IRISH FOLK MUSIC REVIVAL FROM A CENTRAL EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

ENDRE ABKAROVITS

Eszterházy College, Eger

1 Introduction

In our industrialised, urbanised, and globalised modern world the traditional cultures of European nations have been under attack for the last two centuries; a situation that accelerated in the latter half of the twentieth century. Though the pace of this process varied from country to country, and even within the same country from region to region, the tendency appeared to be irresistible. There have, however, always been individuals or social groups, and not only in the last century, who have recognized the importance of preserving traditional culture before it disappears. Others, like some great composers, turned to folk culture not necessarily with the intention of saving it, but to draw on the original sources in order to renew their own art. It was usually urban intellectuals who were in the forefront of saving the nation's heritage of traditional culture in the 'final' hour. (Though it turned out several times it was not the 'final' hour yet.) In the second half of the twentieth century, especially from the 60s and 70s, new social and age groups became involved in these efforts, particularly the young.

Ireland and Hungary seem to share some characteristics in reviving traditional culture. It is not only because of the rich heritage of their peasant culture, but it is also due to their historical development. Both countries were in some way at the periphery of the main stream of European development in the 50s and 60s. Ireland is both geographically at the periphery of Europe, and until recently was one of the poorest European countries. Though geographically at the heart of Europe, but as a result of the decades of Communist misgovernment, Hungary was also a poor country, at least until the 70s when the first tentative economic reforms began, but real change was not possible before 1989. One positive aspect of this economic backwardness was that it created favourable conditions for the survival of rural culture. The slower pace of economic development did not bring about such a radical change in the life of villages in Hungary as in several highly developed Western countries. This was even more so in the case of Romania, where until 1989 an at least two-million-strong Hungarian minority lived (which has decreased to 1.5 million by now). It is a paradox

that Hungarians owe a lot to the dictator Ceauşescu, who, unintentionally, helped to save some of our most precious traditional culture by isolating Transylvanian Hungarians, just like other citizens of Romania, from the rest of the world.

Though some scientists recognised the importance of collecting, describing and reviving our folk treasure as early as the end of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, the fact that from our economically deprived vantage point we could see how rapidly traditional culture disappeared in more developed countries may have contributed to a very conscious approach of trying to save anything of value from this vanishing world, be it a household object or a piece of music. Recently teams of collectors with sophisticated technical equipments have carried out more ambitious preservation programs like the 'Final Hour' project in Budapest.

Besides saving the heritage of the past, Ireland and Hungary have also been successful in so far as the result of this preservation has not simply been a collection of 'museum pieces', but in both countries, though in differing ways, past heritage has been turned into living tradition. A form of renewing tradition was found which makes almost forgotten music, dances an enjoyable way of entertainment for today's people.

Besides some basic similarities between Hungary and Ireland there are also fundamental differences in the way we interpret traditional culture and art. This is what this paper is mainly about.

2 *Traditional* or/and *folk* culture

The word *culture* itself is a difficult term. It can have very different meanings. Sometimes it is used in a narrower sense meaning only sophisticated things, sometimes as a synonym of 'high arts'. But it can also be used in a very broad sense to comprehend all important aspects of life, such as housing, schooling, hygiene, dressing, celebrating, entertaining, traditions etc. The same is the case with *traditional culture*. When we speak about *folk art,* for some people it means only the most perfect products, while for others even ordinary household objects, not meant for decoration, may contain aesthetic values, or are anyway representative products of a civilisation.

It is, however, generally accepted in Hungary that by *folk culture, folk art* we mean those of the villages, the traditional culture and art of peasants. (This is in direct contrast with the use of the word in England where e.g. a 'folk song' often turns out to be the product of a factory hand or a seaman, which is in connection with the rapid demise of traditional

agricultural activities as a result of the Industrial Revolution. In Ireland *folk* also used to be associated mainly with peasantry.)

Béla Bartók said that each folk tune was a model of high artistic perfection and that he regarded folk songs as masterworks in miniature, as he did Bach fugues, or Mozart sonatas within the world of larger forms. He held Hungarian folk music in high esteem as early as 1905, even before becoming acquainted with old-style tunes in Transylvania in 1907, which had such a decisive influence on his music.

3.1 The discovery of Hungarian folk songs and tunes and their main types

Until the battle at Mohács in 1526 Hungary had been a strong state, having about as much population as England. When Hungary's central part was occupied by the Turks for 150 years, the development of Hungary was broken. The country had had only Hungarian rulers until then, and Hungarian culture had been able to flourish until 1526, now this was mainly reduced to the principality of Transylvania. The central part of the country was quite deserted, and when the Turks were driven out of the country, in many places foreign ethnic groups were settled down. The rulers became the Habsburgs, and as it was usually the case everywhere, foreign rulers never promoted the cause of national culture. Even Hungarian aristocracy were alienated from their own people and its culture.

In the middle of the 19th century the first collections of Hungarian folk songs were published (often in an unprofessional way), first only the words, but soon the tunes were also printed, though it was a problem that the collectors could not always distinguish folk songs and art songs.

Though there are some other components of our folk music treasure, the two most important layers are the old-style and the new-style tunes. Bartók, who distinguished these two main types for the first time, could hear only old women sing old-style tunes at the beginning of the 20th century. He could find a greater number of these songs only in Transylvania, in the Székely region in 1907. The old-style tunes are based on the five-note (pentatonic) scale, which is typical of many peoples of Asia, but on the European mainland only the Hungarians used it. While the Hungarian language is a member of the Finno-Ugrian family, our musical language is more related to Turkic music, or rather, they relate to some common Central Asian source. Bartók and Kodály drew a lot on pentatonic music. On the other hand new-style tunes, which came into fashion in the 19th century, are the consequence of Western influences. 'In Bartók's view these refreshing melodies, their vigorous rhymes reflecting changed self-awareness, were

much closer to the spirits of the times than the ancient tunes, which were sometimes melancholic and often alien in mood.' (Manga, 1969:15) The new-style tunes spread beyond the Hungarian language area and flourished among the Moravians, Slovaks and Ruthenians as well. Many of the new-style tunes make use of the seven-note scales, but pentatonic tunes also occur among them. New-style songs with their strict, dance-step rhythms were well suited for dancing slow and quick *csárdás*, which became the most popular dance forms in villages in the first half of the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century even new-style songs were losing their vigour. At the same time art songs often turned into folk songs.

A musical type that is still often confused with authentic folk music is the 'magyar nóta' (Hungarian song), a type of patriotic song in 'folk style'. 'The most effective medium for the spread of the *magyar nóta* was the gypsy band. Ever since their mass appearance in the 18th century, gypsy bands had no real repertoire of their own (least of all gypsy repertoire).

A new era in Hungarian folk music research began around the turn of the century. Beginning with field work in 1896, Béla Vikár, though himself not a musician, became the first systematic collector of Hungarian folk music. He made use of the Edison phonograph. He recorded 1492 songs on 875 cylinders, the greater part of which was later transcribed by Béla Bartók and Zoltán Kodály. It was, in fact, Vikár's cylinders that induced the two young composers in 1905 to concentrate on folk music research. (Manga, 1969:8) By 1943 Bartók came to the conclusion that the older-style peasant music is undoubtedly the surviving part of the one-time common knowledge of the whole Hungarian nation, as in earlier centuries there had not been such a huge gap between the music and dances of the ruling class and those of the common people.

A major enterprise in the field of folk music collection in this period was the Pátria series of records. Bartók, Kodály and others invited informants (singers, musicians) to Budapest between 1936 and 1944 to record in the studios of the Hungarian Radio.

After World War II the communist authorities, who ruled in the name of 'the people', required 'the people' to sing folk songs and dance folk dances in an artificial way. 'The result: several generations learned to abhor folk art for the rest of their lives. The decline of folk culture in Hungary dates to that time.' (Halmos, 2000:35)

A third revival wave of 'folk' dances was the formation of amateur folk dance groups modelled on Soviet folk ensembles in the late 50s. This meant, however, dancing on stage to a learned choreography, and the dances had not much to do with authentic folk dances. Very few people knew Transylvanian dances, there were only a few mute films available; dancers

and choreographers had no direct contact with people living in Transylvania. The dances were stylised, the music was re-worked folk music compiled by composers, the musical accompaniment came from a band or orchestra which had no visual contact with the dancers. (Abkarovits, 2003:121, 138)

3.2 The Hungarian *táncházmozgalom* (dance house movement)

The most successful, present wave of Hungarian folk music and dance revival started in 1972. In that year first the dancers of four leading Budapest folk dance ensembles decided that they would dance folk dances not only on stage and to choreography, but also improvisationally off stage for their own fun. Later one of these (Bartók Dance Ensemble) under the guidance of choreographer Sándor Timár decided to open to the public and start teaching dances to anyone interested.

From the 70s many people from Hungary 'discovered' the almost intact Hungarian peasant culture in Transylvania, which, like the whole country, had been isolated from the rest of the world. Musicians, dancers, folklorists headed for remote Transylvanian villages to study living folk tradition on the spot. Their way had been paved, as mentioned above, by choreographer Ferenc Novák (who collected the dances of Szék (Sic, jud. Cluj) from the 60s), composer László Lajtha (who had collected the instrumental music of Szék), ethno-choreologist György Martin (who collected dances and analysed them), Transylvanian folklorist Zoltán Kallós. In their wake young musicians of the first Budapest dance house bands and dancers went to see how the living dance house tradition worked in the village of Szék (Sic), formerly a town with rich heritage in all walks of life. *Táncház* (dance house) had a double meaning: it was the place and the occasion for dancing at the same time. Though *táncház* was also known in other parts of Transylvania, it was Szék which set a pattern for the urban dance houses of the initial period in Hungary, in which mainly dances from Szék were taught and danced. 'It was only in Szék that the various types of melodies and dances already extinct in other regions could be found in their entire original forms.' (Martin, 2001:34)

The highlight of dance house events is the annual National Dance House Festival, usually held in the biggest sports hall in Budapest, a two-day extravaganza attracting some 15000 participants from all corners of the Carpathian Basin.

Besides the urban dance houses and summer dance camps there is hardly any folk dancing today either in Hungary or in Transylvania.

4.1 Irish folk music in the past few centuries

These days we can often see records with titles 'Celtic music' or 'Gaelic music', though they usually contain songs composed recently by a known artist, sung in English in the majority of the cases, accompanied by musical instruments, some of which were not known even a few decades ago in Ireland. Has 'Celtic' really become a synonym of 'traditional'? To a certain degree yes.

There are 6 or 7 Celtic nationalities: the Irish, the Scots, the Manx, the Welsh, the Bretons, the Cornish, and sometimes the Galicians in Spain are also added. It seems that the kind of traditional music coming from their lands and having some connection with their traditions, though often very little, is labelled 'Celtic'. What they have in common is mainly the use of some traditional musical instruments, especially the pipe, and a kind of 'Celtic spirit', which is full of emotions like joy and sadness, sorrow and delight.

But what happened to the old folk songs and music of Ireland? And, in general, to Irish traditional culture? As the majority of the population do not speak Irish Gaelic any more, especially those musical genres that are very strongly connected to the spoken word have lost a lot. As for example Irish ballad tradition is a mainly English-speaking one, very few ballads have survived in the Irish tongue. Music was not so much language-dependent (especially instrumental, but, to a certain extent, also vocal), and though it must have gone through a lot of changes, it might still preserve many traits from earlier centuries.

Besides the harp traditional musical instruments in Ireland are the tin whistle, the uilleann or union pipe, the fiddle, the bodhran, the flute. The uilleann pipes emerged in the eighteenth century and completely replaced the original mouth-blown pipes by the end of the nineteenth century. 'The fiddle, being well-suited for dance music, was popular throughout Ireland by the eighteenth century. Indeed, much of Irish dance music was composed by fiddlers. Scots fiddle music also had a great influence on Irish fiddling tradition ...' (Sawyers, 2000:59) Other traditional musical instruments in Ireland are the melodeon, the concertina, and the accordion, which are also called free-reed instruments.

Irish folk music falls – just like Hungarian – primarily into two categories: songs and dance tunes. It is estimated that there are more than six thousand dance pieces including jigs, reels, and hornpipes. The jig is the oldest surviving dance music.

'The vast majority of the airs and tunes we know today were composed during the last three hundred years, most during the latter half of

the eighteenth century and the early years of the nineteenth. ... The earliest instrumental music dates back to the sixteenth century.' (Sawyers, 2000:9) It is also interesting that much of traditional Celtic music is pentatonic which, as already mentioned, is otherwise a living tradition only with Hungarians in Europe. (Sawyers, 2000:14) This might prove that Celtic had been one of the earliest civilisations.

4.2 Dancing occasions in Ireland until World War Two

While history has left a lot of accounts of music in pre-Norman Ireland, we have none of dancing. There was not even a native Irish word for dancing. The two words for dancing, *rince* from English *rink* and *dahmsa* from French *danse,* were not used in Irish until the sixteenth century. The earliest written evidence for dancing dates from 1413. (Ó hAllmhuráin, 1998:26-28) It is, however, not likely that there was no dancing before this.

As to folk dancing in later centuries it was done on domestic grounds, in the house, or the barn, or the courtyard, depending on weather. The more ancient (18th century) dances we know about are those corresponding to the dancing tunes of jigs, reels and hornpipes. More recent, 'foreign' dances are polkas, mazurkas, waltzes, and others. But perhaps the best-known Irish dance in the world is step dance, which may have reached Ireland from Scotland in the 18th century. Bodies had to be kept rigid, motion was restricted to the hips down. This dancing ideal – minimal body movement with fancy footwork – remained the model until Riverdance's revolution in 1994.

In the 19th century the Catholic Church began a campaign against dancers and musicians. Priests kept breaking up cross-road dances and house parties. The situation was not better in the first half of the 20th century either. During an anti-dancing hysteria the Gaelic League also banned set dancing and encouraged only solo competitions (especially for girls) instead in the 1930s. A law in 1936 declared dancing not only sinful (as the Church did), but also illegal.

4.3 The revival of traditional music from the sixties

In the late 50s a new kind of music was being performed throughout Britain. Called *skiffle*, it combined elements of folk and jazz and was based on and inspired by American music. After a short time, skiffle splintered into folk on the one hand and rock on the other. It was only in the 60s that a band of different folk musical instruments was set up.

The first really important group of the Irish traditional music revival, *Planxty* was formed in 1972. (The same year when the Hungarian dance house movement started!) They combined traditional music with their own compositions. They remained primarily acoustic. The band's members played both traditional (bodhran, uilleann pipe) and new (guitar, bouzouki, mandolin) instruments.

Another important group was *The Bothy Band*. (1975-1979) They also mixed traditional and modern musical instruments: the melody section being traditional (pipes, flute, whistles, fiddles), while the rhythm mainly modern (guitars, bouzouki, along with traditional bodhran). The group that millions of people worldwide associate Irish traditional music with for four decades has, however, been *The Chieftains*. Since 1979 their line-up has not changed, which may be one of the secrets of their success.

In the 80s and 90s a new generation of Irish musicians emerged. Among those which are looking for the traditional roots *Altan* is generally acknowledged to be the best group.

This ongoing experimentation over the years has created a cross-fertilization between musical genres. At the same time it is more and more difficult to recognize what is traditional. A chart for *world-music* was first introduced by Billboard in 1990. By 1995 two-thirds of toppers were Celtic. The term *Celtic music* now functions as an umbrella just like *world-music*.

It is, however, a bit misleading if we examine the development of Irish music only through that of bands that have become internationally famous. They have only a few musicians in their line-up who can play or sing in the traditional way. Not all groups and solo musicians have, however, followed their way. There are far more excellent fiddlers, uilleann pipers, flute and tin whistle players nowadays than there were ever before, and this is largely to do with the popularity of bands like *Planxty*, *The Bothy Band*, *De Dannan*; so they have functioned rather as catalysts.

While there had been a lot of experimenting in the field of traditional music since the sixties, traditional Irish dance remained unaltered until Jean Butler and Michael Flatley turned it into a freer, more sensuous performance in the seven-minute interlude of the Eurovision Song Contest in 1994. It was a very successful combination of traditional step dancing and American tap dancing (which is also often traced back to Irish dancing) accompanied by Bill Whelan's fantastic music.

5 Conclusions

If we look at the history of the folk music and dance of Hungary and Ireland, we see a number of similarities. Both nations had a very rich folk

culture, with some elements going back to ancient times, though the majority of the surviving folk songs and dances date from the last three centuries. In both countries there is an older layer. This old-style music is pentatonic, which seems to have been wide-spread in various ancient civilisations around the world from China to the North American Indians, but which has survived only in these two countries in Europe.

Folk music used to be interpreted in both countries as that of the village communities. This interpretation has not changed in Hungary, but in Ireland it is usually replaced by the term *traditional* or *Celtic* these days, and the content of that is quite different. Folk music used to be vocal and instrumental. It seems it was more common in Ireland than in Hungary that singing was not accompanied, and it was not usual either that a whole band of various instruments played together. It was usually just a piper or a fiddler who played to the dance. In historical Hungary it was, however, quite common that bands, usually from some lower layer of society, were playing for any of the different ethnic groups living together. Initially there may have been many Hungarian bands, but in time it was mainly Gypsies (sometimes Jews) who made up these. As the whole Carpathian basin has musical dialects of different nationalities which are very near each other, in some villages where e.g. Hungarians, Romanians, Gypsies live together, it is sometimes very difficult to separate the music of one ethnic group from that of another, especially for non-professionals.

When the English occupied Ireland and the Irish ruling class impoverished or left the country, Irish culture became the exclusive property of the common people. It was censured from time to time, sometimes it was completely forbidden to use folk music instruments or to dance folk dances. In Hungary this was not the case, and it was only industrialisation and urbanisation, which made the intelligentsia fear that folk culture might disappear. Hungary excels in the whole world in this respect, namely how folk music was saved by great composers like Bartók and Kodály, who also used folk tunes in their own compositions. Kodály's famous music instruction methods are widely known all over the world.

In the sixties and seventies, though both countries were still underdeveloped in relation to some leading countries of Europe, there was a real danger of the extinction of folk culture. This lead to the revival of folk music in both countries, but the approaches were quite different and the result similarly. In Ireland the internationally best-known groups rather used folk music to renew popular music, and an experimenting of mixing old and new began, which is still going on. They had bands of various folk music instruments for the first time in the sixties. Most bands have had traditional instruments along with new, foreign ones ever since. They have played both

traditional songs and their own compositions. Many singers have sung in both Gaelic and English, but the latter is more common. Unlike Hungary, the revival of traditional music was not accompanied by that of dances in urban areas in Ireland. The songs have often been written in jig time, but they are almost never danced to. The Irish revival of folk music did not trigger other folk arts (crafts) either.

In Hungary it was a brilliant idea on the part of the initiators of the first Budapest dance houses to transplant the village dance house into an urban setting. For the musicians and the dancers the aim has been from the beginning to reproduce the dances and the music of villages as authentically as possible. Though there have always been bands which have experimented with blending different musical genres, they have never been in the mainstream. Bands that have swapped folk instruments partly for modern ones and play mainly their own compositions, like *Ghymes* or *Kormorán,* are also popular, but their music is no longer referred to as *folk*.

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FROM LABOR TO LEISURE:
THE LANDSCAPE EXPERIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASS, 1820s-1850s

IRÉN ANNUS
University of Szeged

A series of economic, political and social changes in the first half of the 19th century led to the emergence of a strong middle class in the US, with a distinct lifestyle, culture and aesthetic sense as markers of their separate economic and social position. This paper aims at mapping the various ways in which the landscape experience came about and contributed to the cultural constitution of this distinct group; it also places a special focus on landscape gardening, landscape tourism and landscape painting.

1. Culture and social position

A number of theorists have studied the relationship between culture and social class, a consideration this paper also undertakes. Most theorists – from Emile Durkheim and Max Weber through Talcott Parsons, Raymond Williams, Louis Althusser and Clifford Geertz, to Anthony Giddens, Pierre Bourdieu and Paul Willis, to mention only a few – seem to have been drawn primarily to an analysis of the cultural fields which characterize various social groups – and outline boundaries between them – as well as the ways in which these fields are reproduced in society, contributing to the overall social reproduction of given communities, positions and power relations. These examinations tend to be in the light of what Gramsci called *hegemony*, a striving to maintain existing social structures and hierarchies, power positions and ideologies.

This paper, however, hopes to capture moments in a process of cultural change, which accompanied social restructuring along with a shift in the power structure. Bourdieu concludes that "the cultural field is transformed by successive restructurations rather than radical revolutions, with certain themes being brought to the fore while others are set to one side" (1971:192). I propose that the transformation of the understanding of the view of the natural environment from the common category of *countryside* to the aesthetically loaded term *landscape* has become one central theme in the constitution of a middle-class culture in the first half of the 19th-century US.

2. The contemporary context

The emission as well as the reception of an image is determined by the specific groups involved in the viewing, their motives, attitudes, behavior and overall relation to the social totality of which they are a part, as Roland Barthes (1977) concludes in his work on the photographic picture. In other words, the production as well as the consumption of an image, in our case a view, as well as the process of signification are framed by the specific social and cultural context of production and consumption. First, it is therefore necessary to outline the American context within which the new landscape experience emerged in the first half of the 19th century.

This era witnessed a series of economic changes, which had an unprecedented impact on life in the US in general. As a result of a number of inventions and developments in technology as well as an expanding system of transportation and markets, industrial production was ever growing, transforming the nature of the population: (1) drawing an increasing industrial labor force from foreign lands; (2) leading to the steady growth of an urban population; and (3) resulting in a maldistribution of wealth, producing a distinguished layer of people in finance and management: the new middle class. This was a marked group of people characterized by a new division of labor, the Victorian family model, new domesticity, leisured womanhood, and early suburbanization.

Urban living became associated with industrial growth and immigration, presenting the country with a series of challenges, including early expressions of xenophobia, anti-Catholic sentiments, and numerous problems with housing, crime and drinking which were addressed either officially, typically resolved in various regulations, or unofficially, in efforts of various civil society organizations and movements, such as the temperance movement.

In parallel, voices challenging urban life also gained strength, arguing for the superiority of the rural existence and, drawing on Locke, the moral impact of the natural environment. In political terms, Jeffersonian agrarianism placed country life above city dwelling, declaring that the "cultivators of the earth are the most valuable citizens, they are the most vigorous, the most independent, the most virtuous" (quoted in Pierson, 1978:356). In intellectual terms, Romantic sentiment toward nature was captured by the transcendentalists, especially Ralph Waldo Emerson, who in his essay 'Nature'(1836) concluded that nature is superior to man in commodity, language, discipline, idealism, spirit and prospect, as it is the dwelling place of the Oversoul, the physical realm representing God and his

handiwork, and thus also the place which may teach about God and bring one closer to him. This pantheistic view and the subsequent moralizing sentiment toward the power of nature over the human soul were embraced by Unitarianism. Unitarian minister Theodore Parker, for example, claimed that the urban industrial elite was "ignorant of tradition and devoid of religious spirit" and was "the principal obstacle to … [d]emocracy as the realization of a divine order among men [which] had to be based on … an upright religious faith, and an appreciation of the teachings of nature" (quoted in Giorgio Cincci *et al.*, 1980: 157). In this context, one's relation to and understanding of nature and the land functioned as a prime social, political and economic signifier.

3. The landscape experience

Fascination with the American land and natural environment, however, was nothing new. Already *Columbus' Letter of 1493* offers an elaborate description of a unique land and its inhabitants. Kenneth Myers (1993), for example, uses this text as a point of departure in his analysis of a series of texts, each of which captured vividly the beauty and uniqueness of the American territory. These texts, I would note, were all written for an educated and inquisitive European audience, presenting to them a sensational, faraway place with its exotic native inhabitants. The very same land, however, represented hard work for the newly arriving settlers, while the natives were perceived much more as a threat and not as models of the exotic or noble savage, nor as an exquisite addition to the settlers' unique experience. Land ownership on the frontier had been thoroughly intertwined with inhabiting and cultivating the land from early on, as also expressed later by the practice of homesteading.

The general shift from laboring to leisuring on the land appeared in tandem with the emergence of the middle class in the North East; earlier only very few of the colonial elite expressed the need for an appreciation of the beauty of nature. Myers discusses in detail how Raymond Williams and John Barrell have already mapped the ways in which "representations of rural or wild environments as naturally beautiful were used by the eighteenth-century British elites … to validate their sense of superiority to their social inferiors who worked but did not appreciate environments as landscapes" (1993:73). Unlike in Britain, however, assigning aesthetic value to the natural view was not related to land ownership in the US. I argue that land ownership there never actually ceased to be bound to laboring: (1) land ownership was bound to direct cultivation of the land in the North and on the Western frontier; while (2) an indirect form of laboring was attached to

land ownership in the South, meaning the work associated with managing a plantation. Therefore, the new relation to the land in the form of aesthetic appreciation emerged among people (1) who were typically not landowners, thus (2) whose daily work was not linked to the land; and (3) who had the financial means and leisure time upon which a new form of relation to nature could emerge.

The potential, therefore, for the transformation of the countryside into a landscape, of a sight into a view, of laboring into leisuring was linked to a new group of people related to industrial production and financial growth. Members of this new class were able to objectify the natural environment as a source of beauty through a mental act, which they experienced as habitual and natural, and not as a learned and consciously enforced activity, according to Myers argument (1993:74). I propose that this repositioning was made possible through a double shift: (1) they were able to rid themselves of traditional relations to the land and nature, historically expressed by utilitarian ownership and cultivation, as they were engaged in neither of these practices; and, instead, (2) they were able to assign a new set of meanings to nature: their ability to assign religious, moral, intellectual, political and aesthetic readings to nature turned the land into a landscape for them, materialized and naturalized in a series of practices and consequent experiences, including landscape gardening, tourism and painting, all regarded at first as exclusively their own.

a. Landscape gardening

The transformation of the individual's relation to the land from laboring to leisuring is perhaps best revealed through the practice of landscape gardening. Gardening as such was already a distinct practice as opposed to cultivating the land or farming as (1) it evoked a part-time, (2) usually non-commercial activity (3) on a relatively small lot, (4) performed partly for utilitarian purposes – to provide fresh produce for the household from the vegetable beds and home remedies from the herbs kept in separate beds – and partly for aesthetic purposes – to enjoy the sight of the flowers planted together with the vegetables and herbs for decoration (Dobbs and Wood 1999:174-175). This traditional, American colonial gardening became transformed into so-called landscape gardening, introduced primarily by the writings and designs of Andrew J. Downing during the second quarter of the 19th century.

Downing's designs were highly ideological. He, as is revealed in his *Cottage Residences, Rural Architecture and Landscape Gardening* (1967), was driven by the desire to offer a suburban home environment which

united building and the natural landscape in a tasteful and harmonious way, conveying tranquility, beauty, cleanliness and comfort, informed by his firm belief in environmentalism: that the environment strongly influences human nature and the development of character. He was also deeply attached to the American environment in his exceptionalism, which emphasized that the trees and plants used in gardens should be native to the American land, as they expressed its uniqueness and distinct nature. Ideally, he contended, the natural site, God's handiwork must be maintained, with the garden designer at hand to perfect the original beauty of the land.

His designs, rooted in the English tradition, did away with the formal, geometric and symmetrical pattern of the Renaissance gardens and strived to achieve a natural, picturesque effect through asymmetrical design, open vistas, curving paths, water features, indigenous trees and shrubs, but also wished to lend tranquil beauty through floral gardens. His designs, at the same time, also remained highly functional. He typically divided the estate into various sections: the entrance, the dwelling, the flowerbeds, the shrubbery belt, the lawn, native ornamental trees, as well as the vegetable garden and the orchard. The latter two signified utilitarian gardening; these were thus always placed behind the house, hidden from outsiders' eyes, cultivated by the gardener and some of the house servants.

The rest of the land was taken up by the ornamental garden. The flower gardens were placed right in front of the home, tended only by the female members of the family, who were the most suited for this task as they "resembled [the flowers] in their fragility, beauty and perishable nature" (Stilgoe 1988:33). Tending the flower garden was conceptualized by Downing not as a burden or responsibility, but as a natural, celebrated feature of the genteel Victorian woman; not as hard work but as a joyful leisure activity. He argued for this shift – which, in fact, also denoted the way in which the change in the mental framework involved in this new practice could be naturalized – in the following manner:

> "The mistress and her daughter, or daughters, we shall suppose to have sufficient fondness for flowers to be willing and glad to spend, three times a week, an hour or two in the cool mornings and evenings of summer in the pleasing task of planting, tying to neat stakes, picking off decayed flowers, and removing weeds from the borders, and all other operations that so limited a garden may require. The love for these floral occupations … gains upon us as we become interested in the growth of plants and the development of varied forms of beauty and grace … and the exercise involved in the pursuit thus soon becomes, also, a source of pleasure and mental satisfaction, and is not, as in many other cases, an irksome duty" (Downing 1967:39).

The gardener tended the shrubs and trees, as much as they needed attention, while the lawn was taken care of by the master of the house – provided that he had the time or inclination. Interestingly, boys were not assigned any specific task, as their main job was studying, most likely off at a boarding school.

Landscape gardening, thus, was introduced as a practice in which members of the family at home could participate, even though it remained primarily reserved for women and girls. The garden was often seen as expressive of the natural refined taste and education of the women of the home, a sign of their diligence and devotion to keeping a proper home. The garden also symbolized their piety and morality: women in the garden "create a paradise" (Downing 1974:136) on earth, which also had an instructive, moralizing effect on anyone who passed by and admired the beauty of the garden. These ideas were soon also advertised in a number of women's magazines, such as the *Horticulturist* as well as the *American Agriculturist* and *The Magazine of Horticulture* (discussed in detail e.g. by Stilgoe 1988:107-123).

In a broader sense, the residence garden was also expressive of the proper nature of the family and, as such, it also served a significant integrative function: the garden was one possible point of contact through which families could be represented to the outside world as well as assessed and viewed by others. The garden was a materialized form of agency through which homes and families could be judged and integrated into proper neighborhoods.

Landscape gardening, thus, was presented as a distinct feature of middle-class families and their estates, primarily located in states along the East Coast, especially in the Catskill Mountains and along the Hudson River. Relation to the landscape and gardening was transformed for the family members engaged in it: through leisure gardening, they could develop a new appreciation of the view, in a religious, moral and aesthetic sense. Gardening practices also reflected the family structure and gender division in middle-class Victorian families in which the mother was regarded as the homemaker, the moral guardian, and the creator of home as heaven on earth, whose fragility and mental as well as moral development were matched by the practice of ornamental gardening, while the husband, the head of the family, found refuge in the home after long hours of stressful work in the city.

b. Landscape tourism

Untouched nature had also emerged as an aesthetic site to gaze at. Stilgoe notes that "[o]lder notions of agricultural aesthetics, an aesthetics summed up in the phrase 'pretty country,' lingered among isolated eastern farm families and governed the thinking of western settlers but no longer shaped educated middle- and upper-class public opinion … Educated urban men and women … embraced the half-wild, half-rural standard its champions called picturesque" (1988:23). Gazers equally saw in the picturesqueness of the native land the beauty of God's creation as well as the embodiment of the American nation which provided them with a source of pride of happiness as they admired the vistas that stretched out from the mountainsides.

The natural picturesqueness of the American scenery was primarily enjoyed through outings, strolls or short trips to the countryside, which soon emerged as a set of new practices middle-class families increasingly engaged in. The first region to attract such visitors was the Catskills and the Hudson River Valley in New York State. The rugged mountains close to the urban coastal centers offered breathtaking views of the natural landscape, often with cultivated land in the far distance, reminiscent of the power and progress of the American nation. The ability to capture the view of all this was overall uplifting, empowering and fulfilling, and soon contributed to another pastime activity for the leisure class.

The ideological construct these practices embodied was also matched by large-scale investments. The Catskill region soon became a popular site for new developments: roads were built to grant easier access to higher points, paths were developed for light strolls, matched with maps showing these and noting points from which the views were especially breathtaking. Soon restaurants, small resort houses and motels were also erected to cater to the various needs of visitors. The practice of what I call *landscape tourism*, thus, reached completion, matched with a new type of business undertaking, which quickly turned landscape appreciation into an activity which demanded time and outlay. It became a practice available only to those with financial status and leisure time, also willing to spend their own money because they felt fully compensated by the overall experience.

Myers captures this development as part of the experience which he describes as the "didactic picturesque in which natural environments were first objectified as visually integrated aesthetic wholes and then interpreted as evidencing unchanging moral truths" (1993:74). While I agree with Myers that "mountain tourism is a kind of spiritual pilgrimage in which

traveler-pilgrims seek ever-more-expansive, ever-higher views" (1993:75), I would also carry this argument further and propose that this Protestant piety in fact was thoroughly intertwined with the construction of the American national identity. Contemporary Romanticism as well as Jeffersonian agrarianism praised the land as the unifying force of the American nation, the guarantor of its piety and morality, expressive of its beauty, uniqueness and grand spirit. Downing also shared in the same ideology when he argued that the spread of landscape gardening was a significant constitutive force in the emerging American national identity in general and a distinct marker of pious American womanhood in particular (1974:44-56).

Landscape tourism was also a practice through which the landscape was treated as a type of representation, a scene, in which, I propose, it is also tied to another landscape representation: painting. Don Mitchell (2000:115-116) contends that landscape, cartography and theater were all important in Renaissance Italy in adopting a new technology of gazing, the linear perspective. This new mode of seeing (1) created a "visual ideology of realism – an ideology that suggested that perspective and landscape was … the true way of seeing" (Mitchell 2000:115), while it (2) also directed the outside world toward the spectator who possessed mastery over the view – and not the one laboring within the view – as if "owning the view … [which] is important because it shows that the landscape way of seeing is precisely a technique to render control, both ideological and material, as 'natural,' as part of the inescapable order of things" (Mitchell 2000:116).

c. Landscape painting

Landscape painting cultivated the very same linear perspective. Moreover, it offered probably the most artistic way to domesticate the landscape experience in its full glory. James Flexner (1962) notes that a proper home in the first half of the 19th century had to have a Bible on the mantelpiece and a landscape painting over it. The artistic representation of the landscape began to function as a sign of great value: a marker of wealth, education, refined taste, and morality.

Originally, landscape paintings operated as mementos of a lovely outing, capturing the sites the family had visited – some of which later became personalized by a very popular new sub-genre of landscape paintings depicting families/friends at picnics. It comes as no surprise, then, that the most widely painted scenes were of the Catskills and the Hudson River Valley. The first school of American landscape painters was also called the Hudson River School, headed by Thomas Cole, and counting as its members Samuel F. B. Morse and Asher B. Durand. These painters

wandered around these sites, made outdoor sketches on the scene and turned these into the final painting in their studios. Just like Downing, they also believed that the genius of the artist within them enabled them to notice visual imperfections in a view and introduce corrections to achieve the most desired effect in the final image.

In addition to artistic inspirations and motivations, both painters and landscapists searched for the picturesque. In general, this picturesqueness in nature was captured at the site, either of the superbly beautiful sense of the natural or of the scaringly powerful, superhuman sense of it, the first drawing on the tradition of Claude Lorrain's *sublime*, the other on Salvador Rose's *terrible* from 17th-century European painting. An excellent representation of the two is offered by Cole in his *Expulsion from the Garden of Eden* (ca. 1827-28), in which an arch divides the canvas into two: Eden on the right side is presented by nature in an absolutely peaceful and harmonious state, associated with the Divine, while rugged mountains, broken trees, stormy dark sky and fearful, dark colors on Earth evoke the power of God's anger, signifying the terrible, on the left. Painters of the Hudson River School were primarily drawn to the sublime, genteel nature, but Cole, for one, also often applied scenes of the terrible, especially in his epic series, such as the five-piece *Course of Empire* (1833-36). The sublime was conveyed in landscape gardening by the ornamental flowerbeds, while the natural picturesque landscape was exhibited in the sections where the original vegetation was kept untouched, in its primary state.

Native vegetation was also highly regarded by Downing for its expressiveness of the unique American land and thus its close link to aspects of the emerging sense of American nationalism, the guarantors of which were the members of the new middle class. Flexner (1962) as well as Angela Miller (1993) discuss in detail the significance of artists as well as wealthy patrons, collectors, art critics and men of letters of the era in the emergence of a new aesthetic taste and the accompanying art market, primarily constructed around the landscape experience at the time. Landscape painting was conceptualized as representative of the American land, the nation, its sacred mission and its values – in close association with the homes in which the pictures appeared. The series of practices associated with the landscape experience in the middle class, thus, were not only signifiers of their position and constitutive of that in and of itself, but also operated as integrative forces, positioning them in the wider ideological landscape at work to stabilize the American national ideology.

4. Landscape experience and the American middle class

Madan Sarup proposes that "[i]deology is not a set of doctrines. It refers to the imaginary ways in which men and women experience the real world. Ideology signifies the way in which subjects live out their roles in class-society, the values, ideas and images which tie them to their social functions" (1998:136). The emerging series of landscape experiences represented these imaginary ways of self-experience and self-positioning of the middle class in the first part of the 19th century. These experiences were deeply attached to a newly established aesthetic value system, about which Terry Eagleton concludes: "the category of the aesthetic … in speaking of art speaks of … other matters too, which are at the heart of the middle class's struggle for political hegemony. The construction of the modern notion of the aesthetic artifact is thus inseparable from the construction of the dominant ideological forms of modern class-society, and indeed from a whole new form of human subjectivity appropriate to that social order" (1990:3).

The naturalization of this aesthetics and landscape appreciation was necessary both for the experiencing and self-positioning of the upper classes as naturally placed in a superior power-position. As Mitchell concludes, "[t]he landscape way of seeing, as one tool among many, served as an important technology for representing new orders as timeless and natural" (2000:117). While in Europe, especially in Britain, this new manner of seeing was at first associated with the owner of the land as opposed to the cultivator, as illustrated by Thomas Gainsborough's *Mr. And Mrs. Robert Andrews* (ca. 1748), in the US this became the possession of the independent viewer: the power to gaze was the basis of the relationship of the middle class to the land, whose position was the outcome of industrial and not agricultural power. The landscape practices represented this new politics of gazing; in a number of English landscapes, such as Gainsborough's mentioned above, the Mr. Andrews who controls the land and the new way of seeing is in fact in the picture, standing leisurely on a hilltop, holding his gun, with his wife sitting by his side, and he is looking straight out of the painting at the viewer, who is on the same level as he is, that is, positioning the person appreciating this picture as his equal, implying that the practice of the appreciation of landscape painting is associated with other members of his class. In contrast, in American landscapes the power of gazing is rarely granted to a figure in the scene, but is reserved for the viewer, typically positioned outside and above the actual scene.

Durand's painting *Progress: The Advance of Civilization* from 1853 is a prime example of this mode of gazing, landscape functioning as a sign vehicle for American nationalism, "a catalogue of its expansionist themes" (Miller 1993:154), a narrative of the development of the US, its power and people. The viewer's gaze is from above, wandering from the close, picturesque view of nature – untouched by the Natives in the middle meadow of the mountainside – to farther vistas: the river, cleared and cultivated land, curving roads with coaches and flocks on them, schooners in the bay, then a train and steamboats farther away, with factory chimneys puffing steam and a large port city, opening up to unlimited horizons, also symbolically evoking unlimited potential, in the far distance – both in space and time. Unlimited progress is recognized and thus becomes captured by the one who has possession over the gaze, the far-sighted one, the one distanced from the specific chores involved in herding, transporting, working in the fields, etc. The gaze is with the viewer who, as if a landlord, looks down from a hilltop to catalogue all his possessions and admire the wealth and advances on his land. And thus the gaze over it is indeed expressive of the claim on it.

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ARGUMENTATION AND EXPLANATION IN THREE ESSAYS BY H.-R. PATAPIEVICI: THE POST-COMMUNIST STATE AND THE 'STATIST' MENTALITIES OF THE ROMANIANS

ISABELA IEȚCU

University of Bucharest

This paper deals with some aspects of the intervention of intellectuals in Romanian public life during the 'transition' since 1989. I have focused on one of the most prominent and controversial Romanian public intellectuals, H.-R. Patapievici. I analyze the way in which 'mentalities', 'attitudes' and other cultural and social-psychological factors are used by Patapievici in arguments and explanations in a few journalistic texts. These texts legitimize a certain neo-liberal conception of the state and of the free market, in parallel with delegitimizing allegedly communist mentalities and attitudes, such as people's excessive faith in and dependence on a paternalistic and omnipresent state.[1]

1. Introduction. Analytical distinctions

This paper is part of a wider attempt to integrate Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA, in particular the version developed by Fairclough 2000, Fairclough 2003, Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999) with argumentation theories, in particular with normative theories of argumentation (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, 2004, Johnson 2000, etc.), which I have developed extensively elsewhere (Ieţcu 2004), as an original methodological contribution to CDA. For reasons of space I cannot focus on these methodological aspects here. I am also taking for granted an analytical framework involving concepts such as 'argument', 'explanation', 'recontextualization' , and a normative view of argumentation in terms of 'critical discussion' (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004), and in terms of 'dialogue' or 'dialogicality' with a range of relevant standpoints (Johnson 2000, Fairclough 2000, Fairclough 2003); such standpoints can be made 'visible' by producers of media texts (Thompson 1995) or on the contrary can be suppressed and ignored. I am also drawing on distinctions between

[1]All translations from Patapievici and other Romanian sources quoted in this study are mine. For reasons of space, I cannot include the original Romanian texts, nor can I deal in detail with more than one of these texts.

'political culture', as defined by Almond and Verba (1996/1963), and 'mentalities' or 'informal institutions', and between 'formal' and 'informal institutions' (Mungiu-Pippidi 2003, 2003a, Miroiu 1999).

A critique of the neo-liberal tenet of state minimalism in post-communism is present in the writings of many political philosophers and economists (Stiglitz 2002, Holmes 2000, Gray 1998, Verdery and Burawoy 1999). Gray (1998) discusses the 'illusion' of the post-communist minimal state in terms of a widespread confusion between a 'limited' and 'minimal' conception. Similarly, according to Holmes, 'weak-state liberalism cannot survive' in post-communist Europe. The paradox is that 'in a society where everything is for sale, including the judges and those enforcing contracts, you cannot have capitalism. Markets require certain things that are outside the market' – if the state is powerless to bring corruption and fraud before a court of law, people are going to perceive market exchanges as immoral, 'not because they have some kind of mental deformation inherited from the previous regime', not because they are 'inhibited by residual collectivism or an inability to understand individual self-reliance', but 'because such exchanges *are* immoral' (Holmes 2000:216). Holmes' view relates to one of the main ideas pursued in this study: the need for a balanced assessment of just how much the problems of transition can be blamed on 'mentalities', and how much on the weakness, corruption and inefficiency of the post-communist state, on the injustice it thereby creates by failing to set up a functional institutional framework. The main problem, Holmes claims, is one of 'authority', i.e. not a 'problem of how to limit the state' but 'how to create a working functional state'. This requires emphasizing because 'history in this part of the world tends to fuel the illusion that the only serious threat to liberty is the overmighty state, a half-truth which obscures many of the most pressing difficulties faced by the advocates of liberalism among the ruins of communism' (Holmes 2000:212-216).

My analytical concerns here are with argumentation and explanation in the legitimation of neo-liberalism and delegitimation of socialism and communism, and on the way in which a particular type of explanation enters into arguments that defend a neo-liberal conception of the 'minimal' state in post-communism. I shall focus on one of the ways in which Patapievici undertakes the delegitimation of the left, namely a mode of 'arguing from extremes': that is, by representing a standpoint he wishes to demolish in an extreme and exaggerated way, which makes it an easier target. I shall look at one particular target here, i.e. what Patapievici calls 'statism' ('etatism'): the allegedly popular assumption that the state should do everything for people. I will argue that, to the extent that such arguments are based on a

diagnosis of the situation in Romania cast exclusively in terms of people's 'statist' mentalities, they involve the construction of 'straw men'.

Arguments against the excessive interventionism of the Romanian post-communist state are frequent in Patapievici's journalistic work. The terms of the discussion are usually similar to those used by highly reputable economic analysts (Dăianu, Şerbănescu) who show that the state's practices of writing off the debts of unproductive industrial state units and excessively taxing the private sector, of tolerating bad debts from both state and private companies which are 'clients' of the regime, have been putting an enormous strain on the economy, on the population, on the public budget. These are practices which serve the corrupt economic and electoral interests of a political-economic 'predatory elite' (in Alina Mungiu's words) and are preventing Romanian economy from becoming a functional market economy. I am *not* disputing this type of diagnosis of the Romanian post-communist state's detrimental involvement in the functioning of the market. My focus is on what I find to be an unwarranted move from this type of analysis to a defence of a minimal neo-liberal state, as well as to a certain type of causal explanation, in terms of the 'psychology' of the population.

2. Explaining 'statism': communist and pre-communist legacies

Patapievici's overall aim seems to be to argue in favour of a version of the neo-liberal position of the 'minimal state', which he understands mainly as a non-interventionist state – i.e. a state that should not interfere at all with the economy, a conception as far as possible removed from the western 'welfare' state, which he dismisses in his essays under such labels as the 'nanny state' ('statul dădacă'), the 'providential state' ('statul-providență'). On his view, the Romanians are 'statist in the extreme', they have 'maximalist' expectations of the state and expect it to satisfy 'all [their] aspirations'. They view the state with limitless 'faith' and 'respect', they 'adore', 'adulate', 'worship' and 'revere' it as supreme authority.

In 'Adulatorii statului' ('The State's adulators',1995) the writer constructs an interesting explanation for why the majority of the electorate supports the so-called neo-communist governments that came to power after 1989. The *explanans* is in terms of the survival in the 'public imaginary' of communist collective representations: a view of the Romanian people as 'a monolithic granite bloc', a 'massified' people of 'anonymous individuals'; a view of the state as having 'natural pre-eminence over the citizen', and of patriotism as 'unconditional support of the State'. This conception of the state – the 'mystique of the State-with-a-capital-S', which enjoys a 'quasi-religious' public respect, in the writer's view – is described as a 'vulgar

error'. Collective representations are also described as 'logical errors … founded in mentality', where 'mentality' is sometimes referred to in terms of a so-called 'abyssal psychology' of the Romanian people, as an irrational realm where 'collective-anonymous' representations and values prevail.

A more recent text, 'Statul nostru cel de toate zilele' ('Our daily state', 2000), constructs an argument for a re-evaluation of people's maximalist view of the state and an explanation for statism in terms of the Romanians' pre-modern conceptions. The Romanian, the writer claims, has 'boundless respect for the state', he 'sees in the state the only force capable of protecting him', wishes for the state 'to be omnipresent', etc. However, the Romanian state is incapable of satisfying people's expectations, it is 'omni-impotent' because it is oversized: 'it is so inflated that it is doomed to impotence', it is 'afflicted with elephantiasis', etc.

The text develops an extended causal explanation for statism, the gist of which is that, alongside a possible explanation 'in terms of stupidity', people's statism 'can be coherently explained' in terms of the pre-modern and illiberal mindset characteristic of archaic rural societies. There are also implicit references to infantilization and paternalism: the Romanian citizen needs to be protected 'from life in general', in the absence of a strong state, he feels like an 'orphan'. A minimal conception of the state is defended instead, 'which requires that the state should only take upon itself those functions which no one else could undertake without it'. Statism is rejected by invoking reason: people's faith in the state is 'unreasonable', associated with 'stupidity', 'nostalgia', and an immature attitude. 'Statism' so constructed becomes easy to reject. Yet, how illegitimate and irrational is it for people to have expectations of the state? And if people do have such expectations, is this necessarily a symptom of pre-modern mentalities?

Treating statism as an entirely pre-modern attitude misses, in my view, the fact that expectations that the state should ensure fairness, prosperity, etc. are widespread in modern societies. Contrary to the writer's explanation, the Romanians' alleged statism is perhaps less a matter of pre-modern mentalities and illegitimate expectations than a matter of disappointed reasonable and legitimate expectations. Like most explanations in Patapievici's texts, this too is cast in terms having to do with psychological, cultural factors, or mentalities, rather than with structural, objective causes. In addition, the 'rationality' that is invoked (statism as a self-contradictory, unreasonable attitude) seems to ignore social actors' own rationality: depending on state employment is for many people more 'rational' than launching into free but uncertain market competition; in addition, for many people the alternative simply does not exist.

3. 'The Romanian electorate: a blurred photograph'

'Electoratul românesc: o fotografie mişcată' (1999) comments on the results of an opinion poll ('Barometrul de opinie publică', 1999) which revealed the population's lack of confidence in most institutions, as well as widespread discontent. Patapievici attributes discontent predominantly to factors having to do with the 'psychology' of the Romanians: their negativity, their refusal to 'see the full half of the bottle', their deeply-entrenched 'statism', etc.

According to the results of the poll, 66% of the population believe that Romania is moving in the wrong direction. At the same time, however, responses to more specific questions seem to show that people are less anxious (about inflation, disease, unemployment, crime) than in 1996, that life in the present seems to be less insecure. The writer identifies a contradiction here: people are less anxious about life in the present but still claim that the country is moving in the wrong direction and express their discontent. How can this contradiction be explained? In his opinion, the discontent of the Romanians (as *explanandum*) has 'objective' but also 'subjective' causes. He identifies the latter as feelings of 'frustration', 'negativity' and 'affective abandon'. In turn, these are eventually traced to the fact that the Romanians are 'profoundly statist'. The explanation proceeds therefore from discontent (as observable effect) to frustration, affective abandon, negativity, and finally to statism (the alleged ultimate cause, the *explanans*). In fact, the writer's stated aim is to identify the *'unexpressed convictions'* which 'seem to lie behind the *expressed responses'*, i.e. to construct a causal explanation in terms of underlying causes, which, I argue, amounts to explaining observable attitudes and orientations towards the political system (people are discontent, they feel they cannot control what is happening, etc.) in terms of deeper psychological traits, or mentalities. Here is an extract from the text:

> So, what is striking is that general discontent is constructed mentally by subjects in the opinion polls independently of and in spite of the increase in the safety of the present. But when discontent is not sensitive to indicators which disconfirm it, it means that its causes are deeper. It is a discontent that adds to its *objective causes* its own special reasons, which are subjective and have to do with frustration. This indicates that there is a significant number of expectations that have been disappointed (…). Moreover, what this self-fuelling discontent shows is not so much that *discontent* is general as that *frustration* has already won two thirds of the electorate. This electorate shows the classical sentiments of

abandonment: it believes that those who run the country do not care about it (86%), and that it, *the abandoned,* cannot control what is going on around it (78%), that nobody cares about it thinks (73%), and that those in power only want to take advantage of everyone (86%). The correct identification of this *affective abandon* seems important to me: we are an electorate for which frustration (resentment against unfulfilled expectations) self-fuels discontent…

(…) Having placed its bets on a strong state which is *au-dessus de la melée*, it is but natural that the population should extract an acute feeling of discontent from the fact that the state's institutions are inefficient. A worrying majority expects almost everything from the state. Over 90% of the population think that the state must intervene to reduce unemployment, over 80% believe that the state must establish prices, over half of the electorate are absolutely certain that every man's welfare is linked mainly to the state. (…). A comfortable majority among us are reproaching the state with the serious situation in which they find themselves, *personally*, and are blaming the institutions of the state for not taking measures to improve living conditions for each and every one individually. (…)

(…) Let us not forget that the majority favour interventionism as something which is self-understood. In fact, I feel that the acceptance of capitalism is hardly more than the outcome of successful marketing, the electorate's deep-seated feelings being that it is normal to expect all initiative to come from the state; this is because, in the view of this majority, the state's natural function is to assist anyone, anywhere, to any extent, indefinitely. At the same time, let us remember that the same people are manifesting a radical mistrust in the institutions of the state, which they expect everything from. I see no contradiction here. People are profoundly statist, expect everything from the state and, at the same time, cannot help noticing that the state's institutions do not meet their maximalist expectations.(…)

(…) So, what is striking in the relationship between discontent and the undeniable existence of improvements is that improvements, although they are experienced, are not *explicitly* acknowledged as improvements. Consequently, we are a population which is not only discontented but also frustrated. In my view frustration shows itself in the refusal to acknowledge definite progress. Everything is drowned in discontent and in the refusal to see the full half of the bottle. Because the subjective indicator of discontent is higher than the objective grounds for discontent, we can say that the Romanian population is one which has internalized resentment. A worrying political consequence of this fact is that the Romanian electorate is an electorate which defines itself through its discontentment, an electorate which in fact takes its discontentment as a badge of identity and a source of satisfaction. At the risk of being paradoxical, I would say that the Romanian population exaggerates discontentment because discontentment with rulers has become a mark of personal intelligence, institutional independence and social authority. Our society is content to be extremely discontent. (…)

(…) One could say the political formula of the dominant type of man in Romania today is summed up in the triplet "statism, interventionism, populism", opportunistically converted to the philosophy of free market economy, respect for

> property and the law. (…) Politicians still have at their disposal enough space to mobilize the political-psychological inclinations of the Romanian electorate not around collectivism but around the values of capitalist individualism. Fixation with the state can only be neutralized by granting *symbolically* to the state what its Bovarian adorers think should be given to the state. Against the *idea of the state* one must not fight useless epic battles: the state must be quietly reduced to what it deserves to be, as the free market develops and consolidates itself. (…)

The writer intends to produce a 'portrait sketch', or a 'profile' ('portret robot') of the 'dominant type of man in Romania today'. He refers to this type of man as an 'imaginary person endowed with a particular psychology', or even as an 'imaginary collective being'. The Romanians' 'statism', as the writer describes it, is an apparently pre-modern faith in the state as an idea ('stat-idee'), an 'essence' or 'archetype' ('arheu') with a 'transcendent' character (beyond parties and society), as a 'medieval' 'substantial form', the 'invisible expression of the body of the nation', etc. – not as a modern functional institution. This faith verges on the irrational: people have 'placed their bets' on the 'state-idea', their faith is described as 'fixation' with the state ('fixație stataloidă'), as 'Bovarian' fantasizing, etc.[2]

In insisting that people have limitless faith in the state, the writer does not seem to be bothered by the fact that the respondents have expressed their negative assessment of virtually all of the state's concrete institutions: more than 60% of them have no faith in the government, Parliament, political parties, the President, the law, etc.; moreover, they believe that those who are in power are only using it for their own personal advantage. The writer acknowledges this but claims to 'see no contradiction here': mistrust in institutions (evident from people's responses) does not seem to disconfirm his claim that people are statist: people *expect* everything from the state, have limitless faith in some transcendent notion of it, *and* cannot help seeing that the state, as it actually functions, fails to satisfy their maximalist expectations – hence the acute feeling of discontent .[3]

In principle, I argue, at least two explanations for discontent are possible: one in terms of several successive governments' persistent failure to deal adequately with economic and social problems, i.e. a societal-structural type of explanation, another in terms of the people's mentalities. Patapievici chooses the latter. In doing so, he moves from statistics which

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[2] I am tentatively using the coinage 'Bovarian' as an equivalent for the Romanian word 'bovaric', itself derived from the name of Flaubert's Madame Bovary.

[3] Patapievici represents the absence of a question about confidence in the 'State-with-a-capital-S' ('Statul scris cu majusculă') as a flaw in the *Barometer*, though it is difficult to see how such a question (particularly in such wording) could have been plausibly included.

invite sociological explanation (including e.g. social explanation of why some people do not feel they can control what is going on around them, while others do) towards an increasingly undifferentiated explanation for public opinion and attitudes in terms of a 'psychology' of the Romanians. References to 'objective' causes for discontent are present at the beginning of the text but they quickly disappear: discontent is described as 'self-fuelling'. In other words, according to this text, the sources of discontent are primarily, if not entirely, 'subjective', having to do with frustration, resentment, and ultimately with 'statism'.

The concept of 'expectations' plays a crucial role in the explanation. It is introduced early on, where frustration is defined as 'resentment against unfulfilled expectations', and reappears later as part of the discussion of statism: at that point, it is claimed that expectations are 'maximalist' and people 'expect (almost) everything from the state'. Nowhere does the writer acknowledge that people may be discontent and frustrated because their legitimate and reasonable expectations have been disappointed. This is fairly surprising, considering that the writer *does* list some results of the poll which clearly indicate an abundance of reasons for objective discontent: 40% of the population say that their living standards have declined since the previous year, the incomes of 39% are only sufficient for their strict necessities, while those of 36% do not even cover basic survival needs, etc.

Instead of acknowledging objective causes for discontent, the writer constructs an infantilized population that expects a parental kind of affection and care (in the absence of which it lapses into 'affective abandon'), and behaves in a child-like manner: nourishing irrational beliefs and reveries about the nature of the state, and ignorant of its true functions; 'helpless', 'negativistic' and 'confused'; awaiting 'all initiative' to come from the state; incapable of taking risks ('investing money in business'), but always ready to 'blame' and 'reproach' the state for personal failure, etc. The minimization of objective causes for discontent culminates in the almost cynical claim that 'our society is content to be extremely discontent': people simply take pleasure in being discontent because discontentment with rulers is a mark of 'intelligence', a 'badge of identity', a 'source of satisfaction'. In today's Romania, the writer argues, 'discontent' goes together with 'social prestige' and is in fact 'fashionable' (*'dă* atât de bine să fii nemulțumit').

On the whole, this explanation for discontent in terms of statism, frustration, affective abandon, draws on a certain recognizable type of critique of communist mentalities, as critics of communism have developed it. Under communism, it is argued, people were dependent on a paternalistic state, which deprived them of freedom and initiative and thus infantilized them (Liiceanu 1996), etc. Credible as this type of explanation may be in

general, the shift to an explanation in terms of 'statist' mentalities in this text, in relation to the post-communist context, has the effect of indirectly exonerating the government from responsibility: it is as if the population, and not in the least an inefficient, incapable and corrupt government, is principally responsible for the state of discontent. [4]

The way in which the explanation is framed in this text seems scientific and logical. The writer identifies a contradiction and proceeds to explain it in a typically realist way: by hypothesizing ('my working hypothesis is…') that observable phenomena ('discontent') have an underlying cause, i.e. a certain 'psychological profile' of the electorate, and checking this hypothesis against evidence (the percentages collected by the 'Barometer'). However, whatever the hypothesis actually is, as long as it is formulated in terms of underlying 'mentality' traits, it is extremely difficult, I believe, to either confirm or disconfirm it. Why indeed is it more credible, in the absence of any specific question on the issue, that people's discontent is caused by certain long-term mass-psychological traits, rather than by their dissatisfaction with the performance of the current government? Why is an explanation of discontent in terms of 'deeper' causes needed at all, when, as I believe, an explanation in terms of the fairly obvious failure of the government of the time (and of previous governments) to take measures capable of satisfying people's minimal expectations would have sufficed? Why are the 'objective' causes of discontent minimized, backgrounded, while the 'subjective' explanation in terms of mass-psychology is given priority? In my view, this is related to the writer's overall intention of legitimizing the ruling coalition and alleviating its share of responsibility for the country's situation at the end of Constantinescu's 1996-2000 mandate. He does this by falling back (once again) on a critique of the left and of

[4] The text also seems to draw on another type of political critique (Tismăneanu 1998, etc.), which emphasizes the connection between what is here diagnosed as 'frustration', 'resentment', 'discontent', 'affective abandon' and the electorate's possible shift towards authoritarian and populist models of leadership. Commenting on the fact that 28% of respondents seem to interpret the situation in terms of 'disorder, insecurity and chaos', Patapievici claims that 'it is known' that deploring disorder is equivalent 'in fact' with deploring the 'absence of a force capable of imposing order', and that 'negativism' is 'potentially dangerous for the country's democratic equilibrium', potentially 'explosive' and 'aggressive', and raises the spectre of a future 'massive vote for the left', which might 'redesign Romania' according to 'collectivist' principles. I have analyzed elsewhere the way in which a topos of 'threat' is often used in arguments which delegitimize the left in Patapievici's texts.

left-wing residual conceptions, on a general critique of the state-dependent, immature, even irrational attitudes and behaviour of the population.

At the other extreme from (alleged) excessive statism and maximalist expectations seem to lie the normative ideals of (1) 'capitalist individualism' – a self-reliant individual, capable of taking risks and not expecting any assistance from the state, and (2) the liberal state, progressively 'reduced to what it deserves to be', as the 'market develops and consolidates itself'. Clearly, the state is not supposed to play a significant (if any) role in the development of the market – this development is assumed to unfold by itself.

The text focuses primarily on explaining discontent in terms of statism, rather than on constructing a strong argument in support of its claims (which might, for instance, require justification of potentially contentious premises, e.g. of how a minimal state might be capable of dealing with people's problems, how it can solve the problem of public services, how it can deal with corruption, etc.). It is taken for granted that the solution to Romania's problems lies in reducing the state's functions to a minimum in parallel with increasing the freedom of the market. As I have suggested, the argumentative construction of 'statism' as involving 'adulation', 'worshipping' and excessive dependence on the 'State-with-capital-S' is certainly a convenient 'straw man' to demolish in arguing for a neo-liberal model of economic rationality, but is not necessarily a faithful description of the real attitudes and mentalities of most of the Romanians.

4. Conclusions

Let me sum up the main lines of my discussion in this paper in the form of three questions:

1. Has the post-communist state failed to fulfil the excessive and illegitimate expectations of its citizens or rather their most reasonable and legitimate expectations? Explanations in terms of alleged statism, affective abandon, negativity and other mentality traits crumble if we accept that the post-communist state, including the government in office at the time of the opinion poll in question, failed to provide reasonable living standards and fulfil legitimate expectations of a majority of Romania's citizens.
2. How can a minimal state deal with discontent and satisfy people's expectations, if by a minimal state one understands a non-interventionist state? Premises which say that a minimal state, a market free from state interference, or capitalist entrepreneurial mentalities might effectively solve the problems of post-communist societies are backed by certain versions of

neo-liberal theory and ideology, but are they also backed by the actual experience of post-communist countries?

3. Should discontent be primarily explained in terms of statist mentalities (including residual collectivism, paternalism, passiveness, dependence) or rather primarily (though not exclusively) in terms of objective, social-structural causes? Does discontent reflect communist mentalities or is it an attitude towards current, objective, structural constraints people are confronted with? Can 'mentalities' and practices be expected to change unless there is substantial change at the level of the functioning of formal institutions, or in the absence of genuine economic progress and development? And 'whose' mentalities are to be incriminated? Those of the average Romanian, who is trying to scrape a living on a monthly salary of at most 100-150 Euros – i.e. the category of Romanians that Patapievici seems to incriminate? It can be in fact argued that the average Romanians have proved far less state-dependent and passive over the past 15 years, and far less confident in a state that has made a mockery of their expectations than Patapievici's argument might lead us to suspect. Since 1989, millions of Romanians have emigrated or sought work abroad; of those who have not made such radical choices, many are caught up in personal situations which do not have as much to do with 'bad' mentalities, than with objective constraints which make them unfit for or incapable of such choices.

On the whole, I find that Patapievici tends to construct arguments in support of certain strategies for action in post-communism Romania by drawing on at least the following sources: (a) a legitimate criticism of what the Romanian post-communist state has accomplished in the name of reform, i.e. a redistribution of assets amongst a political-economic elite, (b) western neo-liberal theory on the desirability of state minimalism and a maximally deregulated market. Using these in combination results in a defence of a minimal state in post-communist Romania, a type of 'market fundamentalism' whose adequacy in transition countries is now being challenged by more and more analysts (Lavigne 1995/1999, Stiglitz 2002).

I believe that arguments and explanations in terms of 'mentalities' or the 'psychology' of the Romanians are misleading and unsatisfactory as long as they do not consider 'mentalities' in relation with formal institutions, their inefficiency and corruption, and, more widely, with an entire background of structural constraints on people, particularly poverty, absence of opportunities for self-development, massive social injustice, institutionalized corruption (this includes the new market institutions) and an acute polarization of society between a rich elite and an impoverished majority. The latter are however much less 'visible', much less present as explanatory factors in Patapievici's essays. To that extent, these texts'

dialogicality, the extent to which they engage with alternative standpoints on the matters they address, is correspondingly reduced and weakened.

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ASPECTS OF POSTMODERNISM IN CANADA

MARGARETA PETRUȚ

University of Cluj

1. Some attempts to define postmodernism

The word "postmodernism" not only evokes what it wishes to surpass or suppress, modernism itself but also denotes temporal linearity and connotes even decadence. Although the origin of the term seems uncertain it is known that Frederico de Onis used it in his anthology of Spanish poetry (1934) to indicate a minor reaction to modernism.

At the end of the fifties Irving Howe and Harry Levin wrote of it as a falling off from the great modernist movement but it was especially Leslie Fiedler and Ihab Hassan who developed the concept during the sixties. Thus for Fiedler it was meant to challenge the elitism of the high-modernist tradition while Hassan used it to define its interest in exploring "the impulse of self-unmaking which is part of the literary tradition of silence." (Hassan, 1987: 85) It is again the latter who warns us against the danger of seeing modernism and postmodernism as separate from each other and confirms that an author may, in his or her lifetime, write both a modernist and postmodernist work.

As far as the distinctions between modernism and postmodernism are concerned Hassan draws an impressive list meant to emphasize differences and considers that

> "...if much of modernism appears hieratic, hypotactical, and formalist, postmodernism strikes us by contrast as playful paratactical, and deconstructionist. In this it recalls the irreverent spirit of the avant-garde, and so carries sometimes the label of neo-avant-garde." (Hassan, 1987: 90)

On the other hand, in his attempt to define postmodernism Jean-Francois Lyotard (1983) sees it as undoubtedly part of the modern. For him "A work can become modern only if it is first postmodern. Postmodernism thus understood is not modernism at its end but in the nascent state, and this state is constant." (Lyotard, 1983: 44) However, trying to define the two concepts in terms of differences he presents modern aesthetics as an aesthetic of the sublime which allows the unpresentable to be put forward only as the missing contents while the form continues to offer to the reader "matter for solace and pleasure." By contrast

> "The Postmodern would be that which, in the modern, puts forward the unpresentable in presentation itself; that which denies itself the solace of good forms, the consensus of taste which would make it possible to share collectively the nostalgia for the unattainable." (Lyotard, 1983: 46)

From this point of view a postmodern artist is in the position of a philosopher as the texts he writes are not governed by pre-established rules, and they cannot be judged according to a determining judgement, by applying familiar categories. The writer is working "without rules in order to formulate the rules of *what will have been done."* In conclusion, Postmodern would have to be understood according to the paradox of the future (*post*) anterior (*modo*). (*Ibid.*)

2. Aspects of Postmodernism in Canada

Some of the aspects worth investigating in connection with postmodernism in Canada include the contacts between American postmodernism and contemporary Canadian fiction, the Canadian view of postmodernism as a tool against modernism and the 'invention' of a collective past as a central concept of postmodernism in Canada.

In the 1960s, 'postmodern fiction' established itself primarily in the United States as a mode of writing, accompanied by a set of critical rules. Fiction as an individual reflection of the real world, the 'postmoderns' argued, had exhausted all its potential.

Many of the new experimental writers' texts , by deliberately exposing their own artificiality, refuse to provide readers with traditional means of orientation and identification and tend to lay open the rules governing the reader's perception of reality. There is also a general tendency for contemporary writing to become openly self-reflexive to focus more and more on the creative process itself. Fiction turns to fantasy and fabulation, experimenting with word games and sound patterns while genres like romance and allegory are revived and subjected to new forms of parody.

Historical narrative, in particular, turned out to be a favourite target for this process of deconstruction and transformation, because it represented a type of fiction tied more closely to an objective reality. Among the first who have questioned the assumptions underlying historical fiction were John Barth and Thomas Pynchon and the attack is aimed not just at certain inconsistent uses of history but tends to unmask history itself as just another kind of fiction.

The Canadian contribution towards the growth of experimental fiction in the sixties is limited and includes Marshall McLuhan's theories

about the end of the analytical and mechanical age of Gutenberg and the beginning of the new era of collective 'tribal' forms of behavior. One of the first Canadian contributors to the debate around the distinction between modernism and postmodernism is Frank Davey through his book *From There to Here* (1974). His reading of modernism as preoccupied with personal and cultural failure and straining for the transcendence which only silence could offer informed his survey of Canadian literature.

One of the first journals to incorporate postmodern into its title was *Boundary 2: a journal of postmodern literature,* founded in Binghampton, NewYork in 1972, by William Spanos and Robert Kroetsch, the latter an outstanding Canadian novelist, poet and essayist. In a Canadian poetry issue of *Boundary 2* in 1974, almost at the same time with publication of *From There to Here,* Kroetsch (1989) would make his notorious pronouncement that Canadian literature had "evolved directly from Victorian into Postmodern".

According to Frank Davey "What has happened to postmodernism in Canada since 1974 has in many ways limited its theoretical usefulness. The political dimension of the term has remained problematical, being recurrently subverted by understandings from Europe and the United States that associate it with "free play" and arbitrary construction, and by characterizations by Fredric Jameson and others as a new aestheticism that seeks to divert readers from things political." (Davey, 1994: 252)

Most of further development of postmodern in Canada has been the work of Robert Kroetsch and Linda Hutcheon. The theory informing Kroetsch's (1989) postmodernism appears to arise out of phenomenology but has changed considerably since 1973 to accommodate the work of post-structuralist theorists such as Bakhtin, Derrida, Kristeva, and Foucault. Postmodernist criticism has become in Kroetsch's practice a criticism that applies post-structuralist theory. In "Carnival and Violence" he uses Bakhtin's theory of the carnivalesque to re-read a passage from Moodie's *Roughing It In the Bush* as perceiving the New World as a carnival disruption of European order. In "The Exploding Porcupine" he takes deconstructive theories of violence to re-read various Canadian novels as implicitly destructive of their own forms.

Linda Hutcheon's thesis in both *The Poetics of Postmodernism* and *The Politics of Postmodernism* is that 'postmodernism' is 'resolutely contradictory as well as unavoidably political' (Hutcheon, 1989:1). Her primary concern is not to facilitate a particular Canadian politics, nor to construct Canada as a postmodern country, or even to argue the existence of the 'postmodern' but to re-construct and direct international understandings

of the term itself. Her conceptions of both modernism and postmodernism are much larger and more diffuse.

In Davey's opinion Hutcheon's *The Canadian Postmodern* has some contrasting resemblances to both Kroetsch's conceptions and his own. Like Davey she constructs Canadian postmodernism "as a variant subset of international postmodernism, and as politicized discourse through which social conflicts are conducted" (Davey, 1994:260). However, Hutcheon constructs a much larger Canadian postmodernism and appropriates into it many texts other theorists have characterized as realist or modernist: Atwood's *The Edible Woman*, Munro's *Lives of Girls and Women*, Engel's *Bear*, Richler's *St Urbain's Horseman*, Cohen's *Beautiful Losers*, Wiebe's *The Temptations of Big Bear.* Like Kroetsch, she moves to define Canada as specially postmodern.

> "Canada's own particular moment of cultural history does seem to make it ripe for the paradoxes of postmodernism (...). Since the periphery or the margin might...describe Canada's perceived position in international terms, perhaps the postmodern ex-centric is very much a part of the identity of the nation." (Hutcheon, 1988:3)

In Canada, as elsewhere, critics have most often addressed at some point the ambiguous relationship postmodernism bears to modernism – its claiming to be its successor (*post*modernism) and its admission of dependency upon it (post*modernism*). Some have simply ignored the complication of postmodernism, like W.J. Keith (1985) who, in *Canadian Literature in English* extends his modernist criteria of directness of control to all authors whether they have been claimed as modernists or postmodernists. Still others have characterized the texts claimed by 'postmodernism' as trivializations or degenerations of modernism.

In most discussions and debates of postmodernism in Canada, there tends to be an assumption that poststructuralist discourse, if not at least one of the adopted discourses of postmodernism, is one of the characterizing discourses of postmodernity. Kroetsch writes as if postmodernism and post-structuralism share common projects; Hutcheon constructs the relationship between the two as "inseparability".

On the other hand, Davey signals other reactions, fears and concerns manifest in the Canadian literary context, fears about influences from other countries (usually the United States, but often France and Britain). Several critics have expressed in more recent Canadian nationalist criticism their concern that these 'influences' will come to 'contaminate' Canadian writing and culture. Thus, in one example, T.D. MacLulich's study *Between Europe and America: the Canadian Tradition in Fiction* (1988), Europe and

America are defined as “experimental, avant garde, or postmodern”(249) and Canadian “postmodernist writers and their critical accomplices” (244) are said to advocate a Canadian literature “that is determined by the example of the literary avant garde in other countries” (229). They “introduce students to works that satisfy the latest dictates of literary fashion” (249); they create a small group of enthusiasts whose tastes are narrowly avant garde”, they “encourage a literature...increasingly written in conformity with an intricate set of conventions that are of interest to a small group of specially trained readers... the assimilation of our literature to the style of the international avant garde”. (MacLulich, 1988:251) To the idealization of an homogeneous international style and a “real” Canadian tradition, MacLulich adds the idea that the international style is a dubious, perhaps inauthentic or fascist cultural manifestation, an arbitrarily dictating “literary fashion.”

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RHETORICAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF JEWISH-AMERICANESS

EMILIA POSTOLACHE

University of Bucharest

Jewish Rhetorical Strategies

The Eichmann trial in Jerusalem and the subsequent conflict in the Middle East have brought the Israeli and German collective representations of the Holocaust to the attention of the Jewish-American community. Thus the mid-to-late sixties witnessed an increase in the Jewish sense of ethnic identity due not to Judaism, but to the Holocaust (Berger, 2002: 158). Jewish-American symbolic need of a significant past and a 'homeland' has found an answer in the European past epitomized by the Shoah and the ancient 'home' represented by Palestine, i.e. the new state of Israel.

The subsequent rhetorical strategies occasioned by various historical (the Six-Day War, the Ramadan/Yom Kippur War, the Civil Rights Movement, the Bitburg incident, the U. N. Resolution which equated Zionism with racism etc) and cultural (multiculturalism, instituting various memorials etc) events and issued by the Jewish-American community included the Shoah in their attempts at defining themselves as 'minority' and 'diaspora' at the same time.

Prior to the sixties, American Jews had tried to downplay their ethnicity, being "one of the most economically successful and culturally assimilated ethnic groups in the United States" (Berger, 2002: 159). The Holocaust and the legacy of European anti-Semitism had not played a significant role; the Jewish-American elites supported the U.S. policy regarding West Germany, the reconciliation agreement and atonement measures between the Israeli state and the German one. The social-ascriptions implied by being an authentic Jew did not specify the obligations to confront 'the void' left by the Holocaust and to have a pro-Israeli / pro-Zionist point of view. The Cold War reinforced only the opposition between capitalism and communism

The Holocaust first appeared in American-Jewish collective memory as part of a rhetorical strategy in the Rosenbergs trial of 1951. Julius Rosenberg and Ethel Rosenberg, who were convicted for passing information concerning the construction of nuclear weapons to the Soviets during and after World War II, used the Holocaust as a justification for their deeds. Despite questions concerning the fairness of the trial, the international pleas for clemency and the USSR statements accusing the

American government and nation of anti-Semitism, the Rosenbergs were executed in 1953.

The inclusion of Nazi mass murder in their defense, together with the collaboration with the Soviet regime made the public Jewish opinion label them as 'inauthentic Jews' (Encarta Encyclopedia, *Julian Rosenberg*), in an attempt at contending with the pre-existent collective representation of Jews as communists and traitors.

The overlapping of the Holocaust with the conflict in the Middle East have caused the subsequent presence of Israeli and Zionist ideological units of meaning within the American rhetorics centering on the Holocaust. The politicization of the Shoah has imposed the rightful spokesperson for the Holocaust victims and survivors as the ones having a clear Zionist perspective. The place dedicated for the memorialization of the Holocaust on American ground – the USHMM -- has become one of the main sites of debate over the meaning of authentic v. ersatz Jewishness.

For instance, Professor John Roth of Claremont McKenna College in California, an internationally respected Holocaust scholar, was forced to resign as a director of the Holocaust Museum's Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies after an assault on his critical opinions of the Israeli policies in the Middle East. John Roth is the author of more than 20 books in American Studies, philosophy, ethics and the Holocaust. In 1988, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching chose him as 'the nation's outstanding teacher / scholar' for his work on *The Holocaust and the American Experience* (Brownfeld, 1998**).**

These definitions of Jewish identity function of the European past as continuous persecution, the Israeli present, i.e. Zionism, and the diasporic communities scattered all over the world resulted in establishing various social-ascriptions with regard to which one could 'distinguish' between an 'ersatz Jew' and an authentic one. Starting as an attempt at strengthening and uniting the Jewish community in the US, the definitions given proved, in some cases, to be only another essentializing means of marginalizing members of the Jewish community itself who did not comply with the standards.

Also, the Jewish community in the US had to contend with the definitions given by Israel and included in various rhetorical strategies meant to justify political decisions.

For instance, prior to the war in 1967, Eliezer Livneh, a well-known commentator and former Knesset member for Mapai, wrote in *Ha'aretz*:

> "It is more than the Strait of Tiran that is at issue now. What is at issue is the existence or nonexistence of the Jewish people. We must crush the machinations

> of the new Hitler at the outset, when it is still possible to crush them and survive...Neither the world nor the Jews believed in the sincerity of Hitler's declarations...Nasser's fundamental strategy is the same as Hitler's" (qtd in Brownfeld, 1998)

Also during his term as prime minister, Menachem Begin repeatedly attempted to justify his policies by invoking the Holocaust. He often compared Yasser Arafat to Hitler (referring to him as a "two-legged beast," a phrase he had used earlier to describe Hitler) and the PLO's Palestine National Covenant to *Mein Kampf (*ibid**).**

Prior to Israel's invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, Begin told his cabinet:

> "You know what I have done and what we have all done to prevent war and loss of life. There is no other way to fight selflessly. Believe me, the alternative is Treblinka, and we have decided that there will be no more Treblinkas". (qtd in Brownfeld, 1998)

A few weeks after the beginning of the war in Lebanon, Begin's response to international criticism of Israel included direct references to Western attitude towards the mass murder of Jews in Europe, taking over the counterrhetorical claims which sustained a more diffuse, generalized guilt and responsibility for what had happened in the Holocaust. From this point of view no one had the right to criticize Israeli policies: "No one, anywhere in the world, can preach morality to our people" (ibid).

A similar statement was included in the resolution adopted by the cabinet after the massacres in Sabra and Shatila, and in a letter to President Reagan, Begin wrote that "the destruction of Arafat's headquarters in Beirut had given him the feeling that he had sent the Israeli army into Berlin to destroy Hitler in the bunker" (ibid).

The opposition Jewish v. Isareli identity collapsed as well as the distinction between 'here' (the new state) and 'there' (far-away Europe). Public-collective Israeli memory integrated completely the exilic past and attempted to establish itself as the sole and rightful spokesperson.

However, this sort of rhetoric backfired, as it generated the appearance of counterrhetorical claims within Israeli community itself (which led to Begin's resignation).

Similarly the rhetorical strategies centered on the Jewish community's status qua victim triggered, especially in the American context of constituting multiculturalism, various 'counterrhetorical strategies', reflecting numerous 'victim contests' (R. Berger's terms) over the position of 'minority'.

The claims that have been issued starting with the Civil Rights Movement have ranged from various attempts at relativizing the event (placed for instance in the context of Black slavery or communist peril) to the www-phenomenon of denying its historicity (Berger, 2002: 90-96)

Denial with respect to the Holocaust entails three basic claims: (1) the gas chambers and the crematoria in the concentration camps were used [only] for delousing clothing and disposing of the people who died of disease and overwork and not from mass extermination; (2) only about 600,000 Jews rather than six million actually died, and (3) the deaths that occurred were "nothing more than an unfortunate by-product of the vicissitudes of war" rather than a result of an international program of mass extermination (Berger, 2002: 154).

For instance, the Journal for Historical Review – founded in 1978 by a right-wing extremist, Willis Carto, first achieved notoriety in 1980 when it offered fifty thousand dollars to anyone who could prove that the Nazis had gassed Jews at Auschwitz. Mel Mermelstein – a Holocaust survivor proved this, but Carto refused to pay the money. Mermelstein sued him and won the trial.

One of the famous deniers of the holocaust is David Duke, a former Klan member, the founder of the National Association for the Advancement of White People and a state representative in Louisiana in the late 1980s and early 1990s. He established the www – phenomenon of debating and ultimately denying the historicity of the Holocaust, representing a *nec plus ultra* case in the rhetoricization of the Nazi mass murder.

The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, built with private donations near the other memorials on the National Mall, reflects an inclusive approach to the Holocaust (the other victims of the Nazi regime are also present) and its appropriation by American collective memory. This fact has been stated by Michael Berenbaum (director of the Museum's Research Institute) who maintained that the Holocaust represents a "violation of every essential *American* value" (R. Berger 160).

The Americanization of the Holocaust has thus led to the emergence of the Holocaust as a rhetorical motif part of inclusive (universalistic implications of the Holocaust) and exclusive rhetorical strategies (aiming at narrowing the Jewish concerns).

Black-Jewish Relations

In 1961, the psychologist Willliam Niederland coined the phrase 'survivor syndrome', introducing a psychological portrait that quickly entered public sphere. He also referred to 'survivor guilt' and presented the

trauma of those who had outlived their dear ones in the Nazi death camps. Gradually the Displaced Persons came to be addressed as 'survivors', but they also represented in the public collective memory *the Victim.*

However, the same kind of arguments had been used for almost two decades by another minority group in the Unites States; for instance, in the 1950s, as part of the intercultural education campaign, Philadelphia Black activist Horace Woodland argued that the history textbooks used in schools constituted "psychologically damaging" texts. This was one of the first instances when the public problems were defined "in terms of their impact of the individual psyche". By 1967, even Humbert H. Humphrey, Vice-President of the NAACP, would warn that racist textbooks, which were still included in the national curricula, "were permanently scarring Black minds" (Zimmerman, 2004).

Significantly enough, in the mid-1940s the segregationist practices in education and racist textbooks were part of the rhetorical strategies of the time in the context of what was later called 'the Holocaust'; for instance, in June 1944, at the meeting between the delegation of African-American leaders and the New York City school officials, the main claim issued by the former was that the practices used in education reflected the "Nazi doctrine" (ibid).

This marked probably the beginning of a shift in the rhetorical strategies to be used in post-war America (also reflecting the increased interest in psychoanalysis and Freud's theories) towards "psychological modes of explanation and remedy" (ibid).

However, starting with the 1960s the association between ethnicity/minority and victimhood/trauma triggered various victim contests over the status of 'the most oppressed'. Two major players emerged in this contest – the African-American Community and the Jewish-American one; the Holocaust and slavery, Black Nationalism and Jewish Zionism, integration and assimilation became gradually rhetorical motifs used in various rhetorical strategies, misused and probably abused.

For instance in 1983-84, during the presidential campaign of Rev. Jesse L. Jackson, a debate started between Min Farrakhan (one of Jackson's fervent supporters and leader of the Nation of Islam) and the Jewish-American community (and subsequently the ADL). Farrakhan's speeches make use of typical liberal justice agenda infused with typical (anti-Semitic) representations of the Jew, and recurrent images of the African-American as the *Victim.* The following excerpts are from the speech he delivered in 1984, February 25 and praised Jackson:

> "Now whether you know it or not, *anytime a Black man stands up with justice in his mouth, his life is on the line*. You know that, don't you brothers and sisters? (…) He's freed the minds of these young Black boys and girls who will never again think that Black people cannot rule themselves and go to the top, this is what he's done. What has he done? *He stands up for the poor, the oppressed and the locked out*. [..]*He reaches out to Arab Americans*. No president or no presidential candidate goes to the Arab seeking Arab American votes. Reverend Jesse Jackson has the nerve to do that and because he had the nerve to want to include all, not some, he's hated (italics mine) ('Farrakhan and the Jews')"

Thus the politics of multiculturalism are defined function of the global, the transnational (Israeli-Arab poles, Judaism-Christianity v Islam), and the liberal justice agenda (the socioeconomic factors).

> "You do not realize there are 35 to 45 percent of your armed forces are Black. It is we who you will send to Nicaragua. It is we who you sent to Grenada. It is we who you sent to Lebanon. *It is we who will be sent to fight your wars*(ibid*)*."

On the other hand on 27th February 1984, Nathan Perlmutter of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith referred to Minister Farrakhan as a "Black Hitler." Nat Hentoff, a Jewish leader and columnist for the Village Voice participated in a New York radio call-in show and also characterized the Muslim leader as a "Black Hitler." (ibid)

In response to these accusations, on 11th March, the same year, in a radio broadcast, Farrakhan declared, "Hitler was a very great man". The reasons he gave are less outrageous than the previous statement; however this was what the collective memory retained.

> "He wasn't great for me as a Black man (See Hitler's attitude toward Blacks) but he was a great German and he rose Germany up from the ashes of her defeat by the united force of all of Europe and America after the first world war. […] Now I'm not proud of Hitler's evil toward Jewish people, but that's a matter of record. He rose Germany up from nothing. Well, in a sense you could say there is a similarity in that we are rising our people up from nothing, but don't compare me with your wicked killers." (ibid)

In 1984, June 24, on his return from Libya, Farrakhan called Judaism a "gutter religion", because it has been used to justify Israeli policies; the rhetorical motif of 'conspiracy' is also present in his speech:

> "America and England and the nations backed Israel's existence. Therefore when you aid and abet someone in a criminal conspiracy, you are a part of that criminal conspiracy. So America and England and the nations are criminals in the sight of almighty God. Now that nation called Israel, never has had any peace in forty years and she will never have any peace because there can never be any peace

> structured on injustice, thievery, lying and deceit and using the name of God to shield your dirty religion under His holy and righteous name." (ibid)

The status of African-American minority in the US seems to be defined mainly function of the left hand side of the hyphen: the global is again used to claim and to justify the status of the oppressed:

> "for thirty years Israel has maintained strong economic, military, nuclear, scientific, academic, energy, tourist, cultural, sports, transportation, agricultural and intelligence ties with South Africa – and thereby prolonged Black oppression there. Jews were the only group in this country who arrogantly threatened to protest the visit of revered African National Congress Chairman and now President Nelson Mandela to the United States in 1990. They have labeled Mandela and Bishop Desmond Tutu "anti-Semites" while the 110,000 Jewish South Africans are, in fact, the richest single community in the world." (ibid)

Israeli statements, such as Moshe Dayan's (the quality of American military forces had deteriorated because they were composed of Blacks "who have low intelligence and low education." He urged America to ensure that "fresh blood and better brains go to their forces" (ibid)), are used in his speeches in order to reinforce the equation white/Israeli – racist – victimizer.

Slavery and the Holocaust are also included in Farrakhan's speeches; for instance, he stated that Jewish Talmudic scholars invented the Hamitic Myth and they thus "sentenced the Black race to a holocaust the likes of which no people have ever suffered" (ibid). Moreover, Farrakhan insists that seventy percent of the slaves in the Old South were owned by Jews.

In 1987, Nai'm Akhar, the president of the National Association of the Black Psychologists maintained:

> "It is a simplistic notion of slavery which makes it easy for people to compare their holocaust with our holocaust. They do not understand that going to the ovens knowing who you are, is damn well better than walking around for one hundred years not knowing who you are….our holocaust in America is worse than the holocaust in Europe" (qtd in Berger, 2002: 168).

Again, the holocaust and slavery are mere rhetorical motifs in almost the same victim contest.

The last but not the least, in 1993, Khalid Abdul Muhammad, member of the Nation of Islam, in a well-publicized speech at Kean College, in New Jersey maintained that Jews were Christ killers; they had been slaveholders and now they continue to be "bloodsuckers of the black people" that control the government and the media. Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan called Muhammad's remarks "vile and repugnant in

manner" and suspended him from his post. But he added that Muhammad's words were, in substance, "true." (Encarta Encyclopedia, *1994: Religion*).

Farrakhan's statements, or rather fragments of statements (which may lead to partial (mis) interpretations) may be found on the official ADL website; they serve to justify ADL's policies and practices, proving that there are instances of anti-Semitism within/despite several decades of multiculturalist policies/PC. This does not mean that the ideological units of meaning are missing from this particular context; the holocaust and the subsequent definitions given to Jewishness (function of the holocaust as the 'best' example of anti-Semitism at work) may prove to be equally essentializing.

Numerous examples may be found in the pages of several newspapers that hosted this kind of political debates starting with the 1960s, such as *The Crisis, the New Leader, Commentary, Dissent, Partisan Review* etc

However, the extremes do not represent the African-American community or the Jewish-American one at large; for instance, the Reverend Jesse Jackson and other black leaders joined Jewish organizations in condemning both Muhammad's speech and Farrakhan's response. Also, there are counterrhetorical strategies within the Jewish community itself, questioning any of ideological units of meaning present in the definitions given to Jewishness, such as Norman Finkelstein's, Paul Novick's, Amos Oz's etc

Multiculturalist Curricula and Jewish-American Contemporary Writers

Gregory Jay states that there have been two directions within multiculturalism: 'pluralistic multiculturalism' and 'oppositional multiculturalism' (1997:104). Oppositional multiculturalists define victimhood as the decisive criterion used in qualifying a writer as 'ethnic'/'multicultural'/'minority' (Jay 1997:104-106); hence, the victim contests seem to be a natural process in the context of American ethnic and racial groups' attempts at defining their own identities. The status of 'the most oppressed' came to be used as one of the most significant factors used in deciding on the exclusion/inclusion of a certain ethnic or racial group's cultural products.

With reference to the Jewish-American community, Mark Shencher stated that, in the 1990s, "in the MLA … list of job openings, the demand for instructors in minority literature or 'multiculturalism' is clamorous,

while nobody is looking for teachers of Jewish-American literature" (qtd in Furman 2000:10)

Also, the academic interest in Jewish-American writers seems to have decreased and even scholars of American literature have ceased to consider them multiculturalist/ minority writers at all. At the same time, few academics regard Jewish-American contemporary writers as part of the so-called mainstream. Regarding the status of contemporary Jewish writers, Furman identifies this current situation as a 'double bind' (the mainstream success of the Jewish-American novelists in the 1950s and 1960s currently discourages multiculturalists from including contemporary Jewish-American fiction in the curriculum), which explains the absence of contemporary academic interest (2000:12). Again the all-inclusive multiculturalist agenda generated essentializing definitions with respect to minority/ethnicity, and the criteria used in judging a work as literature consist mainly of socioeconomic and historical factors.

Norma Rosen (one of the contemporary Jewish writers) states that the reluctance on the campuses to include contemporary Jewish-American writers in the curricula is due to the fact that "we are not regarded as a suffering minority. We are thought to have made it, both in American society and in literature" (qtd in Furman 2000: 19)

Also Cynthia Ozick speaking about academic multiculturalism in her essay "Making Our Way" identifies the same rhetorical strategies triggered by the victim contests as the main reason deciding on literary matters.

> "Multiculturalism is intellectual deceit. Indifferent to the singularity of genius, it prides itself on rescuing groups from the margin (with the exception of Jews), and ends by marginalizing nearly everyone. Trampling on writers' autonomy, it pretends to be about literature, and engages in special work based on population ratios and bloodlines" and threatens to leave out literature altogether" (qtd in Furman, 2000:20)

Furman mentions MLA's discriminating policy with respect to Jewish-American cultural products, saying that it

> "has consistently denied petitions to create a national Division of Jewish-American Literature, or of Jewish Literary and Cultural Studies. Despite the creation in the last 15 years of Divisions of Black American Literature and Culture, American Indian Literatures, Women's Studies in Language and Literature, Ethnic Studies in Language and Literature and Gay Studies in Language and Literature" (2000: 22).

The same thing applies to the other 'Euro-Americans', such as Italian-Americans, Polish-Americans, Irish-Americans etc

However, there have been instances when Jewish-American critics, such as Irving Howe ("Jewish-American fiction has probably past its high point" –in the 1970s), and Leslie Fiedler ("the Jewish-American novel is over and done with, a part of history rather than a living literature" - 1986) claimed that there was no such thing as Jewish-American *contemporary* literature (qtd in Furman 2000: 25).

The rhetorical and counterrhetorical strategies attempting to define a certain community inherent to these victim contests played an important role in the literary production itself. For instance, Cynthia Ozick wrote *The Shawl* (1980, 1983) as a response to William Styron's *Sophie's Choice* (1976) (who had chosen as the main character of his story on the Holocaust a non-Jew). Toni Morrison wrote *Beloved* (1987), in response to *The Shawl.* Phillip Roth wrote *The Ghost Writer* (1979) as a possible response to the controversies that characterized the decade.

The beginning of the 21st century marks a shift in the Jewish-American community attempts at defining itself within the multiculturalist context and transnational one; thus secular Zionism seems to be no longer able to unite the community. Instead there has been the tendency to redefine traditional Judaism function of the Holocaust, the Yiddish culture and language, and the challenges implied by the booming gay congregations. All the writers that Furman identifies as being part of the Jewish-American contemporary 'canon' – Cynthia Ozick, Robert Cohen, Melville Bukiet, R. Goldstein, Anne Roiphe, Tova Reich etc – challenge the all the collective representations of Jewishness that have been issued for the past four decades.

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IMAGES OF ENGLAND

STEEN SCHOUSBOE

Copenhagen University

A language is never only a language. Language, by virtue of its referential and expressive functions, is always related to the external world, or, to be precise, to non-linguistic parts of the world. To learn a language is – among other things – to learn how words can refer to concepts and entities and, more generally, to learn what linguistic actions a speaker can perform and how. Everybody who has studied a foreign language has also, by implication, studied a foreign culture. The foreign language does not only attach new words to well-known concepts. There will always be concepts and entities which require explanation. To understand a text fully requires more than linguistic skill.

These remarks will hardly be regarded as controversial by anybody. All foreign language teachers are familiar with situations in which some extra (i.e. non-linguistic) information is necessary for the understanding of a text. This extra information is what we will look more closely at in the present paper. The extra information goes by various names in various countries, but *culture* is probably the most widely used term; so we shall say that foreign language teachers teach culture as well as language.

In the United States, the term *culture* covers cultural knowledge and cultural empathy as well as cultural competence, i.e. the ability to judge and act in a given situation. According to Risager (1987) the latter two are considered particularly important, but foreign language teaching in the US is rather marginalised.

In Great Britain there is very little discussion of culture, in contrast to the American tradition. The traditional term in Great Britain is *background studies*, but more recently the term *cultural studies* has been used, e.g. by Byram (1989). In Byram's opinion, foreign language teaching should supply students with insight into the sociological reality of the foreign society in question, not just as knowledge or information, but as sympathetic understanding similar to the perspective of the native speakers.

In France there is widespread interest in culture (French: *civilisation*) and what we might call cultural production. There is a strong tradition of regarding literature, language and culture as mutually dependent.

In Germany, too, there is a long tradition of background studies. The traditional term was *Landeskunde* (= knowledge of the country or nation), later replaced by the term *Kulturkunde* (= knowledge of culture). Because of

the unfortunate associations with Nazi ideology the term *Kulturkunde* is now usually replaced by *Neue Kulturkunde* (= new knowledge of culture) or the old *Landeskunde*.

Like many other small countries, Denmark has a fairly strong tradition of foreign language teaching. There has been a continous influence of German and English theory and practice. In particular, the German emphasis on *Alltagswissen* (knowledge about everyday life) and the British emphasis on communicative or functional language pedagogy have been important.

We can conclude that in foreign language teaching it is generally accepted that some sort of cultural information must be given. However, there is less agreement when it comes to the *form* in which such information should be given and also when it comes to the precise nature of this information, its *content*. First, a brief look at form:

It seems useful to distinguish between explicit and implicit ways of conveying information of the kind discussed here, cultural knowledge. By explicit information I mean expository texts which explain or present historical, geographical, sociological, etc. facts about the country or culture in question. In the case of English, such texts could be short essays on specific institutions like the Parliament or public schools or on specific historical events ("King Alfred and the Cakes") or periods ("The Victorian Age"). Such explicit expository texts were used widely a generation or two ago, but are now very rare as will appear below. However, it should be borne in mind that traditionally the Danish teacher of English would be aware that the students would receive general or broad information about the history and geography of Great Britain from other teachers. From informal talks with colleagues in other European countries I gather that explicit information in the form discussed here is still used in some countries, but I will postpone further discussion of the pros and cons of this method until I have more solid information.

The indirect method is now totally dominant in Danish practice. Texts like the ones mentioned above are very rare in today's school books. Typically, historical knowledge is conveyed indirectly, e.g. by presenting a narrative text which takes place in a certain historical period. When older teachers like myself are sometimes shocked by the almost total ignorance of basic geographical and historical facts in some students it is tempting to blame the change from direct to indirect teaching of background knowledge, but it must be borne in mind that geography and history as independent subjects have been considerably reduced in the curriculum of Danish schools in the past decades, so it is by no means certain that we should blame the change from direct to indirect instruction in the English lessons.

As far as I can ascertain there are few Danish teachers who would welcome a return of the expository texts mentioned above.

When it comes to content there is considerably less agreement among Danish teachers of English. What kinds of background information should be taught, which areas are most important? Byram and Risager (1999) have conducted an empirical study in which they are able to shed light on this question. Several hundred Danish teachers of English and English teachers of foreign languages were asked the following question: "Which topics or themes should pupils – as a minimum – be introduced to? (Tick a maximum of 10 for each language.)" The 20 topics or themes given in the questionnaire were as follows:

Political system
History
Daily life and routines
Shopping and food and drink
Youth culture (fashion, music, etc.)
Literature
School and education
Geography and regions
Family life
Film, theatre, art
Social and living conditions
Festivities and customs
Ethnic relations, racism
Tourism and travel
Gender roles and relationships
Religious life and traditions
Working life and unemployment
Environmental issues
Stereotypes
The country's significance for Britain/Denmark

The responses of the two groups of teachers were as follows:

Danish teachers' responses:	English teachers' responses:
1. Social and living conditions (83.4%)	Daily life and routines (92.4%)
2. Daily life and routines (79.8%)	School and education (85.2%)
3. School and education (77.7%)	Shopping and food and drink (84.8%)
4. Family life (63.7%)	Family life (81.0%)
5. Youth culture (fashion, music, etc.) (61.6%)	Youth culture (fashion, music, etc.) (80.5%)

6. Shopping and food and drink (58.3%)	Festivities and customs (73.8%)
7. Ethnic relations and racism (55.2%)	Geography and regions (65.7%)
8. History (49.2%)	Social and living conditions (60.5%)
9. Festivities and customs (45.2%)	Tourism and travel (54.3%)
10. Political system (43.5%)	Working life and unemployment (32.9%)

It will appear from the above figures that English foreign language teachers seem to agree more on the selection of the most important topics than their Danish colleagues. Five of the ten topics are ticked by more than 80% of the English teachers while, among the Danish teachers, only one topic is ticked by more than 80% of the respondents.

The top five themes are the same in both groups, with two exceptions: "Shopping and food and drink" is rated as number three (84%) by the English teachers and as number six (58%) by the Danish teachers. With "Social and living conditions" the difference is even greater: this theme is rated as number one (83%) by the Danish teachers and as number eight (60%) by the English teachers. Overall, of the ten themes ticked by Danish respondents, seven are ticked by the English teachers, who omit "Ethnic relations and racism", "History" and "Political system". Out of the ten themes ticked by the English teachers, seven are ticked by the Danish teachers, who omit "Geography and regions", "Tourism and Travel" and "Working life and unemployment".

With these qualifications it seems reasonable to conclude that there is a fairly high degree of consensus among foreign language teachers in England and teachers of English in Denmark regarding the most important areas or topics of cultural studies. It would be interesting to see similar studies of the attitude among foreign language teachers in other European countries, but I have not come across such studies.

It would also be interesting to compare the views of the foreign language teachers as revealed in Byram's and Risager's study with the books used. Do the school books reflect the priorities of the teachers? In order to answer this question I have looked at a series of Danish school books called *Choice*.

The *Choice* books were published from 1977 onwards and were widely used in Danish schools until the turn of the century. They cover the whole period in which Danish intermediate school children learn English, from fifth grade (approximately 11 years) to tenth grade (approximately 16 years). (The age at which Danish children start English has since been

lowered to the fourth and then third grade). The series consists of a Reader and a Work Book as well as tapes. The Work Book mainly contains grammatical and lexical exercises while the Reader contains short texts representing a variety of genres from pop song lyrics over cartoons to dialogue and narrative/short story. It is in connection with these texts that cultural background is taught and the texts are arranged in sections with a headline indicating the cultural area treated. In the first book of the series, *Choice 1* (intended for the first two years of English, i.e. the fifth and sixth year or – later – the fourth and fifth year of school), the six areas or topics included are My world, Entertainment, Family, Work, Crime and Travel. The ten areas in *Choice for sjette* (= *Choice* for the sixth form or year) are as follows: Pop Music, London, Holidays, Jobs and Money, Art and Work, Going to the USA, The Wild West, Wild Life, Times and Trains and Fourteen (a magazine). The eight areas or topics in *Choice for syvende* (= *Choice* for seventh form or year) are as follows: A Place of My Own, Free Time – and Work, Television, Fear, Two Tales, Olympic Events, It's a Hard Life and Top of the Pops.

If we compare these topics or areas with the priorities of the Danish teachers cited above we see that while the number one and two priorities ("Social and living conditions" and "Daily life and routines") are covered, number three ("School and education") is absent as well as number seven ("Ethnic relations and racism") and number ten ("Political system"). Youth culture, on the other hand, is extremely well represented in *Choice*, but was only the fifth most important priority of the Danish teachers. We can conclude that there is only a partial fit between the priorities of the teachers and those of the books.

What is noteworthy about the texts in the Choice Reader is not only that they convey cultural information in the indirect manner mentioned above, but that they are so totally focused on the age group for which the books are intended. Nearly everything is seen from the perspective of a young teenager, so that one gets the impression that the authors are convinced that young people are entirely self-centred. Whether this strategy is warranted is not for me to say, but certainly the texts of *Choice* could hardly be further removed from the direct expository texts of former times and *Choice* remained very popular in Danish schools for several decades. Clearly the general style of the books was felt to be an asset. It would be interesting to see how this style would compare to the style of school books of the same period in other European countries.

There can be no doubt that foreign language teaching is now more important than ever in Europe, particularly with regard to English, which has become the lingua franca in many fields. As we saw above, there is also

a general consensus that the teaching of English should include some measure of cultural information, though opinion may vary as to the exact nature of this information as well as the best method of teaching it. However, there is another aspect of the teaching of English on which there has been great variation over time and from country to country and which deserves mentioning here. We may call this aspect the ideological one.

The texts used in school books, like most other texts, do not only relay information about sociological facts and cultural phenomena; they also represent, though usually implicitly, certain beliefs and value systems. The facts and phenomena referred to will be presented in a certain light, whether neutral or positive or negative, and this light reflects the ideological stance of the book or the persons who have assembled or written the texts. It is clear that in the course of the twentieth century the English phenomena referred to in school books changed as well as the perspective in which they were presented. In short, the image of England changed. It would be worth while for somebody who was well schooled in Critical Discourse Analysis to look more closely at these images and the underlying beliefs and value systems. Fairclough (1995), Van Dijk (2000) and Wodak (1996) all supply stimulating analyses. However, Critical Discourse Analysis is not without its pitfalls. I refer the reader to Widdowson (2004).

Another aspect of the teaching of culture, closely related to the (shared) beliefs and value systems mentioned above, is the phenomenon known as national stereotypes. It seems reasonable to assume that school books can have a certain effect on creating or modifying national stereotypes, but we must not be too optimistic in this respect. Though national stereotypes can and do change over time (the German stereotype of an Englishman at the beginning of the twentieth century was that of a rich eccentric), they do not change as easily as some might wish. Rasmussen (2003) relates how it took a whole century before English and the English were admitted into Copenhagen University and Danish society in general (the two countries had become enemies during the Napoleonic wars), and Werther (2003) reports on the near-total failure of an attempt to change the British stereotype. A report written by Mark Leonard in 1997 had suggested that six old "stories" connected with Great Britain be replaced by six new ones. The old stories (or images or stereotypes) were:

1) The idea of Britain as a land of great and stable institutions
2) The imperial nation
3) The industrial powerhouse
4) Home of the English language
5) The Protestant nation
6) The inventor of sports and fair play.

The new "stories" which Mark Leonard proposed were:

1) Hub UK – Britain as the world's crossroads
2) Creative Island
3) United Colours of Britain
4) Open for business
5) Britain as a silent revolutionary
6) The nation of fair play

It will be seen that Leonard's proposals were in keeping with the political tendencies of the time. Werther quotes from a speech by Tony Blair in March 2000: "Standing up for our country means standing up for what we believe in. It means standing up for our values and having the strength to realise them in the modern world. It means standing up for the core British values of fair play, creativity, tolerance and an outward-looking approach to the world. It does not mean unthinking resistance to change. It does not mean railing against the outside world. Modernisation is the key."

When Werther asked Danish students who had visited Britain to describe their impressions, *new* and *cool* were not the words that came to mind and fair play had gone unnoticed. Rather, the well-known *traditional, conservative*, *old-fashioned* and *slow* were used as they would have been by the students' parents. Stereotypes die hard, but that does not mean that we should give up trying to change them. School books remain important instruments in this endeavour and foreign language teachers remain potentially potent agents, so there is every reason to use care and deliberation in the choice of texts for school books.

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THE TASK FOR TASK-BASED LANGUAGE TEACHING: TO RETHINK THE COGNITIVE APPROACH

THOMAS WILLIAMS

University of Szeged

Introduction

Few ELT professionals would claim not to have embraced Communicative Language Teaching (CLT) both in theory and practice. However, to the extent that we have done so, many of us continue to engage in the presentation-practice-production (PPP) paradigm of teaching language form in the classroom, which held sway within CLT until the 1980s. A more recent paradigm, task-based language teaching (TBLT), represents an effort to improve the efficacy of CLT by having learners engage in communication in the classroom that much more closely approximates that of day-to-day life. Having developed out of linguistic and methodological considerations, this paradigm offers much promise, but may still require findings from other areas to round it out. Specifically, cognitive psychology may hold the key.

In the first two sections of this paper, I discuss PPP and TBLT, compare them and offer criticisms for each. The third section deals with the work of Robert DeKeyser (1998) in cognitive psychology with principles that may benefit language teaching. It is suggested that this area may serve to bring TBLT forward.

I. PPP in teaching a second language

PPP has been described as the teaching strategy tied to a syllabus composed of individual structural items which have been previously selected and graded; in such a strategy, "we present a structure, drill it, practise it in context…then move to the next structure" (Brumfit and Johnson 1979:1). A PPP lesson has as its very aim the teaching of a specific language form whether this be a grammatical structure or a form that represents a function or notion (Willis 1996:133). Skehan (1998:93) describes the three stages of PPP from the perspective of cognitive psychology: (1) *present:* the teacher introduces a discrete grammar point such that learners will understand and internalise the underlying rule and develop declarative knowledge; (2) *practise:* learners practise the grammar in order to automatize the rule and convert their declarative to procedural

knowledge though the completion of exercises which do not encourage learners to express their own ideas but provide meanings pre-made by the materials developer; and (3) *produce:* with teacher control and support reduced, learners now use the language form that has been presented to express their own meaning in a relatively spontaneous manner.

A key distinction is in order at this juncture between *exercises* and *tasks*. Central to the PPP paradigm, exercises are "activities that call for primarily form-focused language use" whereas tasks prompt the "meaning-focused" sort (Ellis 2003:3). Willis points out that such exercises or drills – and indeed the whole PPP cycle – are founded on "the behaviourist view of learning which rests on the principle that repetition helps to 'automate' responses, and that practice makes perfect" – a view, she hastens to add, which has by now been discredited in language teaching (Willis 1996:133).

In his inclusive discussion of the use of tasks, Ellis (2003:28) cites Howatt's (1984) description of weak and strong versions of the Communicative Language Teaching (CLT) approach of the 1980s. Broadly speaking, CLT drew on Halliday's functional model of language and Hymes's theory of communicative competence (as excerpted in Brumfit and Johnson 1979 and cited in Ellis 2003:27). According to R. White (1988:75), the weak version, associated with PPP, finds expression in notional-functional syllabuses (White's so-called Type B approach) such as the Council of Europe's *Threshold* (Van Ek 1975) and *Waystage* (Van Ek and Alexander 1977), wherein notions, such as duration and possibility, and functions, such as inviting and apologising, represent the organising principle. Thus, PPP has not only been used to teach grammatical structures in a narrow sense but other language forms as well. Conversely, the strong version of CLT is based on the notion that "language is acquired through communication" (Howatt 1984 in Ellis 2003:28). This is what informs Krashen and Terrell's (1983) Natural Approach and Candlin's (1987) task-centred teaching, in both of which learners "discover the system itself in the process of learning how to communicate" (Ellis 2003:28). It is this strong version of CLT from which TBLT has evolved.

I borrow Willis's useful chart below to illustrate some of the salient distinctions between TBLT and PPP lessons in terms of their staging and key conditions for learning:





Fig. Comparison of TBLT and PPP lessons (Willis 1996:135)

Ellis (2003:29) cites Rutherford (1987) as saying that PPP reflects a view of language learning as a series of 'products' to be acquired in sequence as 'accumulated entities'. Indeed, Willis (1996:135) finds fault in PPP for its emphasis on a single item of language at a time. She says that with this emphasis on discrete items and the attendant exercises that "encourage habit formation, [PPP] may actually discourage learners from thinking about language and working things out for themselves" (*ibid.*). As

Ellis (2003:29) points out, PPP resists or ignores the findings of SLA research that learners do not operate this way. Instead, (1) they build up systems called interlanguages which evolve as new features are taken in and (2) they go through multiple phases of acquiring any given target form, e.g. negatives. In other words, PPP is inappropriate because acquisition is characterised by processes – not products, as PPP suggests.

Furthermore, in purely practical terms, problems with PPP abound. Both Ellis (*ibid.*) and Willis (1996:134) point out that learners may actually refrain from using the target form in the production stage. Ellis (*op. cit.*) points out that learners may simply fall back on their strategic competence and thus avoid the form. He suggests that if, however, they are told simply to use that target feature in the production stage then meaning becomes secondary to form. Similarly, as Willis (*op. cit.*) has observed, learners may overuse the form and create stiff, unnatural conversation, e.g.

> What will you do tomorrow?
> Tomorrow I will go to my aunt's house.
> I will go by bus.
> I will see my cousins.
> I will play football with them.

From hearing such talk, as Willis concludes, it becomes clear that (1) the learner is still at the practice stage and (2) he or she is not concerned with expressing meaning. Willis also criticises PPP for providing learners with a false sense of mastery of the given form, one which fails to carry over to later lessons or to life outside the classroom. "The irony is that the goal of the final 'P' – free production – is often not achieved. How can production be 'free' if students are required to produce forms which have been specified in advance? (*ibid.,* 135).

Willis has also raised these other practical concerns about PPP (*ibid.,* 136):

- as form is presented first, context needs to be invented *ad hoc;*
- consciousness-raising is ultimately a matter of "repeat, manipulate and apply";
- examples of language such as sentences to illustrate a single language item provide little variety in terms of exposure to natural language;
- the teacher pre-selects one discrete form allowing little opportunity for learners to notice a variety of features and ask about them;
- PPP provides a limited paradigm for grammar and form-focused lessons.

Finally, Carroll (1975) and Stern (1983) are cited in Skehan (1996:18) as remarking that learners exposed to conventional foreign

language learning tend to reach very low levels of proficiency and come away from school with little usable language. Though Carroll and Stern were writing decades ago, the paradigm and its effects persist. From this, Skehan draws the pithy conclusion that "most language learning is associated with relative failure" (*ibid.*). This, therefore, would appear to be the knockout punch for PPP. Not so.

The question that confounds many, then, of how such a model could have such staying power and, indeed, remain a standard of sorts has also been explored by Skehan. As an explanation – and a criticism – he says that PPP has two key characteristics: (1) it provides teachers with a sense of power and professionalism and trainers with a convenient model; and (2) it offers easy accountability for evaluation purposes with its tidy goals and syllabuses (Skehan 1998:94).

II. TBLT as a departure in language teaching

The criticism of PPP in being an unsatisfactory technique to encourage natural fluency and communication has resulted in the emergence of a relatively new technique in language teaching. It made use of tasks in the classroom setting. Tasks were viewed as activities which are able to create optimal opportunities to develop a variety of spoken interaction skills in the controlled environment of the language classroom. The technique which started to be known as TBLT, was thus understood as the paradigm which assisted students in achieving communication and fluency in a seemingly more natural, less controlled manner. This technique evolved out of a thorough re-examination of communicative language teaching methods and approaches by such researchers as Brumfit and Allwright (see e.g. Brumfit and Johnson (1979)).

In the areas of teaching methodology and learner contributions, TBLT stems from a redefinition of subject matter in language teaching and an exploration of methodological innovations. It is the result of efforts to implement the communicative approach in a new way. Whereas role plays and other communicative activities were once thought to be an important part of language teaching, participatory tasks are now seen as essential to language learning. Pica, Kanagy and Falodun (1993:10) identify learner interaction in these tasks as key to language learning. Breen (1987a:159) sees this view of learner contribution as stemming from two important principles: (1) learners can build on their linguistic competence given comprehensible input (Krashen 1985; Ellis 1985) and (2) learners place their own plan of content on the teacher's syllabus and their own learning strategies and preferred ways of working on classroom methodology (Rubin

and Wendon 1987; Breen 1987b). Tied to this is the notion that different learners learn different things from the same lesson.

Also important to an understanding of TBLT is the question of what a task is and how it differs from any other sort of classroom activity. Ellis (1994:595) says that the process of completing a task must correspond to "that found in discourse based on the exchange of information". More to the heart of the matter, Pica, Kanagy and Falodun (1993:10) view a task as an activity that is "structured so that learners will talk, not for the sake of producing language as an end in itself, but as a means of sharing ideas and opinions, collaborating towards a single goal, or competing to achieve individual goals." An activity such as a role play in which a learner-customer is expected to engage in a service encounter with a learner-shop assistant fails to satisfy a key condition of a task: it has no goal. It is designed to get learners to talk but nothing more. I have also found that many teachers are unaware that the artificiality of such non-tasks may actually demotivate many learners.

Overall, the major shift TBLT represents in the way learners and teachers engage in second language acquisition has resulted from fundamental changes in four areas: (1) language; (2) teaching methodology; (3) learner contributions; and (4) the way in which we plan teaching and learning (Breen 1987a:157). Moving beyond an emphasis on language form and function and rooted in the contention that communication consists of more than the sum of grammar and vocabulary items, TBLT facilitates the development of a learner's "communicative strategies", defined by Pit Corder (1983) as "a systematic technique employed by a speaker to express his meaning when faced with difficulty" (Tonkyn, Sturtridge and Phillips 1999:F13).

Tonkyn, Sturtridge and Phillips argue that, unlike a synthetic syllabus, such as the structural syllabus, which rests on the notion that language can be broken down into discrete parts and that at a certain point the learner acquires a given repertoire of structures, TBLT assumes that the learner analyses language-in-context in order to approximate his interlanguage to NS language in a specific range of situations (*ibid.,* F21). Such an analytic syllabus is essentially a fusion of the formerly discrete areas of content and methodology. Indeed, seeing the dichotomy between them as inappropriate, writers like Postman and Weingartner (1969) have long pointed out: "It is not what you say to people that counts; it is what you have them *do*" (Breen 1987a:159).

Criticisms have also been made of the TBLT paradigm. Tonkyn, Sturtridge and Phillips (1999:F23) raise two concerns: (1) "it is often difficult for learners to identify common features of the code demanded by

the syllabus"; and (2) there is a dearth of examinations of task types relative to the linguistics research available. Furthermore, based on the few such analyses that have been carried out, two of them (Pica, Kanagy and Falodun (1993) and Crookes and Gass (1993)) conclude that of the five commonly used communicative task types only two are fully effective "as a means of providing learners with opportunities to work toward comprehension, feedback and interlanguage modification" (Crookes and Gass 1993:23). If these elements are considered at least facilitative of L2 acquisition (Long 1996), then I would suggest that it is a weakness in much TBLT that there should be several task types commonly employed which fail to deliver all the goods that this technique promises.

Moreover, in the considerable body of research on NS-NNS discourse based on which TBLT proponents such as Long have made many of their assumptions about SLA, I am not aware of studies that have taken into consideration the variable of the NS's proficiency in or familiarity with the L1 of his or her NNS interlocutor and the effect this might have on features held to be facilitative of L2 acquisition. I would suggest that naturalistic NS-NNS conversation would differ significantly in this regard from conversation involving, say, a seasoned EFL teacher intimately familiar with the L1 of the NNS and the influence that may have on his or her L2. So too NNS-NNS conversations involving same-L1 participants. In such cases, it seems likely that there might be less feedback and modification of input or interaction and therefore fewer opportunities for learners to develop form and complexity in their interlanguage. This would need to be explored.

Moreover, concerns have been raised about the theoretical basis for TBLT. Seedhouse (1999:154), while conceding that tasks provide opportunities to modify interaction, questions the benefit this may have for L2 acquisition. He also points out that tasks produce *task-based* interaction which has yet to be evaluated as a whole (*ibid.*). Furthermore, he sees this form of interaction as "a particularly narrow and restricted variety of communication" and only one of many required in day-to-day life (*ibid.,* 155).

Similarly, after a careful review of Long's sources, Ellis (1994:279) also points out that it has not been proved that comprehensible input is necessary for acquisition though it may be facilitative. With regard to modified interaction, he concludes (*ibid.,* 280) that some studies (Li 1989; Tanaka 1991) support the benefits of modified interaction for L2 acquisition while others do not (Loschky 1989; Yamazaki 1991). Thus, it appears that some theoretical claims for the efficacy of TBLT may be unfounded.

Another common criticism centres on the perceived emphasis of meaning over form in TBLT. Foster expresses this concern with the insight that "language does not have to be well-formed to be meaningful" (Foster 1999:69). She says that learners may therefore use language that not only lacks accuracy but also complexity (*ibid.*). They may also buttress their language with gesture and intonation and thus miss opportunities to build up their interlanguage (*ibid.*). Citing Bachman and Palmer (1996), Skehan (1996:20) voices the same concern about learners naturally relying on strategic competence at the expense of improving their linguistic competence. Citing Anderson and Lynch (1988), Skehan (1996:21) points to an analogous phenomenon noted in listening comprehension: that of a reliance on inferencing skills to compensate for gaps in language knowledge. He also notes the time pressures common to TBLT as encouraging learners to get meaning across using all available resources, especially prefabricated chunks of language, at the expense of form and IL development (*ibid.,* 22).

III. The psychology of learning: DeKeyser

DeKeyser (1998) believes that the answer to the question of how and when to approach what kind of form in the classroom lies not only in the L2 literature but also in cognitive psychology. He sees pronunciation work as requiring discrete forms-focused treatment, for example, but a great deal of vocabulary requiring very little. Thus, he says though focus on form may not be necessary for vocabulary or sufficient for pronunciation the issue is complex for morphosyntax (*ibid.,* 43). He sees three linguistic variables as being discussed most frequently vis-à-vis focus on form: (1) the relevance of Universal Grammar (UG); (2) the need for negative evidence; and (3) the degree of complexity of the TL feature.

It is thought that if a structure is part of UG – which Chomsky defines as 'the system of principles, conditions and rules that are elements or properties of all human languages' (Chomsky 1976:29 cited in Ellis 1994a:430) – and if UG is accessible to the L2 learner, then sufficient input will trigger acquisition unless L2 is a subset of L1, in which case negative evidence is required, e.g. adverb placement or interrogative structures for French NS learning English as a L2 (L. White 1991, L. White, Spada, Lightbown and Ranta 1991 in DeKeyser 1998:43). Importantly, DeKeyser says that if a given form is not part of UG or simply cannot be acquired without negative evidence, "a rather strong variant of focus on form, including rule teaching and error correction, will be required." Another concern, as DeKeyser himself points out, is how one can know what forms

are part of UG, how accessible it is in SLA and therefore what forms are not learnable without negative evidence. He sees a tendency among researchers to see ever more structures as falling within the boundaries of UG (DeKeyser 1998:43).

This leads DeKeyser to the third linguistic variable mentioned previously, the complexity of the form to be learned. DeKeyser (*ibid.*) cites Krashen (1982) as making a distinction between rules that are (1) easy to acquire but hard to learn and (2) easy to learn but hard to acquire. DeKeyser considers the latter type appropriate for focus on form teaching, but poses the question: what makes a rule easy to learn but hard to acquire? He cites Krashen (1982) as answering this question with a "combination of formal and functional simplicity", e.g. 3rd per. -*s*. He also cites the views of both Krashen (1982) and Ellis (1990) as agreeing that "lack of formal complexity benefits learnability" (DeKeyser 1998:44) though Krashen says 3rd per. -*s* is easy to learn because it is formally simple while Ellis concludes that it is eventually learnable but only when the learner is developmentally prepared to acquire this new feature because it is formally complex. (He justifies this view by pointing to Pienemann's notion that 3rd per. -*s* is distant from the grammatical subject that determines it).

After a glance at these linguistic criteria, it will become clear that a different set of criteria emerges from research in cognitive psychology (Mathews *et al.* 1989; Reber 1989, 1993 and others cited in DeKeyser 1998:45). Two main findings are salient. The first regards inductive learning, namely that learning works better through implicit induction, defined as "mere exposure to a very large set of instances or memorization of a set of exemplars" than through explicit induction, "where they are asked to figure out the rules" (*ibid.*). This is said to be so because subjects were found to be better (in the first case) at making judgements about grammaticality later. The second finding is that despite the fact that the first group performs better it cannot state the rules (*ibid.*). In this respect, they remind one of many NS – at least those who have not been contaminated by TEFL experience! Based on these findings, these researchers have concluded that subjects can learn abstract rules implicitly and can even draw on them without being able actually to state them (*ibid.*).

Cognitive psychology may also inform our teaching through skill acquisition theory. DeKeyser (1998:48) cites Anderson (1982, 1995) in outlining the three stages of skill acquisition: (1) declarative, or factual, knowledge; (2) proceduralization of knowledge, which encodes behaviour; and (3) automatizing or fine-tuning procedural knowledge, i.e. doing it without having to think about it. The question then becomes how one moves from stage 1 to stage 3. According to DeKeyser (1998:49), "[t]he essential

notion to bear in mind here is that proceduralization is achieved by engaging in the target behaviour – or procedure – while temporarily leaning on declarative crutches (Anderson 1987:204-5; Anderson and Fincham 1994:1323), in other words,…conveying a message in the second language while thinking of the rules." Thus, repeated behaviour restructures declarative knowledge such that it becomes easier to proceduralize so that after a time working memory load is reduced (DeKeyser 1998:49). Once this has been achieved, DeKeyser (*ibid.*) explains, practice enables procedural knowledge to become automatized, thus increasing speed and lowering error rate and burden on cognitive resources (Anderson 1987, 1990, 1995; Logan 1988; Schneider and Shiffrin 1977).

With this, DeKeyser turns to the concept of practice in L2 learning. Saliently, he defines the concept as "engaging in an activity with the goal of becoming better at it" (1998:50). Reviewing the role of practice in various familiar teaching methods, he arrives at the conclusion that none of them conform to the basic concepts of the cognitive theory of skill acquisition. He then explains the implications of skill acquisition theory for L2 grammar learning. It is his contention that if fluency is the goal, i.e. automatic procedural skill, then learners must have the opportunity to practise using the language by communicating something in that language while maintaining the relevant declarative knowledge in working memory (DeKeyser 1998:52). He believes that the most common L2 classroom activity for this purpose is the communicative drill (*ibid.*), in which actual content is conveyed which is unknown to the interlocutor, according to Paulston's definition (1971) in DeKeyser (1998:50). Unlike mechanical drills, which are exclusively forms-focused and require no attention to meaning, communicative drills provide an opportunity for learners to draw on declarative knowledge while the skill is being proceduralized – and this is essential.

Furthermore, it is DeKeyser's contention that automatization and implicit learning are not at odds provided one bears in mind that (1) the degree to which structures are most easily learned explicitly though automatization of declarative knowledge depends on the nature of the rule and (2) automatization can mean different things: either fine-tuning (strengthening) or restructuring, proceduralization and fine-tuning (*ibid.*). "Only in one aspect of its senses, namely proceduralization of explicit declarative knowledge, is the concept of automatization incompatible with implicit learning" (*ibid.,* 57). Thus, he concludes, implicit second language learning and learning based on skill acquisition are not incompatible (*ibid.*).

In sum, DeKeyser espouses a view on "language learning that encourages performing the relevant skill, namely rendering certain

meanings through certain forms, while thinking of the relevant knowledge links between forms and meanings" (*ibid.,* 61).

Conclusion

In this paper I have discussed two paradigms within Communicative Language Teaching (CLT), the firmly-entrenched PPP (presentation-practice-production) paradigm and a departure from it known as TBLT (task-based language teaching). I have analysed the differences between the two in terms of their theoretical background and their application in the classroom vis-à-vis teacher and learner roles. I have also offered a criticism of each. Seeing TBLT as a way forward for CLT but aware of its shortcomings, I have also discussed the work of Robert DeKeyser in cognitive psychology. It is hoped that a new look at such key areas as skill acquisition theory will improve the efficacy of this promising ELT paradigm.

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