flare,

Extinguished totally: lights out;
There was no eye to see,
Time like a foetus thrashed about
Fenceless infinity
From black eternity’s dark weight
My Lord, deliver me,
To you the world be consecrate
And praised may your name be.

Ask me for anything, my Lord,
But give a different fate,
Life and death are in your word
Their fountain and their date;

The eternal blazes from my hair:
Deprive me of it now!
And (the exchange is only fair)
An hour’s love allow...

*****************************************

They lie among silver flowers,
A couple with bright hair,
On their curls a sweet rain showers:
Blossoms fall through the air.

*****************************************

He trembles as in other days
In valleys and in woods,
While guiding through their lonely ways
The tempestuous floods;

But he no more from gates of day
Falls to the ocean’s brim:
What do you care, you piece of clay
If it is me or him?

You are safe and warm while still
Life’s narrow confines hold,
And I in light flaming feel
Immortal and ice-cold.

- De greul negrei vecinicii,
Pârinte, mâ desleagă,
Și lăudat pe veci să fii
Pe-a lumii scară-ntreagă, (9)

O, cere-mi, Doamne, orice preț
Dar dă-mi o altă soarte,
Căci tu izvor ești de vieți
Și dătâtor de moarte; (10)

Reia-mi al nemuririi nimb
Și focul din pricire,
Și pentru toate dă-mi în schimb
O oră de iubire... (11)

Miroase florile-argintii
Și cad, o dulce ploaie,
Pe creștetele-a doi copii
Ca plete lungi, bălaie. (12)

El tremură ca alte dăți
În codri și pe dealuri,
Călăuzind singurătăți
De nișcătoare valuri; (13)

Dar nu mai cade ca-n trecut
În mări din tot înaltul;
- Ce-ți pasă ție, chip de lut,
Dac-oi fi eu sau altul? (14)

Trâind în cercul vostru strâmt
Norocul vă petrece,
Ci eu în lumea mea mă simț
Nemuritor și rece. (15)
Leon Levičchi’s translation

Upon a time, as people said
...In fairy tales of old,
There lived a high-born, royal maid
Of grace and charm untold. […]

Descend, o mild Hyperion,
Glide down upon a ray,
Into my home and thoughts anon
And brighten up my way! […]

“However hard, I left my sky
To gratify your plea,
My father is the heaven high,
My mother is the sea. […]

O, come, and on your fair-haired head
A wreath of stars I’ll lay,
That from my heavens you may shed
More glorious light than they.” […]

But if you really want that I
Should your beloved be
Descend on earth from there on high,
The mortal just like me.” […]

I shall be born, whate’er betide,
In sin, take a new law;
Though to eternity I’m tied,
I shall be tied no more.” […]

How like a sea they girdled him,
And swam and heaved about...
And flew, and flew, an ache-borne whim,
Till everything died out;

For where they reached there was no bourne,
To see there was no eye,
And from the chaos to be born
Time vainly made a try. […]
"From heavy, dark eternity
Deliver me, o Lord,
For ever hallowed may’st Thou be,
And praised through all teh world.

O, ask me, Father, anything
But change my fortune now;
O’er Fount of Life Thou art the king,
The death-dispenser Thou.

My aura of eternity,
My fiery looks retrieve,
And, in exchange, for love grant me
A single hour’s leave. [...]"

Two children with long flaxen hair
Are lying ‘mid the flowers;
Upon them blooms fall from the air
In scented, silver showers. [...]"

He trembles as he often would,
In forests, hills and leas,
And guides the awesome solitude
Of ever restless seas.

Yet he no more, as yesterday,
Falls down into the sea;
What dost thou care, o, shape of clay,
If it is I or he?

You live accompanied by weal
In your all-narrow fold,
Whilst in my boundless world I feel
Both deathless and dead cold.”
Mai am un singur dor

The Last Wish
(my translation)

I have a last desire:
Mai am un singur dor:
That you dig me a grave
În liniștea serii,
At the evening hour
Sa ma lasați sa mor
On the margins of the sea;
La marginea marii;
That my sleep be quiet
Sa-mi fie somnul lin
And the forest near,
Și codrul aproape,
The waters still
Pe-ntinsele ape
And the heavens clear.
Sa am un cer senin.
No costly funeral please,
...Nu-mi trebuie flămuri ;
No banners for the dead,
Nu voi sicriu bogat,
Weave me a plain bed
Ci-mi împletită un pat
From forest branches.
Din tinerere râmâri.

Let no-one follow me
Și nime-n urma mea
With lamentation
Nu-mi plângă la creștet
Only the withered leaves
Doar toamna glas sa dea
Chant dirges of autumn
Franțișului vesteș;
While springs fall from rocks,
Pe când cu zgomot cad

The Boon Which I Last Crave
(Leon Levițchi’s translation)

The boon which I last crave
Is that at eventide
You dig for me a grave
Not far from the seaside.
So may my sleep be quiet,
The forest near,
The heavens ever clear,
The waters in no riot.
I want no coffin rich,
No banners for the dead;
Just weave for me a bed
From tender twig and switch.

Behind me let no one
Lament my death and weep;
Let withered leaves alone
Chant autumn dirges deep.
While from the rocks springs fall
With ceaseless moaning, 
Izvoarele-ntr-una, 
The moon will rise above 
Alunece luna
The fir-trees straight and tall. 
Prin vârfuli lungi de brad 
The sheep-bells will ring 
Patrunza talanga 
On the chill winds of dusk 
Al serii rece vânt, 
And the holy lime will swing 
Deasupra-mi teiul sfânt 
Will wave its branches over me. 
Sa-și scuture creanga.

As I free myself at last 
De-atunci înainte 
From this world’s confusion, 
M-or troieni cu drag 
Dear moments from my past 
Aduceri aminte. 
Will drift ... like snow around my stone. 
Luceferi, ce rasar 
And my old friends, the stars 
Din umbra de cetini, 
From the shadows of the firs 
Fiindu-mi prieteni. 
Will smile continually, 
O sa-mi zâmbeasca iar. 
The sentries of my sleep. 
Va geme de patemi 
And the sea’s bitter chant 
Al mării aspru cânt... 
Torn from its wild passions... 
Ci eu voi fi pamânt 
While I am earth and lie 
În singuratate-mi. 
In this my solitude. 
In perfect solitude.

And moan and never stop, 
The Moon will glide atop 
Of firs, so straight, so tall. 
The chill dusk-winds will be 
Replete with sheep bells ring. 
And the holy lime will swing 
Its branches over me.

As I shall cease at last 
To wade in this world’s muddle, 
Dear moments of my past 
Will to my tombstone huddle, 
The stars, my friends that peep 
Through shady firs of yore, 
Will smile and evermore 
Will watch and guard my sleep. 
Torn by her passions rude, 
The sea will sing and cry, 
While I am dust and lie,
CULTURE BORDERLINES
1. Globalizing trends in specialized contexts

The last few decades have witnessed great developments in co-operation and collaboration at an international level in all fields, but particularly in the business and communication sectors, as part of a continuous process of economic globalisation. This process of globalisation offers a topical illustration of the interaction between linguistic and cultural factors in the construction of discourse, both within specialized domains and in wider contexts. This theme has become so relevant for intercultural communication that it has been the object of several studies in recent years (cf., among others, Wierzbicka 1991, Mauranen 1993, Clyne 1994, Pauwels 1994, Scollon / Wong Scollon 1995, Ulijn / Murray 1995, Ventola / Mauranen 1996, Pan / Wong Scollon / Scollon 2002, Candlin / Gotti 2004a, 2004b).

Domain-specific languages are prone to the pressures of intercultural variation, as it is not only the sociocultural factors inherent in a text but also the interpretive schemata which deeply affect its realisation and interpretation within the host professional community (cf. Gotti 2005). Moreover, intercultural communication is often made more complex by the locutors’ need to make their texts as adaptable as possible to contextual features and pragmatic purposes, thus frequently originating great variation in professional genres as well as phenomena of intertextuality and interdiscursivity (Foucault 1984, Bakhtin 1986, Fairclough 1992, Fairclough et al. 2007). In such a way, not only are novel (inter)texts constructed, but novel (inter)discourses also make an appearance, representing new and as yet not fully stable orders of discourse.

This process of globalization has certainly favoured English, and in the last century English undoubtedly became the language of communication in most international contexts. Indeed, now English is the main language of international business and academic conferences, and is commonly used in a variety of domains: from science to technology, from diplomacy to...
sport, from pop music to advertising. In several countries English is becoming the second language of many people who use it regularly, especially for work. In these contexts the use of English is not only seen as favouring international communication within and outside the company, but also has a significant role to play in the creation of corporate culture within British subsidiaries abroad (Nickerson 2000) or in the enhancement of in-group togetherness in business meetings (Poncini 2004a). In both cases communication is seen as a tool in the strategic management of international operations, and language skills are deemed essential for performing daily activities.

The use of English by non-native speakers is quickly spreading also in non-working contexts. In spite of the multilingual policy adopted by the EU authorities, English is actually becoming the lingua franca of Europe, as this often proves to be the only language common to the interlocutors. As bilingualism in English increases, there is a corresponding decrease in bilingualism with other European languages (e.g. Italian-French, German-Swedish) and a consequent rise in the use of English as a European lingua franca. The same situation is found in Asia, where international trading among Asian countries relies on Asian varieties of English rather than on Asian languages themselves (Yano 2001, Bargiela-Chiappini / Gotti 2005).

Not only do ordinary people in Europe communicate with one another in English, but this language is the one frequently used by European Union officials to communicate with one another and with EU citizens. A confirmation can be found in a sentence taken from the call for tenders for a European Union programme:

Proposals may be submitted in any Community language. In order to facilitate assessment by evaluators drawn from various EEA countries, an English translation should preferably accompany any proposals made in another language. (INFO 2000)

2. Hegemonic trends in intercultural settings

The spread of English, which frequently furthers exchange and contact between nations, also raises the crucial issue of the non-neutrality of language. For example, in business communication, an area in which English represents a means of contact and interaction among people from different cultures allowing concrete common goals to be negotiated and achieved,
the recurrent use of this language—while guaranteeing an international and
global dimension—is necessarily culturally marked and consequently
requires some kind of adaptation on the part of interactants (Trosborg / Flyvholm Jørgensen 2005, Palmer-Silveira et al. 2006). Culturally marked in
a similar way is the choice among the variant forms of English, the consid-
eration of their status and the attitude towards their modes of interpretation.
All this can have a noticeable effect on intercultural communication, as
unawareness of these factors can lead to situations where the apparent
understanding between members of different cultures conceals actual dif-
ferences or confusion related to the identity and discourse practices of the
speaker or writer, possibly having a negative impact (Cortese / Duszak
2005). In these cases comprehension is merely at a surface rather than a
deep level.

These issues are present both in face-to-face communication in gener-
al and in the case of professional/organizational/institutional encounters
and their professional/organizational/institutional memberships (Firth 1994,
1995, Bargiela-Chiappini / Harris 1997a, 1997b). They can also be found in
written texts, which, beyond the apparent surface uniformity linked to the
specific field, are influenced at a rhetorical and textual level by the cognitive
patterns and discourse conventions of the community of the speakers or
issues concern not only the language used, but also the different way of
managing communication and the patterns of interpersonal behaviour in
general.

In spite of the fact that specialized discourse has traditionally been
considered objective and impersonal, in recent years linguistic research has
shown both the existence of overt and covert strategies that modulate the
author’s control of the recipient’s response, and the presence of discoursal
realizations aiming at presenting facts and concepts from a non-neutral per-
spective. This is a confirmation of the fact that language is generally marked
both in its cultural content and in the range of available linguistic variants
(Kuper 1999), and that people involved in cross-cultural communication
clearly construct discourse to suit the communicative needs of an interna-
tional audience, adapting their native identities to a common plan which
implies a new framework of values and shared behaviour. This process is
most evident in domains of use (such as academic, technical and scientific
communication) where the socialisation of knowledge plays a crucial cohesive role.

As intercultural differences are bound to influence the comprehension of events in people belonging to different cultures, research in the field of contrastive rhetoric (Connor 1998, Hyland / Bondi 2006) has greatly helped the identification of those textual aspects which could be attributed to culturally determined schemata reproducing a ‘world view’ typical of the native culture. It has been shown that, when communicating in English, the non-native is confronted with a psycho-cognitive situation where his/her native linguistic and cultural schemata conflict with the English schemata dominant in international professional communities, and is thus forced to negotiate and redefine his/her cultural identity in order to successfully communicate in international and intercultural settings. Furthermore, anthropological and sociological accounts of cultural interaction in international communities and organizations (Hofstede 1991) suggest the possibility of hybrid communicative schemata in which a new set of cultural values and identities—functional to communication in the wider community—is created in response to the need to communicate internationally. Thus, while generally adopting the norms and features of the dominant language and culture in the specific wiser discourse community, the new, contaminated system retains some key traits of the native language and culture. At the same time, English as the language dominant in international exchanges within the professions has a backwash effect, thus contaminating and hybridizing the native system.

In businesses and other organizations this scenario is complicated by the presence of cultural models and communicative repertoires associated with the corporate culture predominant in different economic systems and different countries, an aspect which has been widely explored in the literature (Hofstede 1984, Trompenaars / Hampden-Turner 1997). Studies on the definition of ethnolinguistic identity within multicultural groups (Kim / Gudykunst 1988) have shown that the bi-(pluri)lingualism brought about by the use of English as a *lingua franca* in international relations presents particular features, because the actors involved are not part of the same linguistic community. In business communication research, much attention has also been paid to business negotiations (Firth 1994, Hendon *et al.* 1996, Ghauri / Usunier 1996), also with studies from a linguistic point of view (e.g. Bargiela-Chiappini / Harris 1997a, 1997b; Nickerson 2000; Bargiela-Chiappini
2004), aimed at explaining intercultural variables in the behaviour of individuals belonging to different national/corporate communities. Indeed, the use of English as an international language for communication is more widespread in economics and business than in other specialized fields, particularly as regards *lingua franca* functions. This is a counterpart of the ongoing process of economic globalization, of which it is both an expression and an instrument.

The consequence is an inevitable move towards global communicative models. However, local components are not eliminated and lead to forms of resistance, partly traceable to divergences in ways of categorization resulting from the acquisition of the native language (Gumperz / Levinson 1996) and partly due to the desire to contrast linguistic/cultural homogenization and the homologation potentially imposed by globalization. In this reaction to globalization, three different perspectives have been identified according to the various ways in which the linguistic-cultural identities of the different actors emerge in the use of English as *lingua franca*:

1. The spontaneous emergence, in written and oral exchanges, of elements connected to the ethnic/cultural identity of the actors involved; it is indeed almost inevitable that communicative acts are characterized by linguistically and culturally marked elements, identifiable above all at a discursive level. In this perspective, for the examination of written texts, genre analysis has proved to be particularly suited to identifying the discrepancies between global textual conventions and concrete realizations (Swales 1990, 2004; Bhatia 1993, 2004; Berkenkotter / Huckin 1995, Bargiela-Chiappini / Nickerson 1999, Gillaerts / Gotti 2005, Bhatia / Gotti 2006).

2. The deliberate construction of cultural identity in different discourse types, e.g. to promote an image for the sale of traditional products or products with a strong cultural connotation (for example, typical foods, handicrafts, industries linked to the image of a country—e.g. fashion and tourism in Italy, cf. Poncini 2004b);

3. The ‘affirmative’ representation of identity by companies and other organizations (e.g. banks, financial institutions, organizations focusing on fair trace and solidarity), which through the use of discourse and linguistic practices manifest their intention to disassociate themselves from the social and cultural practices of globalization (Garzone / Sarangi 2007).
3. Domain reconquest efforts

The strong English-language policies frequently adopted by multinational companies and public authorities in many countries have aroused people’s awareness of the risk that the increasing use of English in business, the media, publishing and higher education might greatly reduce the role of national languages for professional and scholarly purposes. This risk is not at all remote; as Ammon (2001) has documented in detail, English has already become dominant as the language for scholarly publications in several countries. In Finland, for example, the number of doctoral dissertations written in English has risen dramatically from 7.1% of all those presented before 1949 to 95% in the 1990s. This highly influential role is favoured by the fact that the education and training of researchers is more and more frequently taking place in English-speaking countries, thus determining the loss of local specificities. The story of the Egyptian marine biologist, Salwa, reported by Swales (1990: 204) shows that in order to have her dissertation accepted, she had to rewrite it several times, modifying the original style typical of the Arabic way of writing and adopting the rhetorical conventions commonly shared by the American scientific community. Also the policy favouring English as a research language adopted by many universities in non-English-speaking countries increases the danger that some researchers may not learn to master the specialized language usage of their own field completely in their first language. Moreover, the demands associated with writing and publishing in English are usually very strict and can thus be used by specialized publications to filter foreign contributions. Indeed, since only the British or American varieties are considered valid, a failure to comply with the journal’s linguistic standards is usually penalised with rejection.

Many countries are becoming aware of the problem of erosion of functionality of their languages and have now started a policy aimed at strengthening the role of the local tongues at different stages of education and in various domains of communication. This is particularly true of some European nations, where a stance has been taken to defend the prestige of the local language. For example, the Academy of the German Language has warned universities against reducing the standards of scholarly German and replacing it by “bad simple English”, and has pointed out the dangers of reducing German to “a system with restricted functional range” (Gorlach 2002: 16). The Nordic countries have set up a research project called Nordens sprak som vetenskapssprak [The Nordic languages as languages of...
science] to defend the use of their languages for academic and scientific purposes, as they deem this use fundamental for the acquisition of a strong competitive position in culture, science and business. Stimulated by the results of this project, policies of domain (re)conquest (Lauren et al. 2002) have been promoted in several contexts. Lauren (2002), for example, reports the case of Norwegians working on oil-drilling platforms who had had to adapt themselves to the use of English terminology and adopt an English special language in order to talk and write about their tasks because of the lack of Norwegian lexis in this field. In recent years, however, both Norwegian companies and governmental authorities have realised the strategic importance—both for the defence of their economic interests in the oil industry and for the enhancement of safety on the platforms—of developing an independent set of terms relating to oil drilling. A data bank covering more than 10,000 concepts belonging to about 60 different systems and structures has been developed, thus facilitating the communication tasks of Norwegian firms in their contacts with national authorities.

Some people object to this innovative trend, affirming that ‘minor’ languages are not capable of covering all the fields a ‘major’ language covers. Their vocabularies are not deemed wide enough nor are their syntactic and textual features comparable to the vast resources of a major language like English. If this is true for the present, people should not forget that the situation of the English tongue in the past was just the same (cf. Gotti 2002). Indeed, over the centuries English has developed the resources necessary to discussion of many specialized topics, in order to meet the new demands made of it. ‘Minor’ languages are also capable of expanding their linguistic resources in the same way in order to guarantee successful communication in all fields of knowledge and experience.

4. Adaptation to global contexts

The globalising trend has also affected the legal field, where an international perspective is becoming more and more widespread. Legal discourse is thus another significant area where intercultural factors may be investigated. Although legal discourse is often thought to be less likely, in respect to professional genres, to display strong cross-cultural variations, since law texts are commonly aimed at practitioners closely linked to national legal contexts, cultural aspects do represent an important condi-
tional factor on its construction and interpretation. Indeed, legal discourse—which used to be employed in narrow professional and local milieus and thus more closely geared to specific cultural values and identity systems—is now more and more frequently involved in globalization processes, which have relevant consequences on the discourse produced by both native and non-native practitioners working in intercultural and cross-cultural settings. Nowadays many of the texts in use at a local level are the result of a process of translation or adaptation of more general documents formulated at an international level. This is the consequence of the fact that in the context of co-operation and collaboration in international trade, law too is fast assuming an international perspective rather than remaining a purely domestic concern. The increasing need at an international level for accurate and authoritative translation of legal texts and documents across languages relies on the need for them to convey appropriately in both languages the pragmatic and functional intentions and implications of the original text (Gotti / Šarčević 2006).

An excellent example of this trend is the need for a common European legal framework; this task is much more complex than simply translating common normative documents into all the languages of the European Union, because this newly created framework is meant to be interpreted within the contexts of a diversity of individual legal systems and tongues. Significant differentiations may arise in the various member countries of western Europe, especially when one needs to interpret such issues as human rights, international agreements and contracts, freedom of speech, freedom of trade, protection of intellectual property, all of which have very strong socio-political and cultural constraints. Although legal documents in all languages address these issues, they do so in distinctive and also in overlapping ways, because of the different languages in which they are constructed and the cultural differences of the societies in question and of their legal systems. Indeed, legal terminology is so culture-bound (the reasons being at the same time historical, sociological, political and jurisprudential) that a satisfactory translation of all the legal terms of one text from one context to another is at times impossible. David underlines this difficulty with a few examples:

To translate into English technical words used by lawyers in France, in Spain, or in Germany is in many cases an impossible task, and conversely there are no words in the languages of the continent to express the most
elementary notions of English law. The words *common law* and *equity* are the best examples thereof; we have to keep the English words [...] because no words in French or in any other language are adequate to convey the meaning of these words, clearly linked as they are to the specific history of English law alone. (David 1980: 39)

The adoption of a particular term instead of another may give rise to ambiguity and misinterpretation. Several examples of this are given by Fletcher (1999), who examines the translation into various languages of the English text of the European Convention on Human Rights. For instance, the translation provided for the expression *fair and regular trial* into *juicio justo y imparcial* (Spanish) and *procès juste et équitable* (French) is not satisfactory, as the use of the non-equivalent adjectives *regular* (English) / *imparcial* (Spanish) / *equitable* (French) can easily show. The same could be said for the rendering of the concept of *reasonableness*, basic in common law systems, where expressions such as *reasonable steps*, *reasonable measures*, *reasonable person* and *proof beyond a reasonable doubt* frequently occur. This concept, instead, when translated into languages spoken in countries adopting a civil law system is considered too vague (Bhatia et al. 2005, Wagner / Cacciaguidi-Fahy 2006) and its rendering as *ragionevole*, *raisonnable* or *vernünftig* often gives rise to criticism and dissatisfaction.

Other excellent examples of translation discrepancies can easily be found in texts relating to the process of building a common European legal framework. For example, translators into English find it difficult to express such culturally-specific French collocations as *acteurs sociaux*, *acteurs économiques*, *acteurs institutionnels*, *acteurs publics*, *acteurs politiques*, which have no direct equivalent in the target language (Salmasi 2003: 117), and they sometimes transliterate terms or create calques from one language into another, relying on the false premise of a very close relationship between similar lexemes in different languages (see the examples of *transmettre* / *transmit* and *prévoir* / *foresee* in Seymour 2002). Indeed, in Europe the legal drafting issue has become extremely important with the elaboration of a multilingual legislation concerning the European Union. This depends on the fact that the official languages of the European Union are those of its Member States, and as new countries join the Union, their languages are added to the number. This is part of a precise policy aiming to build a community of peoples respecting and safeguarding at the same time the existing variety of customs and cultural identities, a principle based on
the conviction that the languages of Europe are part of its immense and diverse cultural heritage, and therefore it is considered the duty of the Union to guarantee their preservation.

As European Union legislation must be published in all Member States’ official languages in order to be valid also at a national level, in the elaboration of European legislation and its introduction into the various national contexts a fundamental role is played by legal drafting and translation. As regards the former, the elaboration of texts is carried out in a parallel fashion by various teams, making use of a common multilingual terminological database and relying on shared Community concepts and institutions. This procedure, however, encounters problems mainly due to the presence of different legal systems in the various countries and the existence of a specific tradition of the legal register in each Member State (Williams 2005). Indeed, closer co-operation between the various legal systems of the EU members has not been achieved through creation of a new legislative framework to replace the existing one. Such systems are still in use and only in very few cases have the more evident discrepancies been eliminated.

The European authorities are aware of these problems and greater and greater emphasis is being laid on the quality of legislation drafting at supranational level. An example of this is the ‘Declaration on the Quality of the Drafting of Community Legislation’ which is an important part of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1998); this document explicitly states that “the quality of the drafting of Community legislation is crucial if it is to be properly implemented by the competent national authorities and better understood by the public and in business circles”. This has led to much greater uniformity in the translation of European directives into the various languages of the Union and to more marked homogeneity and interdependence of the resulting texts. Translators work in single-language units of approximately twenty people and translate, almost without exception, into their mother tongue. Their command of foreign languages is expected to be backed up by a good general knowledge and some competence in at least one specialized area such as law, technology, economics, etc. Translators are also assumed to possess word processing and other computer skills such as database interrogation, as they frequently rely on terminology and documentation available in electronic versions.

This new approach to the translation of European directives has also served a harmonising function, in the sense that from the adoption of the
texts of the European Union greater uniformity has derived in the use of terminology as well as a higher degree of conceptual homogeneity, which is then transferred into local legal practices. A typical example of this influence of European legislation on the local legal language is the frequent adoption of equivalent definitions of legal concepts deriving directly from European regulations and directives. However, these efforts and initiatives in better drafting procedures have not solved all discrepancy problems, as the final texts are also conditioned by the different rhetorical traditions pertaining to the cultural systems involved, thus often leading to diverging constructions and therefore to conflictual interpretations, with the risk of raising legal controversies. Moreover, in the translation process there is often an addition to and/or alteration of the semantic value of the original, due to the fact that the interpreter brings his/her own experience, knowledge and attitude to the text s/he is translating into another language. For this reason it is commonly suggested that translators working in this field should have two different types of competence: not only linguistic but also legal (Weston 1995).

Issues like these are crucial for the construction, interpretation and use of legal language across languages and legal systems. They are especially relevant in international trade, which often involves contracts written in English but incorporating statutes and regulations issued by a third country. Indeed, in the great, rapid changes taking place all over the world, there is a tendency for a single global standard to evolve and dominate over all others—i.e., English. The position of English as the language for international communication is a very strong one and is to become even stronger, due to the need for a common global language. However, as has often been remarked, the adoption of a lingua franca may have important consequences on the approach adopted locally. Indeed, when the language chosen for the international arbitration procedure is English, there is a tendency to adopt procedures typical of common law countries:

Frequently the presence of American (or British) lawyers in a procedure normally leads to the de facto use of US (or English) procedures. (Lazareff 1999: 37)

The influential role played by this language is much more significant now that English is so frequently used also in cases in which no native
English-speaking party is involved. The frequency of this situation is confirmed by Taniguchi’s testimony:

There are very many different arbitral practices associated with different legal and commercial cultures. However, the world has been unmistakably proceeding toward a single commercial culture. Japanese businessmen, for example, are negotiating business in the English language not only with English speaking businessmen but also Korean, European and middle eastern businessmen. This is one of the realities of international trade today. (Taniguchi 1998: 39)

The increasing role of English as a *lingua franca* can also be seen at the European Union level, where the use of English has become prevalent. Indeed, at the Translation Service of the European Union, nearly three-fifths of the documents sent for translation are drafted originally in English. This is nearly double the quantity of material drafted in French, which for decades was the dominant language. The great increase in the use of English in this context is due to the fact that English is often adopted as a ‘relay language’ for translations between combinations of languages, such as the Baltic languages and almost any other, for which the EU institutions are unlikely to find enough translators who can bridge the gap directly: the first translation is into English and from this a text in another language is then produced.

In this way, English terms are creeping into local legal terminologies. For example, over the last three decades, because of the rapid internationalisation of commerce, an increasing number of English legal terms (such as *leasing*, *factoring*, and *franchising*) has been introduced into the Italian legal language. Legislators often attempt to translate some of these terms, as for example the term *antitrust rules*, which has been adopted by the Italian Parliament using the expression *leggi per la tutela della competizione e del mercato* [rules in order to safeguard competition and market]; the original English term avoided by the Parliament has recently been reintroduced by the Government in a few legislative decrees (Belotti et al. 2003: 214). In some cases the original word has been maintained, as the concept itself did not exist in that context; this is the case of the term *joint venture*, the English expression commonly in use also because of the inaccuracy of the numerous translations that have been proposed.

An excellent example of the globalising process taking place in the legal system is constituted by international commercial arbitration. In the
last few decades, all over the world arbitration has become more and more common as a legal instrument for the settling of commercial disputes. The high recourse to this mediating procedure has given rise to a widely felt need for greater harmonisation of the procedures followed, which has led to the elaboration of the UNCITRAL document, approved by the United Nations to be used as a model by most of the member countries in the construction of their own individual statutory provisions for commercial arbitration. However, in spite of the growing globalisation of arbitration culture, the elaboration of the UN Model Law has not guaranteed complete uniformity among the various national legislations, as the different countries have used this model in different ways, depending upon their national requirements, concerns, cultures, legal systems, languages, and other constraints. Indeed, in the process of adoption of this model, the English language text of the UNCITRAL has often had to be translated into the local languages, a procedure which has implied not only the adaptation of the original discourse to the typical features and resources of the national tongues, but also its adjustment to the cultural needs and legal constraints of each specific country.

In the last two decades the UNCITRAL provisions have been used as a model by a large number of countries. As the Model Law and its connected arbitration rules were created with the purpose of achieving the highest degree of harmonisation, the various countries have been recommended to make as few changes as possible when incorporating them into their legal systems. However, the adoption of this Model Law has not guaranteed complete uniformity among the various national legislations, as this process has implied not only the adaptation of the original discourse to the typical features and resources of the national tongues, but also its adjustment to the cultural needs and legal constraints of each specific country (Bhatia / Candlin / Gotti 2003).

5. Conclusion

As has been seen, the recent strong moves towards globalisation have implied relevant consequences in socio-cultural and communication terms. As language is inseparable from set cultural implications and is deeply involved in new social changes, local discourse often demonstrates that culture is not only ignored, but at times even rejected or distorted. Thus
intercultural communication is shown to affect the strategies themselves whereby discourse is negotiated and where social practices are shaped by cultural diversity and a strong need for a language for mutual comprehension. Also the role and status of English in increasingly numerous communities and domains constitute a complex issue, especially because the adoption and influence of this language often has controversial political, social and economic implications. As a result, elements of linguistic and intercultural conflict are bound to arise, determining changes in the forms and uses of both the donor and receiving languages. Although the use of English as a common language is an important tool in increasing our opportunities for mutual understanding and international cooperation, its spread at times creates conflicts, stemming from the diverging interests of monolingual and multilingual societies, an issue which seems to be more a question of social identity than linguistics.

The formulation of concepts and texts in a multilingual/multicultural context is greatly conditioned by specific sociocultural and economic factors strictly depending on the different cultural, linguistic and specialized environments in which it takes place. The investigation of the process of adaptation of international procedures to different national realises has pointed out several cases in which the source text offers the input on the basis of which new autonomous texts are created taking into consideration the needs of the final users. In particular, cultural constraints have proved to be detectable in texts which are the result of a translation or a re-writing process such as those deriving from the process of adjustment and adaptation of a text issued by an international organisation to the legal and sociocultural features of the various national target users. These international documents have been shown to possess clear traits of hybrid discourse; indeed, the differentiations between the source and the resulting texts are the outcome of the conscious and deliberate decisions taken by the drafters of the local documents, and their final form shows that they “are arrived at as an outcome of negotiations between cultures and the norms and conventions involved” (Trosborg 1997: 146).

Thus, the analysis of documents located in different specific contexts has been found to contribute to a wider understanding of how specialized texts are constructed, interpreted and used in multilingual and multicultural contexts. According to this more general perspective, the discussion of certain linguistic and textual features can provide interesting insights into
how sociocultural factors are influenced by local social systems and by different target readers with their own professional culture and expectations. In this way, even a limited investigation of a specific case may be of help for a better knowledge of specialized discourse seen from an international perspective, and for a more detailed understanding of linguistic and textual phenomena closely linked to cross-cultural traits.

References


ENGLISH AS AN INTERNATIONAL LANGUAGE: ILLUSIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES

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The northern coast of Africa, or the Barbary Coast as it was known in the 14th and 15th centuries was a scene of lively trade, not least in slaves from Europe. Peoples of many different backgrounds and languages mixed there, and the bartering, the commandeering of the slaves, the challenges from pirates, all took place in simplified, distorted versions of the speakers’ native languages. One of those in particular became dominant, although it remained far from a stable, fully developed linguistic system: Lingua Franca, the language of the Franks. Since the first crusades had been led by people from northern France, ‘Frank’ had established itself in the Arabic-speaking world as a general word for Christians from Europe. So the lingua franca was the language of al-Faranj, and cognates are also found in Turkish, Hindi, Tamil, Thai and many other Asian languages. There are of course few records of this oral improvisation in many tongues, but it seems to have been typically based on Italian and Provençal, but with considerable elements of Arabic, Turkish, Persian, and Greek. In Molière’s comedy Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme M. Jourdain is ennobled by means of a Turkish ceremony, with a Mufti, four Dervishes, and various Turkish dancers and musicians. The Mufti speaks and the musicians reply in sabir, or Lingua Franca.

By the 16th century, the Portuguese had established themselves as the dominant force in many parts of the world, and their sailors brought the Lingua Franca to new shores, where according to some it developed into the creoles of Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé and Príncipe. But

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2 For an entry into academic work on Lingua Franca, see the website of Alan Corré at http://www.uwm.edu/~corre/. Accessed on 14 January 2007.
it was their high language that became the medium for the administration of colonies and the divulgation of their religion. The Portuguese language was often known simply as Cristão, the Christian language. It is a commonplace to observe that comparable roles are being played in the contemporary world by English, which is increasingly both the language of choice of the marketplace and is outing other languages as the medium of official international communication. Even in the European Union, with its policy of recognizing all member languages as equal and identifying a limited number of these as ‘working languages’, English is rapidly establishing itself as the language of the corridors of power. More and more international businesses conduct all their written and official communication in English only, and specially codified forms of English are used as Airspeak, Seaspeak and Policespeak. And science and scholarship are of course no exception to this: many international conferences are held exclusively in English.

A command of English is increasingly seen as a passport to success in the contemporary world. Yet not everyone is happy about the leading position of English. The Japanese linguist Tsuda (2005), for example, writes that “native speakers of English in the English-dominated conferences, use their linguistic advantage to magnify their power so that they can establish the unequal and asymmetrical relationship with the non-English-speakers and thus push them out of the mainstream of communication.” He charges that “the global dominance of English today is to lead to the control of the mind of the global population by the speakers of English, and their nations, and governments” and he sees a close link between the international use of English and the Anglo-Americanization and commercialization of contemporary life. The actual solutions he proposes are, however, not so practical: the employment of interpreters to allow people to use their native languages (horribly expensive, of course); ‘linguistic localism’, the requirement, for example, that a conference organized in Romania should be held in Romanian; and failing that, a language should be chosen which is equally unfamiliar to all participants to even out the linguistic handicaps.

However far-fetched these counterproposals may seem, the issue is a real one, and no one has pointed more persuasively to the dangers of linguistic imperialism and the resultant threat of a monoculture than Robert Phillipson. He has documented in several works (notably Phillipson 1992 and 2003a) the extent to which the dominance of English is being pushed by British and American interests, economic, financial, military and ideological. Like
Tsuda, he links the spread of English to globalization, citing with approval, in Phillipson (2003b), Bourdieu’s analysis of globalization “as a password, a watchword, while in effect it is the legitimatory mask of a policy aiming to universalise particular interests and the particular tradition of the economically and politically dominant powers, above all the United States, and to extend to the entire world the economic and cultural model that favours these powers most, while simultaneously presenting it as a norm, a requirement, and a fatality, a universal destiny, in such a manner as to obtain adherence or at the least, universal resignation.” (Bourdieu 2001: 84; Phillipson’s translation).

Phillipson records the extent to which native speakers are invested with authority for no other reason than their status as native speakers. Experiments have shown that, given identical articles in English and in their own languages, academics will tend to put higher faith in the articles written in English. Experiments have also shown that the same or similar academics will have 25% less recall of the content of an article written in English! There is a slippage between ‘expert in the language’ and ‘expert in the subject’ which I have noted repeatedly in my own career as an academic in continental Europe. This is strengthened by the increasing barrage of expertise emerging from the grammar and dictionary industry in the UK and elsewhere, with the marketing of ever better and more up-to-date descriptions of English, and its varieties across the country. For those who wish to learn, and their numbers are now in the hundreds of millions, there is material in abundance. It is no surprise that the UK is rapidly building down its investment in the learning of foreign languages. Notwithstanding calls from the EU to encourage bilingualism or trilingualism in education, the BBC reported on 3 November 2005 that learning a foreign language beyond the age of 14 is now compulsory in only a quarter of England’s state secondary schools; the BBC predictably found language teachers to be demotivated and despondent.

Not everyone has a dystopian view of a world in which English functions as a lingua franca. It has even been proposed that English as a Lingua Franca may emerge as a potential literary medium (Lautel-Ribstein 2005). Less speculatively, other writers, notably Crystal (1997), have emphasized the benefits of there being available a means of communication that is usable throughout the world. Crystal advocates a double-barrelled language policy: English for ‘international intelligibility’, and local languages for ‘historical identity’. EU policy, in calling for all school pupils to learn two languages other than their own, is effectively following the same line, since
even if half this target is achieved, English will continue to be the language overwhelmingly taught and learned. Crystal provides extensive statistics demonstrating the extent to which English is being learned and used worldwide, prompting an article in the Financial Times (28.12.2000) entitled simply “English is the World Language”, in which Crystal is cited as pronouncing that “The English language snowball has got so big now that it’s virtually unstoppable”. There is an unmistakeable tone of triumph here, and Crystal has been much criticized for his laissez-faire attitude to the parallel and linked onward march of the English language and American-led globalization.

It is hard to tell to what extent there is resistance to the encouragement of English as a Lingua Franca. In Europe, there are clear signs of irritation with the current situation: Grin (2005) has calculated, for example, that the Europe-wide use of English saves the United Kingdom 17b per annum in translation fees. But what to do about it all? Recent appeals to restore Latin as the medium of communication smack of despair, and the Europe-wide imposition of Esperanto seems improbable. The editor-in-chief of Le Monde Diplomatique, Bernard Cassen, has intriguingly proposed training speakers of French, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian and Romanian in the comprehension of one another’s languages, which after all belong to the same branch of Indo-European (Cassen 2005); they could then continue using their own language in international communication. I recently witnessed just such a bilingual conversation in Galicia between an Italian tourist and a Spanish hotel receptionist; things went excellently until the word habitación ‘room’ proved too different from the Italian’s camera. Cassen’s proposal, then, would involve a switch from active to passive competence in language education, and could facilitate the communicative needs of over a billion people worldwide; clearly, however, it would be of little use in enabling international conversations between native speakers of French and German, or Romanian and Finnish.

The rise of English as a Lingua Franca has not gone unnoticed in schools and in university departments of English across Europe. Teachers are observing that many of their students are appropriating English with a view not so much to its Anglo-American context, but rather to its role in establishing a European or even a worldwide identity. With many more non-native than native speakers in the current world, English is said no longer to be ‘owned’ by its native speakers. This view may be a little naive in the light of the continued domination of the teaching materials market by Anglo-
American publishers, whose textbooks of International English in Erling’s (2000) words “look suspiciously like the former British English textbooks”. Nevertheless, there is some sense in which the Lingua Franca users are ‘talking back’, to use an expression from postcolonial studies, and this question has been studied with increasing interest by linguists.

The traditional model of English which held sway in schools, teacher training colleges and universities across Europe presented the language as a monolithic entity, descended historically from equally monolithic Old and Middle English. Modern linguistic theories, with Chomsky’s ‘ideal native speaker’ in mind, did little to change this view, which engendered a sharp distinction between native and non-native speakers, with the former as the sole arbiter of pronunciation and grammar. With the rise of sociolinguistics and of postcolonial thinking, however, a new model has begun to emerge in which each individual is seen above all as a speaker of his or her own variety, rendering the distinction between native and non-native users less relevant. Communities of speakers can arise anywhere, with their own norms of usage and interaction (cf. Lesznyák 2004 for further detail).

Kachru (1985) and others in his wake have drawn attention to the many new forms of English that have arisen across the world and explored how these have developed into systematic varieties. His model of the various Englishes, in three concentric circles, has achieved considerable fame:

![Diagram of the three 'circles' of English](image)
The inner circle indicates the traditional bases of the language; the outer circle covers countries in which English has achieved institutional status in a multilingual setting; and the expanding circle denotes those places where English functions as an international language but without any official standing.

Modiano (1999) has proposed a radical and provocative variant on Kachru's diagram, which maps the communicative purposes rather than the geographical provenance of language users and in which skilled speakers of Lingua Franca English now stand at the centre. "Proficient non-native speakers of E[nglish as an] I[nternational L[anguage]]," he writes (1999: 25), "rather than the native speakers who are not proficient in EIL, are better equipped to define and develop English as a tool in cross-cultural communication". The intermediate circle is now occupied by both native speakers and those who use English as a foreign language, since both must adapt their speech in situations of international communication. The outermost circle, finally, comprises those who are learning the language (and those who are not (yet?) doing so); these people stand in need of a norm.

The issue of norms has been prominent in much recent work on English as a Lingua Franca. Faced by the increasing awareness of linguistic
variation among both native and non-native users, calls such as the following by Yamaguchi (2002) are not untypical: “It is,” he writes in the *Internet TESL Journal*, “extremely important to devise a common core of English to enable mutual intelligibility among the many varieties … of English.” The use of the verb *devise* is strongly reminiscent of C.K. Ogden’s Basic English. Ogden (1930) had three purposes in mind: to give foreign students a provisional platform before mastering ‘full English’; to provide a model of simplicity for native users; and—nothing new under the sun—to offer a useful tool for international communication. Towards the end of the Second World War, Basic English was much favoured as a contribution to world peace by Winston Churchill, cf. Churchill (1943).

Current efforts towards establishing norms for English as a Lingua Franca are quite different in inspiration, and are embedded in research. Jenkins (2000) bases her proposals on a linguistic analysis of which deviations from native-speaker use do hinder communication in English between non-native speakers (NNS) and which do not. Thus she has found that many of the pronunciation features that are found most grating or confusing by native speakers of English are quite unproblematic in non-native interactions. One example among many is that the substitution of the cross-linguistically rare /θ/ and /ð/ by the more frequent /d/ and /t/ or /z/ and /s/ causes no concerns to non-native interactants. In fact, a non-native speaker may find another non-native’s phonetic accuracy in English to be a minor irritant; as Jenkins has said, the non-use of what are traditionally called errors may be counterproductive, a point to which I shall return. By examining the English of native speakers from various linguistic backgrounds, Jenkins claims to have distilled a phonological Lingua Franca Core. Her colleague Barbara Seidlhofer in Vienna is currently working on morphosyntax and has published some provisional findings which suggest that, in this area too, there are structural properties of the language used in NNS-NNS interactions, e.g. free variation between the relative pronouns *who* and *which*, the use of invariable tags (*isn’t it*? or *no*?), etc. However, I would tend to agree with MacKenzie (2002: 59), who has remarked that “a handful of widespread grammatical patterns … do not constitute a fully fledged lingua franca”, and indeed Seidlhofer (2003) herself has denied that there is “one clearly distinguishable, unitary variety”.

Would it be better, then, for the current norms in English language teaching, Received Pronunciation and Standard English as codified in Quirk
et al.’s grammars (or the American equivalents) to be replaced by new norms, as Jenkins has it, derived from the speech of Modiano’s innermost circle? One scholar who definitely thinks so is Grzega (2005), who proposes a codification called, with more than a nod to Ogden, Basic Global English. He has offered “a complete linguistic and pedagogic presentation of BGE”, going into its pronunciation, its vocabulary and grammar and even its politeness strategies. Thus he proposes to tell students that there are two ways to refer to past events in English, with the past tense (*walked*) and with the present perfect (*have/has walked*); these are distinguished by native speakers, but need not be in BGE. Similarly, native speakers use two techniques for forming the past tense, vowel gradation (*see/saw*) and suffixation (*walk/walked*); except for a handful of common verbs to be memorized, BGE users can apply suffixation without a breakdown of understanding (*singed, feeded and heared*). As for language use, conversations in BGE are liable to be rather straight-laced: Grzega wants his learners to “avoid religion, politics [and] sexuality”, and every joke they crack has to be followed by *as we say in my country*.

So does Basic Global English represent an adequate response to the hegemony of Standard English and native-speakerism? I think not. Grzega’s campaign, however zealously proposed, seems to me to be based on a number of fallacies. Firstly, all the evidence suggests that learners do not want a watered-down version of English as their model. Ranta (2004), for instance, found that Finnish school students appreciate the native speaker model, regarding it as particularly important for “on-record” communication (for example, written texts). Secondly, by basing his codification on the errors made by his native German students as they attempt to learn Standard English, Grzega is failing to operate with relevant data; the lingua franca is not a learner variety but an autonomous form of discourse. Thirdly, and most importantly, his proposal and other such attempts to provide new norms in a globalized world are missing the central point of the expression *English as a Lingua Franca*, namely the word *as*. English is being used *as* a medium of international communication, and our pupils and students can best be helped through a better understanding of such situations of use.

As Smit (2003) has pointed out, existing approaches underestimate the extent to which users of English as a Lingua Franca appropriate it for their own purposes. When native speakers of different languages communicate through English, they are jointly creating a new cultural space, one which
partly overlaps with the native cultures, and partly with shared and differing perceptions of the English languages and its associated cultures. But above all they are creating a new micro-culture, a construction “off the cuff”, and in House’s (2002) view this is the culture that is of greatest importance to lingua franca interactants. This is, I believe, in keeping with Holliday’s (1999) notion of “small cultures” as instances of emergent behaviour that allows speakers to transcend ethnic or national stereotyping.

All communicative interaction is a matter of implicit negotiation and cooperation; this is particularly clear in lingua franca interaction. Firth (1996) has shown how enormously cooperative this use of English is: interactants will go to great lengths to preserve the appearance of normality, even when the language used is abnormal. Rather than pursue points of misunderstanding, lingua franca users will tend to let them pass; and if their interlocutors use a deviant expression, speakers will often incorporate it into their own speech rather than repair it—indeed Firth speculates whether international styles might not emerge from just such tolerance of deviance. Speakers, it appears, are sensitive to their partners’ insecurity about using English (perhaps because of their own uncertainties): not only are they at pains to steer clear of correcting the interlocutor, but they will modify their own speech to avoid idiomatic expressions or even speech sounds like the famous /θ/ and /ð/ that would inappropriately connote ‘native speaker’.

Lingua franca small talk has been investigated by Meierkord (1998), and many of her findings also point to a desire not to intimidate the other linguistically. Thus there is more laughter than in native small talk, and more cajoling expressions such as you know, you see, I mean; if speakers overlap, it is to help each other find the words; and the topics tend more to be drawn from the immediate situation, perhaps in order to avoid vocabulary difficulties or to reinforce the creation of a very localized micro-culture. The use of English as a lingua franca thus appears to be conditioned by the presence, in the background, of the norms imperfectly learned at school and partially recalled during the interaction. Replacing these old norms with new norms derived from observation of lingua franca interactions is not going to change that fact.

What, then, do I conclude for language pedagogy? Well, I see no justification for abandoning existing norms in favour of simplified and/or error-laden English. This is not a reasonable thing to ask of teachers, and is not what students want. On the other hand, it seems right for the teaching of
English, as opposed to that of other languages, to be increasingly oriented to learners' likely future engagement in lingua franca interaction. By providing an admixture of texts by non-native authors, by creating possibilities for communication with future lingua franca users (for example through English-speaking school visits to non-English-speaking countries or, more cheaply, using msn or Skype; cf. Jepson 2005 and Godwin-Jones 2005 respectively), and generally by aiding learners to be listeners as well as performers, teachers can both enhance the verisimilitude of their classrooms and explore the opportunities of lingua franca interactions.

References


MODIFIERS IN MALE AND FEMALE EXPRESSIONS OF EMOTIONS

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As the title of my paper implies, the discussion will concern the issue of genderlects and will be kept within the confines of the sociolinguistic model of analysis. The question of male-female differences in their conversational styles has been a subject of frequent study in recent decades, to a large extent aiming to verify the initial claims put forward by Robin Lakoff (1975) about the so-called “women’s language”—intriguing as the claims were, they were only theoretical postulates, which opened up a new area of study based on a more empirical foundation (cf. Coates, 1993; Crawford, 1995; Swann, 2000; Stockwell, 2002; Eckert & McConnell-Ginet, 2003).

My analysis has also been motivated by Lakoff’s observations, particularly those concerning a greater emotionality of the female style manifested, among other features, by the use of “empty” adjectives, e.g. adorable, divine, and emphatic particles such as so or very. Another incentive for the present study was an experiment conducted by Kessler (after Stockwell, 2002) in which the use of adjectives (more specifically, colour terms) in fact proved to be more frequent in the descriptions provided by men, not women. The adjectives utilised by men turned out to be specially marked by the use of modifiers, e.g. very, rather etc., whereas women used more adjectival intensifiers, e.g. bold red. The majority of studies, though, tend to support the claim that it is women who employ a more affective, emphatic style of speaking, on the whole manifesting positive politeness and solidarity towards their interlocutors (cf. Tannen, 1992; Coates, 1993; Holmes, 1995), and this naturally entails a greater production of adjectives and adverbs, often accompanied by some modifying expressions.

The objective of my brief study has been to examine the question of emotionality of style once again, this time, however, in the context of the means of communication which has been enjoying an enormous popularity in recent years, i.e. e-mail. The language of e-mail in its prototypical form
has been characterised as a hybrid of speech and writing (cf. Dąbrowska, 2000) or even as the “third” medium (Crystal, 2001), side by side with speech, writing and sign language (cf. Deumert, 2000). As some of the linguists analysing this medium claim, one of the observable features of e-mail communication, and computer-mediated communication (CMC) in general, is that it encourages and facilitates a more personal disclosure (cf. Swann, 2000; Boneva et al., 2001). In other words, the users on the whole feel more at ease to break away from certain norms regarding the more traditional forms of communication and show their true selves. This is the feature I wish to analyse in terms of the male and female speaking styles and examine whether the quality of CMC also enhances a more emotional type of expression on the part of men. At this point it is necessary to add that in my perception of gender I assume (after Butler, 1990; Holmes, 1997 and Mills, 2003) that it is not based on a strict binary division into men and women, but rather that it constitutes a continuum in the sense of allowing for a different combination of male and female features in an individual, and what is more, that these are features which to some extent can be acted out or modified consciously. My assumption, therefore, is that men also, especially when more relaxed about maintaining their expected image, may allow themselves to be less restrained in their description of emotions, which might be the case with e-mail correspondence. Women, on the other hand, may not always want to adhere to their customary image of powerless creatures.

My analysis of the expressions of emotions, and the modifiers used in them is based on a corpus of data consisting of 72 e-mail messages written to me by my English-speaking friends and acquaintances. All the e-mails belong to the informal category of letters involving mainly a friendly update on events, sometimes some arrangements or an exchange of views, the kind of communication, as has been mentioned before, inviting a greater solidarity and emotionality of expression. The e-mails have been generated by 15 women and 19 men from Great Britain, USA, Canada and Australia. Having analysed the profile of my correspondents I have decided to divide each gender into three age groups: under 35 years of age, 36–55, and above 56 years of age, respectively, on the assumption that the variable of age may have a certain bearing on the language used. In the group of men 5 are under 35, 8 belong to the middle group (35–55), and 7 are above 56, whereas in the group of the female correspondents, the youngest group is repre-
sented by 4 persons, the middle one by 6 and the senior one by 5—a simi-
lar distribution in terms of numbers, therefore, should make the compari-
son more reliable.

Out of the 72 e-mails analysed, 37 were written by men and 35 by
women (a side comment to be made here is that although the group of
women was altogether smaller by four persons than the group of men, the
two groups generated a very comparable number of e-mails in all, which
indicates that women on the whole tend to maintain this kind of phatic
communion via e-mail more often than men—cf. Boneva et al. 2001). As
indicated above, the object of my analysis are those expressions bearing
some emotional (largely positive, though occasionally also negative) con-
tent; due to the limited scope of the study, these have been narrowed down
to adjectives and adverbs, either alone or, particularly, with a modifier (this
being a lexical word or a determiner). Thus, in the e-mails written by men,
68 such expressions have been recorded, whereas in the messages from
women as many as 117. This observation immediately confirms an earlier
observation that expressiveness is one of the notable female features of
communication. However, the 68 phrases of this type by men show that
their informal style is not completely void of them (on average ca. 3 affect-
ive expressions could be assigned per single male correspondent here, and
nearly 8 per woman).

A detailed analysis of the collected material will follow the division of
the recorded forms into the categories of: bare emphatics (i.e. adjectives or
adverbs alone), hedges, and boosters, the last two being two subtypes of
the category of modifiers. Originally, the division of modifiers into quanti-
fiers and intensifiers was meant to be applied; however, a certain difficulty
was experienced when trying to assign particular samples into the cate-
gories (for example, should a little in a little sad be treated as a quantifier by
virtue of indicating a certain amount of the feeling, or rather as an intensifi-
er that, according to Crystal (1994:189), “intensifies” the feeling “down-
wards”). Therefore, I have decided to follow the more straightforward func-
tional division suggested by Holmes (1995:7) into boosters, i.e. expressions
which “increase the force of utterances” and “hedges”, which “weaken or
reduce their force” (these categories apply to various parts of speech or syn-
tactic categories; yet here, because of the scope of my short study, they will
be limited to adjectives and adverbs alone).
Thus, in the group of male correspondents of under 35 years of age, expressions of emotion reflected by the three above-mentioned categories amounted to 32, these covering nearly a half of all the expressions found in the letters from males (generated by 5 men out of the 19). Interestingly enough, as many as 15 expressions belong to the category of bare emphatics, e.g. how wonderful to write to you, a wonderful day, you must be thrilled, I’m excited, that would be great, which indicate very positive emotions, and it’s scary, it’s a painful way to live, my oppressive work, etc., which have negative connotations. Both the number of such expressions and their character also prove that males can be fairly unrestrained in their emotional expressions in informal e-mail correspondence to a female addressee. By comparison, hedges, which on the whole tone down the rather negative side of things or express doubts (and these have typically been regarded as markers of the female style), were represented by only 4 forms: a little sad, a little busy, it wasn’t all bad, it can’t be any worse. On the other hand, the category of boosters, i.e. those which strengthen the affectivity of an expression, contained as many as 13 examples, these carrying both a positive as well as a negative meaning, e.g. they really mean a lot, I really enjoyed it, X is really taking off, plenty of new challenges, work is so busy, I’m really really bad. Thus, the presented material shows that men may also behave quite emotionally in writing, especially when acting fairly spontaneously.

The 4 women who represent the category of women under 35 years of age together generated only 18 expressions that carry some emotional overtones. This, in fact, gives a lower mean per person than in the case of men in the parallel group. Out of the total of the emotionally loaded expressions, 7 belong to the group of bare emphatics, e.g. this is a great opportunity, lovely to hear from you, it would indeed be lovely, it’s hopeless, I’ve been overwhelmed. Thus, we again have a group of fairly informal, emotional expressions of both positive and negative character, as was the case with men. What, however, seems notable, even in such a limited group of examples, is the use of the adjective lovely, which was pointed out by Lakoff (1975) as one of the typical markers of female style, i.e. the above mentioned “empty” adjectives (we could note that an adjective recurring a number of times in the male group was wonderful. This one, however, like great, was assigned a more neutral and universal application). As far as the other two categories are concerned, hedges (traditionally attributed to the female way of speak-
ing), similarly as in the case of men, were barely marked—only 3 cases: that seemed a bit risky, all possible success, and a little more focused, and their function was also to mitigate the meaning of the utterance. It may be deduced that young women in private communication with other women do feel secure enough not to resort to hedges too frequently, as might be the case with their e-mails to men. Finally, the group of boosters consisted of 8 examples, e.g. so much to do, I don’t really agree, a far bigger question, I’m very busy, I have so much to think about. This limited (also when compared to the male correspondents) number of boosters does not really appear to support the claim that the female style in private communication tends to be overly affective, in any case not more than that of men in this age group.

The question of age will, however, prove to be quite influential in the analysis of the other two age groups. The group of correspondents between 36 and 55 years of age seems to confirm the stereotypical picture of male and female conversational styles most. And thus, the overall number of expressions reflecting emotions in the group of men amounted to 18 (with, at the same time, the largest number of correspondents in this group, i.e. 8), the more detailed analysis providing us with only 5 bare emphatics, i.e. I’d be glad, glad to know, we are excited, seeing friends and family is great, great to hear of your visit. As can be seen, the forms used have a fairly universal character and as such do not carry a heavy emotional load. The recurring lexical items seem to be glad and great. The category of hedges is barely marked with only two phrases recorded: I’m almost certain, I’m fairly certain. This may indicate a certain reluctance on the part of middle aged men to express doubts, i.e. some sign of weakness in the traditional perception of male verbal behaviour. On the other hand, boosters, although still limited when compared to the output in the female group, constitute the largest group in this age category, comprising 11 expressions, e.g. I’ve been so busy, thanks so much, I’d be quite happy, it will be quite a benefit, this is really most helpful, we were very fortunate. The examples show that, despite their being the most affective in nature of all the three groups, the examples noted tend to assume a slightly more formal character when juxtaposed with those produced by younger men. This might be the outcome of both the age of the sender and the female gender of the addressee, the latter probably calling for a greater monitoring of the words uttered than it would have been the case with a male. Some of the more striking modifiers used here are quite, really and so.
The group of women between the age of 36 and 55 is the source of the largest number of expressions: altogether as many as 60 forms reflecting some emotional content have been taken down, i.e. three times as many as in the parallel group of men. Out of these, 10 (thus, a fairly small proportion), represent the bare emphatic category, e.g. *a great contribution, a great encouragement, my lovely card, it’s magical, gorgeous bookmark, to get me a bloody date*. It can be noticed that to some extent we have a certain overlapping in terms of the character of the words used, especially the item *great*. Apart from that, however, some more traditionally female markers can be observed, e.g. *gorgeous, lovely* and *magical*, and as a result, the expressions attain a far more affective feel. The presence of the word *bloody*, characteristic of the linguistic behaviour of one of the correspondents (also in the group of boosters), is an example bearing out the earlier claim about the gender continuum, according to which not all women have to express themselves in a stereotypically female way, and men—in the male one. Apart from this, another striking feature in this age group is an almost complete absence of hedges, so characteristic of women in the common perception—this category, as was the case with men, is represented by two expressions: *a little bit of love for you* and *some moral support*. These, in fact, do not so much express hesitation, as was the case in the group of men, as the aspect of quantity and possibly affection. However, the emotional load is the heaviest in the third category of affective expressions—the boosters, which cover the remaining 48 expressions, e.g. *I’m so sorry, I miss it so much, sooooo much work, we so want to come, thank you so very much, such a waste of good friendship, he’s such fun, I’m very miserable, a very clever chappie, we’re are very excited, it really was a good film, I really miss you, it’s a real challenge, I was bloody angry, she desperately wanted, it was absolutely harrowing, etc.*. This group is naturally very rich and consists of a variety of modifiers, e.g. *so, very, real(ly), such, pretty, absolutely, bloody*. Both the variety and an occasional combination of more than one modifier (*thank you so very much, I do miss it so much*) point to the very affective character of the forms recorded, stress the informality of the contact and at the same time undoubtedly function as markers of positive politeness and the high sense of solidarity with the addressee. The question of solidarity stemming from the shared features between the interlocutors (uniformity of gender and age, as opposed to only age with men) is probably the decisive factor behind this disproportionally large number of
boosters observed in this group. This is particularly worth noting in contrast to the very modest number of equivalent expressions not only in the group of men, but also younger, and, as will be shown below, older women.

The analysis of the third age group also demonstrates certain distinctions between the genders and in comparison to other age groups. Interestingly enough, the number of expressions noted down for the men of above 56 years of age is even smaller than in the previous group—16, and, altogether twice as small as in the case of the youngest men. This may have been caused in the first place by the age difference as well as gender difference between the sender and the addressee, but on the whole it might be deduced that with age, the willingness to openly express emotions is diminishing in the case of men. There is no such striking disproportion across the three categories, as will be in the case of older women: the bare emphatic group is represented by 4 items: great to hear from you, I’m contented first to look around, I’m fine and Fascinating. Their examination demonstrates that they do not seem to be carriers of any particularly affective meaning, perhaps with the exception of the word fascinating. The group of hedges is particularly underrepresented, there being only one hedging phrase in an apology for belated wishes: we are a bit late with ours. Similarly to the previous age group, avoiding hedging expressions might seem more suitable for the image of a senior male, especially when communicating with a younger female foreigner. Compared to the first two groups of forms, only the boosters have marked their presence in a fairly significant way, amounting to 11 examples, e.g. thank you so much, thanks very much, we’re extremely blessed, I’m very happy, enjoying life very much, it was really good. As can be seen, the expressed emotions can be quite powerful, though on the whole they remain within the limits of conventional markers of solidarity, certainly not to be compared to the way the middle aged women indicated their feelings.

The women in the last group did not in any way manage to match the number of expressions in group two, yet with the 33 examples recorded in all, they still outdid the male representatives of the same age category. What is noteworthy, in this group the category of hedges was completely absent, very much as was the case with men. On the other hand, the two remaining groups divided the expressions between themselves almost equally. Thus, the bare emphatics comprised of 14 examples, e.g. lovely autumn forest, lovely to hear from you, lovely photos, beautiful sunny days, we are
delighted, great to have all your news, warmest greetings. It can be immediately seen how different the make up of this category is when compared with the equivalent male examples—not only more numerous, but also of a far more personal and affective character. It has to be admitted that, even though Lakoff’s claims of 30 years ago were to a large extent criticised for not being empirically tested, her attribution of certain types of adjectives to the female repertoire does find some confirmation, particularly among older women. Also the category of boosters, which consists of 19 examples, demonstrates some less conventional type of expressions than in the case of men in the parallel group. They, however, do not attain such a level of personal disclosure as was observed with the middle aged women, e.g. many thanks, thank you very much, I’m so glad, have a REAL holiday, we so enjoyed meeting you, very disappointed, very heartbreaking, totally impossible. Similarly as in the case of older men, even though the affective character of the forms is marked, a slightly greater formality of expression can be sensed, most probably due to the age difference.

Presented above are the results of the analysis of the material in terms of various age groups and different categories of expressions. Some marked differences could be noted in the distribution of the latter with regard to gender and age. What also requires some attention is not only the assignment to the various categories, but also the frequency of certain modifiers. On the whole, the group of hedges was not very strongly marked (7 for men and 5 for women), which should not be surprising in view of the character of the communication act (informal, friendly, phatic). It is certainly the group of boosters, though, that has proved particularly characteristic of this type of informal CMC (35 items used by men and 75 by women). Among these, certain modifiers feature more markedly than others, e.g. so, really, very, quite, such. Their closer examination shows some differences between the genders also in this respect. In the phrases generated by men, the variety of forms is not particularly visible, the modifiers being limited to so, really, quite, very and extremely. The selection found in the female-generated expressions is far greater, as the forms recorded are so, much, really, far, very, such, quite, rather, pretty, truly, absolutely, totally and bloody. Thus, women appear to have a greater repertoire of forms at their disposal when it comes to describing emotional states. An additional element to be noted with respect to modifiers is the frequency distribution of the most popular ones. The modifier which enjoys the greatest popularity with men
is really with 11 occurrences, mainly in the youngest group. This is followed by so (8 records), very (5 records—mainly older men) and quite (3 records, only in the middle group). By comparison, the modifier most frequently used by women is so, which has been attested as many as 17 times. The next in line is very (14 times), closely followed by really (13 times). The remaining ones appear in markedly fewer cases. If we bear in mind that there were fewer female correspondents than male ones, the average distribution per person of these modifiers is rather striking. Moreover, the preference for really with men as opposed to so and very with women may indirectly suggest that men tend to stress the quality of the described situations, and women—their intensity.

To conclude, my initial assumption that the e-mail mode of communication, which is said to be conducive to relaxing the sender’s self-monitoring attitude, and as such might also considerably enhance the affective type of expressions with men, has not been directly proved. The analysis does, however, demonstrate that some males, contrary to common beliefs, are able to generate fairly emotionally loaded messages. This feature could be particularly detected in the youngest group of senders of up to 35 years of age, the sense of openness and self-disclosure being gradually more and more restrained with age, and this naturally intertwined with the addressee’s profile as well. As regards the female correspondents, the stereotypical affectivity of their speaking style has to a large extent been corroborated by this brief study—unlike the men, however, the youngest women did not prove particularly emotional in their letters, which if confirmed by a larger scale study, might be to some extent connected with a certain sense of insecurity when communicating with an older person. These inhibitions are certainly absent in the middle-aged group in which the greatest freedom of expression and, consequently, the most affective and formally most varied conversational style has been noted, this feature gradually, but not drastically, diminishing with age.

Thus, the affective style (Holmes, 1995) or rapport speaking (Tannen, 1992) traditionally ascribed to women has also been confirmed by this pilot study in the context of e-mail communication. In order to recognise these findings as fully binding, however, a larger scale study should be carried out, also with various types of addressees. It is only then that a more thorough description of not only the female, but also the male style of expression could be fully attained.
References


Introduction

As a complex decision-making process, translation involves various choices at all its phases, stages and steps about local and immediate operations as those taken in the translation stage, or about later operations in the task as those taken in specification phase. For didactic purposes, such decisions are best dealt with in respect of the divisions of the translation task, which we consider to consist of two phases: the specification or management phase and the translation phase consisting of three stages: the pre-translation, the translation proper and the revision and evaluation.

The decisions about the procedures to be used in the translation stage are determined by the relationship between the source text (ST) and the target text (TT), i.e. the degree of target text dependence on the original source material, which implies:

• the extent to which the source text content is to be relayed into the target text;
• the similarity or difference between the TT function and the ST function;
• the similarity or difference between the SL genre and the TL genre;
• the points of similarity or contrast between the SL system and the TL system.

Scholars have theorized a variety of procedures used in the translation stage, but the result still remains a “considerable terminological confusion” (Chesterman 1997: 87). Each approach to translation has come up with sets of methods, strategies and techniques corresponding to the view of the process held by the proponents (Vinay & Darbelnet 1958; Reiss 1976; Newmark 1981, 1988; Wills 1983; L örscher 1991; Hurtado Albir 1997; Chesterman 1997, 1998; Nord 1997; Superceanu 2004a, b).
The scholarly treatment of the procedures has brought about insights into the relationship between the cognitive and linguistic operations, the three sets of procedures and the target text type required by a translation situation. The translation theorists and practitioners seem content with just the three sets which account for the three constitutive elements of a text: content, function and form. As they rely on their knowledge of translation, the theorists can easily build a clear picture of the impact of procedures on the process and product, while the practitioners, relying on their experience, can easily anticipate the outcome of methods, strategies and techniques.

Trainee translators, however, who lack thorough knowledge and practical experience, find themselves in a maze of situational conditions, causes and constraints on the task and cannot decide on the proper procedures to lead them to the target text of the expected form and quality. One reason is that they do not know the relationships within the network of the translation situation factors,* another is that they cannot see the relationships between the types of procedures, and still another is that they cannot anticipate the influence of the procedures on the target text content, function and form.

A useful way out of this situation is to teach one more procedural concept: the submode of written translation as a way of dealing with the ST content and consequently with its function. As we see it, the submode is a subdivision of the concept of mode (Dollerup, 2001: 7–10). Having to do with content, which is a familiar concept to the students, the submodes of written translation help them to get a clear overall picture of the required text and if the submode is correlated with the frequent translation methods used by good and experienced translators, the students can make an informed choice of the procedures appropriate for their task.

In what follows I shall first describe the submodes and their relations with the translation methods and then discuss the choice of mode and method on the basis of the situational factors: initiator / sender, target text receiver, motive for translation, and target text type and its relation with the source text genre.

**Translation submodes and methods in the translation stage**

I consider the written translation submodes to be procedural concepts denoting ways of operating upon the content. They aim at meeting the infor-
formation needs of the recipient and lead to specific relations between the source of information / ST and the TT. The submodes involve either the preservation of or a change in the ST content and/or function during translation. Thus, I distinguish a full—content submode, which results in the preservation of both the ST content and the function in the TT, and the partial—content submode, which lead to modifications of content through selections or condensations of the ST content or to the change of function and, consequently, of genre. The partial-content submode is actualized by the selective, condensing and adapting procedures.

As regards the methods used in the translation stage, I consider them to be subordinated to the submodes and to represent ways of dealing with the linguistic material of the ST / source of information. They are global text-processing procedures operating at the level of text and used in order to achieve the specific goals for which the submodes are employed.

In my view, the correlation of the modes and methods is as follows:

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<tr>
<th>MODE</th>
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<tr>
<td>Full - content</td>
<td>a) Linguistic</td>
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<td>b) Pragmatic/Communicative</td>
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<td>Partial - content</td>
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<td>• Selective</td>
<td>a) Linguistic</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1. faithful</td>
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<td>2. semantic</td>
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<td></td>
<td>b) Pragmatic/Communicative</td>
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<td>• Condensing</td>
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<td>b) Concomitant</td>
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<td>• Adapting</td>
<td>a) Linguistic adaptation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>b) Cultural adaptation</td>
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The full—content submode renders the whole ST message into the TL with the help of several methods. The linguistic methods are those theorized by Peter Newmark (1988:46–47). They focus on the linguistic form of the ST, attempting to be faithful to the purposes and textual realization of the ST writer. The faithful method renders the contextual meaning of the ST grammatical and lexical elements, but adapts them to the constraints of the
TL rules. The semantic method is also linguistic and close to the faithful method, but differs from it by striving to render the stylistic values of the ST grammatical and lexical elements into the TL. The faithful method is rather rigid, therefore quite suitable for the translation of scientific and legal genres. The semantic method is more flexible and allows the translator’s creative imposition on the TT. This makes it suitable for the translation of literary texts, but also of non-literary texts with an emotive function.

The communicative method is a pragmatic method. It renders the message of the ST, focusing on the TL norms in the attempt to produce a text which sounds so natural in the TL, that the receivers cannot ideally notice or distinguish it from a non-translated text.

The partial-content submode contains three subdivisions: the selective, the condensing and the adapting submodes.

The selective submode is applied when the initiator or the recipient needs only portions of the ST which speed up his/her access to specific information. The content of the selected passages will have to be relayed in full; therefore, the translator may use either the linguistic or the communicative method.

The condensing submode leads to a shorter version of the ST message, which may take the form of an abstract or summary. These text types are similar in that they are both brief and self-contained, but a summary is the sum of all significant information extracted from the original, whereas an abstract discusses and evaluates the original. This submode is quite demanding, requiring the translator to do both summarizing and translation. S/he can use the consecutive method, i.e. summarizing/abstracting the ST first, then translating the summary/abstract, or the concomitant method, i.e. summarizing/abstracting and translating the ST at the same time.

The adapting submode is used in two situations:

1) when the SL original consists of notes, e.g. business letters, which have to be both translated and adapted to the TL linguistic system and textual norms; the method applied here is linguistic adaptation;

2) when the original is a complete text, but has to be adapted to the target cultural norms in terms of form, e.g. publicity material; the method applied is cultural adaptation.

As can be seen, the adapting mode may involve a change of function, which leads to a change of genre or a change of the TT form to comply with the cultural expectations of the TL readers.
Choice of translation submode and method

The choice of the translation submode and method are determined by a number of factors, which influence the decision directly or indirectly. They are:

- the initiator/sender, whose influence is either direct or indirect, through his purpose;
- the receiver, through his expectations;
- the motive for translation;
- the TT type and its relation with the ST genre.

The initiator/sender may specify the submode and the method himself/herself when s/he is conversant with translations, although he/she may not name the method with the common term. When s/he does not specify them, the translator can infer valuable information from what the initiator/sender specifies about the content or the linguistic form of the TT. When the initiator wants the TT content to be the same as that of the ST, the translator will translate in the full-content submode. When he wants it to be different, the translator will use the selective or the condensing procedures.

When the initiator/sender expresses only his/her purposes with the TT, the translator can derive the submode and method from the relationship between the rhetorical purpose and the method, on one hand, and between the communicative purpose and the submode, on the other hand. For example, an expressive purpose as that of a political speech can best be realized by adopting the semantic method, which, through its concern for style, allows the translator to render in the TT the nuances of meaning intended by the ST writer. Or, an advertising purpose can be achieved with the adapting submode and the cultural adaptation method, which render the message in a language variety with which the receiver is accustomed.

The recipient also has a purpose when reading a translation and expectations towards that text in terms of content and language, derivable from that purpose. Juan Sager (1993: 190) identified possible needs of receivers for translation, which spell out their purposes. According to him, receivers require:

- documents for superficial reading, “for information” only;
- documents for detailed reading, filing, and future reference;
- documents used as drafts for other documents;
- documents for publication;
- texts with the force of legal documents.
For example, a managing director who reads a formal letter, a request for hospitality from a known partner will expect just the items of information about the announced visit. In such a situation, a "gist" translation will do the job and the appropriate translation submode will be the condensing one. As for the language, the director will most probably expect a plain style, straightforward and factual.

This example leads us to the next factor, that of the motive for the translation, i.e. the reason why a translation is needed or the occasion for which it is done. The occasion may involve other factors, e.g. social, which determine expectations on the part of the receiver. In the above example, if the partner were new, his letter would be worded so as to ensure an excellent future rapport with the host and the TT has to have an endearing effect on the director. The condensing submode would not be appropriate. The translator would have to translate the full text by using the semantic method, which renders the personal characteristics of the sender’s style, or the communicative method, which can render phaticisms and a language readily acceptable to the receiver.

The TL text type has a bearing on the choice of submode and method and this is determined by the relationship between submodes/methods and text types. A summary of a long memo or of a report can only be obtained by translating in the condensing submode. A technical book intended for publication will be translated in the full-content submode with the faithful method, while the speech of an important politician will be translated with the semantic method.

**Conclusions**

The procedural concept of submode may prove to be a valuable translation teaching tool through its capability of operating upon the ST content according to the specifications of the translation situation. Moreover, as it bears a relation to the translation method, trainee translators can easily use it in the translation process. However, the choice of the appropriate submode and method requires a thorough analysis of the translation situation factors: the initiator’s/sender’s purpose, the receiver’s expectations, the translation motive and the relationship between the SL and TL genres.
References

INTEGRATIONS AND INTERFACES OF NATURAL LANGUAGE
COMPONENTS AND DEGREE WORDS/CONCEPTS

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1. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that natural language words and concepts have vague boundaries and fuzzy edges. This feature of the English language has integrated the efforts of scientists in different fields, who explored the issues of vagueness, fuzziness and hedging. Linguists and psychologists, philosophers and logicians, as well as mathematicians and engineers have dealt with these problems. Relevant expertise exhibits a certain number of interfaces that will be dealt with.

Secondly, I shall discuss the use of some hedges to show what effects they can have on sentences. Words and their combinations can carry numerous meanings, and natural language sentences are often true or false to a certain degree. Since context change operators, i.e. linguistic hedges or modifiers, specify the degree of the precization of vague expressions, I shall illustrate that the truth value becomes greater with the insertion of these words, and that sometimes they cause problems when used in their various connotations.

Thirdly, it will be also highlighted in this paper that, apart from adverbs, adjectives can convey hedged performatives too. The concept of ‘fat’ will, for example, show that there is no single fixed answer to the question ‘How fat do you have to be to be fat?’ A standard for ‘fat’ is determined by social, cultural and historical conditions. This proves that linguistic meanings of expressions are context dependent, and that category membership is a matter of degree. (see Rosch 1973).

The theory that copes with degrees of set membership is called the fuzzy set theory. How this theory helps us specify meanings of words and sentences will be shown later.
2. Interfaces of Natural Language Components and Effects of Some Hedges on Sentence Meanings

Diagram 1. represents natural language components. The semantic component is placed in the very centre of the diagram, because language is understood to be a means of communication. There are also lexical and conceptual components, pragmatic and genre components, as well as discourse and grammatical components. They are not separate, isolated entities, which is indicated by the broken lines, but are interrelated. Therefore, their different interfaces are possible.

Further discussion of linguistic interfaces needs a clarification. Although “Linguists are particularly fond of positing sharp dichotomies” (Langacker 2004:134) and usually use the concept of ‘interface’ to connect two things (e.g. syntax and semantics or pragmatics and semantics), I feel that it is necessary to group together more than two components and get interfaces integrated. Since language operates as an integrated system, this approach seems to be more appropriate.

To illustrate the interface of lexical and grammatical components and its connection with pragmatic and semantic components, one can consider ‘just a little’, for instance, in

(1) Jim is just a little shorter than John.
It is possible to claim that “it is the precision achieved that is greater” (Hlebec, 1985:265) by insertion of the hedge ‘just a little’, and that “the truth value has become greater” (Todt, 1983:219). This is valid for the modifier used in the sentence to more accurately specify the meaning of the sentence, which proves the existence of the lexico-grammatico-pragmatico-semantic interface. This interface seems to be basic, because words are combined into sentences and the meaning of a sentence as a whole depends upon connotations, and since connotations are part of pragmatic information, semantics cannot be taken to be independent of pragmatics.

But the situation is not always that simple. There are cases when two different hedges (‘technically’ and ‘strictly speaking’, for instance) seem to have the same effects in sentences, such as (2) a. and b. Whales classify as mammals if we take into account important criteria, such as that they give live birth and breathe air, and that they are fed from the mother’s body when young on milk. The following two sentences, therefore, display the conceptual-lexico-grammatico-pragmatico-semantic interface. The decisive component for determining the meaning here is the conceptual component. The examples (2) a. and b. are taken from George Lakoff (1973:475).

(2)  a. A whale is technically a mammal.
    b. Strictly speaking a whale is a mammal.

In other sentences, e.g. 3. a. and b., these two modifiers produce radically different results.

(3)  a. Richard Williams is technically a Quaker.
    b. Strictly speaking, Richard Williams is a Quaker.

‘Technically’ picks out some definitional criterion here, while ‘strictly speaking’ requires both the definitional criterion and other important criteria as well. Richard Williams may be a Quaker in some definitional sense (he opposes violence and spends most of his religious services in silence), but he does not have the religious and ethical views characteristic of a Quaker. Thus, it is possible to say that the first sentence (3) a. is true and the second (3) b. false, but only to a certain degree. These examples also correspond to the conceptual-lexico-grammatico-pragmatico-semantic interface, and the conceptual component is decisive when one tries to reveal
the meanings of these sentences. In other words, it is not possible to interpret these sentences without knowing the meaning of the concept of ‘Quaker’.

The adverbial ‘technically’ can also change the meaning of a sentence if it is used at the beginning of a sentence and in combination with some other words. The example (4) shows that the hedge seems to be cancelling that if you say something, you mean it. The hedge means, in fact, ‘only technically’ he promised to come, but he did not mean it. Since the hedge ‘technically’ and the related words define the meaning of the sentence, it is possible to claim that the interface of lexical and grammatical components here presupposes the interface of pragmatic and semantic components, and that the basic interface, the lexico-grammatico-pragmatico-semantic interface, is illustrated by the sentence (4).

(4) **Technically**, I promised to come.

The valuations for hedges sometimes take context into account. The following examples (5) a. and b. show that it is not possible to understand the meanings of these sentences without taking into consideration the lexico-grammatico-discourse-pragmatico-semantic interface.

(5) a. **Strictly speaking**, Anna Smith is a woman.
   b. **Strictly speaking**, Anna Smith is a man.

Current sex might be primary for determining womanhood vs. manhood in some contexts, and former sex primary in others, that is context determines which criteria should be considered primary and which secondary. This factor also has an influence on the truth value of these sentences.

The next pair of sentences (6) a. and b. illustrates that there is the interface of lexical and grammatical components, and the interface of genre and pragmatic and semantic components—that is the lexico-grammatico-genre-pragmatico-semantic interface. The modifier ‘typically’, used in the first sentence below, (6) a., seems to convey the meaning of having the habit of coming in late and then saying he was sorry, while ‘typically’ in the second sentence, (6) b., used in a technical article, has the meaning of ‘in this case or example’.
(6) a. Typically, he would come in late and then say he was sorry.
   b. One earth station transmits information to the satellite at a specified frequency, typically in the 6 billion cycles per second or 6-gigahertz (6 GHz) band.

The analysis has so far revealed that we need to distinguish between the definitional criterion, when taking into consideration ‘technically’, and both the definitional criterion and other primary/important criteria when discussing ‘strictly speaking’. Lakoff’s study proves that there are two more criteria for category membership: secondary properties, introduced when discussing ‘loosely speaking’, and characteristic-though-incidental properties, required when determining the truth value of ‘regular’. (See Lakoff, 1973:473–478). It has also been shown that the truth value of sentences as a whole depends upon their connotations. As connotations are part of pragmatic information, a very important conclusion can be drawn—semantics cannot be independent of pragmatics. This proves that the existence of pragmatic and semantic components of the interfaces considered above are inextricably tied together, and that is why they are inevitable in the four types of interfaces.

3. Fuzzy Logic

The fuzzy set theory can help us represent meanings of words and sentences. The central idea is that a linguistic hedge is in the set to a certain degree, and that it can be represented as some real number between zero and one. It is well-known that adverbials (such as ‘approximately’, ‘sort of’, ‘rather’ or ‘pretty’) and adjectives (‘good’, ‘nice’, ‘red’, etc.), as well as certain verbs (such as ‘guess’, ‘think’, ‘suppose’) and nouns (‘democracy’, ‘autonomy’, ‘beauty’, etc.) and syntactic constructions (e.g. ‘Won’t you open the window?’) convey hedged performatives.

I shall take up the quantifier ‘fat’ here. How ‘fat’ one is considered to be depends upon what one’s weight is (plus various contextual factors). The meaning of ‘fat’ can be represented by a function, which is fuzzy, and the value for ‘fat’ is determined in the interval 0 and 1, which is shown in Figure 1. The curve for fat is an approximation, as well as everything given here. Figure 2. also shows how weight maps into degree of fatness. The first curve below (Figure 1.) represents that if someone is lighter than 80 kg, then
he is not fat to any degree; if he is 84 kg, we might say that he is fat to degree 0.3; if he is 88 kg, we might say that he is fat to degree 0.95, and if he is over 90 kg, then he is fat. The same relations are represented in Figure 2. The second curve in Figure 1. as well as Figure 3. show degrees of ‘very fat’. 

Figure 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEIGHT (kg)</th>
<th>80</th>
<th>82</th>
<th>84</th>
<th>85</th>
<th>86</th>
<th>88</th>
<th>90</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEGREE OF FATNESS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEIGHT (kg)</th>
<th>80</th>
<th>82</th>
<th>84</th>
<th>85</th>
<th>86</th>
<th>88</th>
<th>90</th>
<th>92</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEGREE OF ‘VERY FAT’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If the language of the fuzzy set theory is used, it is possible to say

(7) let $P = 'George is very fat'$ and $Q = 'George is fat'$.

Since $P$ semantically entails $Q$, the value for 'very fat' is less than or equal to the value of 'fat'. If George is, for example, 85 kg in weight, the value for 'very fat' is 0.2, while the value for 'fat' is 0.55. This could be expressed in the following way:

'$P \rightarrow Q'$ and $|P| \leq |Q|$

If we now consider the sentence

(8) 'George is fat and not fat',

we might think that this is a contradiction. If George is fat to some extent, let us say to degree 0.6, he is not fat to degree 0.4, and therefore this sentence seems to have a degree of truth and does not seem to be false, which proves that

'$Q \land \lnot Q'$ is not a contradiction.

To end up this discussion, we cannot avoid saying that the concept of 'fat' is fuzzy, and that the answer to the question 'How fat do you have to be to be fat' depends on where you live and for what purposes you want to define fatness, i.e. there is no single fixed answer to the question. If someone would like to become a model, then criteria for determining fatness are different than when, for example, someone would like to get a job in a library. To be 'a fat woman' in Turkey is not the same as to be 'a fat woman' in Sweden. It is also possible to say that educated and non-educated people have different opinions of how fat one can be not to be fat, and of course sex and age are taken into account too, when considering the issue of fatness. This discussion leads us to a conclusion that a standard for 'fat' is determined by various factors and that the concept of 'fat' is relative.

In judging the sentence
Isaak Newton and Albert Einstein are similar to be true to a certain degree, one picks out a number of contextually important criteria, and then determines the degree of similarity on the basis of how closely the values match for the criteria chosen. What these two scientists certainly had in common is that they were physicists and that they both were interested in general laws. But we also need to bear in mind that things are similar or dissimilar not just to degrees, but also in various respects.

The situation with ‘similarity’ hence becomes even more complicated when the hedge ‘very’ is combined with ‘similar’, as it is the case in (10). It is likely that here one will take into account other criteria, for instance, personal lives, moral values, etc. As the two scientists were different in respect to these criteria, we might ask ourselves whether the sentence

(10) Isaak Newton and Albert Einstein are very similar

is true. The answer seems to be correct, because being ‘very similar’ semantically entails ‘similar’. And yet, it seems to be incorrect if one takes into consideration more criteria and the closeness of the values assigned to the selected criteria. That is why Lakoff (1973:485) claims that ‘very’ must be assigned vector values, and that it is difficult to completely understand it. To show that the hedge ‘very’ can have different effects on sentence meanings, Lakoff discussed ‘very strictly speaking’, ‘very loosely speaking’ and ‘very tall’ in his famous article (Lakoff, 1973:486–489).

4. Conclusion

Having all said in mind, we can sum up:

- category membership is a matter of degree, not a clearcut issue, i.e. an individual is in the set to a certain degree
- the degree of truth corresponds to the degree of category membership
- words and concepts have vague boundaries and fuzzy edges
their combinations produce true or false sentences to a certain degree
linguistic hedges specify the degree of the precization of vague expressions
sometimes connotations cause problems
the truth value of sentences as a whole depends upon their connotations
language in use is always in question when we discuss meanings
semantics cannot be taken to be independent of pragmatics
the linguistic meaning of an expression is context dependent
four interfaces of natural language components have been found
a variety of meanings is communicated in English through these interfaces and their integrations
these integrations within the English language take us across language borders
scientists unite to explore the issues of hedging, vagueness and fuzziness

References
1. Introduction

In addition to the successful transfer of the source-text syntactic structures and lexical items into the target language, the process of translation also requires the preservation of the functional values assumed by the original texts. A very important role in this respect is played by the manner in which the translator deals with the speech acts of the original text. Starting from this idea, my paper will focus on the illocutionary acts revealed by the EU texts, highlighting the types of speech acts which are predominantly used in this type of documents, as well as the devices by which they characteristically indicate their function. The purpose of this analysis is twofold, since, on the one hand, it is meant to lead to the identification of the newly formed norms presented by the Romanian texts belonging to the genre of the EU legislation as far as the specific speech acts are concerned, and, on the other, to point to the problems that these norms might generally induce during the process of translating these texts from English into Romanian.

In trying to attain the above mentioned objectives, my endeavour is based on elements from various approaches that have contributed to the theory of the speech acts. First of all, in the identification of the speech acts contained by the texts in my corpus, I will use the definitions and part of the terminology suggested by Austin (1962), Searle (1969, 1979), and Bach and Harnish (1979). Additionally, my analysis will incorporate an interesting insight coming from van Dijk (1982), who claims that speech acts in a discourse do not present only a sequential, linear organization, but also a hierarchical one, thus leading to the formation of global macro-structures, which he calls "global speech acts".

Consequently, in what follows, I will identify and interpret the various speech acts contained by EU documents, the indicators of the functions they perform in the discourse as a whole, as well as their combination into
sequences. In the case of the individual acts, the boundary is represented by the clause, while the macro-speech acts are interpreted in the context of the overall discourse.

2. Speech Acts in the EU Documents

In close connection to the communicative purpose of the genre under analysis, each of the EU texts in my corpus—be it an English original text or its Romanian translation—may be summed up as a directive, because, just like in the case of any type of legislation, these documents are issued by an authority with the specific purpose of achieving a certain type of behaviour on the part of the addressees. This main act is supported, on the one hand, by a number of macro-speech acts performed by the various sections of the EU documents (i.e. the Opening text, the Citations, the Recitals, the Enacting formula, the Enacting terms, and the Annex), and, on the other, by the multitude of individual acts that each of these sections includes.

Thus, the Opening text together with the Enacting formula, although separated by a considerable amount of text, count as informatives, whose role is to announce the addressees that the legislative act in question has been adopted: e.g. “The Council of the European Union … has adopted this regulation”/ “Comisia Comunităților Europene, … adoptă prezentul regulament” (32001R0215). In spite of its mainly informative function, the Enacting formula, which actually introduces the prescribing part of the document, is also felt to have a strong imperative tone.

The section of the Citations, in conjunction with that of the Recitals, may be identified as an act of justification, because the main role of these two sections is to state the legal basis and the grounds on which the document is issued. This process of justification is backed up by a number of individual speech acts performed by the utterances included in these two sections. In the vast majority of cases, these acts represent the class of assertives, because their function is to provide information on certain aspects that may constitute arguments for the formulation of the legal provisions contained in the document.

The multitude of assertives included in the sections of Citations and Recitals can be further sub-categorized according to the specific function that they are assigned in each particular case. Thus, in building their arguments, the texts in my corpus make frequent use of:
— *informatives*: e.g. “The terms of office of Ms Ninon COLNERIC and Messrs David A. O. EDWARD ... expire on 6 October 2000.”/ “Mandatele doamnei Ninon COLNERIC și ale domnilor David A. O. EDWARD ... expiră la 6 octombrie 2000.” (42000D0491);

— *descriptions*: e.g. “The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Statistical Programme Committee.”/ “Măsurile prevăzute în prezentul regulament sunt conforme cu avizul Comitetului pentru Programul Statistic.” (32002R0113);

— *predictions*: e.g. “The ban on the marketing and use of chrysotile asbestos ... will contribute to a substantial reduction in asbestos exposure of workers.”/ “Interzicerea introducerii pe piață și a utilizării azbestului crisotil ... va contribui la reducerea substanțială a expunerii la azbest a lucrătorilor.” (32003L0018);


It is interesting that, in both the English and the Romanian texts under analysis, the illocutionary force indicators in the case of all these assertives are never represented by illocutionary verbs, but only by the declarative form of the utterances, the Indicative mood of the main verbs and the unmarked order of the clause constituents. In addition to these elements, which are valid for any type of assertion, the acts of reporting are signalled by the past tense of the verb and by some adverbial phrases with definite past time reference, predictions are indicated by the future tense of the main verb, while descriptions are sometimes associated with a nominal type of predicate.

When the text-producer’s intention is no longer primarily to inform, but rather to persuade the addressees, neutral speech acts like the assertions mentioned above no longer serve the communicative purpose of the text. In such cases, the Citations and the Recitals resort to speech acts with a stronger illocutionary force, like the ones listed below:
(1) ST: “Non-governmental organisations, social partners and local and regional authorities can therefore make an important contribution at European level to understanding the diverse forms and effects of social exclusion …”

TT: “În consecinţă, organizaţiile neguvernamentale, partenerii sociali şi autorităţile locale şi regionale pot aduce o contribuţie importantă la nivel european la înţelegerea diferitelor forme şi efecte ale excluderii sociale …” (32002D0050)

2) ST: “In order to ensure clarity in the definition of the fibres, they should be redefined either in mineralogical terms or with regard to their Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) number.”

TT: “Pentru a se asigura claritate în definirea fibrelor, acestea trebuie redefinite fie în termeni mineralogici, fie prin raportare la numărul CAS …” (32003L0018)

(3) ST: “In the interests of the harmonious administration of justice it is necessary to minimise the possibility of concurrent proceedings …”

TT: “În interesul administrării armonioase a justiţiei, este necesar să se reducă la minimum posibilitatea apariţiei procedurilor concurente …” (32001R0044)

As these examples illustrate, the stronger arguments which support the macro-speech act of justification range from rather neutral suggestions (example 1) to quite powerful recommendations (examples 2 and 3). The main illocutionary force indicators in the case of the suggestions are, in English, the modal verbs can or may, and, in Romanian, the verb a putea, in its possibility sense, as well as the impersonal verb phrase este posibil. As far as the recommendations present in these sections are concerned, they are signalled, in English, by the modal verb should and, less frequently, by evaluative adjectives such as important, necessary, opportune or appropriate, and, in Romanian, by the verb trebuie (sometimes in its weaker form ar trebui) and by a series of phrases containing adjectives like recomandabil, oportun, important, necesar, or even indispensabil.

There are two observations that I would like to make with regard to the manner in which the speech acts contained in the sections of the Citations and of Recitals are rendered in the English and the Romanian variants of the texts under analysis.
The first observation refers to the translation solutions offered for the English modal verb *should*, which registers a very high frequency in the text segment analysed. I consider that the words used as equivalents for this verb in the Romanian variants of the EU texts are generally characterized by a stronger deontic force. Thus, in most of the cases, *should* is translated by means of the impersonal verb *trebuie*, which is more suitable as equivalent for modal verbs expressing stronger obligation, such as *must* or *have to*. The weaker optative form of this Romanian verb, i.e. *ar trebui*, which would be more suitable for the translation of the English *should*, is rather the exception than the rule in the Romanian texts in my corpus. Moreover, the meaning of the English modal verb is sometimes rendered into Romanian by means of impersonal phrases containing rather strong evaluative adjectives: e.g.: “It should be ensured that demolition or asbestos removal work is carried out by undertakings ...”/ “Este indispensabil să se asigure că lucrările de demolare sau de îndepărtare a azbestului sunt efectuate de întreprinderi ...” (32003L0018); “A procedure should be laid down for updating the measurements methods ...”/ “Este necesară stabilirea unei proceduri de actualizare a metodelor de măsurare ...” (32003L0017). I consider that the presence of such adjectives lends the Romanian utterance a more obligatory character, and, therefore, slightly affects its intended meaning.

Recommendations represent the focus of my second observation. Thus, the comparative analysis of the two linguistic sets of EU documents texts in my corpus (English and Romanian) has revealed instances when speech acts of this type displayed by the English texts are rendered into Romanian by means of an illocutionary change (cf. Chesterman 1997: 110). The two examples offered below are illustrative of such situations:

(1) ST: “The names should therefore be entered in the „Register of protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications“ ...”
TT: “Prin urmare, aceste denumiri pot fi înscrise în „Registru de numirilor de origine protejate și al indicațiilor geografice protejate“ ...” (32003R0492)

(2) ST: “The European Year of Education through Sport should be opened up for participation ...”
TT: “Anul european al educației prin sport este deschis participării ...” (32003D0291)
In both examples, the speech act changes are definitely gratuitous, and affect the meaning of the resulting utterance. In example (1), the source-text recommendation becomes a target-text suggestive: in this way, the utterance in question loses much of its obligatory force and, consequently, the Romanian intended recipient is somehow misled. The same effect is achieved as a result of the illocutionary change performed by the Romanian translator of the second fragment. In this case, the original recommendation—which, by definition, involves the imposition of a certain obligation—is turned into an informative, whose role is just that of stating a fact.

The macro-speech acts mentioned so far—i.e. the informative expressed by the sections of the Opening text and of the Enacting formula, and the act of justification rendered by the Citations and the Recitals—are actually meant to prepare the ground for the main macro-act of the EU document, which is the act of prescribing performed by the section of the Enacting terms. The individual acts performed in this section do not present the variety of the acts used in the explanatory part of the text, but they certainly play a major part in the achievement of the communicative purpose specific to the EU legislation.

The macro-speech act of prescribing is realized by means of two main categories of individual acts: directives and declarations. A great percentage of the directives is represented by the commands, which are either positive:

e.g. ST: “The procedure for attesting conformity as set out in Annex II shall be indicated in the mandates for guidelines for European technical approvals.”

TT: “Procedura de atestare a conformității conform anexei II se precizează în mandatele pentru ghidurile de agrement tehnic european corespunzătoare.” (32003D0639)

or negative:

e.g. ST: “This Regulation shall not apply to exports involving Community or national food aid ...”

TT: “Prezentul regulament nu se aplică în cazul exporturilor din cadrul ajutorului alimentar comunitar sau național ...” (32002R2090)
As the examples above illustrate, in English, these commands are marked by the presence of the mandatory shall. It is interesting that, in the Romanian variants of the documents, the obligatory character of the legal provision does not involve any special illocutionary force indicator, and it is rendered by means of the present tense of the Indicative Mood. There are, however, some rare cases when the English texts use must instead of shall in order to render the imperative force of the law, but, this is not the norm in the EU legislation (cf. English Style Guide: A handbook for authors and translators in the European Commission: 42): e.g. “The Exchange of Letters referred to in Article 18 (2) must stipulate the level of any security clearance of national experts on detachment.”/ “Schimbul de scrisori menționat în art. 18 alin. (2) trebuie să stipuleze nivelul unei eventuale autorizații în materie de siguranța informațiilor a experților naționali detașați.” (32001D0041). In such cases, the obligatory character of the provision is rendered into Romanian by the impersonal verb trebuie.

Sometimes, the negative commands acquire a stronger illocutionary force and turn into prohibitions: e.g. “The operating budget of the agency may not be adopted definitively until the general budget of the European Union has been finally adopted.”/ “Bugetul de funcționare al agenției nu poate fi adoptat definitiv înainte de adoptarea finală a bugetului general al Uniunii Europene.” (32003R0058). As this example indicates, prohibitions are marked by the negative form of the verb may/a putea.

In addition to commands and prohibitions, the prescribing part of the EU texts also contains some positive or negative permissives. The positive permissives are marked by the presence of the modal verb may/a putea:

e.g. ST: “Any declaration made in pursuance of the preceding paragraph may, in respect of any territory mentioned in such declaration, be withdrawn according to the procedure laid down in Article 11 of this Agreement.”

TT: “Orice declarație făcută în temeiul alineatului anterior poate fi retrasă, pentru orice teritoriu desemnat în această declarație, în condițiile prevăzute în art. 11 din prezentul acord.” (21974A0917(01))
while the negative ones, are signalled, in English, by the negative form of the modal need, and, in Romanian, by the deontic a putea, followed by a negative verb in the Subjunctive Mood:

ST: “in the case of failure to appear, a judgment given in the civil action without the person concerned having had the opportunity to arrange for his defence need not be recognised or enforced in the other Member States.”

TT: “în caz de neprezentare, hotărârea pronunţată în acţiunea civilă fără ca persoana în cauză să fi avut posibilitatea de a-şi pregăti apărarea poate să nu fie recunoscută sau executată în celelalte state membre.”

The other major category of speech acts revealed by the Enacting terms is that of the declarations, which represent the manner of implementing the legal provision in question: e.g. “The following are hereby appointed Judges of the Court of Justice of the European Communities for the period from 7 October 2000 to 6 October 2006 …”/ “Se numesc judecători la Curtea de Justiţie a Comunităților Europene pentru perioada—7 octombrie 2000—6 octombrie 2006 …” (42000D0491). These declarations are very close to the acts which Austin (1962) first conceived as performatives, a proof in this respect being the frequent use of the adverb hereby in the EU documents written in English. However, the presence of hereby is not compulsory for a certain statement to be interpreted as a declaration, and the English texts in my corpus reveal numerous situations when the speech acts of this type are simply marked by verbs in the present tense of the Indicative Mood: e.g. “The Annex to Decision 2000/147/EC is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.”/ “Anexa la Decizia 2000/147/CE se modifică în conformitate cu anexa la prezenta decizie.” (32003D0632). As far as the Romanian renderings of these acts are concerned, the two examples offered above clearly indicate that declarations do not present any special illocutionary force indicators, and it is only the intended meaning that differentiates these acts from the commands discussed earlier.

A special place among the declarations contained by the category of texts under analysis is represented by the definitions, which are actually declarations concerning the language use itself (cf. Coulthard 1985: 25). This type of language-oriented speech acts is not specific to the EU documents, being used whenever a text producer wants to specify the exact
terms in which an important concept is to be understood in a particular context. The vast majority of the texts in my corpus reveal instances of such definitions: e.g. “‘ship’s spare parts’ means articles of a repair or replacement nature for incorporation into the ship in which they are carried”/ “piesele de schimb ale navei înseamnă articole pentru reparaţii sau înlocuire, destinate a fi incorporate în nava care le transportă” (32002L0006). The indicators of illocutionary force for these acts are represented, in English, mainly by the verb to mean, and, in Romanian, by the verbs a însemna, a desemna or a se înțelege.

The last two sections of the EU texts have an auxiliary role in relation to the main prescriptive act of these documents. Thus, the Place and time of enactment, as its name suggests, counts as an informative: e.g. “Done at Brussels, 8 February 2002.”/ “Adoptat la Bruxelles, 8 februarie 2002.” (32002R0245).

An auxiliary role is also played by the section of the Annex, which can be interpreted as an act of providing additional information. In the numerous cases when the Annex consists only in technical data offered under the form of lists or tables, there is no individual act to support the macro-speech act performed by the text segment in discussion. If, however, the Annex contains complete utterances, its global function is backed up by various types of speech acts, depending on the nature of the additional information necessary in each particular document. Thus, the section of the Annex achieves its specific communicative function by means of a wide range of acts, from simple informatives and descriptions to more forceful suggestions and recommendations. Since these categories of speech acts reveal features that are similar to those discussed in the case of the Citations and the Recitals, they will be no longer illustrated here.

In addition to the speech act types mentioned above, the Annex also makes use of a series of directives, which differ not only from the suggestions and the recommendations contained by the sections of the Citations and the Recitals, but also from the commands, the permissives and the prohibitions identified in the case of the Enacting terms. These directives are represented, on the one hand, by instructions:

e.g. ST: “Measure either peak areas (using an integrator…) or peak heights (manual integration) for trans-anethole and internal standard peaks.”
TT: “Se măsoară arile vârfului (utilizând un integrator...) sau înălțimile vârfului (integrare manuală) pentru trans-anetol și pentru etalonul intern.” (32002R2091)

and, on the other, by requirements:

e.g. ST: “Methodologies to determine the costs of national RTGS systems will be harmonised to an adequate level.”

TT: “Metodologiile de determinare a costurilor sistemelor RBTR naționale se armonizează la un nivel adecvat.” (32001O0003)

It must be noted that, in the case of the English texts, the obligations expressed in the Annex reveal specific illocutionary force indicators (i.e. verbs in the Imperative Mood for the instructions, and the modals must or will for the requirements), which differ from those of the directives present in the section of the Enacting terms. In the Romanian translations of the EU documents, however, the instructions and the requirements formulated in the Annexes are signalled by the same type of verbs in the present tense of the Indicative Mood, which are used for the commands, as well as for the declarations contained by the prescribing segment of these texts. This means that the English variants of the EU texts present more clarity from this point of view, and that it is quite easy for their addressees to recognize the type of speech act used in each particular case. Things are likely to be more problematic for the recipients of the Romanian translations of the EU documents, because the correct understanding and interpretation of the speech acts displayed by these texts has to rely almost exclusively on considerations of semantic and conventional nature, and less on the linguistic features of the utterances expressing them.

3. Conclusions

The most important conclusion regarding the speech acts typically displayed by the EU documents that I analyzed is that the Romanian variants of these texts tend to preserve the characteristics presented by their sources. The macro-speech acts revealed by both the English and the Romanian texts in my corpus, as well as the individual acts supporting them, are presented synthetically in the table below:
As regards the illocutionary force indicators of the individual speech acts in the English EU documents, on the one hand, and in their Romanian counterparts, on the other, the conclusions of my analysis at this level can be summed up as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TEXT SEGMENT</th>
<th>MACRO – SPEECH ACT</th>
<th>ROLE IN RELATION TO THE MAIN SPEECH ACT</th>
<th>CLASSES OF SPEECH ACTS</th>
<th>INDIVIDUAL SPEECH ACTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opening text + Enacting formula</td>
<td>Informative</td>
<td>Preparatory</td>
<td>Assertive</td>
<td>Informative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Citations + Recitals</td>
<td>Justification</td>
<td>Preparatory</td>
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<td>Descriptions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enacting terms</td>
<td>Prescribing</td>
<td>Main speech act</td>
<td>Directives</td>
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<td>Definitions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Place and time of enactment</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex</td>
<td>Providing additional information</td>
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<td>Requirements</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPEECH ACT TYPE</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Informatives</td>
<td>- declarative form of the utterance</td>
<td>- declarative form of the utterance</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- verb in the present tense of the Indicative Mood</td>
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<td>- propositional content</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- unmarked word order</td>
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<tr>
<td>Descriptions</td>
<td>- verb in the present tense of the Indicative Mood (sometimes) nominal</td>
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<td>- propositional content</td>
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<td>- unmarked word order</td>
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<tr>
<td>Predictions</td>
<td>- declarative form of the utterance</td>
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<td>- future tense of the Indicative Mood</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- unmarked word order</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reporting</td>
<td>- declarative form of the utterance</td>
<td>- declarative form of the utterance</td>
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<td>- past tense of the Indicative Mood</td>
<td>- past tense of the Indicative Mood</td>
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<td>- adverbial phrases of time with a past reference</td>
<td>- adverbial phrases of time with a past reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suggestions</td>
<td>- the modal verb can</td>
<td>- the modal verb poate</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- the modal verb may</td>
<td>- the impersonal expression est posibil</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recommendations</td>
<td>- the modal verb should</td>
<td>- the impersonal verb trebuie/</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- adjectives like important, necessary, appropriate</td>
<td>ar trebui</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- adjectives like important, necesar, indispensabil, oportun</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commands</td>
<td>- the modal verb shall</td>
<td>- present tense of the Indicative Mood, third person singular or plural</td>
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<td>- very rarely, the modal verb must</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prohibitions</td>
<td>- the negative modal may not</td>
<td>- the verb nu pot/ nu poate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>- the modal verb may</td>
<td>- the verbal construction poate + sâ ...</td>
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<td>Permissives</td>
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Finally, I would like to stress that the illocutionary force of a speech act is determined by certain conventional associations existing between the linguistic realization of the utterance and the particular situation in which it occurs. This is very well reflected by the texts that I analyzed, because, quite often, my interpretation of the speech acts was based on the type of context in which the various utterances appeared, and not necessarily on the linguistic elements that they contained. Thus, it was in the explanatory segment of the text that various utterances containing should/trebuie or the adjective indispensabil were interpreted as recommendations, and not as requirements. Similarly, it was the context of the prescribing part of the legal document that determined a series of assertion-like utterances with verbs in the present tense of the Indicative Mood to be interpreted as commands.

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**Webography**


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1. Introduction

This paper examines the distribution of different classes of Sentence Adverbs in both English and Romanian from the point of view of the two major theories of adverbs that are currently on the market; the adjunction theory (Ernst 2002) and adverbs as merged specifiers of functional projections (Alexiadou 1994, Cinque 1997, Laenzlinger 2003, etc.)

The feature theory contrasts with the more traditional theory where adverbs adjoin to independently motivated projections of various kinds and recursive adjunction is allowed. The adjunction theory fares better at capturing the fact that adverbs may have a rather free distribution with respect to other elements in the clause. This obviously manifests itself in different ways in different languages.

Romanian is interesting as far as the study of sentence adverbs is concerned since as we shall see there is a striking similarity between adverbs and adjectives to the extent that they are more often than not homonymous in form, making it sometimes difficult to tell them apart, especially if the adjective is used predicatively.

2. Sentence Adverbs in English.

This section offers a classification of sentence adverbs in English. Different authors have put forth different classifications in order to accommodate their theories. However the fact remains that semantically they are not a coherent class.

Traditional intuition says that adverbs are related to sentences or VPs just as adjectives are to NPs. We observe a parallelism between adjectives and adverbs with respect to their surface position. Thus, adjectives in NPs
appear between the determiner and the head. This position is parallel to the auxiliary position of adverbs in sentences.

The same kind of parallelism may be observed for Romanian adverbs. The difference lies in the fact that adjectives appear after the noun in the NP, while adverbs occur in post verbal position. In the presence of an auxiliary verb, the sentence adverb cannot intervene in between the auxiliary and the main verb as in 1b). This is due to the fact that in Romanian, auxiliary verbs behave like clitics. Other adverbs like tot, prea, mai may intervene between the auxiliary and the main verb, but sentence adverbs cannot interrupt the auxiliary verb—main verb sequence.

1) a. A venit probabil.  
   a’. Probabil a venit.  
   Has come3-sg probably.  
   “He has probably come.”  
   b. *A probabil venit. / A tot / prea / mai venit.  
   Has probably come 3-sg.  
   “He has probably come.”

The only exception when a sentence adverb may break the sequence can be observed with the passive auxiliary in Romanian.

2) Rufele au fost probabil spâlate.  
   Clothes-THE have PAST3-pl been probably washed.  
   “The clothes have been probably washed.”

According to Jackendoff (1972: 50), sentence adverbs that occur in initial and auxiliary position, such as probably or evidently are speaker-oriented. They are seen as relating the speaker’s attitude towards the event expressed by the sentence.

3) a. Probably Horatio has lost his mind.  
   b. Horatio has probably lost his mind.  
   c. It was probable that Horatio has lost his mind.

Other -ly adverbs of type cleverly or carefully are ambiguous between a subject-oriented interpretation and a manner interpretation. When these adverbs have a subject-oriented interpretation, they are understood as making a comment on the subject of the sentence.

4) John cleverly dropped his cup of coffee.  
   Subject-oriented  
   It was clever of John to drop his cup of coffee.
Manner

John dropped his cup of coffee in a clever way.

When there is more than one S adverb in a sentence, some interesting constraints appear. The most obvious of these is that two adverbs cannot usually be adjacent.

5) a. *Evidently carefully John left the room.
   b. Evidently, John carefully has left the room.
   c. ?*John evidently carefully has left the room.
   d. John evidently has carefully left the room.
   e. *John has left the room, evidently, carefully.

Jackendoff (1972: 89) observes that the example in 5c) can be made plausible with elaborate intonation. This might indicate that the auxiliary position is fundamental for sentence adverbs.

It appears that under this analysis adverbs of the same semantic type like probably and evidently / obviously cannot cooccur. Sentences such as 6) and 7) can be generated observing however that for the latter no other order of the adverbs can be possible.

6) John obviously will probably soon learn French.
7) Clearly John probably will quickly learn French perfectly.
8) John will probably quickly learn French perfectly.

For this particular analysis, the order of functional projections in English is (cf. Alexiadou (1994), Costa (1998) and others):

AgrSP > TP > AspP > AgrOP > VP

A more refined account of sentence adverbs comes from Cinque’s (1997) classification of “higher” sentence adverbs. According to Cinque (1997), higher adverbs are characterized by a fixed relative order. Since Jackendoff (1972), it has been known that subject-oriented adverbs like clumsily, cleverly follow speaker-oriented adverbs like probably. However, as seen in the previous section, Jackendoff’s class of speaker-oriented adverbs was not homogeneous and it can be further subdivided into:

a) domain adverbs: politically, legally, artistically, theoretically, economically, ethically.

b) pragmatic adverbs: frankly, sincerely, honestly, truthfully.

c) evaluative adverbs: luckily, (un)fortunately, curiously, happily.

d) modal (epistemic) adverbs: probably, surely, certainly, presumably.

e) perhaps.
An interesting fact that has to be noted is that according to Swan (1988), many sentence adverbs have evolved from intensifier / manner adverbs to degree and later into sentence adverbs. Thus, she argues that while some truth intensifiers appear to be full-fledged sentence adverbs even in Old English, evaluatives can hardly be called anything but “embryo SA”. It appears that these adverbs are very rare both in Old English and Middle English and only in Modern English have developed as a true and relatively large class.

According to Swan (1988) Modern English evaluative adverbs function “clearly and unambiguously as SA”, i.e. as sentence modification. They can be seen as (parenthetical) reduced sentences with separate and separating intonation pattern / punctuation, acting as true disjuncts. OE and ME evaluatives are, according to Swan a blend at best of sentence-modification and word-modification. Below there are a few examples of Modern English versus OE and ME evaluative adverbs (from Swan 1988: 4)

**Modern English**

9) a. **Curiously**, no one saw them leave.  
   b. **Unfortunately**, we never saw them again.  
   c. And, **ironically**, Jane hadn’t found John there.

**Old English**

10) a. and **wundorlice** mid ȝeotum wæter ut-ateah.  
   “and miraculously drew out water by means of pipes” (Lives of Saints)  
   b. & **hawendlice** geðencen ða god ða we forgiemelasdon.  
   “and salutarily reflect on the good we have neglected” (Cura Pastoralis)

**Middle English**

11) a. which was **myraculously** translatyd fro Bedlem in-to ȝat place (Margery Kempe)  
   b. which deyed at Constantinople ful **schamefully** (Capgrave)

The reason why these observations are interesting is that the evolution of these adverbs from intensifiers / manner adverbs to degree and later into sentence adverbs is their retention of the manner reading in some cases depending on the position in which they occur. The fact that they had started out as having a manner reading should be an indication to the fact that
we do have to postulate different base positions for these adverbs by taking their readings into account. The examples below from Swan (1988:11)

12) a. They were strangely dressed. (manner)
    b. They spoke strangely. (manner)
    c. The silk seemed strangely white. (manner / degree)
    d. It is strange how white it is. (speaker comment + degree)
    e. It is strange that it is white. (speaker comment)
    f. Strangely, the silk is white. (adverbialized speaker comment)

The adjectival counterpart in 12d-e) helped developing sentence adverbs by adding speaker comment readings.


This section offers a classification of sentence adverbs in Romanian. It also discusses the positions in which they occur and attempts an ordering of the several subclasses of sentence adverbs along the lines of Cinque's (1997) ordering restrictions, trying to analyze the different positions in which they may surface.

3.1. Classification.

Following Cinque's (1997) classification of higher / sentence adverbs for English, we can attempt a similar subdivision for Romanian sentence adverbs. In what follows we shall present the classification of Romanian sentence adverbs providing examples from literary works. The analysis is trying to follow that of Cinque (1997) in offering a relatively strict order of these adverbs. The assumption is that whenever these adverbs appear in the same sentence they co-occur only in a certain order.

a) domain adverbs: legal, legalmente, politic, teoretic, economic which express a point of view. According to Alexiadou (1994) domain adverbs impose a domain on in which only the proposition is asserted to be true. We can observe that just as it is the case with Modern Greek, Romanian domain adverbs have also ‘manner’ counterparts, but unlike Modern Greek they are not distinguished by means of different morphology. These adverbs have the same form for both readings. The fact that certain manner adverbs from Old English later acquired sentence readings could be indicative to that extent. It is also to be noted that Romanian has a
tendency to have adverbs and adjectives with the same form. The only way to distinguish them is the agreement shown by Romanian adjectives. In their manner reading, these adverbs modify the predicate, while in their sentential reading, they are modifiers of the whole clause.

13) Legalmente arepraducele nu are prerogative împărăteşti.  
   (T. Vornic—Sub pajura împărâţiei, p.110)

14) Va trimite copie … spre a ne putea pronunţa şi legalmente.  
   (I. Ghica—Amintiri din pribegia după 1848 p.747)

b) pragmatic adverbs: sincer, cinstit, făţiş.

15) Sincer nu cred că va veni.

c) modal (epistemic) adverbs: probabil, poate,bineinteles, fireşte, posibil, precis, negreşit, desigur, pesemne, neindoielnic, evident.

16) Fireşte că în pragul iernii nu caut o casă cu chirie pentru a o admira din curte—adică din ultiţă, fiindcă n-are curte.  
   (Caragiale—Momente şi schiţe, p.59)

17) Dacă cineva ar fi calculat vârsta acestui boier de țară după perii săi cei albi ca zăpadă, negreşit că i-ar fi dat de la 70 până la 75 de ani.
   (Filimon—Ciocoii vechi si noi, p.69)

18) Neindoielnic voi fi acolo la ora anunţată.  
19) … poate că mai ales de aceea, Ana îmi pără prea tânără, prea aşezată, oarecum prea blândă la fiire…  
   (I. Slavici—Moara cu noroc, p.114)

20) Evident, un asemenea subiect de vorbă tulbura pe Milescu.  
   (D. Zamfirescu—În râzboi, p.220)

21) Şi eabineinteles, îl încredujă, sigur, îi spunea, este foarte normal să te apuci, la talentul tău, la cunoaşterea ta de oameni.
   (Gabriela Adameşteanu—Dimineaţă pierdută, p. 58)

22) Bineinteles că eram beţi, el mai tare, fiindcă eu aveam o practică îndelungată în ceea ce priveşte vinul.

23) Îl spieriasepesemne ciurna.  
   Eram probabil speriat.

24) Era în nesimţire probabil, altfel ne-ar fi găsit el pe noi, dar nu ne-a găsit.  
   (Ştefan Agopian—Tache de caiţea, p. 63, 31, 63)
3.2. An analysis of Romanian S-adverbs.

Romanian appears to be a language where sentence adverbs mostly function as logical terms bringing information about the speech act taking the sentence into their scope (cf. Panã-Dindelegan 1991). These adverbs are: **fieşte, negreşit, sigur, probabil**. They function predicatively just like verbs and adjectives. They differ from verbs and adjectives in that they do not denote properties of objects or (relations between objects) but rather properties of properties. According to Panã-Dindelegan (1991), they are functions which include as an argument another function, the so-called function of a higher type: \( f(y(x)) \).

   b. Sigur (va reuşi (x)).

Romanian sentence adverbs are isolated by a break from the rest of the sentence or they are followed by \( că \). These adverbs: **poate, pesemne, desigur** are used predicatively. Ciompec (1985) argues that \( că \) is used expletively in this context. The puzzle here is that they may but need not select a \( că \) “that” domain. According to Ciompec (1985: 79) this results from the fact that:

sentences with or without \( că \) are syntactically and semantically equivalent.

26) Poate \( (că) \) vine.
27) Desigur \( (că) \) ne preferă.

Adverb + \( că \) is also used when the entity following is not a sentence, but part of a sentence as illustrated below (cf. Ciompec (1985:79)):

28) Faci a doua redactare poate \( că \) mai bună.

In this particular case, it is clear that \( poate \) is a modifier of the sequence \( mai bună \), the occurrence of \( că \) is “parasitic” (cf. Ciompec 1985:79).

Summing up, \( că \) is used expletively just as it is used at the beginning of independent or main sentences. It is also used with other manner adverbs (**Bine că ai venit. / E bine că ai venit. / Ce bine că ai venit!**) which may be part of copulative predications followed by subject clauses introduced by this conjunction or as shown above they may be exclamative constructions. However, Romanian does not pattern with English as far as “that” deletion is concerned. In English the functional head that contains the complementizer may be either lexical or non lexical. Therefore, it is safe to assume that
the absence of că is the absence of the functional head for the complementizer.

29a) **Sigur** va veni.
    Surely, will 3rd sg. come.
    “He will surely come”

29b) **Sigur** că va veni.
    Surely that will 3rd sg. come.

The patterns in 29a & b) above are actually two different structures. Thus, according to, Hill (2004) in 29a) the adverb sigur belongs to the same clause as the verb and functions as a propositional modifier whereas in 29b) it selects a CP introduced by că and seems to belong to a different clause than the verb.

Gramatica Academiei (1963) considers a structure such as the one in 29b) deriving from a biclausal construction such as the one in 30).

30) E **sigur** *(că) va veni.

Therefore, 29b) is an instance of be-deletion, whereas 29a) is an instance of a regular root clause with a sentence adverb. Teodorescu (1964) illustrates a major empirical problem for such an analysis namely that many adverbs which select că disallow the copula be.

31) *E **bineînteles** că Maria va primi banii.

32) *E **firește** că Maria va veni.

These structures are fine however if we eliminate the copula:

33) a. **Bineînteles** (că) Maria va primi banii.
    b. **Firește** (că) Maria va veni.

The main problem is that structures where the copula be appears are usually compatible with adjectives: *e important, e natural, e firesc*, all of them selecting a că domain. Moreover, the fact that in Romanian most adverbs and adjectives have a homophonous form (*sigur* being one of them) we could understand the structure in 29b) as one containing an adjective rather than an adverb since 29b) is derived from a structure with copula be. However, adverbs are not completely excluded from structures with be.

34) a. E **bine** / (*bun) că nu merge des acolo.
    b. **Bine** că nu merge des acolo.

    At a closer look, this structure seems to be rather an exclamative construction.

34) c. Ce **bine** că nu merge des acolo!
This can be supported by a similar construction with noroc câ, which is taken by the Micul Dicționar Academic to be an adverbial phrase. However, by parity of reasoning, we can clearly see that noroc is actually the instance of the noun part of a suppressed exclamative construction just as the one in 34c) above.

35) b. E un noroc câ vrea să te însoțească.
35) c. Ce noroc (pe tine) câ vrea să te însoțească!

Moreover, these instances in 34) and 35) have to select câ because otherwise they are ungrammatical.

According to Hill (2004) adverbs of the type sigur in 29b) underwent a grammaticalization process and ceased to be adverbs. The Minimalist Program Chomsky (2001) analyzes CPs containing câ as phases derived by means of asymmetric concatenation. Such derivations are triggered by the obligatory checking of uninterpretable formal features, in this case features for identifying the type of sentence (±qu).

As proposed by Rizzi (2002: 245) the internal structure of the CP is organized over several functional heads (the split CP hypothesis).

As known Romanian is a null subject VSO (Cornilescu 2000, Dobrovie-Sorin 1994, etc.) language where root clauses project as far as TP and only subordinate clauses project to CP (Alboiu 2002, Dobrovie-Sorin 1994, etc.). Therefore, a stylistically neutral root clause may not be headed by câ. So, 29b) cannot be a root clause. Moreover, câ is assumed by these authors to merge in Force therefore the sentence adverb should be merged higher. Force is nevertheless the highest projection inside the CP domain so Hill (2004) stipulates a projection higher than ForceP, PragP. This is due to the fact that most of these adverbs get speaker-oriented readings. Moreover, some of these adverbs change their meaning according to whether câ is present or not.

36) a. Normal câ vine acasă la timp. Evidential value
Naturally that comes at time.
“Naturally he comes home in due time.”

36)  
   b. Normal vine la masă.

Usually comes to table.
“He usually comes for dinner/lunch.”

Thus, in 36a) the speaker is the only source of information, whereas in 36b) the source of information may be a different person. According to Hill (2004) all this empirical evidence is proof for the existence of a functional domain above ForceP. A grammaticalized adverb as we have established that the one in 29b) to be, is located in this domain.

4. Instead of conclusions.

This paper has looked into some facts of English and Romanian sentence adverbs making a detailed classification of Romanian sentence adverbs along the lines of Cinque (1997). It also investigated how apparently synonymous structures are actually different thus different positions of the same adverbs mapping onto different interpretations function of the scope taking properties of these adverbs. It is clear that in order to understand the different behaviour of sentence adverbs in Romanian one has to further study their distribution so this will be the aim of future research.

Literary texts


References


1. Introduction

If we start from the theoretical assumption that language is a system which associates specific meanings to specific forms and structures, we could proceed by saying that the meanings, i.e. notions, are expressed by the given forms in a given language. Some of these notions represent general concepts which belong to the categories included in the cognitive structuring of our reality. For example, such concepts are temporal and spatial location, possession, agentivity, telicity and many others; thus temporality represents a temporal determination or localization of a situation, a gradual quantification measured from the zero point, the deictic centre or the point of speech (now). These notions could be indicated by various means, both lexical and morpho-syntactic—therefore, they could be lexicalized or grammaticalized. To use the same example, temporality could be grammaticalized within the category of tense, but lexicalized in the adverbial expressions denoting time.

Moreover, these general notions need not have exactly the same status in different languages, because they often depend on the “point of view” taken in a language (or ethnonlinguistic categorization of the world, cf. Piper et al 2005: 576). Therefore, it could be assumed that some of these notions would have a central or peripheral role in the system of different languages or be related to other notions in different ways.

To complete the theoretical framework, these general notions are best represented as elements in a clause structure. Like most linguistic units, clauses consist of structure (form) and content, so a complete and systematic description of clauses requires a thorough analysis of the content, too. Thus, in addition to the syntactic structure, one should also discuss the semantic and pragmatic notions related to the given structure. The semantic structure of the clause is usually called the proposition—the predicate and its arguments, that is the relation(s) between the participants included in the situation denoted by the predicate. The proposition could be placed
within a certain modal framework—indicative or some other mood—which implies the attitude of the speaker to the proposition. This relation between the form and content in the clauses is rather complex, because one structure/form could denote several different semantic components and one semantic component could be denoted by different syntactic and lexical means.

Therefore, lexical and syntactic means of expression usually do not denote just one such semantic concept, but several such concepts “coexist” in one expression, with one of them usually dominating. So, semantic concepts resemble prototypes, or are present in a higher or lower degree and do not always have clear-cut borders. For example, the category of person is typically and centrally indicated by personal pronouns and finite verb forms, but is merged with the category of possession in possessive pronouns/determiners (Piper et al 2005: 580).

After this general theoretical framework, the paper will discuss the semantic category of telicity in English in Serbian and then compare it with the category of aspect in order to specify possible domains of each of these two categories.

2. Telicity

The very term telicity is derived from the Greek word telos denoting “a goal, end”, and it seems that the distinction between the verbs which involve an end or a goal and the verbs which do not could be related to Aristotle’s work (Binnick 1991: 189). However, the very term was introduced by Garey (Garey 1957) to denote telic verbs which have a natural culmination, and atelic verbs which do not have a goal to be realized (Binnick 1991: 189). So, in contemporary linguistic literature, the distinction between telic and atelic situations is related to the notion of the goal, i.e. the telic situations take a specific time to be completed, while the atelic ones do not. This distinction was further developed by many other authors, among them Z. Vendler (1967: 97–121): without using the actual terms telic/atelic, he writes about the difference between the verbs and verb phrases which have a natural terminal point (e.g. run a mile, draw a circle) and those which do not (e.g. run, swim). Vendler also points out that the atelic predicates which are true for a certain time interval, are also true at any subinterval of that time, whereas telic predicates are not. Therefore, if someone swam during the
time interval $t$, it is true that he was swimming during any part of that interval; but if someone wrote a letter during the time interval $t$, it is not true that he wrote a letter during each part of that interval.

Some linguists (for example, Declerck 1979) related the notion of telicity to the notion of boundedness, because bounded situations tend toward a goal, have a limit, a well-defined endpoint (Declerck 1979: 762). Moreover, unbounded situations are homogeneous, while the bounded ones are not, which implies that the former consist of qualitatively equal segments, whereas the latter do not. Such a determination of telicity is quite similar to the contemporary definition of aspect, since aspect is understood as viewing the situation in its entirety (perfective aspect) or as a structure (imperfective aspect) (cf. Comrie 1976: 4). Even more explicitly, some linguists (cf. Smith 1986: 100–101) wrote that perfective aspect includes the endpoints of a situation (i.e. the initial and final point), whereas imperfective aspect does not imply the inclusion of these endpoints. Therefore, there is a direct link with telicity: aspect is a category which implies the inclusion or exclusion of the boundary in the situation denoted by the verb, and this boundary to a great degree coincides with the achievement of the goal.

Finally, telicity is sometimes viewed as a component of the categorial complex of causativity (Piper et al. 2005: 578), because it is related to the causes of a certain situation, conditions for the realization of that situation and eventually to the goal to be achieved. Therefore, it is also implicitly related to the notions of animacy and agentivity necessary to reach a set goal (Piper et al. 2005: 804). The entire telic situation would thus typically include the animate agent wishing to achieve a certain goal or starting a certain activity to achieve a certain goal, with the cause and effect relation between the initial and final stage of the situation. In that case, the notion of a goal is quite similar to the notions of purpose and intention, and different languages might also have specific means to indicate them (Piper et al. 2005: 809–810).

### 2.1. Telicity in English

As far as English is concerned, telicity could be indicated in various contexts, both at the lexical and the syntactic level. First of all, at the lexical level telicity could be indicated by prefixes and by some particles in phrasal verbs. Thus, for example, most of the following verbs imply a goal:

a) *rebuild*
b) drink up

c) pull through

d) drive on

The prefix re- in (1a) indicates the repetition of the situation denoted by the basic verb and the full completion of that repetition represents the goal. The particles up and through in phrasal verbs in (1b) and (1c) also indicate a boundary, natural terminal point which should be reached to “fulfill” the semantic content of the lexeme: to drink the entire quantity (usually a glass) of a certain liquid or to recover fully from an illness. However, the particle on in (1d) does not indicate a goal and thus does not make the lexeme telic (cf. Brinton 1985; Brinton argues that most particles in phrasal verbs mark telic Aktionsart, not perfective aspect, except the particles like on and along).

Secondly, telicity in English could be marked at the syntactic level; for this paper, it is interesting to discuss the influence of the direct object (cf. Brinton 1988). Actually, in English the direct object can add a goal even to the verbs which do not have it at the lexical level. The typical examples are the following:

a) to read vs. to read the letter
b) to run vs. to run a mile
c) to read novels vs. to read the novel
d) to drink beer vs. to drink a beer

The verbs used without an object in (2a) and (2b) do not imply any goal—these activities can go on and stop at any moment without having any natural terminal point, but if the object is added the situations become telic (it takes a definite period of time to read a letter or run a mile). The examples (2c) and (2d) show that even the structure of the object plays a role: the nonmodified plural countable noun (novels) and the nonmodified singular uncountable noun (beer) do not indicate a specific goal, while the premodified nouns (the novels, the beer) do. So in (2c) the noun novels just presents further qualification of the situation, whereas the noun phrase the novel implies both qualification and quantification of the situation, which means that it sets a goal.

2.1.1. Aspect and telicity

Starting from the assumption that the basic English aspectual opposition includes the progressive (i.e. imperfective, with the exclusion of end-
points) and nonprogressive (i.e. perfective, with the inclusion of endpoints) aspect, we could illustrate the interaction between telicity and these two aspects with the following examples:

(3a) She read the letter.
   b) She was reading the letter.
(4a) They rewrote their report.
   b) They were rewriting their report.
(5a) The children ate up the apples.
   b) ? The children were eating up the apples.

The examples (3a), (4a) and (5a) indicate both the presence and the attainment of the goal, that is the entire situation is presented inside its initial and final endpoints. However, if these verbs are shifted into progressive aspect, the goal is still there, but it is not included in the denoted segment of the situation, no confirmation is provided that the goal was reached (examples 3b, 4b). The last example, (5b) is not acceptable for some native speakers, because the phrasal verb eat up requires the attainment of the goal and the inclusion of the final point, which is not the case with the progressive aspect. Therefore, the examples with the progressive aspect prove that the telic situations and the imperfective aspect (progressive) could be combined in the same verb phrase, but this combination results in the neutralization of the goal, i.e. it does confirm the attainment of the goal.

2.2. Telicity in Serbian

In Serbian, the notion of telicity has been systematically discussed only in more recent grammars and articles (cf. Piper et al. 2005: 803–812). These grammars and articles indicate that in Serbian the goal is typically expressed with syntactic structures like prepositional phrases including specific case forms, then with infinitive constructions and decomposed predicates, but also with lexical means (Piper et al. 2005: 805). While mentioning some of these ways of expression, my paper will focus on the intersection between aspect and telicity, as well as the role of the verb’s arguments in denoting telicity.

2.2.1. Aspect and telicity

It is a well known fact that aspect in Slavic languages is almost always marked already at the lexical level, by prefixation; however, prefixes could be assumed to mark both the semantic feature of telicity and the category
of aspect, and it is sometimes quite difficult to distinguish “pure” perfectivization from the cases when the prefix also modifies the meaning of the basic verb. In this paper, I shall make an attempt to delimit these two functions, using examples with the prefix *na*- and starting from the taxonomy presented by Klajn (2002: 250–251).

The morpheme *na* has a double function in Serbian: it is a preposition denoting primarily a spatial relation, like English *on*, the position when one object is touching the surface of another object. This spatial meaning is reflected in its second function, that of prefixation. First of all, according to its function, the prefix *na*- could be divided into two large groups: 1) when it has the pure perfectivizing function, and 2) when the prefix, in addition to perfectivization, also modifies the lexical meaning of verbs.

In the former case (e.g. the verbs *nahraniti*—feed, *nauc’iti*—learn), it seems that the prefix only indicates the entirety of the situation, the situation which is viewed inside its endpoints. Since the prefix also sets the boundary of the situation, adding the telic quality to the situation, the verb implies that the boundary was reached, i.e. that the goal is inside the situation’s endpoints.

In the latter case, the prefix *na*- could be roughly further subdivided into two groups: 1) with the spatial meaning similar to the English preposition *on* occurring with the verbs of motion, and 2) with the meaning of saturation (activity carried out to the point of saturation on the part of the subject). The variants within the spatial meaning include a) placing/putting something on(to) a surface or object (e.g. *natovariti*—load up, *namazati*—*put on grease or oil*), b) accidental contact with an obstacle (e.g. *nagaziti*—step on), c) specific activities on a surface (e.g. *naslikati*—finish painting, *napisati*—write out), and d) sudden movement of a large number of living beings (e.g. *nagrunuti*—swarm up).

There are several degrees of saturation denoted by the verbs with the prefix *na*:- a) begun or just slightly realized activity (e.g. *načutri—hear something, nagristi*—bite slightly), b) partial saturation or “a rather large” portion of an activity (e.g. *naseći—cut a large quantity, napričati—tell a lot*) and c) total saturation (e.g. *najesti se*—eat one’s fill, *našetati se*—walk one’s fill). In these cases, the perfective aspect introduced by the prefix indicates the inclusion of endpoints, and the telic quality (also introduced by the prefix) indicates the presence and attainment of the goal, with the additional semantic implications like spatial relations and saturation.
2.2.2. The Verb and its Arguments

The structure of the verb phrase offers another area interesting for the discussion about the interaction between aspect and telicity. Namely, in some cases, the object NP can also indicate a goal which interacts with the aspectual content of transitive verbs. For example:

(6) a) *napisati pismo* (to write a letter, perfective)
   b) *nabrati cveće* (to pick flowers, perfective)

In these examples, the perfective verbs are followed by direct objects expressed by either a nonmodified singular noun (6a) or a nonmodified plural noun (6b); both objects just specify the semantic content of the goal, because the prefixes in these perfective verbs already indicate telic situations which are placed inside their endpoints.

However, with their imperfective pairs (i.e. the same verbs, but without prefixes), the direct object seems to add a goal to an atelic situation, for example:

(7) a) *pisati pismo* (to write a letter, imperfective)
   b) *brati cveće* (to pick flowers, imperfective)

The verbs *pisati* and *brati* are atelic, they denote the situations which can go on without reaching the natural terminal point. However, the objects (the same nouns as in 6a and 6b) add the goal, making them telic. So, there are the following components in these verb phrases: the imperfective lexemes which do not include the endpoints of the situation, and the nouns which specify the goal. In Serbian, the interaction between imperfective aspect and telic quality results in the same implication as the English combination “progressive aspect + NP denoting a goal”: the situation is presented as having a goal, but the attainment of that goal is left unspecified; in other words, the verb phrase does not specify if the goal was reached or not (cf. Novakov 2005: 128–129).

3. Conclusion

After a brief theoretical overview concerning the notion of telicity in general and its expression in English and Serbian, as well as after the discussion about the interaction between telicity and aspect in the two languages, it could be concluded that these languages show both similarities and differences.
Telicity is defined as a semantic concept which is possibly present in the propositional content of the clause and which denotes a goal, i.e. a natural terminal point to be reached in a situation denoted by a verb. As for the category of aspect, it is understood as viewing the situation as a whole or as a structure, that is including its endpoints (perfective) and excluding its endpoints (imperfective). Therefore, the interaction between telicity and perfective aspect results in the implication that the goal was reached within the situation’s endpoints, while the interaction between telicity and imperfection results in the implication that the achievement of the goal in not specified in the denoted situation.

Within this framework, the paper points out some similarities and some differences between English and Serbian. First of all, telicity is indicated in both languages and it interacts with the category of aspect. Thus in English, telicity is usually not indicated at the lexical level and could be cancelled within the imperfective aspect (specifically, the progressive), whereas the perfective aspect (non-progressive) implies the attainment of the goal. On the other hand, in Serbian, telicity is typically indicated already at the lexical level together with perfective aspect. The second issue investigated in the article is the influence of the object NP on the telic quality of the situation. It was pointed out that English reinterprets telicity at the syntactic level according to the type of NP on the telic quality of the situation. It was pointed out that English reinterprets telicity at the syntactic level according to the type of NP, while Serbian does not, because telicity is fully determined already at the lexical level.

References
